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Abstract 
 
When Spain gave up its colony of Spanish (now Western) Sahara in 1975, it was 
annexed by Morocco and Mauritania. A sixteen-year war ensued, leaving the country 
divided between Morocco and the Polisario Front. This unresolved conflict left 
indelible scars on the landscape, mainly battlescapes, made up of numerous field 
fortifications littered with the detritus of war, and ‘the berm’ (or ‘berms’) a succession 
of fortified earth and stone walls constructed by Morocco between 1980 and 1987, 
partitioning a formerly pastoral landscape, and excluding pro-independence Saharawis 
from the western four-fifths of their country. 
 
This dissertation will explore how this desert landscape has been transformed by 
colonialism and war, and how in some ways, the Saharawi people are actively re-
appropriating their land. This will be done by looking at the landscape at three levels 
of resolution. The broadest, or national level, will chart the growth and spread of the 
berms, illustrating the material extent of Moroccan colonial control, and the exclusion 
of Saharawis within and outside the territory. The middle, or regional level, will 
explore the militarisation of one settlement – Tifariti – which was fought over during 
the war, and which hosted a unique art festival between 2007 and 2010. The third, 
finer level, will look at the land art that was created as a result of the art festival, and 
which is now a new stratum of contemporary archaeology, overlying the extensive 
prehistoric archaeology evident in the region. 
 
A great number of national barriers are at this moment being raised around the globe, 
with countries adopting siege mentalities with their neighbours. This dissertation will 
explore how archaeology can apply a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing upon a 
variety of resources, to help us understand the contemporary phenomena of conflict 
and exclusion, through the unique example of Western Sahara.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 20th century, and by extension, the 21st century, is an age in which conflict has 
forever been present. Indeed, the historian Niall Ferguson has epitomised the many 
conflicts of this era as one ‘War of the World’.1 This period has seen an 
unprecedented industrialisation of war, the breaking up of great empires, both old and 
newly born in the 20th century, and the creation of new nation states. It has also seen 
the partitioning of countries and territories, and the increasing defence of frontiers 
with extensive physical barriers explicitly designed to prevent human movement 
across space. Colonialism was supposed to have ended in the 1960s, but by the middle 
of the 1970s, extraterritoriality has prospered in its vacuum creating neo-colonial 
relationships based on newly defined geo-political entities, global economics and 
cultural hegemonies. In Africa, however, there is still one territory that is often 
described as the last colony on the continent, and that is Western Sahara, formerly the 
colony of Spanish Sahara and now known to Morocco – which presently occupies 
around eighty percent of the territory – as its ‘Southern Provinces’. For a location, and 
general map of Western Sahara, see Fig. 3.1. 
 
As maintained by Mohamed Cherkaoui, Morocco claims that its own Arab-Berber, 
‘Moorish civilization’, has its roots in the Almoravid expansion across much of the 
Maghreb (see Chapter 3), which started in the far west of the Sahara amongst the 
Berber Sanhaja tribes in the 11th century, in what is now Mauritania and Western 
Sahara. In consequence, all of Morocco’s subsequent dynasties ‘… took over this 
heritage and strengthened it. Without the Sahara, Morocco’s history would be 
incomprehensible, and without Morocco, [Western] Sahara would be no more than a 
desert’.2 
 
Such a view, however, is anachronistic today, as it was when Spain gave up its 
Saharan colony of 90 some odd years in the winter of 1975-1976. But even with the 
                                                 
1 Ferguson 2006.      
2 Cherkaoui 2007: 3.  
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Western Saharan people – the Saharawis – agitating for their own sovereignty from 
the early 1970s and before, and their desire for self-determination supported by the 
International Court of Justice in 1975,3 Morocco (with Mauritania) persisted in 
occupying the colony, literally on the heels of the departing Spanish. The violent 
occupation that occurred, caused the exodus of an estimated maximum of around 
100,000 Saharawis out of the country and into refugee camps in Algeria,4 where their 
numbers have increased to possibly more than 150,000 in the present day, and with an 
estimated 90,000 Saharawis presently living in the Moroccan occupied zone.5 This 
precipitated 16 years of war which ended with a United Nations brokered ceasefire in 
1991, between the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), founded by the 
Polisario Front (an acronym for the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-
Hamra and Río de Oro’),6 and The Kingdom of Morocco. The hostilities ended with 
the Western Saharan landscape being scarred in a way that would not have been 
imagined at the start of the conflict. Not only are there battlescapes littered with the 
detritus of war, but the country has been partitioned between a ‘free’ or ‘liberated’ 
zone controlled by the SADR/Polisario, and an ‘occupied’ zone that has, 
administratively, been incorporated into Morocco.  
 
The nationalist Saharawis (Polisario) opposing the occupation of their country by 
Morocco and Mauritania, proved to be an extremely effective fighting force. They 
forced Mauritania out of the territory in 1979, and pushed the Moroccans, more or 
less, into an enclave in the far northwest of the country. However, in 1980 the 
Moroccans went on the offensive and started to push the SADR/Polisario eastwards 
                                                 
3 Pazzanita 2006: 215-221. 
4 Numbers for refugees in 1975-1976 are only approximations. It has been estimated that the number of 
refugees fleeing Western Sahara might have risen from 9000 in late 1975 to more than 100,000 by the 
end of 1976 (San Martin 2010: 109). In comparison, the number of refugees in the camps outside 
Tindouf, Algeria, were put at around 100,000, only by early 1979 (Mercer 1979: 19). 
5 The figure of more than 150,000 Saharawi refugees was estimated by UNICEF in 2010 and published 
on their website at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/algeria_54061.html accessed 21 October 2013. 
In contrast, the UNHCR estimated the number of Saharawi refugees at 116,446 as of 2012. See their 
population statistics website at http://popstats.unhcr.org/ accessed 21 October 2013. A report produced 
for Forced Migration Online, and available at  
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:5146 (accessed 27 November 2013) 
has estimated the number of Saharawi refugees at 165,000, with a population of 90,000 Saharawis 
living in the territory as of 2004. See Smith 2004. 
6 The full name for the Polisario Front in Spanish, or the Frente Polisario, is: Frente Popular para la 
Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro. This recognises the two regions that made up Western 
Sahara as a Spanish colony – the Saguia el-Hamra in the north (the northern panhandle extending to the 
coast) and the Rio de Oro in the south. 
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and southwards from the confines of their pale. To do so, they started to build a great 
wall of sand and rocks, referred to as ‘the berm’, punctuated by forts, and with 
extensive minefields. As the Polisario were pushed further east and south, successive 
walls were constructed, one after another, excluding Polisario combatants from an 
ever enlargening territory regained by Morocco.  
 
A total of six walls (or berms) were raised from 1980 to 1987 consisting of around 
4000 kilometres of earthen banks and ditches, and naturally defensive features, with 
forts and fortlets, and minefields, excluding a very large percentage of the Sahrawi 
people from much of their own country. Occasionally, Polisario forces broke through 
the walls, but they were more or less kept in check. This barrier system has parcelled 
up the territory, cutting swathes through a formerly pastoral landscape, leaving an 
indelible inscription on the land that will remain for centuries, maybe even millennia 
in some places. The barriers are clearly visible on satellite imagery and clear for all to 
see, for instance, on Google Earth. This has marked out the very land of Western 
Sahara in a distinctly singular way, made even more salient by the fact that the berms 
are still fortified, manned, and mined. 
 
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary, though archaeologically grounded exploration 
of this contested landscape. By its very nature, this study is geographically multi-
scaled, and historically and culturally multi-layered and multi-vocal. Taking an 
anthropologically informed archaeological approach, this project is a most needed, 
and appropriate avenue for examining the materiality of this conflict. From the 
Moroccan barriers to individual battlescapes, and to the settlements that have been 
abandoned (and in some instances now being re-settled), the physical reality of this 
conflict is little known, nor understood, and this unique, material perspective on it has 
been overlooked by analysts and commentators alike. Their interests have obviously 
lain elsewhere, since benchmark works on Western Sahara covering the train of events 
from 1975-1976 to the present day7 all deal with the geo-politics and history of the 
conflict, along with the humanitarian issues of the Saharawi people’s refugee status in 
camps in Algeria.8 This research does not dismiss these important studies in any way, 
                                                 
7 Thompson and Ardloff 1980, Damis 1983, Hodges 1983, Lawless and Monahan 1987, Shelley 2004, 
Zunes and Mindy 2010, Jensen 2011, and the most recent addition, Boukhars and Jacques 2014. 
8 San Martin 2010. 
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but instead, it aims to bring to the fore, to manifest9 and make sense of some of those 
elements of the Western Sahara conflict that have been taken for granted – elements 
that are rooted in a materiality that has affected the landscape and people of Western 
Sahara to this day, and tells a story that is uniquely different from those narratives 
which are pre-occupied with the political machinations on the international stage over 
the people and country of Western Sahara. 
 
Archaeology and Modern Conflict  
 
The narrative of this research rotates around certain key concepts, themes and 
approaches to the archaeological understanding of modern conflict, and consequently, 
the war in Western Sahara. They fall under the rubrics of:  
 
• the archaeology of modern conflict as an archaeology of the present, 
• archaeologies of colonialism and imperialism (including an archaeology of 
occupation), and  
• art at an interface with archaeology.  
 
These encapsulate the conceptual drivers that inform this dissertation, and within them 
(as explained further below) they articulate the relationship between battlefield and 
conflict archaeology; they emphasise the relationship of forensics to archaeological 
enquiry; they recognise that archaeology dealing with the modern era is an 
archaeology in and of the present, and that the present day is essentially extra, or 
‘super’ modern (and this is undeniably reflected in modern war); that archaeology can, 
as in this dissertation, deal with issues of imperialism, colonialism and foreign 
occupation, and finally; that archaeology shares with artistic endeavours the aim to 
investigate and make sense of what it is to be human (though in the specific instance 
of this research) in the context of a contested landscape.  
 
This chapter will summarily examine and explain these concepts and themes, but it 
will not attempt an overview of the archaeology of conflict, as a whole, since that is 
                                                 
9 González-Ruibal 2008, and Shanks 2004: 148.  
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better served by John Carman’s recent, Archaeologies of Conflict.10 The chapter will 
then move onto the issues and core questions that have driven this research, and it will 
end with an overview of the structure and presentation of this dissertation, along with 
a summation. 
 
The Archaeology of Modern Conflict as an Archaeology of the Present 
All human activity takes place in substantive geographic space. There is a concrete 
relationship between human actions and the places in which they occur, and those 
places can be landscapes, seascapes, townscapes, buildings, and mindscapes (and even 
airscapes). They can be unique to an individual or shared by a group, and all are made 
up of material structure, meaning and human practice.11 They are the meat of human 
existence and all too often abstract versions of history and geo-politics, as in the case 
of Western Sahara, leave them out. Even though the Moroccan berms, as material 
entities, are described by a number of commentators, all of their renditions are overly 
generalised, incomplete and inconsistent. To paraphrase Miller (though writing about 
material culture in general), the berms, to many writers and commentators, have faded 
out of focus and become peripheral to their vision, yet still serving as a singular 
determinant in their studies and analyses of the Western Sahara conflict.12 As a result, 
a barrier so large as that partitioning Western Sahara cannot be fully comprehended by 
most readers of the standard works on the conflict. It has, in effect, become obscured, 
and its tangible and material presence has only been dealt with marginally. The same 
applies to battlescapes, and this inadequacy can also be found in many published 
accounts of almost all types of wars. However, John Keegan’s The Face of Battle13 
aimed to remedy this by deliberately homing in on the human, phenomenological 
experiences of war, and by so doing, has contributed to changing the complexion of 
contemporary military history. While the archaeological study of battlefields came to 
the fore, internationally, with Scott et al investigating the site of the Battle of the Little 
Bighorn in the United States,14 and as a result, becoming an exemplar for battlefield 
archaeology since the latter 1980s.15  
 
                                                 
10 Carman 2013.  
11 Cresswell 2009. 
12 Miller 2005: 5-6. 
13 Keegan 1978. For other examples, see also Leed 1979 and Holmes 1985. 
14 Scott, Fox, Connor, and Harmon 1989.  
15 Carman and Carman 2006: 5. 
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Work on the Little Bighorn battle site clearly showed the potency of combining the 
inherently forensic qualities of archaeology with historical enquiry. 
 
If it can be said that history turns pages, then archaeology turns the ground. Historical 
archaeology, as the name implies, does both. Records and documents are essential 
ingredients in historical archaeology but no more so than the knowledge gleaned from 
artefacts left behind by historical personages. Thus historical archaeologists weave the 
strands of history with clues painstakingly sifted from the earth to form a fabric unlike 
that attainable through history or archaeology alone.16 
 
In fact, Scott et al go on to characterise the unique histories that can be written by 
historical archaeology, and in their case battlefield archaeology, by drawing upon the 
often-used analogy of crime resolution. ‘In solving a crime, police rely upon two 
disparate classes of evidence. Witness testimony is important but so are clues 
provided by the physical evidence of a crime’. For historical archaeologists, therefore, 
historical documents, ‘especially firsthand accounts.., are tantamount to eyewitness 
testimony’, while ‘the archaeological record contains historical clues in the form of 
physical remains, including artefacts, and their contextual relationships’.17 Crime 
investigators will use numerous methodologies to make sense of clues and testimony, 
as do archaeologists investigating the ‘historical’ past. On the face of it this multi-
methodological approach is a hallmark of the archaeology of modern conflict, but this 
latter archaeological sub-discipline is palpably different from battlefield archaeology 
as it is usually practiced. Battlefield archaeology usually deals with a single event in 
history at a specific location. It has a strong emphasis on field methodology, be it 
terrain analysis or patterns of projectile residues, making its theoretical leanings 
highly processual.18 In contrast, the archaeology of conflict is not site or event 
specific. Its remit is broad, looking at societies in conflict – not just combatants on a 
battlefield – and examining the materiality of conflict on a broader anthropological 
canvas. 
 
In contrast to battles and wars prior to the 20th century, Carman and Carman have 
characterised modern warfare as 
                                                 
16 Scott, Fox, Connor, and Harmon 1989: 5.  
17 Scott, Fox, Connor, and Harmon 1989: 5.  
18 Carman 2013: 45-46. 
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disconcertingly extended from the surface of our globe into other realms: into the air; 
under the sea; into the most inhospitable regions of the world… and even into outer 
space. It has also gone beyond the physical into more conceptual regions: into the 
relations of government to people; into the realm of science and technology; and, 
…into the so-called ‘infosphere’ and… cyberspace. The battles of our age can be said 
to have no limits or boundaries: they frequently cannot be seen or measured, nor 
physically controlled. Unlike the warfare of previous ages, they do not occupy a 
particular location but are at once nowhere and everywhere.19 
 
Modern conflict, as Schofield points out, can be military or civilian. It can include 
small-scale ethnic disputes or larger civil conflagrations. Conflict can be ‘hot’ or cold’ 
and spread across the globe. Its complexity and size can include individual 
battlefields, the landscapes in which battles are situated and the ‘landscape of 
experience’, including not just the land, but also the sea and air, and into space.20 This 
sense of scale and multidimensionality, to Saunders for instance, means that the 
archaeology of modern conflict is, by its very nature,  
 
an anthropologically-informed multidisciplinary endeavour, concerned with the 
social, cultural, psychological, and technological as well as military complexities of 
recent conflicts, and their powerful and unpredictable legacies… This multitude of 
issues makes modern conflict sites, in effect, highly sensitised multilayered 
landscapes that require a robust, interdisciplinary approach, far beyond the ability of 
traditional, single event-oriented, battlefield archaeology to deliver.21  
 
And he goes even further to pointedly differentiate battlefield archaeology from 
modern conflict archaeology. 
 
It is that the names ‘Modern Conflict Archaeology’ and ‘Battlefield Archaeology’ are 
neither coterminous nor interchangeable. They embody quite different approaches and 
agendas, both to the empirical data, and to the presence or absence of an 
                                                 
19 Carman and Carman 2006: 31. 
20 Schofield 2005: 19-20. 
21 Saunders 2012: x. 
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acknowledged theoretical sophistication concerning the nature and meaning of objects 
and landscapes, and their relationships to people in the past and the present.22 
 
Modern, industrialised conflict is a ‘force which has shaped, and continues to shape 
the modern world’,23 and the study of its materiality through archaeology is firmly 
embedded in what has come to be known as the ‘archaeology of the contemporary 
past’. This oxymoron is generally taken to mean that the very way in which 
archaeologists undertake and structure their studies, even when applied to the 
contemporary world, makes familiar quotidian objects – that are so much at the core 
of almost all archaeological enquiries – unfamiliar and even alien, and thereby like 
objects from a more distant past. This idea of alienation and distancing ourselves from 
the materiality of the present through its archaeological study is at the core of Buchli 
and Lucas’ definition of the archaeology of the contemporary past. Though they also 
raise the notion that such an archaeology ‘constitutes the unconstituted’ in that the 
common and everyday, the taken-for-granted, is brought to the fore and given a 
presence – a voice.24 In line with this is the concept of ‘rendering the familiar 
unfamiliar’,25 but this might actually be a poor turn of phrase. Archaeologists, in fact, 
become more familiar (in the broadest of senses) with the objects of their study. They 
familiarize themselves with artefacts, buildings and landscapes in a way that is utterly 
sensual as well as intellectual. By direct physical study, they get to know every crack, 
chip or indent in an artefact. They become intimate with its form and make-up. 
Archaeologists crawl around buildings to examine the way in which they have been 
constructed, leaving almost no interstices unchecked. In terms of landscapes, they will 
walk over ground again and again to understand its features and lie of the land. By 
doing so, and to quote from Ingold, they take on a ‘dwelling perspective’.26 This 
means that they come to understand their object of study by ‘immediate experience’ 
and ‘the understandings that people derive from their lived, everyday involvement in 
the world’. In fact, by ‘dwelling’ with the object of study, it ‘becomes a part of us, just 
as we are [or become] a part of it’,27 and this undoubtedly takes place in the here and 
now of the archaeologist. This chimes with Harrison’s call for ‘a shift away from the 
                                                 
22 Saunders 2012: xiii.  
23 Saunders 2012: xiv.  
24 Buchli and Lucas, 2001.  
25 Graves-Brown 2000: 6.   
26 Ingold 2010. 
27 Ingold 2010.  
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idea of an “archaeology of the contemporary past”, towards an “archaeology of the 
present”… suggest[ing] that we think about the present as a surface – a physical strata 
that contains not only the present, but all its physical and imagined pasts combined’. 
By doing so, and by using the metaphor of the landscape that is all around us, and 
continually changing through human and natural actions, then the ‘past, present and 
future are combined and still in the process of becoming’.28 Harrison goes on to 
propose that archaeologists 
 
abandon the idea of the ‘contemporary past’ to focus instead on an archaeology of and 
in the present; to shift archaeology away from the study of the ruin, the derelict and 
the abandoned to become a discipline which is concerned with both the ‘living’ and 
the ‘dead’. Indeed, our failure to do this hitherto has led to an obsession with the 
novelty of the application of archaeology to the present itself, producing a field of 
research which has appeared at times both superficial and piecemeal in nature. …what 
we need more than anything else is a series of detailed, long term, longitudinal studies 
which demonstrate the actual contribution archaeology can make to understanding the 
present, rather than a series of justifications for it.29 
 
The archaeology of modern conflict can perhaps answer Harrison’s call with, for 
example, Saunders’ account of First World War archaeology, Killing Time (written for 
both the layman and specialist), being a case in point. As Saunders presents it, the 
archaeology of the Great War is, in effect, the excavating of memories: memories of 
an entire century that started in 1914 and continues to this day. He takes a profoundly 
holistic approach to studying the Great War, conjoining archaeology and anthropology 
through landscape and material culture study, and through embracing issues of 
memory, commemoration, national and trans-national heritage, tourism, private 
artefact collection (with its potential for looting), and the still volatile nature of former 
battlescapes due to unexploded ordnance.30  This is very much an archaeology in and 
of the present, and equally, an archaeology that will continue to imprint itself on the 
future. As a pivotal event in human history, and especially remembered by the nations 
that took part, it is an archaeology in the process of becoming – and always on the 
cusp of becoming something new for the future as long as memory does not fail it. 
                                                 
28 Harrison 2011: 153-154. 
29 Harrison 2011: 160. 
30 Saunders 2010. See also, Saunders 2002. 
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Working in the far west of Ethiopia, Gonzáles-Ruibal has shown how archaeology can 
reflect on the failure of modern ‘reason’, which has gone ‘berserk’. In Ethiopia, 
modernity has scarred the land and littered it with the refuse of intensive, modern war, 
and through the impressing of a Soviet inspired ‘utopia’ on top of a traditional African 
nation with agricultural collectivisation and forced re-location of communities. Here 
there is an archaeology of recent contestation manifested through wasted war material 
and abandoned industrial ruins – disposed amidst an ancient landscape and made more 
poignant by the memories of people who experienced the conflict, and changes, that 
occurred during the country’s 17 years of civil war that ended in 1991.31 This too is an 
archaeology in and of the present, and it, like the archaeology of all modern conflicts, 
is also an archaeology of the ‘super modern’. Here, modernity is seen as something in 
excess.32 It is extra modern, exaggerated and exacerbated, baroque even.33 And since 
1914, as Gonzáles-Ruibal points out, it has been ‘characterised by increasing means of 
devastation, both of humans and things, and as a result of this, by a proliferation of 
[new] archaeological sites (battlefields, industrial ruins, concentration camps)’. In 
fact, an archaeology of supermodernity can be unconcealing – disclosing and making 
bare ‘the traumatic nature of the recent past’ and even our own, possible implication 
in events that can still be raw. It should manifest ‘what cannot be said’, 34 and the very 
nature of archaeology is undeniably suited to such a task. 
 
Another way in which archaeology can make sense of the past within the present can 
be found in the application of forensic archaeology to modern conflict; in particular, in 
the examination of mass graves from recent wars and scenes of crimes against 
humanity. The work of Layla Renshaw, on Spanish Civil War mass grave 
exhumations, is an exemplar of forensic archaeology carried out in a social context. 
Through the examination of mass graves, Renshaw linked a traumatic past with the 
present through the materialisation of the dead and their associated objects by 
exhumation. Working closely with local communities she and her colleagues, were 
able to facilitate and explore the transformations that those communities underwent, 
through their encounters with their own dead from the Spanish Civil War, creating 
                                                 
31 Gonzáles-Ruibal 2006.  
32 Augé 1995. 
33 Gonzáles-Ruibal 2008. 
34 Gonzáles-Ruibal 2008.  
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‘new individual and collective identities in the present’.35 Such an approach and 
outcome is very much in keeping with Harrison’s view of contemporary archaeology 
being in and of the present.  
 
However, there is a further use of forensics relevant to the present, and it is one that 
has been employed by the architect Eyal Weizman in the context of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and which he articulates as ‘Forensic Architecture’. As advocated by 
Weizman and his colleagues, forensic architecture is mobilised to study sites of 
violence and human rights violations both in the field and remotely. By its very nature 
it is archaeological, even though his work has been described as a kind of ‘spatial 
cryptography’ and only ‘quasi-archaeological’.36 Nevertheless, Weisman’s specific 
use of the word ‘forensics’ truly resonates with the practice of archaeology of both the 
distant and recent pasts, and of the present. Weizman goes back to basics. He reminds 
us that ‘forensics’ is derived from the Latin forensis, and therefore has its root in the 
‘forum’. In particular, it deals with the rhetorical skill of presenting an argument to a 
legal, professional, or political assembly, or the like, and as such it is concerned with 
speech: not only human speech, but also that of things that require a ‘translator’ or 
‘interpreter’. He cites the rhetoricion’s role as that which ‘the Greeks and Romans 
called prosopopoeia – a mode of speaking on behalf of inanimate objects’. Adding 
from the orator Quintilian, that prosopopoeia gives ‘”a voice to things to which nature 
has not given a voice”’, it can also ‘”evoke the dead”’ and give ‘”voices to cities and 
states”’. To Weizman, therefore, what he calls ‘the thick surfaces of Forensic 
Architecture’ is made up of three related parts: the thing or things at issue, an 
‘interpreter’, and a forum – the place of argument and presentation.37   
 
Though talking and writing as an architect, and being concerned with the concrete 
issues of Palestine and Israel today, what Weizman says is virtually a reflection of an 
                                                 
35 Renshaw 2011: 20.  
36 ‘Forensic architecture typically refers to the practice of building-surveyors who assess building 
damage and structural integrity in legal contexts, often providing expert testimony in court. However, 
extracted from the specialized context of property and insurance disputes, the term could designate a 
general strategy for architectural research and enquiry, expanding the scope of what architecture can 
achieve in the world today… The “architecture” in forensic architecture would thus designate, not the 
product of building design, but rather an expanded field of spatial investigation, imaging and 
representation, while the word “forensic” should be understood as the very condition that enables 
architectural research to perform politically, that is, to enter a complex political or juridical calculus’ 
(Forensic Architecture Project 2011-2015).  
37 Weizman 2012: 8-9, citing Quintilain’s Institutes of Oratory, bk. 9, ch. 2.  
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archaeology of the present, and because of the context of his work, of contemporary 
conflict. Even he, after all, has referred to his work as ‘a kind of “archaeology” of 
present conditions as they could be read, or misread’, and as ‘a kind of archaeology of 
spaces’, especially with reference to the use of imagery, mapping and remote 
sensing38 – well used tools of modern archaeology. His application of ‘forensics’, like 
an archaeology of the present, and of modern conflict, does not give precedence to any 
specific type of knowledge,39 but instead, recognises that there is an entangled 
richness of data, experience and phenomena to draw upon, so as to make sense of the 
complexity of modern contestation.  
 
Archaeologies of Occupation, Colonialism and Imperialism 
One of Weizman’s pivotal concerns with the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is 
the way in which Israel has colonised Palestinian territory through the use of 
architecture, that is, through the creation of an Israeli built environment parcelling up 
the Palestinian West Bank and alienating, and disenfranchising, its Palestinian 
inhabitants. This is expressed in his book, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of 
Occupation.40 This work is an exploration of the materiality of the Israeli occupation 
of Palestinian lands. Though not described as such, it is an archaeology of modern 
conflict in and of the present, and additionally, it falls under the rubric of what Gilly 
Carr has coined as the ‘Archaeology of Occupation’.  
 
To Carr, based on her ongoing work in the Channel Islands (occupied by Nazi 
Germany from 1940 to 1945) occupation archaeology should be a distinct sub-
discipline within archaeology since it deals with human experience in a specific 
context – that of occupation in times of war, and by extension, even after hostilities 
may have ended. It examines the material culture of the occupiers and the occupied at 
all levels of resolution, from individual objects to whole landscapes. It examines, with 
an archaeological sensibility, the manifestations of the unequal power relationship that 
exists when a territory is occupied, and how the people of an occupied country react as 
either opponents, collaborators, or as bystanders – be they active, neutral or with a 
sense of impotence. Trauma from an occupation along with its memory can extend 
                                                 
38 Schapira and Hung 2012.   
39 Saunders 2012: x. 
40 Weizman 2007. 
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into the present, and arguably into the future through many generations, and those yet 
to be born, and this has a bearing on commemorations and heritage awareness.41 This 
resonates with the situation in Western Sahara where the greatest manifestation of the 
country’s occupation is the Moroccan partition with its earthen berms, and where 
specific loci are sites of memory due, for instance, to Moroccan attacks on fleeing 
refugees, or as battlescapes. The occupation of most of Western Sahara has forged the 
Saharawi identity and this is reinforced by national commemorative events, even 
including an art festival, in the Polisario controlled, liberated zone.                                  
 
Carr goes on to point out that an archaeology of occupation is relevant to any period 
and place on the globe where expansive empires have conquered and occupied 
territories. She cites Roman Britain as a case in point, along with the contemporary 
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘Such a perspective would, undoubtedly, enable 
us to study the archaeological record [of occupation] from a different perspective, or 
to watch it in its very act of creation’.42 Her latter point applies to this research since 
the Western Sahara conflict is still unresolved, and only kept in check by a United 
Nations ceasefire. Equally, Carman has pointed out that any ‘archaeology of modern 
conflict has inevitably also to engage with the ongoing nature of conflict’,43 and this is 
undeniably the case in Western Sahara. 
 
Inextricably linked to Carr’s conception of an archaeology of occupation is the 
archaeological study of imperialism and colonialism. In particular, from the period 
that Hobsbawm called the ‘Age of Empire’ (1875 to 1914),44 through to the 
withdrawal from empire by the European nations in the 1960s, and the new post 
World War II ‘empires’ made up of the United States and Soviet Russian spheres of 
influence, and now, the re-shuffling of post Cold War hegemonies. Surprisingly, in the 
post world war era, a newly ‘liberated’ Morocco, freed from France’s African Empire 
in 1956, embarked on its own imperial venture. With a vision of a ‘Greater Morocco’, 
it claimed sovereignty over much of western Algeria and Mali, and the whole of 
Mauritania and the then Spanish Sahara. But with Mauritania and Mali gaining 
independence in 1960, and with Algeria following on in 1962, Morocco could only 
                                                 
41 Carr 2009 and Carr 2010.  
42 Carr 2010: 172. 
43 Carman 2013: 78.  
44 Hobsbaum 2010: 56.  
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covet the remaining Spanish Sahara. Then in 1976, the Kingdom came to realise its 
‘imperial’ destiny, when in agreement with Spain and Mauritania, it colonised the 
northern two thirds of Western Sahara, and subsequently absorbed the southern third 
when Mauritania withdrew from the war with SADR/Polisario. With the whole of 
Western Sahara technically incorporated into the Kingdom of Morocco, it has turned 
Western Sahara into the last colony in Africa. 
 
Another African country that colonised a neighbouring territory in the modern era was 
Egypt, which expanded into the whole of what is now Sudan, and South Sudan, 
between 1820 and 1874.45 But the Egyptians also extended their influence into 
Northern Uganda, and even into western Ethiopia, with the construction of defended 
military stations from the 1860s onwards, only to be abandoned by the 1890s.46 The 
archaeological fieldwork carried out at some of these stations in the 1960s and 
resumed in the 2000s, caused Posnansky to propose, in 2006, ‘Imperial Archaeology’ 
as a ‘distinct sub-field’ within Historical African Archaeology. Such an archaeology 
would represent ‘the contact between two or more peoples, cultures, economies, 
societies and technologies’, implying ‘a power relationship, an imposed new culture, a 
violent impact rather than the gradual development of relationships between 
juxtaposed populations’, and characterised by a lack of equality and partnerships, and 
by domination and control.47 These themes and their examination through material 
culture and landscape, also characterise the ‘archaeology of the colonized’ as 
described by Given.48 
 
Given points out a number of factors that mark out the experience of those who are 
colonised. With relevance to Western Sahara, these include the specific notions of 
alienation and resistance. With the former, Saharawis were moved and resettled and 
‘alienated from their own landscape, …their daily patterns of life and their memories 
of meaningful places’,49 while with the latter – resistance – they have fought off the 
Moroccans and Mauritanians and continue to occupy around one fifth of their country. 
They have built up their own nation with its own functioning government, armed 
                                                 
45 Adams 1977: 614-625 and Lane and Johnson 2009.  
46 Posnansky 2008 and Gonzáles-Ruibal 2011. 
47 Posnansky 2006.  
48 Given 2004. 
49 Given 2004: 163. 
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forces and infrastructure, and they are re-appropriating their land in the liberated zone, 
even though they are a nation in exile in Algeria. 
 
Art at an Interface with Archaeology  
It is not an aim of this dissertation to fully explore the relationship of art to 
archaeology and archaeology to art. This is an expanding theme in contemporary 
archaeology, which is opening up new and valuable vistas in the ways in which we 
relate to, and understand the materiality of the past and the contemporary world that is 
all around us. While quoting the title of Paul Gauguin’s allegorical, Polynesian 
inspired painting entitled: Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we 
going to? – Colin Renfrew has succinctly put it that archaeologists and artists, though 
in their own distinct ways, ‘seek to investigate the “human condition” – to engage 
with and comment upon what it is to be human’.50 In so doing, they both perform, 
interpret, narrate and characterise the materiality of the things that are the objects of 
their work; and ‘inevitably artistic intervention becomes archaeology. Once these new 
places and things are created, their creation is in the past, and thus archaeological’.51 It 
is this aspect of art as archaeology that is focused on in this research, and in particular, 
art as archaeology within the context of an unresolved conflict. 
 
The types of contemporary art that has become archaeology, and are a part of this 
research (examined in Chapter 7), can broadly be categorized as war art (including 
trench art), protest art, and solidarity art. They are mainly interventions that have been 
undertaken out of doors, and as such include murals, sculptures and land art. The 
examples cited have not been carried out by people who were involved in the 
hostilities of 1975 to 1991, but instead, they were created by foreign artists in a sense 
of solidarity with the Saharawi people, and Saharawi artists memorialising the conflict 
and the plight of their nation: all during art festival activities from 2007 to 2010 in the 
liberated Zone of Western Sahara, at the small settlement of Tifariti. They have been 
carried out as an act of defiance – contributing to, and creating an archaeology of 
opposition52 – in a belief that art matters, and that it can have a tangible impact on the 
observer. This can either be in Western Sahara or in exhibitions abroad, thereby 
                                                 
50 Renfrew 2003: 10-11.  
51 Schofield 2006: 5.  
52 Cadw 2009: 16.  
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making the world aware of the plight of the Saharawi people, and fostering support for 
their cause. Many of the artworks have been created with recycled materials, or 
utilised buildings either still in use or in ruins due to Moroccan bombing. In a way, as 
April Krause would put it, they are ‘aestheticising’ a post-conflict place. The artworks 
are ‘anti-authoritarian.., site-specific, visual marks embedded within the built fabric of  
a post-conflict site’53 – Tifariti.  
 
To the artists – and as it would be put by Alfred Gell – their artworks have been 
created as ‘agents’ that can mediate social change.54 They are each, intimately 
connected with their creators as ‘components of their identities as human persons, just 
as much [for example] as their fingerprints’.55 By being created within the context of a 
humanitarian, pro-Saharawi art festival, the artists and their works are a collective, or 
family, that is self-generating with its own momentum.56 
 
They marry, so to speak, and beget offspring which bear the stamp of their 
antecedents. Artworks are manifestations of ‘culture’ as a collective phenomenon, 
they are, like people, enculturated beings.57 
 
The notion that an artwork is like a person, and as such, a social agent, and also in a 
genealogical relationship (able to ‘beget offspring’), relates to Gell’s concept of 
‘distributed personhood’. The artists are a group of people making up something akin 
to a sub-culture sharing their concerns for the Saharawi cause, and imbuing their 
artwork with their sentiments, making them extensions of themselves. Each artist and 
each artwork does not stand alone, but as parts of an aggregate.58 In material terms, 
this ‘aggregate’, especially of artworks literally on the ground, makes up a stratum of 
archaeology in and of the present, poignantly distributed amidst the ruins of colonial, 
and contemporary Tifariti. 
 
                                                 
53 Krause 2011.  
54 Gell 1998: 6-7. 
55 Gell 1998: 21. 
56 Though the art festival – ARTifariti – is no longer held in Tifariti, it has, since 2011, continued to be 
held in the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. 
57 Gell 1998: 153.  
58 Rampley 2005. 
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Issues and Questions Driving this Research 
 
Colonialism, Conflict, and Exclusion 
As the title of this dissertation indicates, there are three intertwined strands to this 
research. They are the issues of Colonialism, Conflict, and Exclusion. It is my aim to 
explore these, drawing upon the concepts and themes within the rubrics already 
described, and consequently, to be presented in terms of landscape archaeology 
(utilising the strategic tools described in Chapter 2). As explained above, the conflict 
in Western Sahara has, to date, been mainly dealt with in terms of contemporary 
history, social history, and international relations, but as with most conflicts, 
especially modern ones, there are longstanding, material manifestations on the ground, 
which is the meat of landscape archaeology. 
 
Issues of colonialism in the western Sahara go back to the latter 19th century with 
France expanding into what is now Mauritania, and with Spain occupying the Western 
Saharan coast at Villa Cisneros from 1884 onwards. And although this European 
expansion is a backdrop to this study, the main colonial issue to be dealt with is the 
colonising of Western Sahara by Morocco in the last quarter of the 20th century. In 
terms of landscape archaeology this will be initially approached through a 
characterisation of the very medium by which the Morocans have been able to occupy 
Western Sahara, and that is through a study of the Moroccan wall – the berm, or better 
– the berms. How its construction in waves, from the northwest of the territory, 
represents how the military fortunes of both Morocco and the SADR/Polisario 
changed, and how, as Morocco’s latest and continuing manifestation of its 
appropriation of the Saharawi patrimony, it has physically isolated the Saharawi 
people from most of their homeland.   
 
Alongside a characterisation of the Moroccan berms, and how they have become 
imprinted on the face of the desert, this research will explore the issue of conflict 
through a more detailed landscape study of the fought over terrain of a specific locus 
in the liberated zone. This is the settlement and immediate region of Tifariti where 
there is archaeological evidence for the Spanish administration and militarisation of 
the area in the 1960s, followed by the fortification of the area by Morocco during their 
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occupation of 1977-1979 in which they were besieged by Polisario. The topography 
around Tifariti is undulating and very rocky and it turned out to be ideal for the 
creation of defensive sangars and dugouts, lookout posts, bivouacs and artillery gun 
emplacements. The terrain was an integral part of Tifariti’s defence and it is reflected 
in the way in which Polisario forces invested the settlement. 
 
A landscape study of the berms, as noted above, is by its very nature a study in 
exclusion. In fact San Martin and Allan59 have described Western Sahara as the largest 
prison on the planet, confining Saharawis into zones within and outside the berms. But 
in the case of the Saharawis in the Free Zone, and in the camps in Algeria, this study 
will look in some way at how these people have reacted to their exclusion, with 
specific reference to the Tifariti area.  
 
Tifariti has symbolic importance to the Saharawi people. National assemblies are held 
there, it is seen as a future capital for the liberated territories, and it provides amenities 
to the Bedouin re-settling the surrounding area. It is the headquarters of the Tifariti 
military region of the SADR, and it is a base for foreign visitors to the liberated zone. 
The settlement has also been the focus of the ARTifariti arts festival, which has been 
running since 2007, but was only held in Tifariti up to 2010. Since that time, the 
festival has been held in the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. In terms of 
archaeology, foreign and Saharawi artists have created new artefacts in the landscape 
as land art, sculptures have been created out of cast off materials and the remains of 
exploded ordnance, and buildings, ruinous or otherwise, have been appropriated and 
painted as artworks. These artworks are new features inscribed on the land, just like 
the berms and the prehistoric remains that can be found in abundance, mainly east, 
west and north of Tifariti. In fact, ARTifariti has been one way of subverting the 
Saharawi people’s exclusion from their land. Through the work of Saharawi artists 
and the solidarity of foreign artists, they have imprinted the very land with their own 
meaningful markers – ‘memorialised interventions’,60 and these efforts have, and are 
seen as giving succour to the Saharawi people on what has turned out to be a slow, 
and still unfulfilled road to self-determination and international recognition. 
 
                                                 
59 San Martin and Allan 2007. 
60 Krause 2011. 
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Research Questions 
This research came about as a direct result of my involvement in the Western Sahara 
Project directed by Drs Joanne Clarke and Nick Brooks of the University of East 
Anglia. I became involved in the project in 2007 and my primary role was to survey a 
prehistoric funerary landscape along the Wadi Tifariti, around 14 kilometres north of 
Tifariti. What struck me on a daily basis, though, especially while driving to the 
survey area, was the ubiquitousness of the remains of the 1975 to 1991 war between 
the SADR/Polisario and Morocco. Positioned along numerous rocky ridges were the 
dug outs and sangars of Moroccan positions, while in the survey area in which we 
worked, there was a group of defensive dug outs including the remains of stone and 
mud brick structures in the Wadi Tifariti, and occasional instances of unexploded 
ordnance (UXOs), and scatters of shrapnel. There were also the numerous remains of 
Moroccan defensive positions in and around Tifariti itself, and amidst these, Action on 
Armed Violence (AOAV, then known as Land Mine Action – LMA) field operatives 
were surveying and clearing UXOs, working from their base in the settlement. 
Coupled with the ruined remains of the Spanish colonial presence in Tifariti itself, and 
with the advent of the ARTifariti art festival near the end of the same year, it became 
evident that Western Sahara was a unique country in which to explore the 
archaeological complexity and materiality of a late 20th century conflict, and this was 
impressed upon me more so when I saw the Moroccan berms through the virtual globe 
of Google Earth. This opened up the vista of an archaeological presence of conflict 
both on the ground, and through satellite imagery on the Internet, which could be 
explored through the multi-disciplinary approaches of the archaeology of modern 
conflict, and as an archaeology in and of the present. 
 
Google Earth was undeniably a catalyst in inspiring me to explore the conflict 
landscape of Western Sahara. And with my seeing ARTifariti interventions on the 
ground when I returned to Western Sahara in 2008, it was obvious to me that the 
archaeological study of the conflict, as a landscape phenomenon, could only add to 
our understanding of it. Thereby adding a concrete, and palpable reality to the study of 
the conflict that has been missing from all the standard works on the contemporary 
Western Sahara. To this end this research hovers around two very simple, yet 
profound, research questions. These are:  
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 How has the landscape of Western Sahara been transformed by the 1975-1991 
war, as manifested by the material remains of conflict?  
 And, how are the Saharawi people manifesting the re-appropriation of their 
land, in particular, at the settlement of Tifariti, which has a special resonance 
for them? 
 
Collage  
I describe the ‘tools’ for carrying out this research in Chapter 2, where this 
dissertation is elaborated on further as being multidisciplinary, multi-vocal and multi-
dimensional, and employing and generating a multiplicity of materials. Because of 
this multi-faceted nature, answers to the above two questions will be presented as 
woven within the overall narrative of this research. This being the case, it would 
probably be best to describe the end result of this work as something akin to a 
‘collage’. In keeping with the view that an archaeology of the present, or the 
contemporary past, ‘has a major role to play in foregrounding those aspects of 
contemporary life at the margins that are constantly being overwritten by dominant 
narratives’,61 then ‘collage’, as described by Rowe and Koetter, is an apt descriptor of 
the work of this project. 
  
Collage [is] often a method of paying attention to the left-overs of the world, of 
preserving their integrity and equipping them with dignity, of compounding matter of 
factness and cerebrality, as a convention and a breach of convention, [it] necessarily 
operates unexpectedly.62 
 
As an example, the anthropologist Hadas Yaron clearly embraced the notion of 
‘collage’ while investigating a contemporary contested landscape in Israel. She 
recognised that in the multiple materials generated by her research there were ‘gaps 
and tensions’ exposed ‘between the narrated and the inanimate, the past and the 
present, and between different narrators or voices which compose different accounts’, 
and by placing such a diversity of voices and materials next to one another, she 
created a collage. In this context, a collage is a partial and alternative reflection of the 
world. It ‘emphasises the agency of the researcher and later the writer in the formation 
                                                 
61 Harrison and Schofield 2010: 11. 
62 Rowe and Koetter 1978: 142.  
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of the text which is composed and, mirroring the researcher/author’s own choices and 
inner conflicts, is autobiographical’.63 In my view, this reflects the make up of what 
will be presented here as the end result of this research. Recognising it as a collage is 
an honest acceptance of the limitations (and serendipitousness) of archaeological 
fieldwork and data collection, and the acknowledgement of mediation on the part of 
the researcher. Nevertheless, by placing together multifaceted histories (narratives), 
perspectives and tools, along with archaeological field (and remote) data, an 
archaeological ‘collage’ will be composed, expressly rooted in the present and the 
contemporary past, and taking advantage of the distinctly forensic qualities of 
archaeology to do so. 
 
Structure of Dissertation 
 
There are seven further chapters to this dissertation. Chapter 2 develops further some 
of the themes and key concepts introduced here within the context of the strategic 
methodologies employed in this research. It explains and elaborates on ‘the right tools 
for the job’, which, after traditional bibliographic research, fall into three broad 
categories. These are: visual and geographic sources, oral testimony/history, and 
archaeological field survey. Chapter 3 moves on to describing Western Sahara: its 
topography, geography and its people. It lays the groundwork for the subsequent 
chapters by describing the Spanish colonial ‘project’ in the territory, and by going part 
of the way to characterising its materiality in the open spaces of Western Sahara. The 
chapter also outlines the events leading up to the war of 1975-1991, and the 
annexation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, and the conduct of the war. It 
ends with an overview of Morocco’s grand tactic of exclusion through the 
construction of ‘the berms’, along with a comparative review of a number of other 
barrier fortifications from the very late 19th century up to the present. 
 
The materiality of the berms is dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 presents an 
archaeology of the barriers, and by its very nature, is landscape archaeology at a 
national, or macro scale. The chapter depends heavily on Google Earth imagery and 
other internet resources (see Chapter 2), while Chapter 5 draws upon oral testimony 
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(both recorded during fieldwork, and from published and internet sources) to describe 
the phenomenology of the berms – but perhaps best described as ‘confrontations’ with 
the barriers – and also incorporating Polisario perceptions and tactics towards 
Morocco’s ‘Great Wall’. Archaeology moves from the macro scale to the meso scale 
in Chapter 6. Here, the landscape archaeology of the immediate Tifariti area is 
examined. Starting with an overview that begins in the mid-Holocene, through to the 
coming of Islam, and on still, to the invasion of the region by punitive French colonial 
forces, and the eventual transformation of Tifariti into a Spanish Foreign Legion post 
and a locus with amenities for the local Bedouin. Tifariti became militarised between 
1977 and 1979, encircled by rings of dugouts and sangars, constructed by the 
occupying Moroccan army into a large defensive ‘box’. The garrison was in a nearly 
perpetual state of siege, and the analysis of this conflict landscape is at the heart of 
Chapter 6. In all, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 aim to make sense of the transformations that 
modern industrialised war have wrought upon the landscape of Western Sahara.   
 
Chapter 7 deals very much with the archaeology of ‘the now’ in Tifariti. In relative 
terms, it can be described as landscape archaeology at a micro scale. It looks at issues 
of landscape re-appropriation and conflict memorialisation through public artworks – 
artworks created on the land in and around Tifariti during the ARTifariti festivals that 
were held in the settlement from 2007 to 2010  – though it also makes international 
comparisons. It deals with the founding of the festival and the experiential aspects of 
the mainly foreign artists, working in the Western Sahara landscape as an expression 
of solidarity towards the Saharawi struggle for self-determination. The chapter 
highlights selected artworks and their artists, and contextualises them as integral to a 
new stratum of contemporary archaeology at Tifariti. The chapter caps the 
archaeology of Tifariti described in Chapter 6. A discussion of conclusions is 
presented in Chapter 8, which aims to make sense of the collage like narrative that is 
at the heart of this dissertation. It reviews the context of the research and the central 
themes of colonialism, conflict and exclusion. The chapter ends by examining the 
archaeological consequences of this research, and it gives directions for future work. 
 
 
 
 39
Summary  
 
My aim in this research is to explore, and bring into focus, the materiality of the 
Western Sahara War of 1975-1991 and its aftermath. This aspect of the conflict has 
been barely touched upon by most commentators, analysts, and historians dealing with 
Western Sahara, yet the very works of war – in particular, the Moroccan berms – 
though monumental in nature and written about often, are barely understood. The 
same applies to battlescapes, and the ways in which the Saharawi people are trying to 
re-appropriate their national territory since the United Nations brokered ceasefire of 
1991. 
 
The conceptual springboard that drives this dissertation is based on the idea that the 
archaeological study of modern conflict is multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary, 
and this, in turn, is situated within the notion that the archaeological past and present 
can exist, and be visible, side-by-side in the landscape. They make up a palimpsest. 
That the best way to study such an archaeology, especially in the context of modern 
conflict, is to draw together the practical and forensic skills of traditional archaeology, 
and especially landscape fieldwork (be it on the ground or through remote sensing), 
with historical accounts and oral testimony (either traditionally compiled or derived 
from publications and the internet), thereby connecting the past with the here and now 
– creating an archaeology in and of the present. This is crucial, in Western Sahara, 
since the territory is still contested and the effects of the Moroccan occupation of the 
country is continuously felt by Saharawis on a daily basis, either by living in exile in 
refugee camps in Algeria, and/or living in the Polisario controlled ‘liberated’ zone, or 
living in the Moroccan occupied zone. This makes the archaeology of conflict in the 
territory an archaeology with a running narrative, and one that is continually evolving. 
As a result, the materiality of the conflict continues to ‘become’ something new for 
every generation of Saharawis. 
 
But the practical, forensic qualities that are a hallmark of good archaeological enquiry, 
consist of more than just meticulous record making. As pointed out within the concept 
of forensic architecture, they have to do with the very way in which the study of 
conflict is carried out. That is, that there is an issue, or object of study; it is to be 
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interpreted and given voice; and this takes place and is presented within the public 
sphere. That is what good archaeology does. It gives presence and voice to the 
materiality under study, with no preference to any specific type of data or knowledge. 
It is the purpose of this dissertation, and this approach is very much in keeping with 
the aims of the archaeology of modern conflict, and an archaeology in and of the 
present. 
 
The issues of colonialism (and imperialism) and occupation, by a foreign power – in 
this case Morocco – are crucial to understanding this research. The power imbalance 
that exists has been expressed materially at a national geographic scale: by the very 
partitioning of Western Sahara through the construction of the Moroccan territorial 
berms. Consisting of almost 4000 kilometres of barriers (most of which are still 
fortified), their study as a landscape phenomenon, especially through the employment 
of Google Earth, as in this research, is undoubtedly unique. As far as I am aware, no 
other similar study has been undertaken anywhere else on the globe, so I believe that it 
is the first of its kind. Through my description and analysis of the berms, I will show 
how one nation has literally appropriated and corralled another. Nevertheless, the 
resultant exclusion of the bulk of the Saharawi people from approximately eighty 
percent of their national territory has created a new, post-ceasefire relationship 
between the Saharawi people with the remainder of the country still under their 
control. In material and geographic terms this is best shown by a landscape study of 
the little known settlement of Tifariti. Here, and again, this study emphasises the 
concept of palimpsest, and archaeology as being multidimensional, and in and of the 
present. To this end I will present an archaeological study, and narrative, of the 
landscape surrounding, and including Tifariti, that will illustrate the composition of its 
palimpsest as an archaeological continuum up to the present day. This will also 
include artworks created out of doors as part of the ARTifariti festivals held in the 
settlement between from 2007 to 2010. Within the context of this study, these make 
up the top-most stratum of archaeology in the settlement. 
 
In the chapters that follow, I will present the archaeology of Western Sahara’s 
contested landscape as an archaeology in and of the present, and as Harrison would 
put it, as a real stratum that combines its physical and imagined pasts with the present, 
and is concerned with both the living and the dead. I also put this research forward as 
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a study that answers Harrison’s call, that archaeology dealing with the recent past and 
present should not be piecemeal but detailed, cover the long term, and be longitudinal 
in scope.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the strategic methodology and resources 
employed in this dissertation, and to explain the reasoning behind their choice. This 
research applies a multiplicity of methods reflecting the essence of modern conflict 
archaeology and the subject’s multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature. Saunders 
has described the archaeology of conflict, and in particular conflict landscapes as 
multi-vocal and multi-dimensional.64 This view has roots that go back to W. G. 
Hoskins,65 in the context of British landscape history, whose  
 
main thesis was that the landscape was there to be ‘read’. If one examined it closely 
one could ‘read’ or detect evidence for earlier landscapes that had subsequently been 
replaced or adapted. This approach has been likened to a palimpsest, faint traces of 
original writing visible in parchment that has been reused. Sometimes, the landscape, 
like manuscript palimpsests, can reveal multiple episodes of use and reuse. Hoskins 
stressed the importance of combining evidence produced by an archaeological 
examination of the landscape itself with a study of historical records, such as maps, 
parish registers, deeds and so forth.66 
 
Hoskins’ emphasis on the combining of different types of evidence to get a total, 
holistic picture of a landscape’s history, is a strength that is found in contemporary 
historical archaeology. It is especially so with an archaeology of the present, including 
the archaeology of modern conflict; though the different classes of evidence for the 
recent past, undoubtedly, go far beyond anything Hoskins might have considered. An 
archaeology of the recent and contemporary past can draw upon an immense and 
varied range of resources unavailable to researchers of the more distant past. Besides 
                                                 
64 Saunders 2001: 37.   
65 Hoskins 1977. 
66 Pryor 2010: 15.   
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traditional resources such as artefacts, and written and visual accounts – in all of their 
variety – we are also all personally linked to, and part and parcel of the recent past and 
present. We move with it and it moves with us in a personal and intimate way. The 
present becomes the past on a daily basis while we inexorably move into the future. 
We interact immediately with its materiality and we have access to the voices of 
others, both close to us through direct contact in some instances, and further a field, or 
around the globe, through a variety of ways and media, and of course, through the 
matrix of the World Wide Web, all contributing to an archaeology in and of the 
present. This is also the case for an archaeology of modern conflict in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries, which, by being multi-faceted, draws on the insights, resources, 
techniques and knowledge of disciplines other than archaeology. They include 
anthropology and culture studies, cultural geography, military history, art history, 
museum and heritage studies, and tourism, plus the sub-disciplines that feed into these 
fields. This diversity gives a strength to modern conflict archaeology ‘which, rather 
than privileging one or other kinds of knowledge, seeks instead to draw on each as 
appropriate in order to respond to the complex challenges of investigating conflict in 
the modern world’.67 As Schofield points out, archaeology is not a ‘thing’, it is ‘a way 
of looking at the past’.68 It is a way of looking at the little things, the mundane things, 
the familiar and overly familiar, the taken for granted, and those things that are so 
humble that we do not even see them,69 and in the words of Arundhati Roy, talking 
about her novel The God of Small Things:  
 
the God of Small Things is a book where you connect the very smallest things to the 
very biggest: whether it's the dent that a baby spider makes on the surface of water or 
the quality of the moonlight on a river or how history and politics intrude into your 
life, your house, your bedroom.70  
 
Roy’s statement is relevant to the archaeology of all periods, and her sense of 
intimacy and scale in recognising the connectedness of the ‘small things’ that make up 
human experience with the bigger things of natural phenomena, history and politics 
resonates with an archaeology of the contemporary, and of modern conflict. 
                                                 
67 Saunders 2012: x.  
68 Schofield, 2005: 28.  
69 Attfield 2000, Graves-Brown 2000, and Buchli, and Lucas 2001. 
70 Barsamian 2001. 
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Therefore, those distinct methodologies from the contemporary archaeologist’s tool 
kit that are best suited to understanding the disposition of smaller things on a greater 
landscape – that is both physical and conceptual (and even ‘virtual’) – are to be 
employed in this research, and their application is discussed below.  
 
‘The right tools for the job’ 
 
While describing the practice of archaeology, David Hurst Thomas has succinctly 
written: ‘Archaeological objects vary. So do archaeological contexts. Deciphering 
meaning from such objects in context is the business of archaeology’.71 This simple 
distillation of archaeology’s goal is ever more challenging in the context of recent and 
contemporary conflict, where 
 
militarised landscapes and the metallic artefact assemblages of recent conflict… [are] 
windows into a world of extraordinary complexity and contradictions. Tradition 
clashes with modernity. Rival ethnicities and nationalisms collide. Memory and 
remembrance are politically contested.72 
 
As pointed out by Klausmeier et al., these complex issues take archaeologists beyond 
‘simple field recording, noting presence/absence and architectural detail’. They 
require ‘more reflexive, more integrated and more thoughtful approaches’.73 It is these 
kinds of approaches that are examined below, and hopefully are, ‘the right tools for 
the job’. 
 
The tools and methodologies used in this research are quite varied. Besides the 
expected bibliographic searches of standard research, they range from traditional 
archaeological landscape survey to the analysis of satellite imagery (Google Earth), 
and from the application of geographical information systems to the Internet fostered 
phenomenon of ‘volunteered geographic information’. The Internet has been explored 
for topic specific (general and personal) websites and further user generated content, 
including historical imagery, contemporary imagery and relevant art. Oral history 
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72 Current Archaeology 2009: 40. 
73 Klausmeier, Purbrick and Schofield 2006: 5.  
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fieldwork has been carried out, and YouTube videos have been included as audio-
visual documents.  
 
The ‘materiality of conflict’ is at the heart of this research, and attempts to present and 
understand it have dictated the composition of the ‘tool kit’ utilised. After traditional 
bibliographic research, including published books, journals and newspapers, 
dissertations, technical and specialist papers, and online publications, there are three 
generalised categories of tools and resources employed in this project. They are: 
 
 Visual and geographic sources  
 Oral history/testimony 
 Archaeological field survey 
 
The order of these three categories is not hierarchical, they all fold into each other. 
They do, however, represent different distances (both real and conceptual) at which 
the Western Sahara conflict has been examined. Visual and geographic sources are the 
most distant, relying on satellite imagery (in particular, Google Earth), geographic 
information systems, and user generated Internet imagery – photographs. In contrast, 
the carrying out of oral historical research is a close contact undertaking – it requires 
person-to-person interaction. ‘Oral history’ is multi-faceted, it can refer to a spoken 
memoir or describe a historical research methodology. It provides a distinctive ‘source 
base which can be integrated into approaches to history such as social, political, 
cultural, economic, medical, legal or military history’,74 and of course, the 
archaeology of the recent past. In this project, it also includes websites and blogs, 
YouTube videos (and similar) and published interviews and personal accounts. 
Archaeological field survey is also ‘close contact’, but the interactive human element 
is minimal. It has mainly been carried out to familiarise oneself with the data derived 
from satellite imagery, though it also highlights the relationship between the 
archaeologist in the field and the landscape under study. 
 
 Fieldwork was carried out in Algeria and Western Sahara in 2011 between October 
11th and November 5th. The aim was three fold:  
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 To carry out an archaeological examination of the Moroccan field defences in 
and around Tifariti with the aim of ground truthing them in relation to Google 
Earth satellite imagery. Also, to record the Spanish Foreign Legion fort in the 
centre of Tifariti, and to record the still standing artworks produced by artists 
taking part in the annual ARTifariti festivals since 2007. 
 To interview artists taking part in the 2011 ARTifariti festival, specifically, 
while they were working in Tifariti.75 
 And to interview individual Saharawis about the war with Morocco and their 
personal experiences, and to get an intimation of their feelings about their 
country.  
 
Visual and Geographic Sources  
 
Visual sources and tools can mediate the materiality of conflict very effectively. The 
visual tools used in this research include open source geographic information systems 
and Google Earth (and free third party applications) along with user generated visual 
Internet content, both historical and contemporary. It has been an aim of this project to 
see how productive open source and Internet resources can be in pursuing research of 
this kind. 
 
Using Google Earth  
Remote sensing in archaeology, that is, the study of past materialities from a distance, 
and through non-direct human intervention, has been a part of archaeology since the 
earliest pioneers of aerial archaeology in the early 20th century.76 However, with the 
proliferation of satellites in orbit around the earth, archaeologists have been able to 
access satellite imagery that can record very great expanses of the earth’s surface in 
relatively fine detail. Satellite imagery can also provide data in non-visible light 
spectra, allowing features to be seen, and analysed, which are not visible to the naked 
eye. But in terms of satellite imagery captured within the visible light spectrum, that 
                                                 
75 It turned out, that at very short notice, the organisers of ARTifariti 2011 decided not to go to Tifariti 
due to limited finances. Instead, they stayed and worked in the refugee camps in Tindouf. Because of 
this I was not able to talk with artists while working in, and experiencing the landscape of Tifariti. As a 
result, I had to seek out other sources of information and personal recollections of artists from earlier 
ARTifariti festivals. This is explained below in the section on oral history and testimony etc. 
76 Parcak, S.H. 2009.  
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is, the kind of imagery that is captured in a simple photograph, and is visible to the 
naked eye, archaeologists now have a free tool in the ‘virtual globe’ of Google Earth, 
released onto the Internet in 2005. 
 
Google Earth satellite imagery is all around us. It is used on a daily basis in television 
news coverage, and it is used in education at all levels, at the very least, for 
visualisation and presentation.77 In fact, Google Earth has probably been used its most 
in visualisation and presentation, from, for example, presenting and displaying 
archaeological sites in the Egyptian Delta78 to the mapping and presentation of the 
Nazi Holocaust, and more recent genocides – extremely violent events in the history 
of mankind.79 It has shown to be of real use in the health and other sciences,80 and it 
has been recommended as a productive, though basic, mapping tool that can be 
employed by NGOs in humanitarian crises and natural disasters.81 
 
Though, accepting Google Earth as a mapping and visualisation tool, archaeologists 
have not held back from voicing their concerns over the perceived drawbacks of the 
application, mainly being, as Myers has summarised: issues of data ownership and 
permanence, the use of file formats specific to the application, the variable coverage 
of high resolution imagery, and the ethical issues of the potential use of Google Earth 
by antiquities hunters. He also raises the point that people recorded on Google Earth’s 
highest resolution imagery have no say in their being viewed, especially in such a 
freely available application. Additionally, he raises the spectre that it is panopticon-
like and that it has the potential to do ‘violence’ to those being viewed.82 However, 
this potentiality surely exists with all types of remotely acquired imagery. 
Nevertheless, and as Parcak clearly acknowledges, the best imagery available on 
Google Earth can qualitatively match similar aerial photography, and all of the 
application’s benefits outweigh its disadvantages.83  
 
                                                 
77 Myers, A. 2010b: 7. 
78 Spencer and Spencer 2009: 42. 
79 See the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum website at http://www.ushmm.org/ accessed 16 
April 2012. 
80 Stensgaard et al 2009. 
81 Crossley 2008 and Morris 2009.  
82 Myers 2010b: 10. 
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Stensgaard et al. reviewed the use of Google Earth within the scientific community 
between 2005 and 2008, and they discovered a positive response to the application. 
They searched peer-reviewed literature and found, in 2008 alone, seventy publications 
actually using Google Earth for scientific purposes. The disciplines included, geology, 
palaeontology, environmental management, conservation, and medicine. Though its 
most extensive use was in the environmental sciences, with its use in the health 
sciences and in public health projects increasing. The application had also been used 
retrospectively for earlier research to be disseminated to new and wider audiences.84 
 
In contrast, Myers, writing in 2010, noted that the use of Google Earth in the social 
sciences – beyond visualisation, presentation and teaching – had been relatively slow 
in coming, and he only described three archaeological research projects, carried out 
since 2008, which used the application analytically.85 These were; Thomas and 
Zipfel,86 and Thomas et al.87 in Afghanistan; Contreras and Brodie,88 examining the 
looting of archaeological sites in Jordan; and Myers’ own work investigating the 
development of Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.89 However, Contreras also 
examined the looting of archaeological sites in Peru,90 while Yves Gauthier has been 
examining and mapping prehistoric Saharan sites and monuments with Google Earth 
since at least 2006. More recently, Kennedy has used Google Earth to map prehistoric 
monuments in inaccessible areas of Saudi Arabia.91 
 
Yves Gauthier has been investigating prehistoric sites in the Sahara since, at least, 
1989.92 Since 2006, with the introduction of high-resolution imagery on Google Earth, 
he has been systematically plotting swathes of visible prehistoric remains across the 
Sahara. He has used these to augment his earlier fieldwork, to prepare and get the lie 
of the land before commencing new fieldwork, to contextualise his findings, and to try 
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87 Thomas et al 2008. 
88 Contreras and Brodie 2010. 
89 Myers 2010a. 
90 Contreras 2010. 
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to understand overall site distributional trends across large portions of the Sahara. He 
also uses Google Earth to illustrate and inform his findings.93 
 
With Gauthier writing almost exclusively in French (and by not highlighting his use of 
Google Earth in the titles of his published articles), Thomas et al. remarked that, as of 
2008, ‘hardly any archaeological research using Google Earth has been published, 
partly because most archaeologists are able to conduct fieldwork, rather than being 
solely restricted to desk-based studies’.94 This latter point was made in the context of 
his own ASAGE (Archaeological Sites of Afghanistan in Google Earth) project, 
where Thomas decided to utilise the high resolution imagery available on Google 
Earth to ‘collate new information about the archaeological remains of southern 
Afghanistan, where fieldwork opportunities… [were] limited’95 due to the ongoing 
conflict in the country since the United States led invasion of 2001. 
 
As of 2008, Thomas and his colleagues were able to identify 250 (that is, nineteen per 
cent) of the then known archaeological sites in Afghanistan in the seven per cent of 
the country (around 46,000 square kilometres) covered by high resolution Google 
Earth imagery. Of these, 217 lacked even the simplest of plans. They also focused on 
45 medieval sites of which only eight had plans. This being the case, ASAGE took a 
threefold approach to utilizing Google Earth as a research tool. First, descriptions and 
plans of known sites were checked, and where necessary, enhanced. Second, detailed 
‘sketch’ plans were generated of known, but un-mapped, sites, and third, Google 
Earth’s high-resolution imagery was interrogated so as to locate and plot unknown 
archaeological sites.  
 
Their approach was very systematic, virtually carrying out the equivalent of a land 
based survey, working over transects of north to south strips of high-resolution 
imagery, and covering a variety of environmental zones. By visually scanning the 
strips in five survey areas, Thomas was able to identify 451 potential archaeological 
sites, which were cross-checked and catalogued. Further, more detailed planning of 
                                                 
93 The following references illustrate, very well, the way in which Gauthier has made Google Earth an 
integral part of his research: Gauthier and Gauthier 2007, Gauthier and Gauthier 2008a, Gauthier and 
Gauthier 2008b, Gauthier and Gauthier 2008c, Gauthier 2009a and Gauthier 2009b. 
94 Thomas et al 2008: 22. 
95 Thomas and Zipfel 2008. 
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sites was also carried out, and at Bust, for instance, they were able to enhance and 
expand a 1978 plan with the addition of intra and extramural features including, 
houses, possible caravanserais, enclosures, mausolea and further details of the 
fortifications.  The dimensional accuracy of Google Earth was also checked by 
measuring features with known dimensions, such as tennis courts and football pitches. 
This was done on six continents, and the dimensional variation was usually within one 
to two percent of the expected measurable value.96 
 
The looting of archaeological sites is a market driven, international problem, and the 
analysis of looting through commercially acquired satellite imagery can be hampered 
by prohibitive costs. With this in mind, Contreras and Brodie decided to investigate 
whether it was ‘possible to use exclusively free [Google Earth] or low-cost imagery to 
identify and interrogate evidence of looting and site destruction’, and to enquire how 
information gathered through remote sensing could be ‘combined with other types of 
data to generate quantitative studies of archaeological site looting.’ They chose Jordan 
as a case study, since there was a substantial history of looting in the country, and 
since pedestrian survey had failed to systematically record or quantify any of it.97 
Also, a significant inventory of Jordan’s archaeology exists, and the country is well 
covered by sub-metre pixel imagery on Google Earth.98 
 
By inputting the distribution of known archaeological sites, and by visually inspecting 
the relevant Google Earth imagery, and taking into consideration references of known 
looting from archaeological surveys and publications, Contreras and Brodie were able 
to identify 25 looted sites (reduced to 22 after ground truthing). The areas of looting, 
shown by extensive pitting were then compared with the known, overall areas of the 
sites, and in the case of ancient cemeteries (of which there were eighteen), estimated 
densities of graves or tombs was factored in. Such a methodology allowed Contreras 
and Brodie to quantify the destruction through looting at the sites investigated, and in 
effect, created a base line from which past and future looting could be compared. They 
clearly showed that, free, publicly available satellite imagery could be employed in 
                                                 
96 Thomas et al 2008: 23-25 and Thomas and Zipfel 2008. 
97 Contreras and Brodie 2010: 102. 
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site analysis, and in this case, the analysis of archaeological robbing.99 However, 
Contreras has also pointed out, by carrying out a similar analysis of looting in Peru, 
also with Google Earth, that the extent of looting in cemeteries could provide a 
minimum estimate of cemetery size (since it can be presumed that looters will not dig 
where their efforts would not yield profitable results) and this could inform 
archaeological fieldwork, by providing a rudimentary index of areas of ancient 
occupation.100  
 
Writing in 2009, David Kennedy was alerted by Abdullah Al-Saeed, an amateur 
archaeologist, to the extensive presence of prehistoric remains visible on Google Earth 
in Saudi Arabia.101 He subsequently explored some of the ‘windows’ of high-
resolution imagery available on the application, and realised that a virtual survey of 
even a small part of the country could add, quite considerably, to all the land based 
surveys that had previously been carried out in the country. With the assistance of 
M.C. Bishop he decided to explore a window of high-resolution imagery east of 
Jeddah with an aim to work out issues of feature and site categorization, and the 
limitations and strengths of Google Earth for archaeological prospection and 
interpretation.102 
 
The evaluation area was a north to south strip of high resolution imagery measuring 
17 kilometres by 72.8 kilometres, with an area of approximately, 1240 square 
kilometres. With a pre-knowledge of monument types, Kennedy visually inspected the 
imagery and marked site and feature locations in Google Earth. These were looked 
over a second time by Bishop and confirmed, and/or expanded upon. Any additional 
sites were added to the dataset, and a total of 1977 sites were recorded in all.103 This is 
a very impressive number, and undoubtedly, it does not represent the full distribution, 
and quantity, of monument types present in the landscape. To Kennedy, Google Earth 
proved its worth in the identification of, and prospecting for, archaeological sites 
when dealing with large, inaccessible landscapes. 
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As Thomas et al have shown, it is more than possible to use Google Earth to survey, 
record, and analyse, archaeological sites in inaccessible and contested regions – in 
their case, the war zone of contemporary Afghanistan. While Adrian Myers has used 
Google Earth to explore the American detention complex of Camp Delta at the United 
States Naval Base of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since this too is an area of high 
inaccessibility, Myers has, in effect, strayed into the realms of ‘satellite imagery 
activism’104 and he has used Google Earth as a ‘reverse panopticon’ where ‘the taken-
for-granted neutral power of satellite imagery, aerial photography and mapping is 
deployed against the very forces that were instrumental in its original deployment’.105 
 
From the start, and like Contreras and Brodie, Myers wanted to use Google Earth 
imagery and publicly available spatial data to learn, in a systematic and 
methodological way, as much as possible about Camp Delta. He collected dated 
Google Earth imagery, using the ‘historical time slider’ utility in the application, along 
with other imagery, including media photographs of the camp as well as documentary 
sources. And like the other Google Earth based projects described above, the collected 
data was loaded into a GIS for detailed analysis and mapping. His ‘Camp Delta 
Project’ has been able to record the expansion of the prison between 2003 and 2004, 
and between 2004 and 2008 when sub-camps were constructed. Constructional 
changes have also been recorded – from temporary barrack-style buildings to multi-
level concrete structures.106 
 
The Camp Delta Project shows that ‘Google Earth has shifted the relationship between 
archaeologists and remotely sensed data in exciting, significant and sometimes 
troubling ways.’107 This free application can obviously turn the archaeology of the 
contemporary into a critical, political and humanitarian intervention, with ‘the 
potential to contradict, what is officially stated and displayed about places like Camp 
Delta in other sources.’108 Such a use of Google Earth can also be situated within the 
contemporary phenomenon of ‘neogeography’.109 According to Turner, neogeography 
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is a new type of geography and cartography that is accessible to many people who are 
using new techniques and tools outside of what is now considered traditional GIS. It 
‘is about people using and creating their own maps, on their own terms and by 
combining elements of an existing toolset. Neogeography is about sharing location 
information with friends and visitors, helping shape context, and conveying 
understanding through knowledge of place’, and much of this is realised using virtual 
globes and mapping, and geographically referencing (‘geo-tagging’) photography and 
text.110 Goodchild sees this growing trend as something akin to ‘traditional citizen 
science’, reviving the ‘role of the amateur in geographic observation’. And this 
‘volunteered geographic information (VGI)’ is, undoubtedly, part of a growing 
internet phenomenon of  ‘user generated content’.111   
 
The projects just described all indicate that Google Earth is a viable tool for remote 
imagery interpretation. Google Earth does not include the additional data that is 
included in commercially available satellite imagery. But where the imagery has high, 
sub-metre pixel resolution, it can equal in quality some traditional, vertical aerial 
photography. Besides Google Earth’s easy to use interface, there are some additional 
programmes that can be used in conjunction with the platform, and the following 
examples have had utility in this research. One is ‘Another Earth’.112 This application 
allows the user to view Google Earth in two adjacent windows, and within both, the 
historical time slider facility can be used so that imagery of different dates can be seen 
side by side. This is very useful when comparing landscape changes. The tilting, three 
dimensional facility in Google Earth can also be used in one window, while in the 
other, the vertical view can be kept, or a three dimensional view can be looked at from 
a different angle, allowing comparisons from different viewpoints to be made. There 
is another application, ‘Hey What’s That’,113 which incorporates SRTM114 digital 
elevation data with Google Maps to produce landscape panoramas and profiles, and 
highly relevant to this research, viewsheds, called ‘visibility cloaks’ in the application. 
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These can be displayed and saved in Google Earth, and/or as image files. 
Subsequently, they can be imported in one form or another into a GIS, and used in 
further analyses. 
 
By using these add-ons to Google Earth (and Google Maps), and by doing so in 
tandem with an open source GIS, a formidable suite of geographic analysis tools can 
be created at no cost. And as already emphasised, incorporating free geospatial 
software is one of the aims of this research. In fact, this project could not have been 
conceived without Google Earth, since the cost of commercial satellite imagery of 
comparable resolution would have been economically prohibitive.  
 
Online Visual Archives 
As Myers has shown with his analysis of the American detention centre at 
Guantanamo Bay, publicly available geospatial information can be harnessed to make 
meaningful enquiries about highly contested spaces. This application can be academic 
or anti-hegemonic as a form of citizen empowerment. The tools are easy to use, and 
when virtual globes are combined with other sources of online and user generated 
content, such as virtual photo archives, then very interesting enquiries can be carried 
out. The arts magazine, Cabinet, recently ran an article with the title, ‘D.I.Y. Eye in 
the Sky’, and the title says it all. Here, the author, Andrew Toland, wanted to take 
photographs from publicly available internet archives and see ‘just how far beyond the 
images’ he could go (also with the use of Google Earth and Google Maps).115 
 
First, Toland accessed Flickr, the online photo and video hosting website and searched 
for ‘Beirut skyline’. After finding one distinctive image of Beirut in Lebanon, he was 
able to access the producer’s Flickr photostream to find other similar images of the 
city. They, also, all provided him with their exposure dates and cameras used. He 
compared photos taken from different angles, and in his example, he marked out 
distinctive buildings common to two photos. He tried finding images of the same 
Beirut locations in Google Earth by searching the application’s embedded user 
generated imagery, but there were too many images to cross check. Instead, he went 
back to the original photos and found the hint of an address on a very tall building, 
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and by querying Google Maps, he was able to find its location in the city. This then 
allowed him to discern the alignments of the two photographs he was working with 
and to record their fields of view in plan, and in Google Earth, he was able to acquire 
the viewpoint from where the photos were taken. Also, by marking the position of the 
sun in one photograph, he was able to estimate its azimuth and by using the longitude 
and latitude coordinates of the viewpoint, the date the photos were taken, and by 
taking account of Beirut local time, he was able to figure out the time of day that the 
photos were taken. By comparing Google Maps with Google Earth, and by using the 
search facilities in the former, and the Google search engine, and by additionally 
searching Wikimapia when inconsistencies occurred, he was able to acquire the 
address of the building from which the photos were taken. The location was a hotel, 
which Toland was able to confirm by a simple email request.  
 
By interrogating other photographs uploaded by the same photographer, Toland was 
able to cross reference them and discern who his employer was, and by so doing he 
was able to do further internet searches which gave him more personal information. 
Toland was also able to double check the date and time that the photos were taken 
since they could be downloaded with their metadata attached. This revealed a time 
stamp that matched the time of exposure already calculated by Toland. But the 
recorded time was two hours earlier, the time in London, not Beirut. The photographer 
was British, on a business trip in the city, and he obviously did not adjust the time 
settings in his camera. 
 
This example, which could be described as a form of cyber, or digital excavation,116 
along with the archaeological examples already cited, illustrates all too clearly the 
potentialities of free Internet resources. Toland’s example clearly shows that there are 
substantial ethical issues to be addressed, but the principle still stands that the Internet 
is a viable source of geospatial and visual information that can be systematically 
interrogated.  
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Using Visual Imagery 
The Western Sahara conflict has a definite Internet presence, and since the conflict has 
continued into the twenty-first century, parties with an interest in it have been adding 
materials to the World Wide Web. Amongst these are photographic images – 
historical and contemporary – from official sources, journalist photographers, artists 
and other types of Internet users. They have been an invaluable visual resource in this 
research, and their online origins and the way in which they have been incorporated 
into this work is described herein. For example, a sizable portion of Chapter 3 is 
devoted to a narrative of the Spanish presence in Western Sahara, and in particular, to 
the creation of a Spanish colonial space and military presence. That ‘space’ had, as 
would be expected, a real material expression in the form of military outposts and 
forts – along with French colonial posts in the neighbouring French colonies – 
encircling and enclosing Western Sahara. To appreciate the materiality of these desert 
posts, and to express their concretedness, it has been appropriate to employ historical 
imagery, and because of ease and accessibility, imagery specifically sourced from the 
Internet. This approach has also been applied to the decades following the end of 
Spanish rule in the territory, where imagery is also available. 
 
It is not the intention here to give a thorough review of the use of imagery in historical 
research. Suffice it to say, historical photographic imagery appears to be rarely used in 
archaeology, even in an archaeology of the contemporary and recent past, though a 
recent exception to this is the University of Manchester archaeological project at 
Whitworth Park in Manchester. In this project, 19th and early 20th century postcards 
are seen as ‘agents’ that can provide insights into the materiality of the park in the 
past, as well as provide or hint at social meanings and identities associated with it.117 
Also, Matthew Leonard, a postgraduate student from Bristol, has studied imagery in 
the form of sketches produced by a family relative who served in France, and the 
Levant, during the First World War. These made up a secret, visual diary (soldiers 
were forbidden to keep diaries): ‘a piece of visual material culture in the form of a 
personal history of the war’, and reflecting the ‘varied physical settings in which the 
conflict occurred, and… the structure of… everyday life’ for the soldiers at the front. 
                                                 
117 Jones 2012. 
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Without text, the diary is ‘an embodiment of the notion that a picture is worth a 
thousand words’.118  
 
A very well received overview of critical visual methodologies is presented in what 
has become a standard text on the subject, by Gillian Rose,119 and in it she guides the 
reader over a series of interpretive methods applicable to imagery, including 
compositional interpretation, content analysis, semiology, psychoanalysis, discourse 
analysis, audience studies, and the social life of visual objects. However, none marries 
directly with what can be deemed as an archaeological approach, meaning an 
interpretive method that provides insights into, and primary data on, the materiality of 
human existence – our relationship with material objects of all types, visible in any 
given photographic image. This can be implicit in the methods described by Rose, 
with much of the interpretive guidance directed at understanding imagery per se and 
our relationships with images and imagery, as opposed to eliciting information on 
material culture and our relationship with materiality (though this can be a by-product 
of the methods described).  
                                                                                                     
In sum, the researcher must approach the photograph as a social artefact, to 
understand the process of interaction between the producer of the image, the subject 
of the image, and the viewer. [In] …a reflexive, critical, study of photographs that 
contextualizes [the] images...120 
 
The most analytical use of imagery within archaeology is with satellite and aerial 
photography, and the employment of the latter in modern conflict archaeology is 
admirably elaborated upon in Images of Conflict, edited by Stichelbaut et al.121 When 
an archaeologist interprets an aerial photograph (or a satellite image), he/she is not 
immediately concerned with the producer of the image, nor the initial and subsequent 
viewers of the image and their interactions with it, nor the image as artefact with its 
own history (or biography). The archaeologist is interested in primary data that can 
shed light on the palimpsest that is the land and/or townscape viewed from above. 
Stratigraphy is not so important too, instead, the past and present are both visible and 
                                                 
118 Leonard 2012: 54, 55 & 69.  
119 Rose 2001. 
120 Scherer 1992: 32. 
121 Stichelbaut et al 2009.  
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on the same surface, and this is the object of data acquisition and subsequent 
analysis.122 The same basic approach can be applied to terrestrial photographs, and at 
least one anthropologist has done so, examining historical photographs with a critical 
eye for the ‘material’. 
 
In 1981, the anthropologist Margaret Blackman published Window on the Past: the 
Photographic Ethnohistory of the Northern and Kaigani Haida,123 wherein she 
examined the changes in the material culture of the Haida Native Americans of the 
Pacific coast of Canada and southern Alaska from the last quarter of the 19th century 
into the early 20th century. By interrogating collections of historical photographs she 
was able to chart changes in settlement layouts, and architectural styles, including the 
effects of missionary activity (through acculturation) and the impact of that on 
traditional settlement patterning. She also examined the relationships of material 
culture items within and around buildings and the village-scapes that she was 
studying. This was informed by fieldwork and interviews, archival research, and 
published ethnographic and historical accounts, but central to her thesis was that 
photographs could be the medium through which an ethnohistory could be written.124 
 
Quoting Sontag, that a ‘photograph is a thin slice of space as well as time’,125 
Blackman went on to compare the ethnohistorical study of photographs to 
archaeological sampling: 
 
The photographs... can be regarded as sharing much in common with archaeological 
specimens. This similarity can be seen first of all in the fact that the photographs of 
the Haida are only a sample from the past of a population of photographs, much as 
archaeological specimens are only a sample from a past population of artefacts. The 
photographs constitute a sample because they represent neither all of the historic 
photos taken of Northern and Kaigani Haida people and villages, nor do they present 
in their entirety a total picture of Haida culture during the time period under study. 
The shortcoming of the photographic sample, its incompleteness, is the same 
shortcoming inherent in the archaeological record of a culture. Archaeologist and 
                                                 
122 For a standard text book on aerial archaeology and the interpretation of aerial photos see Wilson 
[1982] 2000.  
123 Blackman 1981. See also Blackman 1992.  
124 Blackman 1981: 2. 
125 Sontag 1973: 22 cited in Blackman 1981: 48. 
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photo ethnohistorian share some of the same methodological problems. Both are 
attempting to reconstruct the dynamics of past cultures, but these cultures must be 
deduced from study of only some of the parts.126 
 
She then highlights how her ‘archaeological’ type of ethnohistory has, as its kernel, 
material culture studies: 
 
contained within the photographs are images of artefacts, material culture which can 
be described both temporally and spatially. As with the organization of archaeological 
data along space-time co-ordinates, one can examine and order the photographic 
material to see how Haida villages and their components differ from area to area and 
how village features change through time. The content of the photographs of Haida 
culture… is primarily artifactual as opposed to behavioural. The photographs 
comprise almost exclusively images of houses and totem poles, panoramas of 
villages, and a few shots of house interiors. Because of the artifactual orientation of 
the photographs, as in the reconstruction of archaeological cultures, the behavioural 
sphere of the culture must be derived largely from analysis of the material culture.127 
 
Blackman’s use of historical photographs resonates with the approach to imagery 
applied in this research, though of course, the scale of photo enquiry is not the same. 
Visual imagery, and in particular, user generated internet imagery, is only a small part 
of this project, but as a part of the narrative presented, it adds to an understanding of 
the material reality of the Western Sahara conflict. 
 
Online Imagery and Archives – the Spanish occupation of Western Sahara 
User generated Internet content has its pitfalls. It is not checked or reviewed (except in 
limited circumstances) and in the case of geographically referenced imagery, it might 
even describe the wrong place. It is a lottery as to whether or not the material is 
useful, or of good quality. Some of the individual items recorded and posted on the 
Internet might be insignificant, and sometimes only partially of value, but the overall 
sum of such data is probably greater than the individual parts. By reflexively 
interrogating this partial data, such user generated content can only add to an 
examination of the contested and militarised landscape of Western Sahara. 
                                                 
126 Blackman 1981: 48.  
127 Blackman 1981: 49. 
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Some websites exist to memorialise people’s experiences. These can be individuals or 
groups, and they can include texts and/or group or personal blogs, group forums and 
virtual archives. There are three such websites that have been a good source of 
historical imagery relevant to this research, and they have been set up by veterans of 
the Spanish military who served in Western Sahara up to the winter of 1975-76. The 
first site is La Mili en el Sáhara,128 a website created in 2003 with the stated aim of 
wanting to stimulate and reawaken the experiences of those people who lived, worked, 
and served in (and were conscripted into) the Spanish military in Western Sahara 
during the colonial period, and to rediscover the places they lived in and the people 
they met, in that ‘wonderful land’. The website is very much a celebration of veterans’ 
times in Western Sahara, and by invoking a passage on its home page from the 
prologue in Wilfred Thesiger’s Arabian Sands, which also quotes T.E. Lawrence, it 
expresses the romantic idea that once a person experiences the desert, that person will 
always long to return to it.  
 
Lawrence wrote in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, ‘Bedouin ways were hard, even for those 
brought up in them and for strangers terrible: a death in life.’ No man can live this life 
and emerge unchanged. He will carry, however faint, the imprint of the desert, the 
brand which marks the nomad: and he will have within him the yearning to return, 
weak or insistent according to his nature.129  
 
This website includes articles, book lists, audio and video recordings, a forum for 
members, and photo albums. The albums130 allow individuals to post their own 
photographs of their times in Western Sahara up to 1976, and of their more recent 
trips, exploring the sites at which they served while in the Spanish military. It is 
common, also, for veterans to post scanned images of their military documentation 
and citations. Most of the photographs are snapshots, usually showing individuals in 
specific locations, and/or with friends, including Sahawari military comrades and 
civilians. The photographs are often posed, and their aim seems to have been to record 
young men having a ‘good time’ in the company of other, like-minded young men. 
                                                 
128 La Mili en el Sáhara (2003-2013). 
129 Thesiger [1959] 1994: 17.  
130 The majority of the photographs have attributions to their producers (or submitters), but there are 
also early photographs with no attributions.  
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However, there are also photographs of soldiers carrying out daily chores, in training, 
and on manoeuvres. There are photographs of troops on parade, troops with military 
equipment, and images of the main Spanish settlements, including townscapes and 
historic buildings, street scenes and aerial shots. Some of the soldiers photographed 
scenic vistas, while others just recorded their places of work and the posts they were 
stationed at. The site is very active, and it is being continually updated with new 
material.  
 
Another website memorialising the experiences of Spanish veterans in Western Sahara 
is Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara.131 This site is 
specifically for veterans of Spain’s camel corps: the Tropas Nómadas. Although its 
overall aims appear to be the same as those of La Mili en el Sáhara, there is something 
which could be described as more officious about the website. It seems to be very 
much a veteran’s association in that, for instance, its members appear to be associated 
with the mainstream veterans culture in Spain, and members of the ‘fraternity’ take 
part in public military parades on national holidays in Spain. Such activities can be 
found on the website’s home page. The site includes articles about member’s 
experiences in Western Sahara, the history of the Tropas Nómadas (including the 
Regulares132), and Spain’s military presence in the colony. There is a member’s 
forum, a downloadable magazine, and photo albums.133 The albums are different from 
those in La Mili en el Sáhara, since they do not include many images of common 
soldiers living their daily lives in the colony. The emphasis is on more historical and 
topographic imagery. However, there are also photo collections dealing with the flags 
of units, unit formations, individual forts and posts, some military hardware, maps, 
flora and fauna, local people, colonial stamps, and even sites of water wells. In all, 
there are fewer photographs than are available at La Mili en el Sáhara, and they have 
not been updated since 2010.  
 
                                                 
131 Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara (2011).  
132 The Regulares were an elite unit of the Spanish Army in northern Morocco, made up of indigenous 
Moroccan soldiers commanded by Spanish officers (Alvarez 2001: 219-220).  
133 Although there is meta data attached to each photograph, the creators or posters are not usually 
noted.  
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The third website with historical imagery relevant to this research is Tercio ‘D. Juan 
de Austria’ 3° de La Legion.134 This site is primarily aimed at memorialising the 3rd 
Regiment of the Spanish Foreign Legion. The site is very martial indeed, and on its 
home page, there is a cameo of the founder of the Legion, Milan Astray: an ultra 
conservative and controversial character within his own lifetime. The site definitely 
aims at commemorating the Legion, and besides including items on the history and 
campaigns of the unit (including its deployments today), it posts the ‘Creed of the 
Legion’, and its martial songs, including the official hymn of the Tercio (the Legion), 
and the song, ‘The Betrothed of Death’.135 Nonetheless, the website photo galleries 
are very pertinent to this research.136 They emphasise the history of the Legion from 
its foundation during the Riff War and into the Spanish Civil War, then up to the 
present day, including its disposition in Western Sahara. As with photo albums on the 
Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara website, most of the images 
show units and men in action, posts and bases, and scenes of men in battle. There are 
very few snapshots of individual soldiers with their comrades. There is a forum on the 
site, but it is little used, though there is much activity with articles about the 
contemporary Spanish military scene. 
 
Online Imagery – from the Spanish occupation to the present day 
Besides websites set up by veterans of Spain’s military presence in Western Sahara, 
there are other types of websites that aim to document the story of Western Sahara. 
One in particular is www.lasonet.com/sahara/, a website entitled on its home page as 
(when translated from Spanish) ‘Let’s help the Saharawi People!’. The site includes 
very basic facts about Western Sahara; a video about the Western Sahara conflict; 
photographs of stamps, both Spanish colonial and of the Saharawi Republic; Spanish 
military and non military badges, stickers, and posters; some Saharawi poetry; a link 
to Western Sahara in Google Maps; a listing of the countries that recognise the 
Saharawi Republic; and even photographs of some Spanish period car number plates. 
Most importantly, however, the site includes 300 web pages of historical and 
                                                 
134 Available at http://www.amigosdeltercertercio.com/ accessed 12 September 2012. 
135 For the texts and lyrics of these see Álvarez 2001: 237-244. 
136 Many of the photographs have captions, but the names of the image originators are apparently never 
noted. 
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contemporary photographs137 including images of the Spanish colonial period (some 
of which are duplicated on the websites already noted), the areas occupied by 
Morocco and Mauritania, the Polisario controlled ‘free zone’, and the refugee camps 
in Tindouf (including the Saharawi diaspora). The site also includes some low level 
aerial photography of the Moroccan berms and its forts.   
 
The mix of historical image types on www.lasonet.com/sahara/ is very much the same 
as on La Mili en el Sáhara, and there is a celebratory air about the photography. But 
the site also includes scenes of Saharawi protests at the time of the handover of the 
colony to Morocco and Mauritania, and images of anti-Moroccan protests today. Also 
photographs of Saharawis physically abused and tortured when in detention by 
Morocco, which can be disturbing. 
 
Another source of imagery that bridges the Spanish colonial period in Western Sahara 
with the contemporary is Panoramio, linked with Google Earth. As the Panoramio 
website says, it 
  
is a community-powered site for exploring places through photography… Panoramio 
is different from other photo sharing sites because the photos illustrate places. As you 
browse Panoramio, notice that there aren't many photos of friends and family posing 
in front of places, or photos of interesting surfaces – Panoramio's all about seeing the 
world.138 
 
As a website with user generated visual content, people can upload their own 
photographs, both recent and old, and they can also upload historical photographs. In 
Western Sahara, for instance, the Google Earth Panoramio layer includes historical 
photographs of the main towns, and photos taken by people visiting the country now 
and in the recent past. However, most of the historical imagery appears to have been 
culled from other websites, such as the ones already described. Nevertheless, 
Panoramio provides the added dimension of contemporary photography, and in the 
deeper desert of Western Sahara it even provides relatively recent terrestrial imagery 
                                                 
137 Available at http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/fotos.htm accessed 2 October 2013. Many of the 
photographs have their producers and/or submitters noted, and there are captions in many instances. 
138 See http://www.panoramio.com/help accessed 2 April 2014. 
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of the Moroccan berms. This can only contribute to an understanding of the 
physicality of place within colonial and contemporary Western Sahara. 
 
There are other online sources of imagery that are drawn upon in this research, mainly 
reflecting the contemporary materiality of Western Sahara, and as expressions of 
different people’s experiences with the country. There are also sites with virtual 
archives dealing with other conflicts, in particular, the Vietnam War, which are drawn 
upon for relevant comparative material. But all of these will be noted as and when 
they are referred to in the text.  
 
 
Oral History: oral testimony and interviews, blogs and videos 
 
Oral history, or personal testimony, has much to contribute in this research. Oral 
history is a ‘people’s history’ giving voice to those individuals, actors or participants, 
whose lives have been intimate with, or have been affected by historical events (from 
the mundane to the momentous), and whose life stories are usually not to be found in 
traditional historical documentation.  Where oral histories are introduced in this 
research they tend to the autobiographical, allowing the interviewees to put their own 
experiences and interpretations of the Western Sahara conflict onto the historical 
record. But the concept of a people’s history in this project, in effect a social history 
from the perspective of non-hegemonic individuals or small groups also includes web 
logs (blogs), personal websites and internet user generated videos. Blogs and user 
generated videos can be as intimate as diaries, published or otherwise, (or as verbal 
accounts given in an interview) and they are the voices of people who would remain 
hidden if accounts of Western Sahara only depended on published sources. When 
married with visual records and archaeological enquiry, a rich, multi-dimensional 
narrative can be created.  
 
Oral history is also ‘”recovery history”, recovering the voices of those who have been 
hidden, such as the working classes or women’.139 It can ‘constitute the unconsituted’: 
an aim of contemporary archaeology,140 and as such, it can illuminate the ‘lifeworld – 
                                                 
139 Peniston-Bird 2009: 106. 
140 Buchli and Lucas 2001. 
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the taken-for-granted pattern and context of everyday living through which the person 
conducts his or her day-to-day life’.141 Such histories are undoubtedly subjective, but 
 
the unique and precious element which oral sources force upon the 
historian and which no other sources possess in equal measure is the 
speaker’s subjectivity. If the approach to research is broad and articulated 
enough, a cross section of the subjectivity of a group or class may emerge. 
Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, 
what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.142 
 
This resonates with the anthropological approach of contemporary conflict 
archaeology where there are multi-vocal, parallel narratives. The military historian 
Richard Holmes had this impressed upon him when he was with the Princess of 
Wales’s Royal Regiment in Iraq in 2004. About the book that he eventually published, 
he had this to say when writing about his experiences in the field with the regiment: 
 
This book taught me more than I thought I needed to know about the writing of 
military history. Most participants saw action through blinkers, often with little idea 
of what was happening even a short distance away, and when they recalled events 
they sometimes reassembled them in the wrong order, like an editor haphazardly 
reassembling film from the cutting-room floor… Even though I could telephone or 
email to check or question accounts, it was occasionally difficult to reconcile four 
versions of what happened at the same place and at the same time. If it was hard for 
an hour-long battle at the road junction known as Yellow 3 in Al Amarah, then it must 
have been correspondingly more difficult for the retreat from Moscow or the Battle of 
the Somme. 143 
 
Holmes was totally dependent on what people wanted to tell him since (as he noted) 
the Battalion’s war diary would not be accessible for thirty years. He relied on 
accounts from all ranks, gathering his information from conversations and written 
accounts composed for him at the time, all of variable quality. In contrast, not all 
historians have embraced the breadth of scope possible through oral histories (and by 
extension today, audiovisual material and sources available on the internet). For 
                                                 
141 Seamon 1984: 130.  
142 Portelli  1998: 67. 
143 Holmes 2007: xxv-xxvi 
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instance, the military historian Barbara Tuchman, wrote in the 1970s (and republished 
in the 1980s) that the audio recording of oral histories was encouraging ‘an artificial 
survival of trivia of appalling proportions’ and that historians were ‘drowning’ 
themselves in ‘unneeded information’.144 In terms of material culture, however, the 
trivial is very much the stuff of archaeology, without which the subject would not 
even exist.145 And in contrast to Tuchman’s view, the historian Richard Baxell – and 
with a real pertinence to key aspects of this research – has written:   
 
It is undoubtedly true that oral testimonies often fall short of providing pinpoint 
locations, reliable chronologies, or dispassionate and objective analysis, but this is not 
their strength. To really gain an understanding of a soldier’s day-to-day experiences in 
war requires looking at the world through his (or her) eyes. As Helen Graham, one of 
the foremost British Historians of modern Spain, has argued: ‘Telling big stories 
through individual human lives is a powerful way of doing history’.146  
 
Collecting Oral Testimony 
It is not the intention to treat oral history as something separate from the other 
resources employed in this research, but to weave it into the overall narrative, mixed 
with all the other resources and methods employed. The multi-disciplinary character 
of modern conflict archaeology lends itself to a multiple method approach. Oral 
historical and personal accounts (in whatever medium) are as valid as any other data 
source: they are all pieces of the puzzle. They are in effect part of a triangulation net 
that lends focus to the research.147  
 
Thirteen people were formally interviewed in Algeria and Western Sahara, or asked to 
give statements, between 13 October and 2 November 2011. These were all audio 
recorded, but additional conversations were had with some of the interviewees, and 
notes on these informal discussions, where appropriate, were recorded in a fieldwork 
day-book.  Five of the 13 interviews were conducted in English, one was conducted in 
Spanish with an interpreter, while seven were conducted in Arabic, also through an 
interpreter.  
                                                 
144 Tuchman 1984: 76, cited in Sharpless 2008: 20.   
145 Because of this, Olsen et al 2012 gives archaeology the moniker of ‘the discipline of things’.  
146 Baxell 2012: 10, and citing Helen Graham quoted in Faber and Fernández 2010. 
147 On the use and juxtaposition of multiple research methods, see Brewer and Hunter 2006.  
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Two of the interviewees essentially gave statements reflecting the ‘official’ Polisario 
narrative of the war. These were by senior SADR Army officers. One dealt with the 
course of the war in general, and tactics,148 while the second was specifically about the 
hostilities around Tifariti.149 Three interviews were of personal experiences of the 
conflict, and the present situation in Western Sahara, but expressed with a historical 
dimension. One of these was with a poet and activist who was a Polisario soldier in 
Tifariti in the 1980s,150 the second was with the Mayor of Tifariti,151 while the third 
was with a very high profile Saharawi journalist and activist.152 Six further interviews 
were undertaken with Saharawi individuals, two of which were journalists and 
activists,153 another well-known Saharawi poet,154 an elderly veteran from the early 
days of the conflict,155 and two Bedouin women presently living in the Tifariti area.156 
All of these people, save for the SADR Army officers were essentially asked to 
recount their ‘personal stories’ about their lives in Western Sahara since the start of 
the conflict (with very little cross questioning). Additionally, two artists from 
ARTifariti were interviewed in the Tindouf refugee camps. One was the founder of 
the art festival who explained his motivations and aspirations for it,157 while the 
second was a long-standing participant in the yearly gathering, who elaborated upon 
his participation in ARTifariti and his personal feelings for the Saharawi people and 
their land.158  
 
Web Logs: Blogs 
It was my intention to collect oral testimony from ARTifariti artists while they were in 
Tifariti, interacting with the landscape and creating artworks out of doors. 
Unfortunately, and at short notice, the 2011 festival confined itself to the refugee 
camps in Tindouf due to financial restrictions. It was, therefore, incumbent on me to 
                                                 
148 Breica, Interviews 13 October and 2 November. 
149 Fadel, Interview. 
150 Awah, Interview. 
151 Deya, Interview. 
152 Larkhal, Interview. 
153 Touballi, Interview and Bachir, Interview. 
154 Salama J’Dud, Interview. 
155 Billali, Interview. In the end, however, this interview has not been referenced. 
156 Najem, Interview and Salma, Interview. 
157 Peraita, Interview. 
158 Guzman, Interview. This interview, however, has not been referenced, and instead, Guzmán n.d. has 
been referred to. 
 68
find other sources of information, and personal recollections, by and about the artists 
who took part in previous ARTifariti festivals. Besides accounts from the ARTifariti 
website and blog, and included in the festival’s annual catalogues, some artists had 
personal websites about their interests and work, some were featured on websites 
dealing with the arts, while some had their own internet blogs. Some videos were also 
produced about ARTifariti by the festival organisers, and some of the participating 
artists produced their own videos about their involvement, and their artworks 
produced in Tifariti prior to 2011.  
 
All of these Internet resources have been employed in this research, where 
appropriate, and blogs, personal websites, and artist produced videos are viewed as 
personal testimony. According to www.blogger.com a site for creating web logs, a 
blog is ‘a personal diary. A daily pulpit. A collaborative space. A political soapbox. A 
breaking-news outlet. A collection of links. Your own private thoughts. Memos to the 
world’.159 
 
The initial blog for acquiring insights into the artists taking part in ARTifariti – and 
the event itself – is the ARTifariti blogspot.160 There is also an ARTifariti website (re-
launched in 2012).161 The blog has up-to-date information about all of the ARTifariti 
events around the globe, as well as in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps. 
There are links to other online media and websites, and the annual ARTifariti 
catalogues describing each year’s festivals can be easily accessed. There are also links 
to Flickr162 for a full collection of photographs chronicling the ARTifariti festivals and 
other events, and there are links to YouTube videos: mainly produced by ARTifariti. 
 
Federico Guzman is an important blogger for the ARTifariti phenomenon. He is an 
artist who has been involved with the festival since 2008 and he has two blogs, one in 
English and one in Spanish.163 They chronicle his thoughts on, and experiences of, 
Western Sahara, and his and other ARTifariti artist’s artwork is displayed. The 
Saharawi artist Mohamed Moulud Yeslam has a blog called Arte Por La Paz (Art for 
                                                 
159 See www.blogger.com/tour_start.g accessed 18 December 2012. 
160 ARTifariti n.d. 
161 ARTifariti 2014. 
162 See http://www.flickr.com accessed 2 April 2014. 
163 Guzmán n.d. The Spanish language version is available at http://salammalekum.blogspot.co.uk  
accessed 18 December 2012. 
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Peace).164 It chronicles his activities as an artist and it includes the artwork he created 
for ARTifariti 2010. This website was only started in October 2012, but it is 
distinctive in that it provides a Saharawi artistic voice alongside the blogs and videos 
presented by artists from outside Western Sahara. Another Spanish artist with a blog 
which, includes his write up on his contribution to ARTifariti in 2008, is Guillermo 
Roiz de la Parra.165 Additionally, there are the web presences of other artists who have 
taken part in ARTifariti, but these will be referred to as and when it is appropriate.  
 
Videos: YouTube 
YouTube is a free Internet video facility that allows anyone to upload videos onto the 
Internet. These are mainly user generated and they can cover almost all aspects of 
people’s lives. They can be personal diaries, video-logs, political comments (and 
polemics), educational and instructional materials, artistic creations, commercial 
videos, and people just presenting themselves as highly serious or downright silly. 
YouTube can also be a record of, and witness to, current events, with individuals (as 
well as established news producers) uploading live action events from their computers 
and mobile devices. 
 
‘Worldwide YouTube is becoming a major platform for viewing news. In 2011 and 
early 2012, the most searched term of the month on YouTube was a news related 
event five out of 15 months, according to the company’s internal data’.166 Over the 
same time period the most viewed videos on YouTube were natural disasters and 
political upheavals, with more than a third of all news items being citizen generated. 
In the United States, for instance, just under a third of all adults visit YouTube on a 
daily basis.167 This being the case, it is not unusual for ARTifariti to produce and 
upload videos onto YouTube, or Vimeo (a similar facility), and for videos to be 
produced by, and about, some of the festival’s artists. Also, videos describing aspects 
of the Western Sahara conflict have been uploaded onto the Internet, apparently by 
activists representing Saharawi interests, while there are also videos that are 
undeniably pro-Moroccan. All of these types of videos are considered legitimate 
sources of information about the Western Sahara conflict. Of course, the caveats that 
                                                 
164 Yeslem 2012. 
165 Roiz de la Parra 2008. 
166 Pew Research Center 2012: 3. 
167 Pew Research Center 2012: 6.  
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have already been noted about user generated Internet content applies to them, but in 
particular, those that represent the testimony of individual people are viewed as oral 
history, and they are treated as such in this research. 
 
 
Archaeological Field Survey 
 
Essential archaeological field recording was carried out in 2011 over a three and a half 
week period – as an adjunct to satellite (Google Earth) imagery analysis – within and 
around the settlement of Tifariti. The aim of this type of survey was to ground truth 
Google Earth’s satellite photography, so that features visible on the imagery could be 
more confidently identified. Generalised descriptions and dimensions for some types 
of features were compiled, and a number of different types of features were 
photographed. Four days were specifically spent investigating military features on the 
ground, while a further four days were similarly spent recording the still standing 
artworks created during the ARTifariti festivals from 2007 to 2010. Of the latter, 19 
artworks were recorded, and besides a selection described in Chapter 7, they are listed 
in Appendix 3. Additionally, a hand measured, and photographic, survey of the old 
Spanish Legion fort was carried out, see Chapter 6.  
 
Summary 
 
As already stated, the main tool for the recording and interpretation of the archaeology 
of the Moroccan berms has been Google Earth (see Chapters 4 and 6). However, using 
remote sensing to study landscape phenomena is not simply a methodology for 
recording archaeological remains, it also creates an archaeology. It, and the other 
resources employed in this project, actually bring into being, an archaeology of the 
recent conflict in Western Sahara. As with Blackman’s photos of the Northern and 
Kaigani Haida, that which is under examination is partial – only fragments of a past 
reality, and in the context of this research, that being studied is mediated by a remote 
technology (digital satellite imagery capture) which transforms an earth bound, 
concrete reality into a pixellated representation on a computer screen. While living 
and working in the present, it is the archaeologist’s senses and fore-knowledge that 
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also mediates the material under study, and this is translated into archaeological 
records and interpretations – all a creative act – recomposing and reconstituting that 
which was once whole, but seen ‘through a glass darkly’, and never being able to 
know the true degree of authenticity, if any at all, of the new confection. To mitigate 
this, this project embraces the interdisciplinary and multidimensional essence of 
modern conflict archaeology, employing the multiple methods and resources 
elaborated on above. Such a research approach was written about in 1953 by the 
French historian Marc Bloch, who had this to say about multidimensional research: 
 
The variety of historical evidence is nearly infinite… Everything that man says or 
writes, everything that he makes, everything he touches can and ought to teach us 
about him. It would be sheer fantasy to imagine that for each historical problem there 
is a unique type of document with a specific sort of use. On the contrary, the deeper 
the research, the more light of the evidence must converge from sources of many 
different kinds. What religious historian would be satisfied by examining a few 
theological tracts or hymnals? He knows full well that the painting and sculpture of 
sanctuary walls and the arrangement and furnishing of tombs have at least as much to 
tell him about dead beliefs and feelings as a thousand contemporary manuscripts.168 
 
This catholic approach to research can only be enriched by the craft of archaeology,169 
especially when combined with the naturally heuristic approaches of the discipline. It 
is perhaps appropriate, therefore, to end this chapter with another quote, this time from 
Andrew Flemming who, while writing about the craft of landscape archaeology, has 
pointed out that it relies on ‘a range of measures of confidence around truth claims, 
from effective certainties to probabilities and possibilities, and then conjectures and 
speculations’. He emphasises that it is the strength of argument that makes an 
archaeological account plausible. 
 
These arguments are exposed to the scepticism of colleagues who need no instruction 
about the cussedness of archaeological data or the sketchiness and fragility of 
representations of the past. They are also assessed against a variety of questions, such 
as: ‘what other explanations or interpretations might there be?’… ‘could this apparent 
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pattern or relationship have come about by chance?’ or ‘how thin does the evidence 
have to be before I abandon this proposition?’170  
 
In consideration of this, it is hoped that the strategic approaches and resources laid out 
in this chapter, and employed herein, will be shown to successfully foreground the 
materiality of conflict and contestation in Western Sahara. By presenting what I 
believe to be a qualitatively genuine account of historical events and archaeology, I 
hope equally, that the possible scepticism of colleagues and others, would not call for 
my presented narrative, and propositions, to be ‘abandoned’.  
 
                                                 
170 Fleming 2006: 272-273. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SHAPING A COLONIAL SPACE 
 
Part 1 
The Land, its People, Colonialism and Conflict 
 
 
Geography 
 
While situated on the Atlantic coast, at the western limit of the Sahara, Western 
Sahara’s neighbours are Morocco to the north, Algeria to the east, and Mauritania to 
the south and east (see Fig. 3.1). The territory’s width, east to west, varies from 
around 450 kilometres in the north, down to its narrowest width in the south, at around 
325 kilometres. The length of the territory from north to south is around 700 
kilometres, and it has an area of roughly 266,000 square kilometres.171 Its coast is 
1062 kilometres long,172 and in many places it is characterised by steep cliffs, which 
make access from the sea difficult. The country has only two natural harbours, 
Dakhla, formerly Villa Cisneros at the inlet of Rio D’Oro, and La Guera at Cape 
Blanc. There is only one wadi which can be described as a seasonal watercourse – the 
Saguia al-Hamrah. This is a long distance, east to west wadi in the north of the 
country that can pool with water at El-Ayoun, where its path to the Atlantic is blocked 
by sand dunes. The wadi extends for some 650 kilometres from the uplands of the 
Zemmour massif. This rocky highland is characterised by numerous wadis, which 
dissect it, feeding the Saguia Al Hamra. 
 
Most of the Zemmour massif is in the northern, Western Sahara panhandle, though 
part of it extends southwestwards to Guelta Zemmour. The terrain, away from the 
massif, to the south and east and into Mauritania is mainly flat, being relatively high-
level stony desert known as hamada. Along the lower ground of the coastal literal, 
there are distinct areas of sand dunes broken up by areas of dissected rocky ground, 
from which areas of flat stony ground rise upwards to the east, known as reg. The 
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dunes run more or less parallel with the coast and extend inland by around 15 to 30 
kilometres. Further inland, Western Sahara is relatively free of large sand dune areas, 
with its southern and eastern borders virtually outlining the expansive sand dune areas 
of Mauritania. Only in the far southeast does Mauritania’s Azeffal sand dune belt 
cross through the territory. The southern half of the country includes salient igneous 
ridges, inselbergs, and large plug-like outcrops called guelbs, which stand out like 
beacons in the Tiris plateau. As might be expected, there are numerous low level 
saltpans, known as sabkha, though the most notable in the region is in Mauritania at 
Idjil.  
 
There are no real oases in the territory, but rainfall is relatively high inland. It is higher 
than in other Saharan regions at the same latitude, and in the period 1926-1950 mean 
annual rainfall was estimated at 30-40 mm in the Tifariti area and at more than 50 mm 
elsewhere nearby.173 This produces good areas of pasture with savannah-like 
vegetation, especially after the occasional autumn and winter rains. 
 
Children of the Clouds 
 
Western Sahara is rich in archaeological remains, especially prehistoric rock art sites 
and extensive funerary landscapes which include a variety of built stone structures and 
burial monuments. Nevertheless, archaeological fieldwork in the territory has been 
sporadic, and not surprisingly, there were no field investigations during the years of 
conflict from 1975 to 1991. Most of the fieldwork undertaken, to date, has been 
carried out by archaeologists from Spain, with Basque and Catalan teams carrying out 
a good deal of it since 1991.174 However, the University of East Anglia’s Western 
Sahara Project (WSP) has been operating in the territory since 2002, though their 
latest field season was in 2009. The following, very brief synopsis of the prehistoric 
archaeology of Western Sahara is derived from the findings of the WSP in an area 
around 14 kilometres north of Tifariti (the TF1 study area, centred on the Wadi 
Tifariti) where the project carried out intensive fieldwork in 2005, 2007 and 2008.175 
 
                                                 
173 Dubief 1953: 920-921, cited in Brooks et al 2009: 920. 
174 Fieldwork commenced in 1995, four years after the ceasefire, with the Catalan, University of 
Girona, followed by the Universities of Granada, and the Basque Country. See Soler Subils 2007. 
175 Brooks et al 2006, Brooks et al 2009, and Clarke and Brooks in press. 
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The TF1 study area includes evidence for human occupation in the Early Holocene 
and the early Middle Holocene, indicated by sites with chipped (knapped) stone 
assemblages and pottery, and ranging in date from around 9000 years before present 
(bp) to 5000 bp. The last Saharan humid phase ended around 4500 bp, and with the 
shift towards the aridity that characterises the Sahara today, starting by or around 5200 
bp (the Middle Holocene), occupation in the TF1 study area started to shift from 
hunter gatherers to cattle pastoralists represented by the introduction of stone funerary, 
and ‘ritual’ architecture. The WSP excavated two burial mounds (stone tumuli or 
cairns) indicative of this phase of occupation, and surprisingly for the excavators, their 
C14 dates indicated a date range spanning the 5th to 8th centuries A.D.176 Such late 
dates suggest that the funerary and ritual landscape of which these features were a part 
might have been occupied by pastoral people for at least 4000 years, and that the 
landscape in which they were embedded, was the same as that encountered by the 
early evangelists who brought Islam to the far northwest of the Sahara in the 8th 
century.  
 
The 7th century Arab invaders of the Maghreb did not penetrate the Sahara, instead, 
Islam was spread by Berber converts through their efforts to sustain trade with the 
Sudan.177 Hugh Kennedy has described the Maghreb, for the Arab invaders of the 7th 
to 8th centuries, as a kind of ‘wild west’. The Muslim Arab expansionists did not 
consolidate their Moroccan and Algerian conquests well. In no way was the 
indigenous Berber population supplanted by the invaders, and apparently, their 
conversion to Islam was only nominal.178 
 
The Berbers are the pre-Arab peoples of North Africa and much of the Sahara. The 
term ‘Berber’ comes from the Greek barabaroi, Latinised to barbari, and denoting 
non-Greek and Latin speakers, and non-Phoenicians in Cathaginian North Africa. 
Berbers call themselves ‘Imazighen’ which means ‘free men and women’.179 The 
origin of the Berbers is not precisely known, and ‘today, many scholars believe that 
the peopling of North Africa was infused with migrations from the east and south and 
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across the straits from Western Europe’.180 Starting with the Roman occupation of 
North Africa, Berbers were gradually pushed into the North African hinterlands,181 
though this might not have been the case in Western Sahara since Roman influence 
did not penetrate far into western Morocco.182 The Berber tribal group which occupied 
Western Sahara, Mauritania, and even spread into the West African Sudan and the 
region of the River Niger, was the Sanhaja. This ‘great historic Berber family’183 was 
highly mobile and able to penetrate well into the western Sahara, especially with the 
introduction of the camel in the first to fourth centuries A.D.184 
 
By the 8th century, the Sanhaja tribes were only partial converts to Islam. The new 
religion was slow to take hold, but this was to change in the 11th century with the 
ascendancy of the Almoravids. This was an Islamic puritan movement that came 
about in the wastes of the far western Sahara, when a Sanhaja chief, Yahya Ibn 
Ibrahim, returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca in the late 1030s, and realised that his 
fellow Sanhaja Berbers were not truly adhering to the observances of Islam.185 To re-
evangelise his people, he ‘invited a fierce and austere preacher from the Souss (in 
Morocco), Abdallah Ibn Yacin, to begin lecturing the Berbers on what they believed 
to be a “pure” form of Islam’.186 Ibn Ibrahim even hoped that a revival of Islamic 
adherence would counter the then falling eminence of the Sanhaja in the region. To 
this end, Ibn Ibrahim and Ibn Yacin, soon called for a holy war, a jihad, to regain the 
Sanhaja’s pastoral ranges across the western Sahara, and the key trading towns of 
Aoudaghost and Sijilmassa, thereby giving them control of the caravan routes across 
the Sahara (previously lost to the Ghana Empire and the Zenata Berbers).187  
 
The Almoravids became masters of the western Sahara and eventually Morocco. Their 
power and influence, and martial prowess, allowed them to spread into Iberia and their 
‘empire’ extended from Zaragoza in Spain to the Senegal River in Africa, and 
eastwards to Algiers. They could not sustain their authority, however, and in 1147 
                                                 
180 Ilahiane 2006: xxxi. 
181 Ilahiane 2006: xxx-xxxii. 
182 Past Worlds 1993: 170-171. 
183 Ilahiane 2006: 109. 
184 Pazzanita 2006: 383. 
185 Hodges 1983: 5-6. 
186 Pazzanita 2006: 19-20. 
187 Pazzanita 2006: 19-20. 
 77
they were eclipsed by the Almohads, in Morocco, with the fall of Marrakesh which 
the Almoravids founded in 1062. Muslim Spain also revolted against them and they 
were permanently eclipsed by 1150.188 From the 12th century onwards, there was a 
continuing influx of Arabs into the Maghreb from the east. These invaders settled as 
far west as the Atlantic plains of Morocco, and in the 13th century, one group – the 
Maqil (originally from Yemen) – settled south of the Moroccan Atlas.189 From within 
the Maqil, a sub section known as the Beni Hassan moved on further still, and settled 
well into Mauritania. This group came into conflict with the Sanhaja, but the Beni 
Hassan – the ‘Hassaniya’ Arabs – gained the ascendancy. Berbers and Arabs 
intermarried, their cultures mixed, and many of the former acquired the Hassaniya 
Arab language. This process was virtually completed in the 17th century by which 
time all the Berber tribes of the very far west of the Sahara adopted an Arab origin and 
could be considered ‘Arabised’. Known to Europeans as ‘Moors’, these desert nomads 
of mixed, Berber, Arab, and black African ethnicity (the latter through miscegenation 
with slaves and their descendants) came to occupy a region extending from the Wadi 
Draa in the north, to the Senegal in the south, and to eastern Mauritania and the bend 
of the River Niger. Their adoption of Hassaniya Arabic was more or less complete by 
the 19th century.190 
 
Out of this crucible came the tribes that occupied Western Sahara at the advent of the 
colonial period. Many of these nomad groups had pastoral ranges that extended well 
beyond the boundaries of the territory, and these (for the main tribal groups in the 
1970s) are illustrated in Fig. 3.2. It is not the intention to present a history of the tribes 
here, but the following brief observations on four of the more conspicuous tribes is 
pertinent nonetheless.  
 
The Reguibat Confederation 
The largest of the tribes were, and still are, the Reguibat Confederation. They called 
themselves the ‘sons’, ‘children’ or ‘people of the clouds’191 since, like all the pastoral 
tribes of Western Sahara, they had to follow the clouds that brought the rains since 
there are no natural oases in the territory. They trace their ancestry back to their 
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common ancestor, Sidi Ahmed Reguibi, who in 1503 founded the tribe.192 It has also 
been noted, contrarily, that Sidi Ahmed was a 14th century saint, who ‘reputedly 
delivered his fellow Berbers from Arab domination’.193 Nevertheless, upon his death, 
the tribe split in two. The western (coastal), or Sahel branch, confined its ranges 
within what is now Western Sahara, and they only extended into Mauritania during 
periods of drought. In contrast, the eastern (Leguacem), or Sharq branch, extended 
over a much greater range of pasture – more or less covering much of the territory of 
the Sahel branch and extending from Goulmim in Morocco to Atar in Mauritania, and 
taking in the Tindouf region of Algeria and extending further into Mali, and in the 
extreme, even into Niger.194 By virtue of numbers, the Reguibat are the most 
influential tribe in Western Sahara, and as such, they are a very substantial component 
of the Saharawi nationalist movement.195   
 
The Tekna Confederation 
The Tekna tribal group are Berber and Arab, dating back to the 12th and 13th centuries. 
Unlike the Reguibat, they have been both sedentary and nomadic, living by agriculture 
in the Wadi Draa and by pastoralism in the open Sahara, traditionally, between the 
Anti-Atlas Mountains and the Saguia el-Hamra. Positioned thus, many Tekna became 
traders and they could exploit their position straddling the caravan routes into southern 
Morocco. In all, they interacted well with the Spanish and French, and they were on 
good terms with Donald Mackenzie, founder of the British North-West African 
Company at Cape Juby in 1877. Fig. 3.2 shows the southern extent of the Tekna’s 
ranges, but at the end of the colonial period, most of the tribe were to be found in 
Southern Morocco.196 
 
The Oulad Delim and the Oulad Bou Sba 
The Oulad Delim, like the Oulad Bou Sba – two bellicose tribes – claim Arab Maqil 
origins.197 The Oulad Delim (‘Oulad’ means ‘children of’) have been described by 
Mercer as having a ‘history of rapine’, due, they claim, to the poor environment in 
which they ranged, causing them to take up raiding and extortion as a justified 
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livelihood.198 Even in the 16th century they were described as being ‘Poor Robbers… 
and Strangers to Gallantry’.199 They were a hostile and arrogant tribe, which came to 
dominate their neighbours, and with their ranges in the south of Western Sahara, they 
had no reservations about attacking both the Spanish and the French in the region.200 
However, the direction of such belligerence was to change when the Spanish 
consolidated their colony, and many Oulad Delim took up soldiery with the colonial 
army and police. Apparently, amongst the Polisario fighters, they (up to 1980 at least) 
made up the second most important tribal element after the Reguibat.201   
 
The Oulad Bou Sba ranged over central Tiris and into Mauritania (see Fig. 3.2), 
though they must have also covered the same pastures as the Oulad Delim, since they 
were encountered by the American sea captain James Riley, and his crew, who were 
shipwrecked in 1815 and landed at Cape Barbas – around 175 kilometres north of 
Cape Blanc. The Oulad Bou Sba had a terrible reputation with mariners at the time, 
especially if they were unfortunate enough to get shipwrecked south of Rio D’Oro.202 
As judged by the ill treatment they meted out to Riley and his compatriots they 
obviously lived up to their hostile and bellicose nature, treating the sailors as slaves 
and trading them for meagre profit. In fact, the sale of Riley and some of his crew to a 
Moroccan caravaneer, who expected to be paid a ransom for the sailors in Mogador 
(present day Essaouira, in Morocco), eventually secured the Americans’ release.203 
But perhaps such hostility towards Christians who landed in Western Sahara by sea 
should not be seen as out of place. Repercussions of the Spanish reconguista ‘sent 
impulses into the desert’ in the 15th century and after,204 and trading in humans was 
well established in the region well before the arrival of Europeans.205 Additionally, 
Portuguese, and then Spanish slavers, raided the Atlantic Saharan coast in the 15th and 
early 16th centuries, resulting in the creation of short-lived European coastal outposts, 
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and recurrent violence between the Iberians and the indigenous tribes.206 The Spanish 
finally left the region in 1524 when they abandoned their trading post at Santa Cruz de 
Mar Pequeña – occupied since 1476 and believed to be located around 70 kilometres 
northeast of Cape Juby. Their interests in Africa waned while their ambitions in the 
Americas increased, and they did not return to the Atlantic Sahara until the late 19th 
century.207 
 
Factories, Forts and Barbed Wire 
 
The present day extent of Western Sahara was demarcated by agreement between 
France and Spain in 1912, after a series of negotiations and treaties.208 Spain re-
entered the Atlantic Sahara during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ when, in keeping with the 
spirit of the time in Europe, Spain desired an ‘area of interest in Africa’. This was 
encouraged by a renewed interest in the African coast opposite the Canary Islands, 
which was increasing from the 1870s onwards (initially at the instigation of the 
Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid), and there was a firm belief that Britain and France 
would carve up Africa between them. By sending an expedition to the Sahara coast in 
1884, led by a lieutenant Emillio Bonelli, and partly funded by the Compañía 
Hispano-Africana and the Compañía Transatlántica,209 Spain claimed the coastal 
territory, that would eventually extend from the Wadi Draa in the north to Cape Blanc 
in the south, by establishing the trading post of Villa Cisneros at the inlet known as 
Rio de Oro (see Figs. 3.1 and 3.3). Although the settlement and factory was 
established by negotiation with the local Bedouin, it quickly came under attack by the 
Oulad Delim (whereby a number of Spaniards were fatally wounded) causing its 
inhabitants to flee to the Canary Islands.210 Thus began the contest over the territory of 
Western Sahara in the modern era, and the creation of a Spanish colonial space on the 
far western fringe of the Sahara.  
 
It would be an understatement to say, as Pazzanita has, that the Saharawi tribes ‘did 
not take kindly to European intrusion on their land’. With the re-establishment of a 
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Spanish presence at Villa Cisneros by Bonelli, with only twenty soldiers, the factory 
came under attack in 1887, 1890, 1892 and 1894, and these only came to an end in 
1895 when a trading concession was agreed with Sheikh Ma el-Ainin, the then 
charismatic leader of tribal opposition to colonial expansion in the western Sahara (see 
below).211 It was during this period that the Spanish started a process that resulted in 
the militarisation of the landscape of Western Sahara; initially, by turning the factory 
of Villa Cisneros into a fort, and by reinforcing their presence through the progressive 
monumentalising of the structure. At this time, the Spanish had very little interest in 
the deep desert of Western Sahara. Their concerns were mainly commercial, being 
pre-occupied with off shore fishing and limited trade with the tribes. The attacks 
between 1887 and 1895 led Bonelli and his contemporaries to realise that the 
hinterland was a potential minefield that a small Spanish garrison could never deal 
with, therefore it was best to leave the Bedouin tribes in peace, not to interfere in their 
internal affairs, and behave as diplomatically as possible towards them.212 
 
Three pre 1910 images, two photographs213 and one illustration captioned as being a 
view of the fort and factory as of 1893,214 clearly show the early fort as a simple, stone 
built, rectilinear compound with blockhouses at diagonally opposite corners. The 
corner blockhouses were two-storeys in height and of substantial proportions. The one 
at the northern corner (Fig. 3.4), adjacent to the entry to the compound had gun loops 
at ground level with battlements along the roof. The second storeys of both structures 
had shuttered windows. The compound wall apparently reached no higher than the 
floor of the second storey. The corner blockhouses were rendered, though the 
compound wall was not, and there was a portion of an upper floor, or gangway, above 
the arched entrance. One of the photos shows that, internally, single storey courtyard 
buildings were being constructed along the compound walls, and in the mean time 
were being used for storage. Mercer noted that this early ‘trading fort’ had two 
entrances, one door leading eastwards to the bay, while the other, the northern entry, 
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was referred to as the ‘Moors’ Gate’, which had an eight centimetre Krupps field gun 
pointing towards it from within the compound. He also described one of the 
blockhouse-type structures as a ‘trading building’, with the other noted simply as a 
‘defensive tower’, with a complement of twenty-five soldiers (this latter structure was 
probably the northern corner blockhouse).215  
 
A postcard (Fig. 3.5), post-marked 1910, proclaimed that the factory was definitely 
now a military fort, being captioned: ‘Rio de Oro: Exterior del Fuerte militar’. This 
was presumably during the administration of Francisco Bens Argandoña (1904-1925), 
a veteran of the Spanish-American War who realised upon taking on the governorship, 
that much had to be done if the territory was to be more than just a flag and a 
warehouse planted on hostile soil. So the postcard shows that besides Bens’ reputation 
for good relations with the Saharawi tribes, and his empathy towards them,216 he 
obviously embarked on a project improving the fort, making it fit for a garrison 
(though when he arrived he only had 31 infantrymen), and turning it into the largest 
construction in the region save for Ma el-Ainin’s city of Smara217 built between 1898 
and 1902, and about 550 kilometres to the northeast. 
 
The postcard shows definite building phases. The enceinte of the fort was enlarged 
and the ground level buildings were heightened by an additional storey, thereby 
raising the external walls in most places. These also had broadly spaced crenellations. 
According to Lodwick, the rooftop firing parapets were up to shoulder height, and 
only a ‘powerful battering ram’ could break down the main door.218 The postcard also 
shows that only some of the masonry had been rendered, and where it was not, 
construction details can be easily seen, such as the dressed window jambs and quoins 
at the new building’s corners. There are Bedouin tents in the foreground, and these 
low-lying, portable structures designed to deflect the winds of the desert, and to be 
malleable in form so as to adjust to the changing needs of their inhabitants, contrast 
sharply with the monolithic form of the fort. Although, at this time, the Spanish had a 
very ‘hands off’ approach to administering Western Sahara, this postcard illustrates 
that there is a difference between the coloniser and the colonised. There is 
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undoubtedly a ‘them and us’, an ‘other’ that is outside the ‘pale’ of the fort. Brice 
describes this succinctly with reference to an illustration of Fort Laramie in the 
American West in 1849, also showing Native Americans and their tipis outside the 
walls of the fort: 
 
In common with all peoples confronted with different cultures the Indian tribes find 
themselves drawn towards the trading opportunities offered by the fort, even though it 
also acts as a cavalry base and staging post for military and commercial operations 
which will eventually destroy their way of life. Meanwhile, the pioneers, fearing the 
primitive peoples outside have surrounded themselves with blank-faced walls, their 
corners protected with square blockhouses.219 
 
The existence of forts such as Laramie and Villa Cisneros, unbidden and imposed onto 
the landscape by outsiders, an ‘other’ to the indigenous peoples, would undoubtedly 
turn the land into a contested landscape, manifested by the transfiguring of the land 
through further colonial building works, and the eventual stratagems of outright 
conflict by all involved. Nevertheless, Bens pursued a ‘sugar lump’ approach towards 
the Saharawis. He was obviously very positive in his feelings towards the Bedouin, 
and although he wanted to consolidate Spain’s position along the littoral of the 
territory, he, like Bonelli before him and the Spanish authorities, did not want to 
occupy the hinterland, nor pursue an aggressive policy of colonisation as the French 
were conducting in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. In fact, he made a point of 
distinguishing Madrid’s policies from those of France with respect to territorial 
expansion.  
 
He managed, after a number of attempts (initially thwarted by Madrid) to occupy 
Cape Juby (Tarfaya) in 1916, setting up a fort and garrison there, and establishing a 
fishing base and factory at La Guera in 1920.220 But the policies of France in 
consolidating its Protectorate over Morocco and in its expansion throughout 
Mauritania during this period, created inevitable conflict with the Saharawi tribes 
who, in real terms, occupied an area far larger than the territory of Western Sahara, 
inhabiting the desert regions south of the Wadi Draa and extending south of Cape 
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Blanc and deep into Mauritania. As nomads dependent on their herds, always seeking 
out the best pasture, and with no permanent settlements and mainly seasonal water 
sources, the idea of a territory controlled either by France, Spain, or even the Sultan of 
Morocco was anathema.221 
 
With the Spanish on the coast, and with the French expanding northwards into 
Mauritania, Ma el-Ainin, an almost Mahdi-like individual, who managed to 
consolidate some of the western Saharan tribes in opposition to the French, founded 
the town and religious centre of Smara in 1898, near the Saguia el-Hamra.222 
Construction of the main part of the city was completed by 1902, and it is so very 
striking that while Europeans were encroaching around the perimeter of what is now 
Western Sahara, a regional marabout had the vision and wherewithal, albeit with the 
support of the Moroccan Sultan, to impress upon the desert a brand new, indigenous 
city, in effect, running counter to the advances of France and Spain, and contributing 
to the contest for Western Sahara. But from Smara’s location, it is obvious that Ma el-
Ainin was also planning something that was to represent more than a direct 
confrontation with the Europeans. Smara is around 180 kilometres from the sea, and it 
straddles the longstanding caravan corridors from Goulmim in southern Morocco to 
the Senegal basin.223 Such a location, with the presence of water in the Sagia el-
Hamra, suitable for limited agriculture, would have made Smara a magnet and an 
entrepot for the Saharawi tribes. 
 
After a military defeat at the hands of the French in 1909, Ma el-Ainin left Smara (he 
died in 1910), and the city was eventually seized and partially destroyed by a French 
occupying force in 1913, even though it was virtually uninhabited at the time.224 This 
did not end hostilities, however, and the territory was not considered ‘pacified’ until 
1934. 
 
From a European’s perspective, as has already been noted, the Saharawi tribes had a 
longstanding antagonism towards foreigners. The early nineteenth century accounts of 
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Adams,225 Cochelet,226 Paddock,227 Riley228 and Robbins229 give vivid descriptions of 
the plight of shipwrecked sailors on the Atlantic Sahara coast, though obviously 
belonging to the genre of ‘white slave’ literature with all of its inbuilt biases and pre-
conceptions. Nevertheless, Riley’s account has been described as the first 
ethnographic description of the Saharawi people,230 while Mackenzie’s account of his 
travels in 1883231 gives a description of the tribes around Cape Juby as being 
approachable, unantagonistic and eager to trade. 
 
With the Spanish confined to the coast, leaving the hinterland unoccupied, the 
Saharawis, quite justifiably saw the French, with their aggressive policies in the 
region, as interlopers and a threat to their way of life, and through the impetus of Ma 
el-Ainin and his sons, Western Sahara soon became a base for Saharawi raids against 
them. The raid, or ghazi, was for all intents and purposes the basic offensive tool of 
the Bedouin tribes in the Sahara, and the Middle East. T.E. Lawrence harnessed it in 
the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918, and immortalised it in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom.232 
 
Pazzanita makes the point that raiding ‘militarised’ traditional Saharawi society.233 
Although the roots of the ghazi had more to do with pastoral ecology and economy, 
the acquisition of livestock along with booty, and in the expression of dominance 
within regional groups or tribes of Bedouin,234 the degree of planning required to 
undertake such raids, and the martial skills acquired and developed in their execution 
prepared the Saharawi tribes to confidently oppose the advancing French, and to a 
lesser extent Spanish, in the western Sahara. In fact, Briggs has pointed out that the 
very presence of colonial camel corps troops caused some Saharawi tribes-people, at 
the time of his writing (in the 1950s), to view them as ‘raiders’ and respond 
accordingly.235 
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Raids against European outposts and forces could take place over great distances. In 
1927 an audacious raid was launched from Cape Juby to attack the French at Port 
Etienne (Nouadhibou), more than 1000 kilometres to the south (though Port Etienne 
was also attacked earlier in 1924236). The raiders reached their destination but the 
camel corps based in Atar intercepted them ‘and slaughtered them to a man’.237 This 
took place more or less when Antoine de Saint-Exupery took up his tenure as chief of 
the Aero Postale station at Cape Juby, but he too described another instance when a 
ghazi was being planned for an attack into Mauritania. Saint-Exupery recounts how 
camels were being ‘led to the wells [around Cape Juby] for three days’, how there 
were ‘powwows’, and he continued that there was a ‘fever running through the camp: 
it was as if men had been rigging an invisible ship… the air was filled with the wind 
that would take her out of port’. All of this preparation was for an attack (that would 
take two months) on a French camel corps column out of Atar, led by one, Captain 
Bonnafous, described as an almost ‘legendary figure’ amongst the tribes, who could 
outflank them by raiding within the Spanish territory, and driving off their camels.238 
 
Camel corps (Mehariste) officers such as Bonnafous adapted the ghazi to French 
military ends, and archaeological evidence supporting this might exist in Zug in 
southern Western Sahara close to the border with Mauritania. Here, in a great expanse 
of open desert, mainly punctuated by inselbergs and guelbs, a small fort (Fig. 3.6) was 
constructed on a low-lying rocky outcrop – literally daubed onto the landscape. It was 
summarily recorded in 2005 by Mark Milburn and Nick Brooks, while carrying out 
surveys for the WSP in the area. The local Saharawis knew of the structure as a 
‘French fort’, and Milburn made subsequent enquiries of the Musée des Troupes de la 
Marine (in Fréjus, France), and indeed, in around 1911, accounts of French incursions 
into Spanish territory did suggest some kind of military presence in the Zug area. 
Also, by 2007, at least two of the 2005 team members went back to the fortlet and 
found a French army button.239 The remains of the fort consist of an irregular polygon 
covering an estimated area of around 22 metres by 30 metres. The denuded walls are 
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of drystone rubble construction, and they include the remains of internal buildings 
along with three bastion-like structures.240   
 
With the situation intensifying between the French and Saharawi tribes in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century there was an undoubted knock on effect at the Spanish 
garrisons along the coast, and this altered the way in which the landscape was 
inscribed. Looking back at the 1910 postcard described above, it is clear that there is 
no physical barrier between the fort and the tents in the foreground, but that was to 
change with the employment of barbed wire. 
 
Barbed wire was invented in the 1870s in the United States. It was a cheap, low 
technology success story, allowing the American West to be parcelled up so that the 
land could be appropriated by cattle ranchers and farmers. The very act of enclosing 
the land with a simple wire deterrant that could hurt the flesh of any living creature 
that tried to force its way through it – by its numerous barbs – made the wire a prime 
tool for not just controlling animals, but people. Entire landscapes could now be 
enclosed with an offensive wire inscribing authority over previously accessible and 
open spaces.241 Its use in war and in the controlling of populations was initialy made 
most evident in the Cuban insurgencies just prior to the Spanish-American War of 
1898. As a precursor to the 20th century use of barbed wire, the Spanish military 
divided Cuba into zones attempting to exclude Cuban freedom fighters from specific 
parts of the island. These barriers consisted of barbed wire fencing, ditches and banks, 
and forts and blockhouses, and they stretched across the island from coast to coast. 
They also, along some of them, incorporated a railway.242 This was the advent of 20th 
century ‘total war’, even with the inclusion of concentration camps. Here, as 
elsewhere, swathes of landscapes were inscribed with linear implements of hostile 
control, eventually culminating in the 20th century with the Iron Curtain, the Israeli-
Palestinian barrier wall, and the Moroccan berms in Western Sahara.   
 
The British in South Africa, during the Boer War (1899-1902), took the combination 
of barbed wire, blockhouses, railways, and concentration camps to a new offensive 
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level. In order to combat the Boer commandos, they criss-crossed the veldt with a 
system of blockhouses and barbed wire fencing that rivalled any enclosing of the 
prairie by American farmers and ranchers. And in the same way that an American 
rancher would ‘drive’ his cattle, the British military, under Kitchener, drove the Boer 
insurgents from one enclosed part of the veldt, into another, and another, until they 
were either killed, surrendered, or had nowhere else to go and were captured.243 So 
with this in mind, and with the belligerance of both the French and Saharawis, it is not 
surprising that at some time within the first quarter of the 20th century, the Spanish 
employed barbed wire in their coastal enclaves.  
 
An undated photograph shows a Spanish blockhouse at Rio de Oro surrounded by 
barbed wire entanglements.244 This was one of four such blockhouses constructed by 
Francisco Bens in 1914 in a line across the narrowest part of the Dakhla peninsula 
immediately north of Villa Cisneros (see Fig. 3.3). High resolution Google earth 
imagery shows that three of these blockhouses are still standing and they were 
recently recorded by the Spanish archaeologist, Luis Blanco Vázquez.245 Save for the 
barbed wire, the blockhouse in the photograph is relatively picturesque. It is obviously 
square and there are turrets at its diagonal corners. The building is two-storeys high, 
and with decorated crenelations along its rooftop parapet. It is rendered and pale in 
colour, but with a dark dado at ground level. The upper floor has ordinary windows, 
but the ground floor has firing embrasures and the turrets have horizontal firing slits. 
The photograph cannot tell us if barbed wire entanglements stretched from blockhouse 
to blockhouse, since Francisco Bens hoped to construct an extensive barrier across the 
peninsular. However, in whatever form he envisaged it, it was never realised.246   
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Two photographs, one terrestrial,247 and one aerial (Fig. 3.7), show the Villa Cisneros 
fort surrounded by barbed wire. The photographs also include bi-planes and hangars, 
thereby dating them to sometime after World War One. This was when France’s Aero 
Postale service was inaugurated, flying over Western Sahara to Dakar, and the 
Spanish air force initiated its Escuadrilla Sahariana.248 The photographs also show 
the fort much as it looked up to its demolition in 2004.249 The additions that were 
constructed by 1910 were now all rendered, and an additional blockhouse-like tower 
was added to the front façade at the eastern corner of the fort. Interestingly, this new 
tower had decorative corner turrets. Along the rear wall, a small bunker-like extension 
was added at the building’s western corner, and this had a horizontal firing slit. 
 
In contrast to the earlier pre 1910 postcard image, these photographs show no Bedouin 
tents or people, the local Saharawi were now kept a greater distance away from the 
fort, girdled in its protective barbed wire entanglements. There is now an even greater 
distance between the coloniser and the colonised, and it is clearly inscribed on the 
ground. The situation was similar at Cape Juby, where a perimeter of barbed wire, two 
kilometres in length surrounded the fort, and the garrison was described in a 
contemporary account as being dejected and godforsaken, and since there was also a 
gaol at Cape Juby, the soldiers were considered as being hardly indistinguishable from 
the inmates.250  
 
The technology of enclosure as represented in barbed wire is the first step in literally 
marking out the land of Western Sahara and creating oppositional, and militarised 
spaces. Luckily for the Saharawi tribes, the Spanish were never overly aggressive in 
appropriating their land, and at this time they clung to the coast. It would take further 
machinations by France into the 1930s, and a conflict in the late 1950s, to really cause 
the Spanish to impress upon the land their colonial project. 
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Tracing out a Pacified Region 
 
By the time that France and Spain felt that the region was ‘pacified’, in 1934, a brutal 
war had been fought in the Rif region of northern Morocco, subduing the uprising of 
Abd el Krim,251 and the bilad es siba (or the ‘dissident territory’) south of the Atlas 
Mountains, and north of the Wadi Draa, had been brought under French control.252 
The Spanish had secured its three coastal positions at Cape Juby, Villa Cisneros and 
La Guera, while along the desert frontier between Western Sahara and Mauritania the 
French had a garrison in Tindouf, Algeria, and forts at Ain Ben Tilli, Agmar, Bir 
Moghrein (Fort Trinquet),253 Idjil (Fort Gouraud),254 Attar and Port Etienne, all 
hugging the border outline (see Fig. 3.8). Most of these forts were linked by the Piste 
Imperiale No 1, which extended all the way to Dakar in Senegal.255 Designated as 
such, this route unequivocally exemplified the colonial spirit of France, writ large on 
the desert sands.  
 
Berthome256 has published a plan of the French fort at Attar as it appeared in the 
period 1907-13, and it illustrates clearly how the French envisaged space in their 
military outposts in the Sahara at this time. The fort was roughly diamond shaped in 
plan, and aligned longitudinally more or less north to south. It was probably a mud 
brick structure257 with bastions at its northern and southern ends, and with an entrance 
on its northeast facing side. The curtain walls had rooms up against their internal 
sides, which included company detail rooms, officer’s quarters, storerooms, an 
infirmary, a gaol, and a powder store. A zariba, of thorn or brushwood, five metres 
thick surrounded the fort, following a trace not that different from that of the fort, save 
for a rectangular extension to the southeast where a camp for colonial troops was 
located. This illustrates, in the very layout of the fort, the difference between the 
colonial troops and the French, in that the latter, soldiers and officers, were quartered 
within the walls, while the African troops, separated from the Europeans, were 
camped outside and only protected by the zariba. Also, outside the fort, but within the 
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zeriba, there were kitchen facilities, a well and latrines. To the southwest, just outside 
the zeriba, were depot areas for camels and goats. 
 
Forts such as this, along with the Spanish positions on the coast, served as a 
containing mechanism surrounding much of the heartlands of the ‘refractory tribes’,258 
creating a geography of enclosure, and delineating a militarised landscape. But this 
was not an extensive enclosure of barbed wire, blockhouses and fortified ditches as in 
Cuba and South Africa. Instead it was a ring of strong points impressed onto the land 
and dependent on the ability of locally recruited mobile troops to patrol the hinterland, 
as the Spanish started to do in 1926 with the creation of their own camel corps, the 
Tropas Nomadas.259 Meanwhile, the French, based in their Mauritanian forts could 
interdict ghazis, and invade Spanish territory, either with their Mehariste troops 
(Groupes Nomades) or with tribal factions in league with them.260 In fact, the eventual 
‘pacification’ of the region was seen by many Saharawi Bedouin, the very people who 
were ‘pacified’, as a way of being protected from the French. San Martin261 illustrates 
this with an account given by an old Saharawi of an encounter with a Spanish column 
in 1935: 
 
I was in Hagunia in the year 1935 when Captain Capaz faced for the first time a group 
of 40 Saharawi… Before, I had heard about the Spanish, but I had never seen one. 
Capaz told us: ‘ask what you want’. We… established four conditions: The Islamic 
Shaaria to be the law in the territory, not to force anyone to abandon arms and to give 
a licence to keep those arms we have now, that the slaves will continue under the 
command of their owners and that the owners could decide what to do with them in 
their own way… and not to give to Spain any recently pregnant camel nor any 
castrated camel for transport. We demanded these conditions…to be sure that they 
would not do the same as the French… The Spanish fulfilled their promise. 262 
 
In a way, an equilibrium was reached in the western Sahara in the 1930s, with the 
Spanish and French both acknowledging their territorial limits and responsibilities. 
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After decades of fighting, the tribes had to accept the dominance of the better armed, 
and organised Europeans, and in the end, they found themselves welcoming what 
became a durable peace.263 The Spanish finally occupied Smara in 1934, where they 
created their first desert post. They secured the coastal routes, and by 1938 they 
founded El-Ayoun, the future capital of the territory.264 They also occupied Guelta 
Zemmour, Bir Gandus, Tichla and Zug by 1946 (see Fig. 3.9).265 San Martin has 
described Western Sahara at this time as mainly one large military garrison, and as a 
‘playground’ for Spain’s African army that was ‘forged’ in the Rif War. Though this 
became even more salient after Morocco became independent in 1956.266 In fact, an 
informant told Lodwick in 1955 that to the Spanish military, Western Sahara was very 
much ‘their territory’. The army felt that they built up, and held on to the colony with 
little assistance from Madrid, even ‘against every kind of foreign intervention and 
intrigue’.267 
 
Photographs, mostly dated from 1971, exist of the small desert fort that the Spanish 
established at Tichla (located about 200 kilometres from the sea, and around 30 
kilometres north of the border with Mauritania) in their efforts to extend their colonial 
space into the interior in the decade or so after 1934. They give us a glimpse into what 
a Spanish, deep desert outpost was like. From the collection available on the La Mili 
en el Sáhara website268 we can clearly see a simple, yet martial, colonial edifice 
implanted onto the desert landscape, something akin to a Beau Geste fort, and the 
images clearly illustrate the built, military environment which the Spanish constructed 
for themselves in the deeper desert. An aerial image, which is one of the few photos 
not dated in the set, shows the small square fort, quite forlorn, and like the earlier fort 
at Zug, literally daubed onto the great expanse of the desert. It is probably the earliest 
view of the fort since it does not include any of the external structures shown in the 
other photos, almost all of which are dated to 1971. It (Fig. 3.10) also shows the fort 
cocooned in a broad ring of barbed wire, clearly marking it out as an implant in 
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territory perceived as hostile (and perhaps indicating that the date of this image is 
closer to the 1940s than to 1971).  
 
One close-up elevation of the entrance to the fort suggests that its construction was of 
stone rubble, with a coarsely applied mud render.269 A plan of the fort, with no scale, 
and given a date of 1971,270 along with other photos of the exterior of the fort, confirm 
that it was virtually square with its entrance on its northern side and with towers at its 
northeast and southwest corners. The towers had balconies around them and 
decorative arabesque-style double windows.271 Most of the photos also make clear that 
there were broadly spaced crenels along the upper parapet. This resonates with similar 
detailing along the parapeted roofline added to the Villa Cisneros fort that can be seen 
in the postcard dated 1910, and in the subsequent, later photographs. The interior of 
the fort at Tichla (according to the 1971 plan, but also recorded in a composite 
panorama272) included separate quarters for troops and non-commissioned officers, 
accommodation for the commandant, an office, weather station, radio room, kitchen 
and canteen, a dispensary and store rooms, while externally, there were generator 
buildings and a sizable encampment of local Bedouin. And notably, by 1971, there 
was no longer any barbed wire surrounding the fort, separating the colonised from the 
colonisers. 
 
Judging from these images, outposts like Tichla were no longer lone forts in the desert 
well before the 1970s, but instead, the hub of a colonial presence servicing a locale or 
region. That is, servicing the military as well as the local Saharawis. This happened in 
a presumably larger way at Villa Cisneros, where a low level aerial photograph, dated 
to 1930,273 showing details of the fort’s interior, also shows that the barbed wire 
around the fort had been removed, and apparently, local people can be seen to roam 
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freely were the entanglements once were. By removing their barbed wire, and 
allowing the civil population access to the heart of the settlement, in this case the fort, 
the Spanish must have felt secure in their appropriation of the territory. It may very 
well have looked as if the creation of a Spanish colonial space was succeeding. But 
this was to change. 
 
The Making of a Spanish Sahara 
 
The Maghreb was a tumultuous region in the middle and late 1950s. There was a 
brutal war for independence in Algeria (1954-1962) while both Tunisia and Morocco 
gained their independence in 1956. From 1953, various guerrilla groups existed in 
Morocco, mainly from the Rif and Middle Atlas regions. These coalesced into the 
‘Army of Liberation’ in 1955, and at that time, southern Moroccans and Saharawis 
started to join the group. Also, many Moroccans who were auxiliaries in the French 
army joined the group in 1956 when Morocco gained its independence. With their 
officers gone, they brought with them arms raided from their former French 
armouries. As a result, the new, independent government of Morocco did not have full 
control over large areas in both the north and south of the country. These were 
controlled by insurgents bent on removing France and Spain from the whole of the 
western Sahara. To gain control of these regions the King of Morocco tried to lure 
many of the insurgents into his new Moroccan army, the Forces Armees Royal (FAR). 
But even though, about 10,000 members of the Army of Liberation agreed to lay 
down their arms, thousands more remained virtually in control of the south of the 
country, south of Agadir. The King distrusted the Army of Liberation, but his new 
army did not have the capabilities to confront it. So undeterred, the Army of 
Liberation went into action, attacking French Algeria in June of 1956, and then setting 
their sites on Sidi-Ifni.274  
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War in the Western Sahara  
The Army of Liberation attacked the Spanish Enclave of Sidi Ifni in 1957,275 
beginning the Ifni-Sahara War, known to Spanish Historians as the ‘Forgotten 
War’.276 The war soon spread deeply throughout Spanish Sahara, and parts of 
neighbouring Mauritania and Algeria. By re-instituting the tactics of the ghazi, the 
Army of Liberation, now known by the Spanish as the Saharawi Liberation Army, 
virtually roamed unchallenged across the territory. They successfully pushed the 
Spanish back to El-Ayoun and their pre 1934 positions.277 To counter this, the French 
and Spanish joined forces and launched ‘Operation Ouragon’.278 By deploying 5,000 
French and 9,000 Spanish troops and 70 French and 60 Spanish military aircraft,279 
the insurgents were defeated in 1958, a year that became known as the ‘year of the 
peace of the graveyards’.280 Western Sahara was now securely back under Spanish 
control. 
 
Morocco played a double game during the conflict. At first it distrusted the Army of 
Liberation, then its newly formed FAR gave the rebels logistical support during the 
early months of the conflict. In opposition to this, Morocco then allowed Agadir to be 
used as the airbase from which French and Spanish aircraft could fly sorties, 
successfully attacking the rebels. In consequence, the Tarfaya strip was ceded to 
Morocco, by Spain, ‘as a reward for its collaboration in the last phases of the war’.281 
Spain’s Saharan colony was now given the geographic delineation it has today, as 
Western Sahara, and ‘…from the decade of the 1960s onwards… it make[s] sense to 
name this region Spanish Sahara, and only then… the colonial frontiers start[ed] to be 
real, for the Saharawis as well as the Spanish’.282 In fact, this second pacification of 
the territory created a new colonial impetus previously unmatched, and in the deeper 
desert areas it created a new militarised space imprinted on the land. 
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With Spain giving up northern Morocco in 1956, its African Army, with its mainstay, 
the Spanish Foreign Legion, was posted to Ifni and Western Sahara. It has even been 
implied that Franco was keen to hold on to these territories, ‘partly out of a desire to 
find a new mission for the Foreign Legion in Africa’.283 There were already large 
military establishments attached to the main towns of El-Ayoun, Villa Cisneros, and 
Smara, but by 1961, with the potential for further conflict with a resurgent Army of 
Liberation, the Spanish military had established a presence throughout the territory.284 
Amongst these was a new type of small desert outpost, such as the fort at Tifariti, 
which was indicative of the type. There were at least seven of these forts throughout 
the territory, and apparently, they were all identical. Many were positioned in the 
north, presumably, in case of further conflict with Morocco (the Spanish still occupied 
Sidi Ifni which Morocco disputed), and there were tensions between Algeria and 
Morocco which could have spread into Western Sahara, and resulted in the ‘War of 
the Sands’ in 1963.285 
 
The outpost, or fort, at Tifariti (Fig. 3.11) was constructed by the Spanish Foreign 
Legion in 1964.286 It would probably be fair to say that Tifariti was more of a place 
than a settlement in the 1960s. It was shown on Spanish and French maps, and judging 
from these, it was on obvious routeways, and it had a water source (see Chapter 6). It 
may even have served as a stopover point for one of the innumerable routes that must 
have passed through the area serving the Goulmim-Senegal caravan trade (the Wadi 
Tifariti heads northwards, towards the Saguia el-Hamra). The location of Tifariti is at 
the junction of flat stony desert to the south, and low level, igneous hills to the north, 
and that is more or less where the fort was constructed. Tifariti is approximately 17 
kilometres from the southern border of Western Sahara’s northern panhandle. It is 
around 130 kilometres southeast of Smara, 150 kilometres northeast of the French 
Fort at Bir Morgrein in Mauritania, and 100 kilometres west of the French fort at Ain 
Ben Tilli. The closest Spanish outpost was Hausa, around 115 kilometres to the north-
northwest (see Fig. 3.12).  
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The fort at Tifariti is only partly preserved. It was hit by a Moroccan air strike in mid 
August 1991 (see Chapter 6), just before the proclamation of the present UN brokered 
ceasefire. The attack destroyed approximately one third of the structure. It was 
apparently built to a standard plan, and it is identical to the Spanish forts at Echdeiria, 
Hausa and Mahbes in the north of Western Sahara, and Aargub, Guelta Zemmour and 
Bir Enzaren in the centre of the territory (see Fig. 3.12). It is presumed that all of these 
posts were established sometime soon after the end of the ‘Forgotten War’. A good 
selection of photographs exist, illustrating the structure and layout of these small 
desert forts.287 They were all rectangular in plan with rectangular blockhouses at their 
corners and a central courtyard and a defendable right-angled entrance. The cast 
concrete walls were slightly battered with narrow embrasure-like windows, while 
internally there were obvious attempts at domesticating what was essentially a 
military space.  
 
As has already been noted in the case of the earlier fort at Tichla – and judging from 
the photographic coverage of these desert posts – these newer forts were all an integral 
part of locally emplaced hubs of colonial presence distributed in the more remote parts 
of Western Sahara. Surrounding them were ancillary buildings and other compounds, 
and encampments of local Bedouin, as shown in a photograph of the fort at Mahbes 
taken in 1974.288 What is striking about all of these outposts, and it is made clear in 
the photograph of Mahbes, is the fact that these forts are constructed in such a way 
that they look solid and embedded. With their corner towers and slit windows, they 
are iconic redoubts in the centre of isolated military and tribal settlements. Though, 
for a full description of the fort at Tifariti, in its setting, see Chapter 6. 
 
From Spanish Sahara to Moroccan Sahara 
 
So far, the Spanish colonial space of Western Sahara has been seen to have been 
created by the dual actions of France and Spain. Initially, by the creation of Spanish 
forts and factories – militarised places along the coast – at Villa Cisneros, Cape Juby 
and La Guera. While the French, in their turn, encircled the territory with forts and 
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garrisons along the Piste Imperiale through Mauritania, which served a similar 
function to the limes of the Roman Empire. With the acknowledged pacification of the 
region in 1934, the Spanish began to occupy the interior by securing the future 
colonial capital at El-Ayoun, and by occupying the iconic capital of colonial 
resistance in the region, Smara, the city of Sheikh Ma el Ainin. Nevertheless, the 
Spanish were restrained in their punctuation of the territory with military posts, 
especially since the tribes accepted the peace imposed upon them mainly by the 
tenacity of French arms. But after the ‘Forgotten War’ of 1957-58, the situation 
changed, and Western Sahara was turned into an extensive garrison for Spain’s 
African Army. 
 
The historical events that altered the situation of Western Sahara during and after the 
1960s – culminating in the rise of the Polisario Front – and which paved the way for 
the annexation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, and the 1975-1991 war,289 
are best described by the mainly geo-political works referred to in Chapter 1. It is not 
my intention to cover the same ground here, but instead, to summarise the events that 
led up to the partitioning of Western Sahara, which started in 1980, and created a 
territory-wide militarised landscape that is dealt with, in terms of its materiality, in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
In June 1956, the leader of the nationalist Istiqlal Party in Morocco declared that a 
Morocco independent of France, would only be complete if it included the whole of 
Mauritania with Spanish Sahara, and much of Western Algeria and Mali (this ‘Greater 
Morocco’ is shown in Fig. 3.13). As noted in Chapter 1, Morocco has seen its natural 
territorial limits as including the lands taken by the Almoravids in the 11th and 12th 
centuries, and denied to them by the partitioning of the western quarter of the Sahara 
by France and Spain. By the end of 1957, this irredentist vision became firmly rooted 
in the political establishment of Morocco.290 But with the independence of Algeria in 
1962, and the independence of Mauritania and Mali two years earlier, Morocco could 
only channel its claims, for a ‘Greater Morocco’, in the direction of Western (Spanish) 
Sahara. 
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In 1965, the Government of Francisco Franco in Madrid, was being pressured by the 
United Nations to de-colonise Sidi Ifni and Western Sahara. Spain accepted the 
United Nation’s call but wanted the process to be delayed because of the 
underdeveloped nature of the territory. Nevertheless, the United Nations called for a 
referendum on Saharawi independence at the end of 1966.291 The presence of 
phosphate deposits at Bou-Craa was announced in 1962,292 and perhaps because of 
this, Spain stalled on the issue of independence for the territory. Nevertheless, in 
1967, Spain set up the Asamblea General del Sahara (or Djemaa) of Western Sahara. 
This was an assembly of Saharawi notables, which it was aimed would lay the 
foundations for eventual autonomy for the territory under a pro-Spanish Saharawi 
leadership.293 At the same time, Harakat Tahrir Saquia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab 
(the Movement for the Liberation of Saquia el-Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab) was 
founded, agitating for independence from Spain. Its activities were peaceful, but in 
1970, at a protest in the Zemla neighbourhood of El-Ayoun, Spanish Foreign 
Legionnaires fired on the protestors, killing some and arresting many others. The 
founder of the organisation, Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, was immediately 
arrested, and soon after ‘disappeared’. As a result of this ‘Massacre of Zemla’, 
Harakat Tarhrir was duly extinguished.294  
 
At Tan-Tan, in southern Morocco, anti-Spanish demonstrations took place in 1972 
and the United Nations adopted, for the first time, a resolution upholding the right of 
independence for the Saharawi people. In the following year, 1973, phosphate exports 
began from Bou-Craa, and the Polisario Front was founded, led by El-Ouali Mustapha 
Sayed.295 Polisario also formed the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA) at the 
same time,296 and on May 20th, only ten days after its founding, Polisario/SPLA 
committed its first military action against Spanish colonial troops at El-Khanga. In 
1974, internal autonomy plans were announced by Spain for Western Sahara. 
Morocco tried to dissuade Spain from following this route and the King, Hassan, 
announced in August that he could not accept a referendum in the territory if the vote 
included the possibility of independence. Nevertheless, Spain immediately announced 
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that it would hold a referendum within the first half of 1975, but by January 1975 they 
postponed it. The following May, a United Nations Visiting Mission found that the 
majority of people in Western Sahara wanted independence, and by September, Spain 
and Polisario came to a tentative agreement on independence for the territory, if 
economic concessions were granted to Madrid. In October, the Saharawi sheikhs 
declared their backing of the Polisario Front, and four days later, on October 16th, the 
International Court of Justice at the Hague, ruled that territorial claims on Western 
Sahara by both Morocco and Mauritania were unfounded, and that the Western Sahara 
people had a primal right to self-determination. Ignoring this, King Hassan already 
had plans in place for annexing Western Sahara in cooperation with Mauritania. He 
announced his so-called ‘Green March’ on October 17th and it commenced on 
November 6th. This was a supposedly civilian demonstration, which marched into the 
far northwest of the territory, but it was preceded by a Moroccan military invasion 
into the north-most limits of the territory. By November 14th, the Madrid Agreement 
was signed between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, partitioning and handing over 
the colony to Morocco and Mauritania by the end of February 1976 (see Fig. 3.14). 
Generalissimo Franco, who had been seriously ill for some time, died on November 
20th, and a provisional tripartite administration was set up on November 25th by the 
signatories of the Madrid Agreement. Two days later Moroccan troops entered Smara, 
and on the following day, more than 50 percent of the Djemaa, in Guelta Zemmour, 
proclaimed their support for Polisario, and created a Provisional Saharawi National 
Council.297 
 
From November 1975 onwards, there was a steady exodus of Saharawi refugees 
leaving the centres of population for the interior of the territory. Moroccan troops 
entered El-Ayoun in December, and Dakhla in January 1976.298 The soldiers did not 
arrive in a spirit of fraternity, instead they viewed most Saharawi as collaborators of 
the ‘terrorists’ – Polisario.299 Many Saharawi men flocked to join Polisario to 
militarily oppose the invasion of the country. In fact, Polisario was bulwarked by 
former Saharawi colonial troops who became the backbone of their forces. But the 
refugees mainly consisted of women, children and older men, and they continued to 
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move into the badiya, into centres such as Guelta Zemmour, Amgala, Oum-Dreiga, 
Bir Lahlu, Mahbes300 and Tifariti,301 all organised by Polisario. The refugees found 
themselves under aerial attack (which included napalm) by Moroccan forces and their 
safety became a priority for Polisario. With the goodwill of neighbouring Algeria, 
Polisario was able to set up refugee camps outside Tindouf, Algeria (around 53 
kilometres east of the Western Sahara frontier), and there, the Saharawi people 
became a nation in exile.   
 
 
Part 2 
‘Wall upon wall are between us’ 302 
 
Spain’s African Army finally left Western Sahara in January 1976,303 while Morocco 
occupied the northern two thirds of the territory, and Mauritania occupied the southern 
third. This was not a deterrent to Polisario who proclaimed the existence of the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in February 1976304 and vigorously took 
up arms against the occupying armies. By reviving the tactics of the ghazi, they forced 
Mauritania out of the conflict in 1979, and they pushed the Moroccan forces up into 
the northwest corner of the territory, into what was called, the ‘useful triangle’ (see 
Fig. 3.14). To counter this, and to regain their almost lost colony, Morocco embarked 
on the creation of a series of great earthen fortifications, which would literally sculpt 
the desert in a hitherto unseen way. Between 1980 and 1987, the brute force of simple 
earthmoving machines305 carved out a new, Moroccan colonial space in Western 
Sahara. 
 
These earthen fortifications, called ‘berms’ in contemporary military jargon, have put 
a new slant on the concept of mankind inscribing itself on the surface of the earth. 
Here, the power of a territorial authority, in this case Morocco – a colonizing power, 
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with the assistance of modern technology, bulldozers and the like, was able to 
appropriate a land and corral it. The Spanish built forts and outposts to punctuate their 
authority across their colony. These were at unconnected points distributed across the 
territory, all potentially vulnerable by their isolation from each other. But in the 1980s, 
Morocco re-shaped the very earth to lay claim to Western Sahara. Much as in the great 
trench systems of World War I, ‘digging’, in the guise of bulldozing, made a 
comeback, and Morocco embarked on building, that is excavating and earth moving, a 
series of six earth and stone defensive walls which extended in waves from the 
northwest corner of the territory, partitioning Western Sahara with the aim of denying 
the fighters of the Polisario access to around four fifths of the country (see Fig. 3.15).  
 
The use of continuous, fortified barriers to deny territory to an enemy was not a new 
idea. The greatest example from antiquity is the Great Wall of China, and in Britain, 
there are the Roman examples of Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall, the latter, an 
earthen barrier not that different from the Moroccan berms. As already noted, 19th 
century industrial technology allowed barrier defences to be devised quickly and with 
ease, as shown by the use of barbed wire in anti-insurgency measures in Cuba, and in 
South Africa. But the First World War took the use of barbed wire and excavated 
defences to a new level of complexity and land coverage. 
 
When writing about pre 19th century field fortifications and siege works, and in 
particular, Renaissance period sieges against artillery fortresses, Paul Hirst has noted: 
 
The besiegers… had to behave as if they were besieged and to erect fortifications that 
were often as elaborate, if temporary, as those they confronted. Sieges thus involved 
an immense amount of digging. They created ephemeral structures that are fascinating 
in their own right but that have been ignored by architectural historians.306 
 
Hirst goes on to describe them as ‘disposable architecture’, and as ‘inventive’ as some 
1960s ‘radical’ architecture. These ‘spider’s web[s] of earthworks’, though temporary, 
were as elaborate and ‘costly in human effort’ as the very fortresses that were under 
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attack.307 These offensive, though also defensive, siege works evolved into the trench 
systems of World War I, which  
 
were simply versions of the saps and parallels of the old siegeworks. Over time they 
became more and more elaborate, and concrete bunkers began to appear as the core of 
the strongpoints. Essentially, a sixteenth-century technology was adapted to the 
demands of industrialised warfare.308  
 
When coupled with barbed wire, the continuous trenches of the Western Front became 
a ‘river of steel’, and as such, they came to be viewed as a ‘permanent feature of the 
landscape’ of the war. The 475 mile long wire and excavated obstacles, extending 
from Switzerland to the English Channel, became the perfect solution to the problem 
of ‘preventing human motion’ across space,309 and culminated with the idea that a 
place to be defended was no longer a specific locus, like a town, a fortress or a city, 
but a ‘national territory’.310 This attitude of mind set in motion a great spurt of military 
engineering across the European continent in the post war period, and resulted in the 
construction of massive, defensive networks and barriers. All aimed, in what turned 
out to be a futile effort, to prevent another continent wide European war. 
 
World War Walls 
 
The most impressive of these new national defences was the Maginot Line – devised 
by France to prevent a potential German attack. It consisted of underground concrete 
fortresses, and extensive support facilities, all linked by tunnels. There were also 
numerous bunkers, anti-tank barriers, and barbed wire with landmines. But the 
Maginot Line proper was only 125 miles long, mainly covering the border with 
Germany, though there was also the ‘Little Maginot Line’, facing Italy.311 Because 
France fell to Germany early on in World War II, the Line is often evoked as a symbol 
of that defeat. But in actuality, it was a success, and where the Germans attacked it, it 
did not succumb. Linear defences could work. France fell because of the openness of 
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its border with Belgium and the inability of its army to counter the unanticipated route 
of the German offensive.312 
 
Germany also constructed extensive, linear defences along its eastern and western 
frontiers between the World Wars. There was the West Wall (or Siegfried Line), and 
the East Wall. These consisted of anti-tank barriers, bunkers and heavily reinforced 
underground fortifications. In all, the West Wall was relatively lighter than the East 
Wall, but it had a great depth of formidable obstacles, such as anti-tank ‘dragons 
teeth’, and these eventually came into their own by obstructing the Allies’ advance 
into Germany in 1944.313  
 
Sensing a threat from Germany in the 1930s, the Czechoslovak government 
constructed its own ‘Maginot Line’. There were underground forts and bunkers 
inspired by French examples, but the degree of fortification was variable. 
Nevertheless, they were made almost continuous by anti-infantry barriers (barbed 
wire), and anti-tank obstacles. Though incomplete, they extended along the German, 
Austrian and Hungarian borders, but they never fired a shot in anger, and 
Czechoslavakia was occupied by Germany in early 1939.314 
 
In the 1920s and 30s, Finland constructed a system of linear fortifications along the 
Karelian Isthmus in an attempt to thwart Soviet aggression. Known as the 
Mannerheim line, it ran roughly east to west and was approximately 130 kilometres in 
length. It mainly consisted of bunkers – of stone, wood or concrete – and trenches 
were a key element. There were also anti-tank obstacles. The system was not 
continuous, and its defensiveness depended on the abilities of the soldiers manning it. 
At the end of the Winter War with the Soviet Union in 1940, the Finns commenced 
construction on the Salpa Line, this time along their eastern border with the Soviets 
from the Gulf of Finland to the Barents Sea. The line consisted of entrenchments, and 
bunkers of various types, some armed with tank turrets. There were also anti-tank 
obstacles and mine fields. The Salpa Line was stronger than the Mannerheim Line but 
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it was never completed. Both lines also relied on natural obstacles such as forests, 
lakes and rocky terrain.315 
 
These linear defensive systems were all based on the premise that they would have to 
deter a modern industrial aggressor. The presumption was that the offensive 
technology developed during, and after, the First World War, would be hurled at them 
in terms of unlimited and total war – with mass troop movements, long range heavy 
artillery, tanks, and aerial bombardment. All in a potential war, not that dissimilar to 
the world conflict described by H.G. Wells in his alternative, futuristic history, The 
Shape of Things to Come.316 In effect, these defences were designed for ‘big wars’. 
This appellation is not made to trivialise the awesome destruction of modern industrial 
warfare, but the term is used here to highlight the difference between our 
understanding of unlimited war and small, or ‘little wars’. 
 
‘Little War’ Walls 
 
The term petite guerre, or ‘little war’, came into use in the eighteenth century. It was 
coined to describe the irregular ways of fighting encountered by traditional European 
armies in North America and Central and Eastern Europe. The tactics of North 
American colonials and Native Americans in the late 17th century confounded 
traditional militarists, as did the behaviour of Eastern European irregulars from the 
Hungarian-Turkish marches and the Polish plains. Such ‘partisans’ were perceived 
more as ‘spectres than soldiers’, especially in their abilities to cover great distances, to 
strike and run, and to terrorize populations.317 The Arab ghazi fits very well with this. 
Today, for example, we call the fighters of little wars ‘guerrillas’ (from the Spanish 
for ‘little war’), ‘partisans’ and even ‘terrorists’, and little wars have become 
‘insurgencies’, ‘irregular warfare’ and ‘special operations’. In turn, little wars in the 
20th century in colonial North Africa and Indochina, and even the Arabian peninsular, 
not to mention the Arab-Israeli conflict, have spawned further developments in the 
application of linear barrier defences, and some of these are briefly described below. 
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Libya 
Before World War Two, Italy finally crushed all resistance to its occupation of Libya 
in the Italian-Sanusi War of 1923-31. Besides undertaking a war of attrition that 
exhausted all tribal opposition, especially in Cyrenaica, the Italians, in 1930, built a 
barbed wire barrier nine metres wide by 1.5 meters high and extending for 320 
kilometres along the border with Egypt, from the Mediterranean to the Great Sand Sea 
that straddles the Libyan-Egyptian border. Its aim, and it was successful in doing so, 
was to cut the rebels off from sanctuaries and sources of supplies in Egypt.318 Such an 
anti-insurgency barrier would not have been out of place in Spanish Cuba, nor in 
South Africa, just a few decades earlier. While ten years later, in World War Two, 
Alan Moorhead described the barrier as ‘Mussolini’s famous fence’ and saw it 
impotently silted up with sand at its southern end, allowing vehicles to drive over it,319 
or in other places, nosed through by British tanks.320  
 
Indochina and Algeria 
A bitter war for independence erupted in Algeria in 1954, and lasted until 1962 when 
Algeria finally won its independence from France. With both Morocco and Tunisia 
already attaining their own independence in 1956, both countries were obvious safe 
havens for insurgents of the Algerian National Liberation Front, and its National 
Liberation Army. After France’s defeat in Indochina in 1954, its military were 
‘baffled by how poorly armed insurgents could defeat a modern army’, and believed 
‘that all insurgencies were part of a global Communist strategy to subvert the West’. 
They concluded, that to stop the flow of fighters and arms, mainly from Tunisia, from 
bolstering the Algerian insurgency, they had to secure the country’s borders by 
devising frontier barriers.  
 
Although the earlier French experience in the ill-fated Indochina war of 1946-54 was 
nationally demoralising, they managed to successfully construct a string of 
fortifications to secure the Tonkin Delta region in northern Vietnam from the 
communist Viet Minh. This was the de Lattre Line,321 a string of 2,200 bunkers and 
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other fortifications. Some could be linked by trenches to become forts, and all were 
surrounded by minefields, barbed wire, and even moats in some instances.322 
  
This barrier concept was applied to Algeria’s borders, though, most famously, along 
the border with Tunisia. Here, the Morice Line was constructed (1957-1958) from the 
Mediterranean to the Sahara. It was essentially an electrified fence of 5,000 volts, 
eight feet high, incorporating a barbed wire apron, and with minefields on both sides. 
Electronic sensors and radar could detect breaks in, and people approaching, the 
barrier, and such surveillance could then direct the fire of howitzer batteries while 
rapid reaction forces would be put into the field. The barrier proved highly successful, 
killing thousands of insurgents within seven months after its completion.323  
 
Vietnam 
The success of the Morice Line was highly attractive to the American military in the 
Vietnam War, and a similar barrier was commenced in 1967 to the south of the 
Demilitarised Zone, between North and South Vietnam. Christened the McNamara 
Line and modelled on the Morice Line, this ‘high tech’, anti-personnel barrier was 
planned to incorporate minefields with cleared ground and barbed wire obstacles, 
sensors, and observation towers, and all supported by manned strong points and fire 
support bases in the rear. But the barrier was never completed, especially when its 
electronic sensors were re-deployed in the extensive defence of Khe Sanh, and the 
Vietcong’s strength south of the barrier had already become too great. Nevertheless, 
the sensor technology proved extremely successful at Khe Sanh, and it showed how 
adaptable it could be, working well in 360 degree applications as well as in linear, 
barrier deployments, as along the Morice Line.324  
 
Oman – Dhofar 
Oman had been ruled as a feudal state from 1932 until 1970, when Qaboos bin Said, 
engineered a near bloodless coup against his father, the Sultan. In the forty or so years 
prior to 1970, animosities developed in the country and these evolved into a Marxist 
rebellion against the Oman government and so-called ‘Western imperialism’ in Oman 
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and the Arabian Gulf.325 The insurgents had supply bases in neighbouring South 
Yemen, and as in Algeria, it was incumbent to prevent rebel traffic across the border. 
To this end, the British military supporting Sultan Qaboos, built a series of fortified 
barriers from the coast up into the mountainous Dhofari hinterland east of the border 
with South Yemen. In the end, four barriers were constructed, made up of barbed wire 
entanglements, booby traps, minefields, fixed patrol bases and artillery positions. 
They were so successful that clean-up operations between the barriers and the South 
Yemen border were easily executed, and the campaign was declared as successfully 
ended by December 1975.326  
 
Suez – Sinai: Return of the Big War Wall 
The lightning Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbours radically 
altered the geo-politics of the Levant by turning Israel into an unrivalled military 
power in the region. Israel also expanded into the ‘West Bank’ of Jordan, the Golan 
Heights (Syria), and the whole of Sinai (Egypt). The war was fought conventionally, 
more in keeping with the concept of a ‘big’ war. The opponents were highly 
mechanized and they all had artillery and modern air forces. 
 
After the war, the newly occupied territories gave Israel a geographic spread of three 
times its pre-war area, and provided it with ‘new boundaries… thought to form the 
strategic enclosure that would buttress the defence of the state’. In line with this, there 
were ‘frenzied and varied attempts at studying and domesticating these territories 
from within and efforts to fortify their edges against counter-attack from the 
outside’.327 Israel was intent on fortifying its new, enlarged borders – it was only a 
question of how. 
 
Through its own tactical inertia in the Six day War, the Israeli army fought its way to, 
and occupied the east bank of the Suez Canal, a formidable barrier in itself to any 
further military advances from Egypt. Although the decision was not unanimous, the 
Israeli premier wanted to keep the canal and even close it to shipping, with the aim of 
forcing the Egyptians to sign a peace treaty favourable to Israel. It was also proposed 
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that the east bank of the canal be fortified with a series of strongholds that could 
withstand continual artillery fire. These evolved, during the War of Attrition with 
Egypt (1968-71), into an immense barrier system328 – the Bar Lev Line – which 
became operational in 1969. 
  
At the base of the barrier was the entirety of the Suez Canal, stretching approximately 
200 kilometres from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez, and described as ‘one of 
the best anti-tank ditches in the world’.329 Above it, Israeli military engineers 
mustered that earth-moving stalwart – the bulldozer – to carve out and fashion a new, 
linear, monumental landscape above the east bank of the waterway. This was a great 
earthen rampart, up to 25 metres high, that rose form the water’s edge at an angle of 
45 to 65 degrees,330 peppered with landmines and fronted with barbed wire.331 Such a 
singular moulding of the face of the earth for military purposes had probably not been 
undertaken since the digging of the great trench systems of the First World War, and it 
would not be surpassed until the construction of the Moroccan berms in Western 
Sahara. Behind this barrier, and incorporated within it were forts, called Maozim 
(Hebrew for ‘castle keep’). Thirty-one were planned, but only seventeen were 
constructed.332 Their sizes averaged out at 200 metres by 350 metres.333 They were 
surrounded by barbed wire entanglements and land mines, and internally, they had 
accommodation blocks, medical facilities, ammunition stores, observation posts, 
command bunkers, mortar and anti-aircraft positions. Their traces were delineated by 
sandbagged entrenchments which could be covered, and these included weapons 
firing pits and machine gun bunkers.334 The forts were supposed to be spaced every 
ten kilometres or so, with their garrisons being able to observe about half that distance 
during the day, thereby covering all of the ground between them. But night time was a 
problem, since the supplied electronic sensors proved unreliable.335 
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In 1969, Arial Sharon (Chief of the Israeli Southern Command) reinforced the line 
with an additional network of inland strong points, Taozim (to be differentiated from 
Maozim), around 12 kilometres east of the canal, and disposed on tactically important 
hills. Each semi-independent stronghold was able to support its neighbours, and they 
were supplemented by mobile troops, tank battalions, and the Israeli air force. The 
plan also included the creation of an expanded network of link roads. Again, the 
bulldozer was put into action, and the desert was carved up into a militarised space. 
‘The western Sinai Desert was fashioned by Sharon into a future battlefield, and the 
desert seemed to Sharon to be perfect for this; it contained military installations, 
bases, roads and minefields, with no civilians to disturb the war game’.336 
 
The Bar Lev line appeared indestructible during the War of Attrition when it came 
under nearly daily Egyptian bombardment, and no positions were evacuated or 
irreparably damaged. The line only fell during the October War of 1973 by the failure 
of the Israelis to keep it maintained and properly manned, and by the ingenuity of the 
Egyptian military. The Egyptians successfully crossed the canal in an amphibious 
assault. They broke their way through the great earthen bank of the line by carving out 
gaps with high pressure water hoses, fed from the canal by high capacity pumps. 
These eroded the 20 metre high sand banks into slurry, in gaps that were then neatly 
bulldozed clear, allowing the Egyptians to successfully attack and over run all of the 
Maozim. The Egyptians won the battle for the Bar Lev line, but in the end, the Israelis 
held on to most of Sinai. They quickly moved enough troops and armour up to the 
canal, and succeeded in preventing the different prongs of the Egyptian attack from 
consolidating their front. At the end of hostilities, the Egyptians occupied most of the 
east bank of the canal, while the Israelis succeeded in crossing it and occupying a 
small part of ‘Africa’ in Egypt.337  
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a brief introduction to the land and people of Western 
Sahara. It has also explored some of the ways in which colonial spaces – both Spanish 
                                                 
336 Weizman 2007: 64-68. 
337 For succinct descriptions of the Egyptian attack on the Bar Lev Line see Dunstan 2008: 46-55, and 
Weizman 2007: 71-77 
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and Moroccan – have been shaped in Western Sahara, and it has given examples of 
the ways in which spaces of colonialism and occupation elsewhere, particularly in the 
context of conflict, have been carved out and shaped by the will of nations, armies and 
individuals. The transfiguring of the earth can start quite simply in the digging up of 
natural materials, for example mud, from which bricks can be made, or in the piling 
up of stones, both of which can be used to create walls. With brute strength, 
earthworks can be raised and trenches dug, but with the advent of earth moving 
machines, whole landscapes could be altered relatively quickly. From the building of 
desert outposts in the Sahara to the construction of the monumental Bar Lev Line, 
land has been appropriated, contested and fought over. And in Western Sahara, there 
exists the largest example of a fortified military barrier created in modern history – in 
fact, probably the largest appropriation of land by bulldozer to date. By the very way 
in which Morocco sought to regain territory lost to the Polisario up to 1980, through 
the very sculpting of the earth to create a series of earth and stone walls, they 
partitioned the very territory they appropriated. They constructed ‘the berm’ and 
created a matrix of exclusion. 
 
Frantz Fanon has pertinently written that, ‘the colonial world is a world divided into 
compartments’.338 In the desert landscape of Western Sahara this is exemplified by the 
‘Moroccan wall’ – ‘the berm’ – though more appropriately: ‘the berms’. Morocco’s 
weakness in the face of Polisario fighters, especially after 1979, forced them to adopt 
this extreme, defensive posture. They withdrew all of their garrisons and outposts up 
into the northwest of the territory – taking in the Bou-Craa phosphate works, Smara, 
and the capital El-Ayoun – into what became known as the ‘useful triangle’.339 
Chapter 4 outlines the sequence of construction of Morocco’s berms – six in total, and 
all constructed between 1980 and 1987. Its aim is to describe the materiality, and 
shear monumentality of the walls, and their imprint on the desert landscape.  
 
 
 
                                                 
338 Fanon [1961] 1968: 37.  
339 Hacene-Djaballah 1985: 105. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TOWARDS AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE BERMS 
 
Part 1 
 
I had heard any number of stories about the wall, its size, its character and aspect, but 
none of them prepared me for this cryptic blemish on the body of the desert. I had 
imagined a structure that would be visible from a long way off; the bases situated… 
along its length would surely dominate the landscape. The whole thing would rise out 
of the desert, effortless and magisterial. But... it required hard work with the 
binoculars and guidance from the local Polisario commander to pick out the defence 
at all. In the event, it was a thin band of pallor standing out from the rest of the terrain, 
which was darker by a shade. At the crest of a hill where the defence rose with the 
contours of the land, there was a base, a wide circle of ground, paler still.340 
Jeremy Harding 
 
Studying the Moroccan Berms 
 
The history of military defensive barriers in the 20th century, as outlined in Chapter 3, 
clearly shows that Morocco’s adoption of a barrier defence was not a new one. But its 
novelty has been in its size and monumentality. In six sweeping movements, the 
Moroccans created, as already quoted from Hirst, a ‘spider’s web of earthworks’, 
measuring approximately 4000 kilometres across virtually 80 percent of the territory 
of Western Sahara. By mimicking the success of the Morice Line – incorporating 
electronic surveillance – and by replacing barbed wire fencing with single and 
multiple earthen banks, and incorporating extensive fields of landmines, the 
Moroccans have set out to defend what they perceive as a large part of their national 
territory, and to prevent the movement of people across space; to exclude one group of 
people – Saharawi nationalists – from the settled areas of Moroccan occupied Western 
Sahara. To this end, the berms have become an indelible, transfiguring inscription on 
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the land, crossing great expanses of open desert, following the contours of mountains, 
and cutting off wadi systems which would have been used as routeways, and as 
pasturage, for millennia. 
 
Morocco built its series of defensive barriers between August 1980 and April 1987. 
Antecedents already existed defending El-Ayoun, Smara, Dakhla, Boujdour and the 
phosphate works at Bou-Craa,341 but the success of Polisario in forcing Morocco to 
withdraw from most of the territory, save the useful triangle (see Fig. 3.14), caused 
them to develop the system even further, and to use the barriers as a means of clawing 
back territory. According to a Polisario spokesman, Morocco conceived the idea of 
building a barrier system from the Israelis,342 though advice on its construction 
allegedly came from France and the United States as well.343 
 
Throughout this matrix of earth and stone embankments, which can be up to 4 metres 
in height,344 there are almost 2000 military installations. These include mural forts, 
rear defence forts, fire support artillery bases, observation posts, mustering positions, 
and garrison camps in the rear. There are anti-vehicular ditches, cordons of barbed 
wire and mine fields. At least 120,000 Moroccan soldiers have manned the 
defences.345 All mustered to keep at bay an estimated Saharawi force of 6000 Polisario 
fighters346 whose main tactic has been the long range ghazi, though in the second half 
of the twentieth century, a highly motorized one. In the light of this, and when 
considering the massive efforts taken by the Moroccans to defend their occupied 
territory, by using a ‘big war’ solution against ‘little war’ tactics, their efforts have 
been highly disproportionate – like trying to swat a fly with a very large hammer. 
 
Charting and Describing the Berms  
 
The aim in this chapter is to come to an understanding of how, as military defences 
and monuments, the barriers have left their mark on, and have partitioned, the Western 
                                                 
341 Pazzanita, 2006: 91. Zunes and Mundy also note the construction of defences around Dakhla 
between 1982-1984, see their Map, p.7. 
342 Muhammed Fadel, Interview. 
343 Habua Breica, Interview. 
344 Pazzanita 2006: 91-93. 
345 Pazzanita 2006: 91-93. 
346 Cordesman 2002: 90.  
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Saharan landscape, and concomitantly (continuing in Chapter 5) how people have 
confronted them, both militarily and otherwise. It must be kept in mind that the 
landscape of the barriers is still actively militarized – the barriers are still in use. Even 
so, the berms have a material presence that can still be studied by a relatively 
straightforward archaeological approach. But before I describe this, I will give an 
overview of what is presently known about the berms through published maps and 
written accounts. The purpose being to illustrate, as noted in Chapter 1, that the 
renderings of the berms in the accounts of virtually all commentators on the Western 
Sahara conflict are overly generalized, incomplete and inconsistent, and that the 
materiality of the barriers has become obscured and marginalized. They have become 
a taken for granted, while analysts have homed in on the geo-politics of the conflict. 
As Buchli and Lucas might say, they have become ‘unconstituted’. 
 
Studying the Berms – Published Maps  
A small number of cartographic representations of the Moroccan berms, and the final 
limit of the barrier demarcating the Moroccan occupied zone from the Polisario 
controlled, ‘liberated’, zone exist in print and on the internet. Unfortunately, since 
they are all generalisations, they do not represent the extent of the barriers in any way 
that can be considered precise. For instance, the United Nations’ own map, posted on 
the internet, does not show the barrier extending into Mauritanian territory at the 
junction of the Western Saharan panhandle (Saguia Al-Hamra) and the southern two 
thirds of the country (Rio D’Oro) thereby dividing the Polisario controlled zone in 
two.347  However, this is more correctly shown by Land Mine Action (LMA), now 
known as Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), on maps on their website, and in their 
published documentation.348 Two of the more recently published maps showing all of 
the berms are also very simplified. The first, by Zunes and Mundy in 2010,349 is 
probably one of the better of any generalised, published map to date. It has been 
compiled from a number of earlier sources, and although schematic, it clearly shows 
all of the phases of the different barriers’ construction. It shows defences around 
Dakhla, and it tries to show what it considers to be the full extent of the first barrier 
                                                 
347 MINURSO 2014.  
348 AOAV 2008. Other relevant AOAV reports are available on their website at: http://aoav.org.uk/ 
accessed 4 April 2014. 
349 Zunes and Mundy 2010: 7. 
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through southern Morocco, and surrounding the useful triangle. However, it differs 
markedly from the mapping compiled for this research. 
 
The second, more recently published map, also in 2010, has been presented by San 
Martin.350 Like the Zunes and Mundy map it shows the barrier encroaching on 
Mauritanian territory, but its delineation of the first berm extends to the south of 
Bojdour. This is contrary to the Zunes and Mundy map, which shows the western end 
of the first barrier as situated north of Bojdour. Both maps show the second berm 
extending to the south of Bojdour, while in an earlier map of 1985, Belkacem Hacene-
Djaballah351 shows the second barrier as an enclosure extending southeastwards from 
the Smara to the Bou-Craa portion of the first berm. Although Hacene-Djaballah’s 
map does not show the second barrier as encroaching into Mauritania, she shows it as 
hugging the border, and thereby, still dividing the Polisario controlled zone in two. A 
map published three years later, by Tusa,352 shows all of the barriers relatively clearly. 
However, it does not show the barrier passing through Mauritania (though it hugs the 
border), and it mistakenly shows one of the barriers as taking in Tifariti, which has 
never been the case. All in all, one of the better maps of the Moroccan berms (though 
still very schematic) was published in 2005, by Fuente Cobo and Mariño 
Menéndez.353 Like the later Zunes and Mundy map, it shows the phasing of the 
barriers quite clearly, but it still does not show the barriers as definitively encroaching 
on Mauritanian territory, nor does it include the Dakhla defences.  
 
One thing is certain, and that is that the maps readily available for Western Sahara, 
showing the partitioning of the country, are essentially sketch maps, and they must be 
viewed as such. Only a more detailed mapping of the barrier system will allow its 
faithful description. Even written depictions of the berms are inadequate since they are 
usually short, and highly generalized. Some of these accounts are described below.  
 
Studying the Berms – Written Accounts 
When describing the Moroccan berms, almost all commentators agree that they 
include single, and/or multiple sand, or earth and stone embankments, that there are 
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minefields in front of the barriers with cordons of barbed wire, that forts are disposed 
along the walls, that there are artillery installations, and that electronic sensors (radar 
and the like) are deployed. Such a summary description was provided by Wenger, in 
1982, when writing about Morocco’s first berm from the Zini Mountains to Bou-
Craa.354 However, it is in the details about the barriers’ construction and make up 
where most writers dealing with the Western Sahara disagree, and present conflicting 
and contradictory information. 
 
Hodges’ account of 1983, though like Wenger’s, added a height dimension for the 
berms – up to three yards – and he also pointed out the presence of Moroccan army 
reserves stationed behind the barriers with the potential to repel Polisario attacks.355 
The first barrier securing the useful triangle, was portrayed by Damis as ‘Morocco’s 
Great Wall’. He described it as seven feet high and fronted by a ditch, around twenty-
three feet wide. Besides barbed wire, mines, and ‘special’ radar, he noted that the 
barrier’s observation posts and ‘fortified bases of operations’ were disposed 
differentially according to the lie of the land. Once a sizable portion of the barrier was 
built, the Moroccans added further fortifications to it. Damis also described the berm 
as an ‘anti-vehicular sand barrier’ and a ‘trap for vehicles’, and pointed out that if 
Polisario succeeded in breaking through the barrier, it would inhibit their fast escape 
back across it. The barrier was constructed with bulldozers, protected by the 
Moroccan Army’s mobile, ‘Zallaqa’ brigade.356 
 
‘A great wall of sand’ is how Lewis described the berms in 1985. Besides the mines 
and regularly placed sensing devices, ‘artillery units were deployed at critical 
locations, small forts were interspersed, and mobile columns were stationed at main 
centres to reinforce units located at or near the wall’.357 According to Dean, the 
Moroccans referred to their defences, as a ceinture, a ‘belt’. Besides fortified 
positions, mines and radar posts, there were strong points with ‘mobile reaction units, 
and… quick access to air power based at El-Ayoun’.358 Seddon, in 1987, specifically 
noted some of the architectural elements associated with the berms, in particular, 
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‘artillery placements and observation posts.., protective dug-outs’, and ‘elaborate 
underground quarters for the troops’ manning the barrier along its entire length.359 
 
Visiting the Polisario controlled zone in 1986, Harding expected to see a barrier made 
up of formidable, concrete forts, visible over fifty miles or so. But when he actually 
saw the wall, he could only make out a low-lying, pale strip of ground in the distance. 
The forts, which he had heard so much about, appeared only like ‘a wide circle of 
ground, lighter in colour than the rest of the wall’.360 However, in the region east of 
Smara, Harding presented a more detailed, ground level view of the wall: 
 
It consisted of two sand-and-rubble parapets, three to four metres high, one behind the 
other. These were separated by an alley where mobile artillery and armoured 
personnel carriers could be deployed. Every twenty miles or so was a base, between 
the bases a series of alarm-points, each with roughly forty men. On the other side of 
the wall there were larger bases with still more troops. The radar and the sophisticated 
surveillance equipment were said to be sited on the wall itself, with the ground 
sensors in front. In some sections there was a barbed wire terrace and a random 
scattering of land-mines.361 
 
Brazier, visiting Tifariti in 1998, got close to the berm and described it literally as a 
one and a half metres high ‘pile of rubble’. Polisario informed him that there were 
Moroccan bases placed at five kilometre intervals, with 80 to 90 soldiers each, and 
there were ‘watch posts’ positioned halfway between them. There were mine fields in 
front and behind the barriers, and Moroccan soldiers passed through the rear 
minefields along throughways referred to as ‘bridges’ by his Polisario informants.362  
 
Cordesman referred to the Moroccan berms as ‘Hassan’s Walls’.363 He described the 
barriers as two metres high, with barbed wire and mines. The Moroccan army manned 
‘over 300 strong points on and behind the wall’, and these were supported by ‘mobile 
desert strike units, firebases, attack helicopters and air support forces, and 20 ground 
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surveillance radar bases and other sensors’.364 In 2004, Forced Migration Online 
described the berms as having an estimated one to two million anti-tank and anti-
personnel mines with 100,000 to 200,000 troops manning the barrier. They also noted 
240 heavy artillery units stationed every ten kilometres or so along the barrier, and all 
equipped with ‘sophisticated surveillance equipment’.365 
 
The Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara described the berms as two parallel lines 
of embankments, around three to four metres high, and bulldozed out of the earth. 
They included parking areas and revetments for Moroccan armour and artillery, along 
with ‘foxholes and trenches’ for the troops, and with barbed wire and other obstacles 
fronting the barriers. The Dictionary uses the term ‘blockhouse’ (postes avancés) to 
describe positions manned by 600 to 800 troops, and positioned at approximate ten 
kilometre intervals along the wall, with further detachments of 100 to 200 troops 
positioned in sonnettes every three to four kilometres between them.366 The numbers 
of soldiers noted here, as manning the individual fortifications, is markedly different 
from the smaller numbers quoted by both Harding and Brazier. 
 
Laschi notes the barrier as being three metres high by two metres wide, with its main 
protection made up of ‘circular forts’ with garrisons of approximately 200 troops. On 
either side of these there are smaller forts with around twenty soldiers each. The 
minefield fronting the berm is described as extending 400 metres, while ‘behind the 
wall, at a distance of 5-6 km, there are artillery units, a dense network of radar 
screens, armoured vehicles, jeeps and all the equipment necessary for the 
reinforcement divisions’.367 
 
The latest description of Morocco’s ‘great wall’ is by Zunes and Mundy. They state 
that in 1981 ‘Polisario reported that it had engaged Moroccan forces constructing a 
large “earthwork defense system.” During the fight, the SPLA blew up several 
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“earthmoving machines” that were digging a double-walled trench’.368 They go on to 
describe the wall in very generalised terms, just stating that its earth and stone 
embankments are three to six feet high, and that they are topped with barbed wire, and 
heavily mined on the Polisario side. Besides ‘sophisticated electronic sensing 
devices’, it is ‘guarded by an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Moroccan soldiers, either 
in frontal guard positions or in rapid-reaction bases’.369 
 
The summaries presented above, represent the type of baseline data about the berms 
that most commentators and analysts rely upon and employ. Obviously, the authors 
are not interested in the material manifestations of the Western Sahara conflict, but 
instead, with the geo-political history and machinations of the hostile parties, their 
allies and supporters, so perhaps, more precise descriptions of the Moroccan walls 
should not be expected. Also, their accounts may only reflect the quality of their 
sources. Nevertheless, a thorough understanding of the materiality of the conflict is 
not well served by this insufficiency of detail.  The partitioning of Western Sahara is a 
prime determinant inscribed on the land in the contested space of the territory, and the 
study and characterisation of the Moroccan barrier system – the berms – requires 
better descriptions, analyses, and improved mapping. This chapter, and the next, shall 
amend this, and it will do so by looking at the berms with an archaeological 
sensibility, as artefacts on the land. And in keeping with the tenets of an archaeology 
of the present, this dissertation will retrieve them from the periphery, and bring them 
back into focus. To draw upon Gonzáles-Ruibal, they will become ‘unconcealed’.  
 
A ‘Virtual’ Survey of the Berms 
 
If one could walk up to the barrier that is now the definitive dividing line between the 
Moroccan controlled part of Western Sahara and the Polisario’s liberated zone, and if 
it were a ruin – like any traditionally conceived archaeological feature – then it could 
be measured, surveyed, its disposition in the landscape could be assessed, and its 
constituent parts could be studied and recorded. All of this data could be collated and 
put into a GIS and interrogated in an attempt to understand its growth and distributed 
characteristics, its placement in the landscape, its workings as both an offensive and 
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defensive barrier, and as a manifestation of political control writ large across an entire 
country. But this is not the case. Land mines are distributed in front of the barrier, it is 
manned by military garrisons, and there are strict terms governing access to the barrier 
laid down by the United Nations ceasefire agreement of 1991. Also, as linear features, 
all of the barriers extend over a total of approximately 4,000 kilometers. An 
archaeology at such a macro scale requires a bird’s eye view – some form of remote 
sensing – and aerial photography or satellite imagery is unquestionably required. By 
drawing upon the archaeological examples cited in Chapter 2, the berms can be 
‘virtually’ surveyed as distinct entities, and groups of entities in the landscape. To this 
end Google Earth has been employed, and through its use this dissertation probably 
represents the first ever archaeological analysis of a complex of features – the berms – 
at such a countrywide scale.  
 
Google Earth provides both high and low-resolution satellite imagery for Western 
Sahara. The disposition of all of the berms, and associated features, can be seen on 
both types of coverage, but there are many instances on the low-resolution imagery 
where details are poorly defined. Therefore, the imagery that can be used most 
effectively is the high resolution Digital Globe (and/or Geo-Eye) imagery which has 
sub-metre resolution per pixel, but which only covered, at the beginning of this 
research in 2010, an estimated 10 to 15 percent of the country (see Fig. 4.1).370 This is 
not viewed as a problem, since it would be an overwhelming task to attempt to study 
the entirety of the berms. In fact, the limited coverage of the country by high 
resolution imagery acts as something akin to a clustered sampling mechanism, 
allowing a practicable portion of the berms to be studied, and for generalisations to be 
made from appropriately selected locations. 
 
 
With Google Earth as a base, it is very easy to plot the disposition of all of Morocco’s 
barriers across Western Sahara (Fig. 4.2 shows the general disposition of the different 
berms with Google Earth imagery as a backdrop, while Fig. 4.3 shows the berms 
overlaying a Spanish military map of 1960371). The method for charting the 
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delineations, or ‘traces’, of the berms is very straightforward. Google Earth has a line 
drawing facility, called a ‘path’ tool, and by selecting it a line can be drawn 
(digitised), and properties can be ascribed to it. Every plotted line segment was given 
a unique numeric (or alphanumeric) designation, and a very brief, one or two word 
description, usually noting whether or not a berm was single, double, or multiple 
embanked, and/or with additional configurations of multiple banks (see Fig. 4.4). 
Additional qualitative observations were also added in some instances. The traces 
created in Google Earth were saved as Google Earth KML files, and they were 
imported into the free, open source GIS, Quantum GIS (QGIS). Once imported, they 
were converted into ‘shape’ files – the commonest file format in GISs. The length of 
each trace could also be tabulated in the GIS, and the total length of all of the berms 
(excluding the defences around Dakhla and the earlier defences around Smara and 
Bou-Craa) came to 3822 kilometres. Of course, the barrier system is not complete. 
Natural features are incorporated, as for example, in the mountainous region north of 
Guelta Zemmour. Here the barrier consists of forts and artillery bases only, positioned 
amidst the hills and troughs of a naturally interdigitated terrain. The lengths of such 
un-walled sections, undoubtedly boosts the overall length of all of the territorial 
barriers to over 4000 kilometres. 
 
Once the linear traces of the berms were digitised, the forts and other fortifications, 
and installations, had to be plotted, also in Google Earth. This was done with Google 
Earth’s ‘place mark’ tool. The position of each installation was marked, and described 
by a code representing its type, based on a visual inspection. The ‘types’ of forts and 
installations included; mural forts; forts in the rear; mural forts with integral firebases; 
mural forts with firebases subsequently added; small mural forts (described as 
fortlets); small occupied positions (specific to Berm No. 4),372 non-mural fire support 
bases; non-mural, and mural compounds; and garrisons or camps set behind the berms 
and usually without a defensive enclosure. Not all of the features associated with the 
barriers were plotted, such as individual artillery gun pits and vehicular, or ‘tank’ 
slots, and small bastion like positions (under 50m in size) found along some parts of 
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the berms, usually without internal features.373 The table in Fig. 4.5 provides basic 
descriptive information on the types of installations recorded (with their descriptive 
codes). This simple plotting by type was then imported into QGIS, and converted to 
shape files. Longitude and latitude coordinates were also generated. This ‘virtual’ 
survey has recorded at least 1,820 military installations on, or associated with the 
Moroccan barriers. Nevertheless, the plots created of the berms and their associated 
installations should not be presumed to be exhaustive. The low resolution Google 
Earth imagery can appear unfocussed in places, making it hard to discern the details of 
features. There is also the possibility of human error, whereby some features or 
installations have simply been missed out during the plotting process.                                                                                                    
 
‘Snapshooting’ the Berms 
With Western Sahara traversed by thousands of kilometres of barriers, and with close 
to 2000 associated military installations – many of which could share the same 
characteristics – a practical way of illustrating and describing the barriers, through 
samples, or ‘snapshots’, had to be devised. The first notion was to compile an 
expanded inventory of all of the features associated with the berms, based on the 
original digitisations from Google Earth, but only in those areas covered by high-
resolution imagery. This proved too time consuming, and it soon became obvious that 
it would create data far above the needs of this dissertation as it is structured. As a 
result, a sampling strategy was devised incorporating grided sample areas – rectangles 
– measuring twenty-five kilometres east to west, by twenty-eight kilometres north to 
south.374 Only those rectangles, located over Google Earth’s high resolution imagery, 
and including the berms were then selected, and out of them, a 50 percent random 
sample was made, along with some purposively selected deletions and additions. This 
resulted in a total of up to 22 rectangles from which descriptive examples, as 
‘snapshots’, of the berms and associated installations could be selected (see Fig. 
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4.6).375 Such examples of Google Earth, high-resolution imagery of berm lengths and 
installations, taken from these sample areas are incorporated throughout Parts 1 and 2 
of this chapter. These ‘snapshots’ are integral to the text, and they clearly illustrate the 
materiality of the berms in a surprisingly direct way. GIS examples, or ‘snapshots’, 
generated in QGIS, have also been based on, and around, the randomly selected 
sampling rectangles, and they too illustrate this chapter.                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Additional Cartography 
Besides Google Earth, and as already noted above, Spanish military mapping from 
1960 has been employed in this research. Although the scale is only 1:2,000,000 it has 
been very useful in providing names of places and natural features, and in clearly 
illustrating the topography of the territory.  Some Soviet Russian mapping has been 
consulted too, and used as background mapping. Russian maps were produced during 
the Cold War for many of the landmasses on the planet, and the coverage for Western 
Sahara is of a reasonable quality.376 French mapping of 1945, republished by the 
United States military,377 has also been occasionally consulted, but only for 
comparative purposes with the Spanish mapping. 
 
Chronology and Outline Descriptions of the Territorial Berms 
 
Disposition of Berm No. 1 
Writing in 1979, John Mercer noted: 
 
Moroccan energies, after the initial phase [of the conflict], were concentrated on 
defence fortification, the main posts being ringed with concentric trenching and 
                                                 
375 These rectangular ‘snapshot’ areas were created, numbered and randomly selected in QGIS. Their 
numeric designations are: 28*, 62*, 92*, 100, 124, 126, 157, 187, 215, 221*, 248, 359, 482, 491, 520, 
549, 553, 583, 850, 853, 854, 952**. Rectangles numbers with ‘*’ represent those that were 
additionally, and purposively, selected to cover regions not included in the initial random sample of 
rectangles, and 952** is a rectangle that was manually positioned over berm four, in Morocco, near the 
border with Algeria. There are instances where the randomly selected rectangles lay only partially over 
Google Earth high resolution imagery. Where this has occurred, as in the case of Berm No. 2 (and for 
part of Berm No. 1) its sampled ‘snapshot’ has been taken outside of the nearby rectangles (see Fig. 
4.11).  
376 The full range of available Russian Soviet mapping for Western Sahara, produced between 1980 and 
1987 (as noted on individual map sheets), is available at: http://mapstor.com/map-sets/country-
maps/western-sahara.html. It should be noted, however, that the berms do not appear on the maps. This 
suggests, and it would not be surprising, that the data for the maps was compiled prior to the 
commencement of the building of the berms. 
377 U.S. Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers, 1958. 
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barbed wire. From time to time a large contingent crosses the open desert, either on a 
supply run or to help another post under siege by the Sahrawis. For these Moroccan 
troops, now comparatively aware of the true nature of the conflict, the war, like the 
desert, must appear, endless, barren, difficult to survive: they have every reason to 
think back with bitterness of their fervour during the ‘victory [Green] march’.378 
 
With the precedent of large defended areas already established, at Smara and Bou-
Craa, the Moroccans embarked in August 1980 on the construction of its first 
defensive territorial barrier – Berm No. 1. The aim of this wall was to defend Smara, 
El-Ayoun and Bou-Craa, and to exclude Polisario fighters from the northwest corner 
of Western Sahara – the ‘useful triangle’. The barrier was built in two phases. The 
first phase, Part 1 (from Jebel Zini to Bou-Craa), started at the southern end of the 
Jebel Zini massif, at the western end of the Ouarkziz Mountains, south-southwest of 
Tan-Tan, and around 140 kilometres east-southeast of Tarfaya (Cape Juby). The 
barrier extended southwards into Western Sahara territory and its first stretch reached 
Smara by March 2nd 1981. It was extended to Bou-Craa by May 11th of the same 
year, where it linked up with the Phosphate works’ earlier perimeter defences that led 
to the coast, southwest of El-Ayoun. The second phase of the barrier, Part 2 (from 
Bou-Craa to the Atlantic), was completed by May 1982 with the berm reaching the 
sea south of Bojdour.379  
 
Zunes and Mundy have presented the first berm as initially extending from Zag, close 
to Morocco’s border with Algeria, where a salient of defences was created in May 
1980, just two months prior to the commencement of the barrier southwards from 
Jebel Zini.380 It includes the southern escarpment of the Ouarkziz Mountains, upon 
which (according to Google Earth imagery), there are no defences of any kind. Tusa, 
and Laschi, also consider the very first berm as extending across the Ouarkziz 
Mountains from Zag, but it is the intention here to treat Berm No. 1 as only starting 
from Jebel Zini, in line with the majority of the published accounts already 
summarised, of which Zunes and Mundy, Laschi, and Tusa are the only exceptions.381 
 
                                                 
378 Mercer 1979: 12. 
379 Seddon, 1987: 105 and Hodges 1983: 289-290 
380 Hodges, 1983: 288-289. 
381 Zunes and Mundy 2010: 7, Laschi 2009: 139, and Tusa 1988: 40-41. 
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Berm No.1 – the first of the territorial berms – is shown in Fig. 4.7. Part 1 of the 
barrier (as already noted) starts on low ground beneath the southwest end of the Jebel 
Zini massif, at an elevation of around 230 metres. Above it is the spur-like Ras el-
Khanfra, where there are forts, enclosures and fire support bases.  
 
Running southwards to Smara (around 110 kilometres away), the barrier rises to the 
300 metre382 contour to which it more or less clings, overlooking the Gaat Chbabien 
depression, at least 100 metres lower, and to the east. The 300 metre contour 
delineates a relatively level area that slopes downwards to the west, and at its southern 
end, the berm drops towards the Saguia al-Hamra, at an elevation of just over 150 
metres, around 15 kilometres north of Smara. The Saguia al-Hamra marks the 
northern limits of the earlier Moroccan defences surrounding the city, made up of two, 
though incomplete, defensive traces. When the berm reaches the Saguia, it partly turns 
to the west for a very short distance, to align with an extension to the earlier Smara 
defences. A gap is preserved between the two, presumably to allow the Saguia to 
drain. But at this point, along the northern bank of the Saguia, the barrier’s main 
course continues east-southeast across it (though leaving another gap for drainage) 
creating a convex, easterly salient around Smara and its earlier defences. At around 19 
kilometres south-southeast of Smara, the barrier turns west-southwest, and an 
extension of it heads backwards, in a northeasterly direction, to join up with the earlier 
defences.  
 
The berm, southwest of Smara, arcs southwards cutting across an undulating terrain. It 
heads towards Bou-Craa, and joins up with the earlier perimeter embankments 
delineating the phosphate works. The Bou-Craa perimeter was not well defended, and 
the trace is mainly a single earthen bank with no substantial strong points. Google 
Earth imagery makes it appear much more like a simple earthen boundary bank, rather 
than a defendable bulwark. Summary statistics for Part 1 of Berm No.1 are shown in 
Fig. 4.8. 
 
Part 2 of the barrier starts at approximately 35 kilometres east-northeast of Bou-Craa, 
as an extension out of the south flank of the Part 1 berm. It descends southwesterly 
                                                 
382 References to heights above sea level should not be considered as absolute values. They are taken 
either from Google Earth or Soviet mapping. 
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again, cutting across wadis and keeping to the high ground where it can. Where it 
resumes a west-northwesterly route, it keeps to the watershed between two wadis 
before it drops into the north-south Wadi El Jat, then climbs onto the southern, portion 
of the Izik plateau. It actually reaches an embayment in the plateau, and its steep sides 
are incorporated into the barrier as a natural feature, though supplemented by cliff-top 
forts. There are also, further trench and berm constructions at the northern end of the 
embayment. 
 
The berm heads west-southwest across a north-south strip of sand dune country, and 
gradually follows the downward sloping terrain, towards the sea. The berm 
incorporates the Sabkhat Aridal as a natural barrier, and then resumes its course to the 
coast, around 28 kilometres south of Bojdour. At 15 kilometres from the coast, it 
bifurcates. A short westerly extension has been added as a secondary barrier, 
terminating at the coast 10 kilometres north of the original berm. Summary statistics 
for Part 2 of Berm No.1 are shown in Fig. 4.9.  
 
Fig. 4.10 tabulates the basic elements for the whole of Berm No. 1. Made up of single, 
double and multiple configurations of embankments (as illustrated in Fig. 4.7), its 
overall length from Jebel Zinni to the Atlantic is 634 kilometres. It is striking that 74% 
of the barrier is made up of single earthen embankments, while natural barriers 
account for 16%, leaving 10% made up of double and multiple configurations of 
embankments. As Fig. 4.7 indicates, there are double and multiple embankments 
along the ‘front’ of the Smara salient (27 kilometres in length), while there is another 
double embanked section of 13 kilometres between Bou-Craa and Smara, and another 
double and multiple embanked section overlooking the Gaat Chbabien, at 23 
kilometres in length. As a broad indicator of density of military installations along and 
behind the entirety of Berm No.1, and excluding the installations constructed at an 
earlier date in and around Smara, there is one installation for every two kilometre of 
built (and natural) barrier.383  
 
                                                 
383 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.1 at 634 kms (including natural barriers) from Jebel 
Zinni to the Atlantic coast, divided by the total number of installations, numbering 325, resulting in a 
density of one installation for every 1.95 km of barrier.  
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Forts (ft), fortlets (flt), forts with an integrated firebase (ftfb), and forts with an added 
firebase (ftfba) which are all situated on the barrier itself, or adjacent, account for 66% 
of all of the installations associated with Berm No. 1. They number 220 in total and 
their density along the berm amounts to one fortified mural installation for every 2.9 
kilometres.384 Fire support bases (fsb) in the rear, number 40 in all, and their density 
works out at one firebase for every 15.9 kilometres of barrier.385  
 
GIS snapshots illustrating how these installations are disposed along Berm No. 1 are 
shown in Figs. 4.11 and 4.12. The first, Fig. 4.11 (showing rectangles 124 and 157 
from Fig. 4.6), illustrates the Smara salient and includes a part of Berm No. 2. The 
overwhelming majority of mural installations are forts (ft) with numerous fire support 
bases (fsb) in the rear. Also, there are forts in the rear (rft), relatively close to the 
barrier. That portion of Berm No. 1 in rectangle 215, shown in Fig. 4.12, is close to 
the Atlantic, and crosses flat open desert. This is in stark contrast to the hilly terrain of 
the Smara salient. The installations along the berm in Fig. 4.12 are mainly fortlets (flt) 
with some mural forts (ft), and mural forts with firebases (ftfb and/or ftfba). It is the 
difference in terrain, the predominance of fortlets, and the lack of firebases (fsb) in the 
rear that differentiate this section of Berm No. 1 from that portion defending the 
Smara salient. Though it should not be a surprise that Smara was, and still is, heavily 
defended. 
 
Disposition of Berm No. 2 
In December 1983,386 construction began on a second barrier, Berm No.2 (see Fig. 
4.13). It was completed in January 1984.387 The barrier began close to a mural fort 
with a firebase attached, at around 23 kilometres southeast of Bou-Craa. With the fort 
being on slightly high ground, at around 250 metres, the new wall drops slightly, then 
steadily, towards the Mauritanian frontier to the east-southeast. Just before crossing 
the border, the barrier splits in two, creating a polygon, at around 400 metres in 
elevation and situated on a northern extension of the Guelta Zemmour massif. The 
polygon joins up with a mural fort just inside Mauritanian territory, where there is also 
                                                 
384 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.1, at 634 kms, divided by 220 fortified mural 
installations, resulting in a density of one installation for every 2.9 kms of barrier. 
385 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.1, at 634 kms, divided by 40 firebases, resulting in a 
density of one installation for every 15.9 kms of barrier. 
386 Seddon 1987: 107. 
387 UPES 2008. 
 128
a break through the berm. To the east of the fort, the berm splits again, incorporating 
north-south ridges of the Guelta Zemmour massif, at an elevation of about 460 metres.  
 
Still in Mauritanian territory, the barrier proceeds due east, over north to south 
alternating hills and wadis, dropping from a height of approximately 430 metres to 
about 350 metres above sea level into a wadi, where it then extends northwards at 
around 390 metres elevation. The barrier crosses the Mauritanian frontier back into 
Western Sahara where a mural fort is situated, and then proceeds northwards, 
following the contours on the high ground along the west bank of the Wadi Uein 
Terghit (Terguet), running at an average elevation of just over 350 metres. At 37 
kilometres south-southeast of Smara, north of Amgala, the berm drops down (almost 
100 metres) to follow the watershed of a ridge running parallel with the Wadi Uein 
Terghit. The barrier, running to the northeast, creates a salient, around 40 kilometres 
due east of Smara, and follows the wadi to the northwest where the barrier then 
crosses the Wadi Lejcheibi, a tributary to the Saguia Al-Hamra. The Wadi Lejcheibi 
lies at an elevation of approximately 200 metres, and from there, the berm extends 
north-northwest, rising up and then dropping to under 200 metres elevation at the 
Saguia Al-Hamra. Crossing the Saguia, the north-northwest course of the barrier 
continues with the berm descending along the south most reaches of the Gaat 
Chbabien, then rises up to the first berm, joining it at a mural fort east of the area of 
Khreibichat.  
 
The table in Fig. 4.14 summarises the basic statistics for Berm No. 2. Of its 357 
kilometre length, 66% of it consists of a single embanked barrier, with the remaining 
34% made up of double and multiple embankments along with multiple 
configurations of barriers. With, on average, 202 military installations associated with 
the barrier, there is one installation for every 1.8 kilometres of berm. Where the 
barrier extends through Mauritania (see Fig. 4.13), it is made up of mixed sections of 
double (or multiple) embankments, and single embankments. Continuing 
northeastwards, there are also alternating sections of double, multiple, and single 
embankments overlooking the Wadi Uein Terghit, and where the wall runs parallel to 
the Smara salient, it is again made up of double, or multiple arrangements of 
embankments (see Fig 4.13). This overall stretch of wall (from just south of the 
Mauritanian frontier to where Berm No.2 is joined by Berm No.3 at the Wadi 
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Lejcheibi) is 137 kilometres long with only 28 kilometres made up of single 
embankments. Mural forts (ft) and fortlets (flt) account for 65 % of all of the 
installations associated with Berm No.2. They number 132 in total and their density 
along the barrier amounts to one fortified mural installation for every 2.7 kilometres of 
built barrier.388 There are 24 fire support bases behind the barrier, making up 12% of 
all of the installations associated with it, and their relatively regular distribution 
averages out at one firebase for every 14.9 kilometres.389 There are no firebase come 
fort variations on the berm itself. 
 
A GIS snapshot of Berm No. 2 is shown in Fig. 4.11. It illustrates a sample 
distribution of the installations on the barrier along the Smara salient (just to the east 
of rectangles 124 and 157 from Fig. 4.6). It almost mirrors the disposition of 
installations along Berm No. 1 which it superseded. The two berms, along with the 
earlier concentric defences around Smara, with all of their combined fire support 
bases, illustrate the effort that was made to defend Smara, a city between 30 and 40 
kilometres from the Polisario controlled, liberated zone. 
 
Disposition of Berm No. 3 
Like the second berm, Berm No.3 was constructed within two months, from April to 
May 1984.390 The aim of this barrier (see Fig. 4.15) was to defend the southern border 
of Morocco with Western Sahara, and to diagonally cut across the Western Sahara 
panhandle taking in the former Spanish posts of Echdeiria and Hausa. The barrier 
starts at the southern, upper lip of the depression in which the Moroccan town of Zag 
is situated, 32 kilometres from the border with Western Sahara, to the south. The rim 
of the Zag depression had earlier fortifications, including intermittant berms and forts, 
and fire support bases (and as already mentioned, Zunes and Mundy, Laschi and Tusa, 
have considered these features part of the first Moroccan berm391).  
 
                                                 
388 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.2, at 357 kms, divided by the total of 130 forts and 2 
fortlets (that is 132 fortified mural installations), resulting in a density of one installation for every 2.7 
kms of barrier. 
389 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.2, at 357 kms, divided by 24 firebases, resulting in a 
density of one installation for every 14.9 kms of barrier. 
390 UPES 2008. 
391 Zunes and Mundy 2010: 7, Laschi 2009: 139, and Tusa 1988. 
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The berm heads southwest at an average elevation of just over 500 metres, starting out 
as a double embanked barrier (for 26 kilometres) until it gets within around eight 
kilometres of the Western Sahara border. Thereafter it consists of a single 
embankment running for 142 kilometres across open hamada desert, until it reaches 
the greater valley system of the Saguia al-Hamra. Here, the berm terminates on an 
escarpment overlooking the Wadi Mesuar, a parallel and tributary wadi running to the 
north of the Saguia. The escarpment is approximately 200 metres higher than the wadi 
system, and its precipitousness has allowed the barrier to consist of only a string of 
forts, running in a west-northwesterly direction, for fifty-two kilometres (southwest of 
Echdeiria). Less than a kilometre south of the most westerly fortification along the 
escarpment (and at an elevation around 130 metres lower), the berm resumes, with 
double and multiple embankments on a south-southwesterly course, crossing a broad 
expanse of the Wadi Mesuar before crossing the Saguia al-Hamra, and then heading 
almost due south to an escarpment overlooking the Wadi Dirt and the Wadi Leicheibi. 
The escarpment is the better part of 50 metres above the Wadi Leicheibi, and the 
barrier turns westward meeting up with Berm No. 2 at a mural fort where the Wadi 
Leicheibi joins another wadi (the Wadi Uein Terghit), which drains into the Saguia al-
Hamra. The length of the barrier from where it resumed, until joining up with Berm 
No. 2, is 118 kilometres, with only three kilometres consisting of a single embanked 
barrier. 
 
The berm along the top of the escarpment over looking the Wadis Dirt and Leicheibi 
is very complex. It hugs the heights, following every twist, inlet and turn. It mainly 
has double and multiple configurations of embankments, and in many instances, they 
are also designed to cut off the lower reaches of the myriad natural embayments that 
mark out the high ground (for an example of such barriers see Fig. 4.52). Fifteen 
percent of the barrier is made up by the natural obstacle of the escarpment over the 
Wadi Mesuar, while 43% of the barrier consists of a single embankment. Double and 
multiple embanked barriers, and those with multiple configurations of banks make up 
42% of the barrier. Of the 181 military installations associated with the barrier, 113 
are fortified mural installations, mainly forts (ft), but including one fortlet (flt) and one 
fort with an integrated firebase (ftfb). These make up 62% of all the installations 
associated with the barrier (see Fig. 4.16), and their distribution averages out at one 
fortified installation for every three kilometres of barrier (including the Wadi Mesuar 
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escarpment).392 There are forty-one fire support bases behind the barrier. These make 
up 23% of the associated installations, and their distribution averages out at one 
firebase for every 8.2 kilometres.393 The distribution of all types of installations 
associated with the entirety of the barrier averages out at one installation for every 1.9 
kilometre of built and natural barriers.  
 
Fig. 4.17, showing rectangles 92 and 126 from Fig. 4.6, is a GIS snapshot illustrating 
how installations along Berm No. 3 are disposed. It also illustrates the circuitous 
nature of the barrier (along with Berm No. 4 extending to the east) on the high ground 
above the wadi (the Wadi Dirt) to the south. That portion of Berm No. 3 that extends 
to the north is clearly straighter, and it covers ground that is not very undulating. 
 
Disposition of Berm No. 4 
The fourth berm extended Morocco’s control over most of the Western Sahara 
panhandle, reaching very close to the border with Algeria (see Fig. 4.18). Its 
construction commenced in December 1984 and it was completed in January 1985.394 
The barrier begins deep in Moroccan territory, at a terminal fort on a north facing 
escarpment, overlooking the greater Wadi Draa basin, 35 kilometres due south of the 
Wadi Draa itself, and 77 kilometres north of the border with Western Sahara, and 16 
kilometres due west of the Moroccan-Algerian border. The barrier runs southwards 
across open hamada desert, passing the older Spanish post at Mahbes, to the west. It 
enters a region of dissected terrain with wadis running to the west and to the south, 
and at a mural fort overlooking the Wadi Ben Amera to the south, the berm turns 
westward. The barrier is made up of either double or multiple embankments, and 
multiple configurations of embankments along the entirety of its route, save for a trace 
of a single embankment (41 kilometres in length) while crossing the Graret Quercha, 
and a similar, but very much shorter length, approximately twenty-two kilometres to 
the northeast, where there is also a very short length of natural escarpment 
incorporated as part of the barrier. 
 
                                                 
392 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.3, at 338 kms, divided by the total of 111 forts, 1 
fortlet, and 1 fort with an integral firebase (that is 113 fortified mural installations), resulting in a 
density of one installation for every 3 kms of barrier. 
393 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.3, at 338 kms, divided by 41 firebases, resulting in a 
density of one installation for every 8.2 kms of barrier. 
394 UPES 2008. 
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Behind and to the west of this substantial barrier, by around 10 kilometres, there is a 
subsidiary berm consisting of a single earthen bank, 138 kilometres long. It more or 
less mirrors the trace of the main barrier along the Algerian frontier, but instead of 
extending to the Wadi Draa in the north, at approximately 12 kilometres north of the 
Western Sahara-Moroccan border, it turns to the west and joins up with Berm No. 3 
close to a track between Mahbes and Zag. It also heads westerly at its southern end, 
tying up with some rear installations associated with the barrier. 
 
The east to west, southern trace of Berm No.4, starts by following a latitudinal 
watershed. It dog-legs to the southwest and then arcs southward following the 
watershed of eastward flowing wadis (including tributaries to the Wadi Ben Amera). 
Crossing the Graret Quercha, the berm heads west-northwest on an escarpment 
overlooking the headwaters of the Wadi Ternit, but then follows the Wadi Dirt, which 
joins up with the Wadi Leicheibi. On the high ground above the wadis, the barrier 
clings to the high ground, and mirrors every bend and embayment, and it is here that 
the barrier is its most complex, with multiple embankments and additional 
configurations of barriers. It joins up with Berm No. 3 along the same escarpment, and 
the two barriers create a formidable obstacle facing southwards, overlooking Polisario 
controlled territory. With the construction of this berm, linked to the third berm, which 
in turn joined Berm No. 2, the Moroccans secured their southern border, excluding 
Polisario and the Saharawis in the Tindouf refugee camps from the Saguia al-Hamra 
and much of the Western Sahara panhandle.  
 
The table in Fig. 4.19 provides basic statistics for Berm No.4. There is an average 
density of one military installation for every 1.7 kilometres of built barrier 
(discounting the small occupation positions [sop] only recorded in sampling rectangle 
952 – see Fig. 4.6, and the reference in Fig. 4.5). In contrast, the main frontal barrier, 
at 486 kilometres (78% of the barrier),395 has a density of mural installations, 
comprising, forts (ft), fortlets (flt) and forts with firebases attached (ftfba) of one 
installation for every 2.2 kilometres.396 These total 186 in number and make up 49% 
                                                 
395 If the rear, subsidiary barrier, at 138 kms in length, is deducted from the total length of all of Berm 
No.4 (including natural barriers), then the distance of the barrier’s frontal trace is 486 kms. 
396 This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.4, at 486 kms, divided by the total 
of 153 forts, 31 fortlets, and 2 forts with an added firebase (that is 186 fortified mural installations), 
resulting in a density of one installation for every 2.2 kms of barrier. 
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of all of the installations associated with the barrier.  The fifty-three firebases (fsb) set 
behind the barrier, are spread out at average intervals of 9.2 kilometres.397 They make 
up 14% of all of the installations associated with the barrier.  
 
Two GIS snapshots illustrate the disposition of installations along Berm No. 4 (Figs. 
4.20 and 4.21). In Fig. 4.20 (showing rectangle 100 from Fig. 4.6) there is a relatively 
even distribution of mural forts along the barrier looking southwards, into Polisario 
controlled territory, while there are only a few fire support bases in the rear. In 
contrast, Fig. 4.21 (showing rectangle 952 from Fig. 4.6) has a greater density of 
mural forts along with forts in the rear, and a greater number of firebases. In 
particular, there are small occupied positions (sop), since the Moroccans built a 
substantial number of these small, half circle, fortified positions along this 
westernmost stretch of berm directly facing Algeria. These are described further in 
Part 2 of this chapter, but this snapshot shows that they are distributed very densely, 
with one positioned at just over every half kilometre.398   
 
Disposition of Berm No. 5 
With the Moroccan frontier secured, and with much of the Western Sahara panhandle, 
literally corralled, and with the territory cut in two by Berm No. 2, the Moroccans 
embarked on building Berm No.5 in May 1985. The barrier was completed in 
September, later that year (see Fig 4.22).399  
 
The barrier begins within Mauritanian territory, at 21 kilometres southwest of Amgala 
where it links a north-south ridge in the northern part of the Goleta Zemmour massif 
with the south most limit of Berm No. 2 (where there is also a mural fort). The rocky 
and very hilly terrain north of Guelta Zemmour is very corrugated, with a number of 
interdigitated hills running south-southwest to north-northeast. The dips and troughs 
of the terrain, spread over a latitudinal distance of approximately twelve kilometres, 
rises eastwards from an elevation of under 320 metres in the west, to a peak of almost 
500 metres, and then, dropping to the east to under 400 metres. The terrain rises again, 
                                                 
397 This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.4, at 486 kms, divided by 53 
firebases, resulting in a density of one installation for every 9.2 kms of barrier. 
398 Fig. 4.21 shows sampling rectangle 952, within which the length of Berm No. 4 is 30.2 kms long. 
There are 53 sop installations in this rectangle which results in a distribution of one sop for every 0.57 
km of barrier. 
399 UPES 2008. 
 134
to 420 metres, dropping to under 380 metres, and then rising to 450 metres. In its 
eastward direction, the land drops again, this time to just over 380 metres, and rises to 
410 metres. The very eastern limit of the high ground finally drops to under 360 
metres before gently rising to the east, in Mauritanian territory. This corrugated terrain 
is a major element of Berm No.5 for a distance of around sixty-three kilometres north 
of Guelta Zemmour, where only relatively short lengths of earth embankments have 
been constructed between hills and across wadis, along with strategically placed forts 
and fire support bases. These short lengths of barrier block wadis and inlets within the 
massif, and are usually double banked.  
 
At around thirty-eight kilometres northeast of Guelta Zemmour, and five kilometres 
due west of the Mauritanian frontier, the berm resumes as a continuous construction, 
made up of single and multiple embankment arrangements. At this point it starts on a 
490 metre high peak, and immediately drops by sixty metres to the south. It then 
heads in a southwesterly direction, outlining the eastern limit of the main part of the 
Guelta Zemmour massif. For much of the course of the barrier, south of Guelta 
Zemmour, there is a matrix of subsidiary embankments, creating multiple enclosures 
behind the primary, frontal trace (which includes multiple configurations of double 
and single embankments). These link up hills, and have forts and other types of 
installations associated with them. The mesh of barriers passes to the northwest of the 
Sebkhat Aqsumal, by only a few kilometres, and links up with the hills (and 
incorporating the escarpments) of the Gor Lefcih (or Gour Lafkah). When reaching 
the southern limit of the Gor Lefcih, with Oum Dreiga to the northwest by twenty-
seven kilometres, the barrier heads west-southwest. Here, it is no longer a matrix of 
barriers, creating enclosures between rocky outcrops in the desert, but it is a frontal 
trace made up of sections of single and multiple embankments, with a meandering, 
subsidiary rampart in the rear, situated at a variable distance of anywhere between one 
and 13 kilometres. There is also evidence for an apparently earlier alignment of the 
frontal trace along part of the barrier. 
 
At approximately 135 kilometres east of Dakhla, and at around 19 kilometres 
northwest of the Sebkhat Tennuaca, the barrier becomes a consistent single 
embankment that heads westward to the sea, via a sabkha depression, just south of 
Imlilli. Here, there is a two kilometre break in the berm, but the sabkha has been 
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incorporated as part of the barrier. The barrier ends with a mural fort around one 
kilometre from the sea and 50 kilometres south-southwest of Dakhla.  
 
The table in Fig. 4.23 provides basic statistics for Berm No.5. Of the total 1002 
kilometres of built and natural barriers making up the berm, there are 321 associated 
military installations, averaging one installation for every 3.1 kilometres of barrier. 
Along the frontal trace (at 648 kilometres long and making up 65% of the total 
barrier400) there are 203 forts (ft), and 19 fortlets (flt), located at an average interval of 
2.9 kilometres.401 Firebases (fsb) behind the frontal trace average out at one for every 
14 kilometres.402 The forts and fortlets make up 69% of all of the installations 
associated with the barrier, while the firebases make up 14%.  
 
GIS snapshots illustrating how these installations are disposed along Berm No. 5 are 
shown in Figs. 4.24 and 4.25. The main difference between these is terrain. Fig. 4.24 
shows a portion of the barrier through the southern part of the Guelta Zemmour region 
(in rectangle 359 of Fig.4.6) with the berm situated on high ground with natural 
drainage running to the southeast. In contrast, the berm in Fig. 4.25 (which is close to 
the coast in rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6) is laid out in straight segments, and the barrier 
cuts across ground that slightly rises and dips. Strikingly, there are a considerable 
number of forts in the rear in this latter sample of the berm. 
 
Disposition of Berm No. 6  
In February 1987, the Moroccans embarked on the final part of their partition of 
Western Sahara, attempting to completely exclude Saharawi nationalists and Polisario 
fighters from the bulk of the territory. The final, and sixth barrier (see Fig. 4.26), was 
completed in April 1987.403 It started at a mural fort on Berm No.5, at around 170 
kilometres due west of the Mauritanian border and around 230 kilometres east of 
Dakhla, and about 160 kilometres northwest of F’derik (Idjil). It heads south-
southwest, bypassing Ausserd, twenty kilometres to the west. Further south, it passes 
                                                 
400 This is based on subtracting 354 kms of rear, subsidiary berms, from the total length of 1002 kms for 
all of the barriers making up Berm No.5.  
401 This is based on the total distance of Berm No. 5, at 1002 kms, divided by a total of 222 forts and 
fortlets, resulting in a density of one fortified mural installation for every 2.9 kms of barrier. 
402 This is based on the total distance of Berm No.4, at 1002 kms, divided by 46 firebases, resulting in a 
density of one firebase for every 14 kms of barrier. 
403 UPES 2008. 
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Zug, forty kilometres to the east, and then it clearly arcs to the southwest, and Western 
Sahara’s southern border with Mauritania. It passes the earlier Spanish post of Tichla, 
twenty-eight kilometres to the north. The barrier runs parallel with the Mauritanian 
frontier, and even overlaps it in places. It reaches the Atlantic at a terminal fort, 
situated on a low level cliff overlooking the sea and around fifty-six kilometres north 
of La Guera.  
 
The barrier is made up of double and multiple configurations of embankments for 
most of its north-northeast to south-southwest frontal trace. From around ninety-four 
kilometres north of the Mauritanian frontier, the frontal trace becomes a continuous 
single embankment. For a great deal of the barrier’s length, there are subsidiary, rear 
and parallel, single embankments (though well under three kilometres of these are 
double embanked). They are situated anywhere from one to twenty-four kilometres 
behind the frontal trace, and some of these have integral forts and other associated 
installations as well. Sizable portions of these secondary berms, incorporate the few 
rocky, spike like hills (guelbs) that are present in the southern quarter of Western 
Sahara, undoubted beacons in an otherwise flat, hamada desert landscape – the Tiris 
plateau.404 Far to the west, however, there are occasional sand dunes within fifty 
kilometres of the Atlantic.  
 
The table in Fig. 4.27 outlines the basic statistics of Berm No.6. The total length of all 
of the berms making up this barrier is 1168 kilometres, and on average, there is one 
military installation for every 3.2 kilometres of barrier. There are 611 kilometres of 
single embanked, rear, subsidiary ramparts (save for three short sections of two banks 
or more, at a total length of under four kilometres), making up 52% of the whole of 
Berm No.6. However, unlike the fourth and fifth berms, where subsidiary barriers do 
not have forts (ft) and fortlets (flt) associated with them, this berm does. At the 
northern end of the barrier, where a subsidiary berm heads in a northwesterly direction 
toward Berm No.5, passing the Sabkhet Tennuaca to its immediate west, there are six 
mural forts and fortlets on the secondary barrier. Also, just before Berm No.6 heads 
westwards to the Atlantic, between Zug and Tichla, the barrier splits. Here, the 
subsidiary barrier (up to 24 kilometres behind the frontal trace) includes 24 mural 
                                                 
404 Mercer 1976: 23. 
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forts and fortlets. These account for 34 forts and fortlets leaving a total of 272 forts 
and fortlets on the frontal trace of the barrier (557 kilometres long405). The frontal 
trace, therefore, has a distribution of one mural fortification for every two kilometres 
along its length.406 Also, in relation to the frontal trace, where there are 25 firebases 
(fsb) in the rear, their distribution averages out at one firebase for every 22.3 
kilometres.407 All forts and fortlets make up 84% of all of the installations associated 
with the entirety of the barrier, while the firebases make up 7%.  
 
A sample distribution of some of the installations along Berm No. 6, along the 
Mauritanian frontier (in rectangle 853 of Fig. 4.6), is shown in Fig. 4.28. There is 
almost an even number of mural forts and fortlets, there are extensive sand dune areas, 
and although there is a garrison and one fort in the rear, there are no fire support 
bases. This is very indicative of Berm No. 6 within 150 kilometres of the coast. 
 
 
PART 2 
Towards an Anatomy of the Berms 
 
As has been pointed out in Part 1 of this chapter, descriptions of the Moroccan walls, 
the berms, are incomplete, imprecise and contradictory. Commentators have obviously 
tried to describe a complex series of structures as if it were a single build wall with a 
conformity of features. But the ‘Great Wall of Morocco’ is not that. The very fact that 
as a series of barriers, the matrix of defences was constructed across differing terrains, 
at different times, means that its construction adapted to changing topography and 
strategic and political contingencies. These changes, including the chronology and 
disposition of the Moroccan barriers, have been indicated by employing Google Earth, 
and the details made evident are the basis for the following, descriptions and 
characterisations of the salient components of the berms. The aim is now, therefore, to 
                                                 
405 This is based on the total distance of Berm No. 6 at 1168 kms, having 611 kms of rear, subsidiary 
berms subtracted from it, resulting in 557 kms of frontal barriers. 
406 This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.6, at 557 kms, divided by 272 
fortified mural installations, resulting in a density of one fortified mural installation for every 2 kms of 
barrier. 
407 This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.6, at 557 kms, divided by 25 
firebases, resulting in a density of one firebase for every 22.3 kms of barrier. 
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apprehend the make up of the different barrier components, and how they have created 
an ensemble of features marking out, and partitioning the very land of Western 
Sahara. By being in existence for only some thirty odd years, the barriers bring to 
mind Olivier’s proposition of ‘an archaeology of the short term’. An archaeology that 
does not mimic ‘more classical periods’, but seeks out its own methodologies, unique 
and sometimes contingent, to the study of the particularities of the very recent past.408 
 
The Architecture of the Moroccan Barriers 
 
The nomenclature drawn upon in this research for describing the various features, or 
installations, that is the ‘architecture’, associated with Morocco’s Great Wall does not 
directly marry with modern military terminology. The use of descriptors such as 
‘forts’ and ‘fortlets’, in particular, harks back to Roman period archaeology when 
describing Roman fortified positions in Britain and elsewhere, and they are not to be 
found in modern military glossaries.409 Instead, modern military concepts of defence 
centre around ideas of protection and ‘survivability’,410 and under this umbrella, 
particular types of defensive structures and contingencies are to be found. For 
instance, the term ‘base’, as opposed to ‘fort’, is used for any ‘locality from which 
operations are projected or supported’, or ‘an area or locality containing installations 
which provide logistic or other support’,411 while the contingencies of protecting such 
bases fall under the rubric of ‘base defence’, which is defined as  
 
the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce 
the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the 
maximum capacity of its facilities is available to [in the dictionary quoted] US 
forces.412  
 
Not withstanding these examples, the terms ‘fort’ and fortlet’ have still been used in 
this study, as have references to them being ‘mural’ or ‘non-mural’. In contrast, the 
modern term ‘fire support base’, which first came into use during the Vietnam War,413 
                                                 
408 Olivier 2001. 
409 US Department of Defence 1995. 
410 US Department of Defence 1985.                      
411 US Department of Defence 1995: 54.  
412 US Department of Defence 1995: 54. 
413 Ott [1975] 1995. 
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will continue to be used alongside these anachronisms. Other descriptive terms for 
elements or installations associated with the berms that have been devised for this 
research, and have been described in Fig. 4.5, will be elaborated upon below. 
 
It is easy to look at the Moroccan barriers and compare them with other strategic 
geographic barriers from history, such as Hadrian’s Wall and the Great Wall of China. 
The very nature of the berms in their range and extent beg the comparison. But there 
are real discontinuities in space and time – geography and era – separating these 
ancient barriers from the Moroccan berms, and other defensive systems of today, and 
because of this it could be considered wise not to pursue direct comparisons. 
However, correspondences can occasionally be found as to make it a misjudgement 
not to note the apparent commonalities where they occur. Analogies are of value, and 
relevant analogues will occasionally be incorporated to explore the ways and means of 
people’s engagement with the materiality of their surroundings,414 in this case, the 
materialities of the militarised landscape of the Moroccan berms. This also applies, 
even more pertinently, to American fortifications of the Vietnam War era, and here 
analogues of real value can be found. 
 
Ramparts to Berms 
 
The term ‘ramparts’ is not to be found in modern military jargon. As a generic term, it 
easily describes the earth and stone barriers that make up the Moroccan berms. In 
traditional usage, a ‘berm’, is the edge, or ledge, of flat ground between a wall or 
rampart, and a ditch. Hadrian’s Wall has a clearly defined ‘berm’. But the more 
modern use of ‘berm’ as an earthen bank (defensive or otherwise), comes from the 
United States where its first instance is recorded in 1854 as a ‘birm-bank’ associated 
with the towpath of a canal.415 By referring to an embankment in this instance, the 
term has been used by the American military to denote a protective, defensible earthen 
mound or bank of any size and length, and this definition has spread into general 
military usage. The berms can also be generically described as ‘parapets’. But this too 
is a word not easily found in modern military usage even though it was used in both 
                                                 
414 Wylie 1985: 107. 
415 From the Oxford English Dictionary, online, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/17945?redirectedFrom=berm& accessed 13 September 2012. 
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world wars for defensive earthworks instead of the more modern ‘berm’.416 In fact, the 
term parapet was used up into the 1970s when the use of ‘berm’, in conjunction with 
bulldozing, started to gain prominence.417 
 
The ramparts or parapets, berms, or earth embankments, that make up the Moroccan 
barriers, are essentially obstacles designed to hinder the movement of mobile Polisario 
forces into the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara. They were designed to 
serve as a ‘tripwire’, and as an obvious testimony of Morocco’s presence.418 As the 
various descriptions by commentators and journalists have stated, and observations 
through Google Earth have confirmed, the berms could be single or multiple 
embankments, they could have ditches associated with them, and they could include 
stone revetments or walls, all tying together the various installations situated on the 
barriers themselves. Their recorded heights can range anywhere from one to four 
metres. By taking ‘snapshot’ views of high resolution Google Earth imagery from the 
22 sampled rectangles selected (see Fig. 4.6), and by looking further at terrestrial and 
low level aerial imagery available on the internet (in essence, further snapshots), we 
can take a good look at the various configurations of the sand and stone embankments 
making up the berms.  
 
When looking at the basic earthen berms as features in their own right, Google Earth 
and other imagery can do more than just indicate type. They can even provide 
indicators of how the barriers were built. For instance, individual embankments 
appear to be from five to eight metres wide, and even more in some instances. They 
can show signs of being bulldozed from both sides to create a linear mound, while 
there are instances of the barriers being bulldozed from only one side – the Moroccan 
side. The bulldozer tracks can range from around 10 to 20 metres in length.                                                                                                                         
 
Fig. 4.29 shows a single embankment along Berm No.1 in the Smara salient (located 
in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). The bulldozer tracks are clearly visible only on the 
                                                 
416 See Imperial War Museum 1998 and U.S. War Department 1944. In this latter publication, ‘berms’ 
are referred to in their traditional sense, as a ledge between a parapet and an excavated feature, e.g., a 
fighting position pit, or foxhole. 
417 Ott [1975] 1995. Throughout this publication, General Ott almost always describes the earthen 
banks around field artillery as parapets (he even uses ‘breastwork’), but he specifically talks about 
berms (pp. 162-163) only in conjunction with bulldozing.  
418 Tusa 1988. 
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western side of the earthen bank. They extend for around 15 to 25 metres. The sharp 
shadow on the west side of the berm indicates that there is a single apex at the top of 
the bank suggesting that its section is more or less triangular. In contrast, Fig. 4.30, 
which illustrates another section of Berm No.1 (but this time close to the Atlantic in 
rectangle 215 of Fig. 4.6), shows the barrier as having an almost flat top, and even 
with a hint of a depression, giving it more or less a trapezoidal profile. The image may 
not indicate it, since bulldozer tracks are not visible, but it is possible that the flatter 
top of the barrier might be due to it being bulldozed from both sides. Fig. 4.31 (from 
rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6) provides another view of a section of the bank along Berm 
No.1. It has definitely been built by being bulldozed from both sides, and its possibly 
trapezoidal profile indicates a very slight depression along its top. Though the bank is 
more triangular in the lower right of the image.  
 
Double and multiple embankments can show a variety of configurations. Besides the 
plain embankments already illustrated, there are single embankments with short 
stretches of secondary banks. An example from Berm No.5 illustrates this in Fig. 4.32 
(from rectangle 583 in Fig. 4.6). It shows secondary embankments along the rear of a 
single embankment where the barrier crosses wadis.  
 
The barriers show greater complexity when the embankments multiply in number. 
Fig. 4.33 shows a part of Berm No.1 (located between rectangles 124 and 157 of Fig. 
4.6) with a secondary bank to the rear (by an average of 250 metres), which follows 
some of the contours of a watershed. There is also a track to the west, running parallel 
to the barrier, and another track (along a wadi) passing west to east through the 
barrier. Both barriers were constructed by being bulldozed only from one side – from 
the west. Often, however, double embanked barriers are much more uniform, as 
illustrated in Fig. 4.34. Here, the two banks making up a part of Berm No.2, along the 
Smara salient (and located around nine kilometres southeast of rectangle 157 in Fig. 
4.6), are under 15 metres apart, and they are truly parallel. The image is low 
resolution, but a parallel track just behind the barrier is visible, as is another track (in 
all actuality a braided track, but it too is unclear) heading north-northeast, away from 
the barrier. 
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Double embanked barriers can also have short sections of intermediate, subsidiary 
banks, similar to those shown in Fig. 4.32. Fig. 4.35 shows a portion of Berm No.5 
(located just west of rectangle 491 in Fig. 4.6), which includes variable lengths of 
longitudinal, subsidiary banks, about 10 metres behind the frontal barrier, with a 
second defensive barrier in the rear. What is distinctive here is that the rear 
embankment includes a ditch just in front of it. So the sequence is, from the south, an 
east to west frontal embankment with short lengths of subsidiary banks immediately 
behind, then an area of flat ground around 15 to 50 metres wide, followed by a ditch 
with a bank immediately on its northern side. The bank has undoubtedly been raised 
from the earth excavated to make the ditch since there are no apparent bulldozing 
tracks associated with it. Fig. 4.35 also shows a break in the rear ditch and bank, like a 
short causeway, which would give easy access to the frontal rampart. 
 
In many parts of Western Sahara, as shown in Fig. 4.35, there are multiple embanked 
configurations of barriers, with a ditch in front of the rear embankment. Fig. 4.36 
illustrates a section from Berm No.5 (located in rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6) where there 
is a frontal barrier with a building or bunker type structure incorporated into it. The 
area behind the frontal barrier is probably at a slightly lower level than the ground in 
front of it, to the southeast. This is because it must have been created by bulldozing 
from its rear (the northwest) since the natural drainage in front of the barrier has not 
been disturbed. Close examination of the image shows that the frontal barrier has two 
ridges, so it is likely that it was constructed in at least two bulldozing phases. There is 
a central bank at about 12 metres behind the frontal barrier, and at another 10 metres 
or so, there is a ditch with a bank on its northwest side. The overall depth of this 
stretch of berm is up to 30 metres. There are also two breastworks behind the barrier, 
in the upper half of the image, which represent vehicular (or ‘tank’) slots. However, 
these are probably for jeeps, or other similar vehicles, since they are apparently less 
than four metres wide. There is also a break in part of the bank and ditch near the 
bottom of the image, which presumably gives or aids access to the mural building, or 
bunker, nearby.  
 
Multiple embanked berms can be even more complex then the length shown in Fig. 
4.36. Fig. 4.37 shows a section of Berm No.4 located in rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6. In 
this image it is clear that the barrier was constructed along an east to west watershed, 
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since natural drainage gullies can be seen to run off to the south. As in Fig. 4.36, there 
are three banks with the rear bank including a ditch just in front of it. There are a 
number of routeways (causeways) through the barriers, and between the central bank 
and the frontal bank there are at least two right-angled embankments that 
compartmentalise the front half of the barrier. There are numerous bunkers associated 
with the front of the barrier, and there is even a dog-leg entry giving access to the 
string of structures, and positions, in the lower part of the stretch of barrier shown. 
The barrier has an average, overall, north to south depth of under 40 metres, with an 
approximate distance of less than 20 metres between the frontal bank and the central 
one. It is very light, but there is a pale line roughly seven metres in front of the barrier, 
which might represent barbed wire. It is not always easy to see barbed wire on Google 
Earth imagery, and it is more often found only in front of mural forts. There are motor 
tracks behind the barrier running east to west, and there are two sub-circular 
earthworks, more than 125 metres north of the barrier (to the left), and roughly 11 
metres in diameter. These might represent single gun artillery positions. 
 
Fig. 4.38 is a low level aerial photograph of Berm No.2, within Mauritania, at the 
corner of the Western Sahara panhandle.419 It illustrates a treble embanked section of 
the Moroccan barrier similar to that shown in Fig. 4.37. The photo shows a rally car 
from one of the Paris-Dakar rallies. Rallies went directly from Smara to Zouerate in 
Mauritania, in 1996, 1998-99, 2001, and 2004 to 2007,420 so the photo could have 
been taken in any one of those years. The approximate location of the photograph is 
shown in Fig. 4.39, situated due south of rectangle 157 in Fig. 4.6, in Mauritanian 
territory. Fig. 4.38 shows a cleared gap in the Moroccan wall through which the car is 
being driven. The cut flanks of the recently bulldozed track are clear. Soldiers are 
standing on either side of the cutting, watching the blue car pass, which is heading 
south into Mauritania. It is interesting to note that just in front of it, there is a large ‘no 
parking’ sign, presumably set up to tell the drivers not to stop while within the 
militarised barrier. This photograph says much about the make up of the berms. The 
soldiers give a definite sense of scale to the barrier, and it is obvious that the central 
and rear banks (the front of the barrier is to the left of the photo) are triangular in 
section and considerably higher then the men, with the frontal bank appearing lower 
                                                 
419 This is an undated, and unattributed photograph of the Moroccan Berm from Origo 2009. 
420 Dakar Rally 2009. 
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than the stone buildings (or bunkers) just behind it. There are further, apparently 
unroofed, stone structures that appear to be integral with the frontal bank, and these 
might represent fighting and/or observation positions. There are clear bulldozer 
impressions behind the barrier, and visible at the right of the photograph. There are 
also stones painted white along the sides of the bulldozer impressions, and these might 
point to the impressions being deliberately created to serve as vehicle parking areas. 
The ditch in the photograph has relatively steep sides, and its depth can be visually 
estimated to be at least three quarters of the height of a man – based solely on the men 
in the picture. 
 
Although the barrier consists of three banks and a ditch, further in the immediate 
background, there is a fourth embankment to the north, while even further into the 
background, at the upper left of the photograph, there is an additional frontal barrier 
heading away to the west, from a shallow wadi shown by relatively dense vegetation. 
There is a fair sized zariba-like enclosure in the very centre of the photograph, 
presumably made up of thorn bushes, while just in front of it, and slightly to the left, 
there is another, smaller zariba-like structure. There is a possible open topped stone 
structure just in front of the ditch, and just beyond the track that has been cut through 
the barrier for rally cars to pass. The stone buildings, or bunkers, are at least as high as 
a man. Their floors may be partially sunken and their roofs are flat. An illustration of 
low lying profiles of buildings behind the berm (Berm No. 4, near Algeria), are shown 
in Fig. 4.40. It gives an impression of what a section of the Moroccan barrier, perhaps 
similar to that shown in Fig. 4.38, might look like when viewed from the front. 
 
Stone walling has been incorporated into the Moroccan berms where the ground is not 
very sandy, and stones are obviously readily available. This is the case in portions of 
the Western Sahara panhandle, and an instance of stone walling is shown in Fig. 4.41. 
This photograph was taken somewhere within easy reach of Tifariti by an Italian 
photo journalist and it shows a barrier made up of three linear elements.421 Salek 
Labaidi Bachir, now a Saharawi journalist, crossed the Moroccan barrier southeast of 
                                                 
421 Photograph of the Moroccan ‘wall’ (dated: 19 February 2010) taken by Bruno Zanzottera ‘not far 
from the village of Tifariti’ for Parallelozero, an Italian photo journalism agency based in Milan. 
Available at: http://stock.parallelozero.com/?p=5 and 
http://www.parallelozero.com/images/stock/mid/c72e465d7af3494aa14600a8956d98bb5fa097fc.jpg 
accessed 13 January 2014.   
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Smara in 2004 (then aged 17), into the Polisario controlled liberated zone. The barrier 
he crossed was identical to that shown in the photograph. It consisted, from the 
Moroccan side, of a dry stone wall, around 1.5 metres high by 0.75 metres wide, then 
at around three metres further on there was an earthen bank, approximately two metres 
high, followed by a further earthen bank beyond which was a barbed wire fence.422 
Fig. 4.41 does not show the barbed wire, but the frontal barrier (at the very left of the 
photograph) has two ridges presumably caused either by being bulldozed from both 
sides, or by being bulldozed from the rear side in two phases of earth moving. Such a 
double-ridged frontal embankment is visible in Fig. 4.36. 
 
There are also instances of the barriers having a frontal rampart with a dry stone 
revetment (facing the Polisario controlled zone). In 2008, a Saharawi protest was 
staged in front of the Moroccan barrier near Mehairis. Here the protesters made their 
way through a flimsy fence of barbed wire, and actually approached the barrier which 
was around two metres high and faced with dry stone walling. While Moroccan 
soldiers watched and did nothing, some protesters climbed on top of the frontal 
rampart and started to dismantle some of its stone facing. There was also a second 
barrier behind the frontal embankment with a depression between the two. The protest 
was staged near a small mural post where there were fighting positions in the rampart 
as well.423 
 
Other features that make-up the Moroccan barriers are minefields and barbed wire. 
The ramparts never had dense fields of barbed wire in front of them as in the trench 
systems of the First World War. On Google Earth, barbed wire is only most evident in 
front of forts and fortlets. The distribution of mines in front of the barrier are, 
apparently, quite differential too. A sizable proportion of people successfully cross the 
barrier into the liberated zone unscathed, and the Polisario have, before the 2001 
                                                 
422 Bachir, Interview.  
423 Malainin Larkhal showed me a video of this protest when I was in the Tindouf refugee camps on 12 
October 2011, and  I could clearly make out the details of the Moroccan barrier construction. I was also 
able to talk with Hamdi Touballi who took part in the protest and was visible in the video. For more on 
Larkhal and Touballi, see Chapter 5. 
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ceasefire, actually removed mines and covertly repositioned them behind the 
Moroccan lines.424 
 
On Forts and Fortlets 
 
A ‘fort’ is used here, generically, to describe an enclosed fortified position, while the 
term ‘fortlet’ has been borrowed from archaeological usage. Both terms have little 
currency in contemporary military jargon and are anachronisms. For instance, ‘fort’ is 
not to be found in compendia of military jargon, such as the United States Department 
of Defense’s Dictionary of Military Terms,425 The Oxford Companion to Military 
History,426 nor The Penguin Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology.427  In 
practice, the overarching term ‘fortification’ is always preferred. But the word ‘fort’ is 
commonly known and understood, and its diminutive, ‘fortlet’, speaks for itself; it is 
literally a small ‘fort’ – but size is relative. The term ‘fort’ is also to be found in 
virtually all publications about the Moroccan barriers and it is commonly used in 
overviews of all types of fortifications, including modern ones.428  
 
In modern military usage, the concept of fortified positions has a variety of 
descriptors, and in Anglophone literature, these have apparently evolved since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, spurred on by the contingencies of field operations 
and their concomitant fortifications. The term ‘fort’ appears to have been superseded 
by ‘strong point’,429 and ‘defensible post’ and ‘redoubt’.430 Even though, earlier, well 
established forts were integrated into the massive trench systems of World War One, 
the new European defensive systems devised between the world wars did not use the 
term ‘fort’. The grandest of all, the Maginot line referred to its main fortified 
positions, its fortresses, as ouvrages, (‘works’ in English). There were ‘large works’, 
‘small works’ and ‘artillery works’.431 
                                                 
424 Zunes and Mundy 2010: 22, and Malainin Larkhal, Interview. Also, during my visit to Western 
Sahara and the refugee camps in 2011, Saharawis took it as fact that Polisario/SADR fighters had often 
removed Moroccan mines and placed them behind the barriers, on the Moroccan side. 
425 US Department of Defence 1995. 
426 Holmes 2003. 
427 Macksey 1995. 
428 For example, see Hughes 1974. 
429 Wheeler 1893. 
430 War Office 1911 and Imperial War Museum 1998. Thuillier 1902 uses the terms ‘defensible post’, 
‘redoubt’ and ‘fort’ interchangeably. 
431 Kaufmann and Jurga 1999: 19. 
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The Vietnam War saw a reinvigoration of the traditional fort, ‘more akin to Old West 
frontier army posts within Indian Territory and surrounded by hostile and capable 
foes’; and in 1966 these Special Forces installations were simply referred to as 
‘fighting camps’.432 Numerous other terms were used to describe fighting positions 
and bases of operations, and surprisingly, there was no consistent terminology in the 
Vietnam theatre. The commonest were firebases, or fire support bases, forward fire 
support base, patrol base, fire support patrol base, landing zone, camp and base camp. 
The term ‘fort’ was reserved for the older French fortifications situated throughout the 
country.433 Israel’s Bar-Lev line was contemporary with the Vietnam conflict, and as 
already pointed out, it was provided with strong points called Maozim (the singular, 
Maoz, means castle-keep in Hebrew).434 More up to date terms for fortifications 
include advanced operations bases, forward operations bases and main operations 
bases.435 In Afghanistan today, the lone outpost appears to have made a comeback in 
the deployment of fortified ‘checkpoints’. In some instances, these are not too 
dissimilar to the frontier like fighting camps of 1960s Vietnam.436 
 
This very brief review of military jargon has shown that 20th and 21st century terms 
for fortified positions is so mixed, that the generic term, ‘fort’ (and its diminutive 
‘fortlet’), is more than adequate for describing fortified positions along the Moroccan 
berms. It is therefore appropriate to now describe these in more detail, along with the 
other installations that are integral to the Moroccan barriers. 
 
Mural Forts and Fortlets 
 
The difference between mural forts and fortlets could be considered somewhat 
arbitrary. In this study, the distinction between the two came about through the very 
processes of plotting the mural forts on Google Earth, when an apparent pattern 
seemed to emerge with strings of smaller forts situated between larger ones. Such a 
grading of fortified positions can be found in many types of fortification systems, and 
                                                 
432 Rottman 2005a: 5. 
433 Kelley 2002: xviii-xx 
434 Dunstan 2008: 17-19. 
435 US Department of Defence 1995. 
436 Refer to ‘Flashman’s Fort’ in Harnden 2011. 
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in Britain for instance, such distinctions are common on both the Antonine and 
Hadrian’s Walls.437 What have been designated as fortlets along the Moroccan berms 
rarely cover more than 1,000 square metres, while some heavily defended forts can be 
more than 300,000 square metres in area. Some installations are concentric in plan 
with multiple perimeter embankments of sand and stone, and most are 
compartmentalised with earthen blast barriers. Fighting and/or observation positions 
are placed along the fort perimeters, and internally there can be mortar pits and other 
artillery positions. Most, if not all of the internal buildings are partially subterranean 
and bunker-like. As already shown in Part 1 of this chapter, a relatively small number 
of mural forts have artillery firebases attached to them, though it is more usual for 
firebases to be hidden from view, and set back, behind the barriers. Forts and fortlets, 
along with other installations, can be positioned in flat open desert, or on hilltops and 
along escarpment edges. The distances between them can vary from around 650 
metres to up to four kilometres. 
 
As with the different territorial berms, all of the forts and fortlets have been created 
through bulldozing and digging. They can be quite variable in outline, but they fall 
into four broad morphological (though mainly descriptive) categories, and these are 
described below. Indicative examples of these can be illustrated by looking at 
‘snapshots’, visible through Google Earth, from some of the 22 sampled survey 
rectangles (see Fig. 4.6), and by looking at additional terrestrial and low level aerial 
imagery, accessible on the internet. 
 
Polygonal:  
These can include forts and fortlets with approximately rectangular, square and 
trapezoidal outlines. Triangular and multi-sided traces are also included in this 
grouping. The corners can be sharp or rounded, and the sides can even be ‘bent’ in 
some instances. Four examples of polygonal forts are described below. Fig. 4.42 
clearly shows a fortlet (flt 10) on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 215 of Fig. 4.6). It 
is obviously rectangular (about 70 metres long by 60 metres wide, with an area of 
around 3,993 square metres) and it almost straddles the berm centrally. It also has a 
clear, rectangular central area. Since Berm No. 1 is now redundant, the bunkers and 
                                                 
437 Breeze and Dobson 1987. 
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other types of structures around its perimeter, and internally, are roofless. Roofing 
materials and other portable materials were presumably removed when the post was 
evacuated. Internal blast barriers are minimal though there is an external barrier just 
outside, and protecting the entrance into the fortlet, on its northwest side. There is one 
external building, and on either side of the fortlet, there are fighting/observation 
positions in the berm itself – where there are also additional entries into the fortlet. 
Another mural installation, a fort (ft 163) on Berm No. 1, is shown in Fig. 4.43 
(located just outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). It is essentially 
an uncluttered trapezium with two concentric perimeter ramparts (about 335 metres 
long by 256 metres wide, with an area of around 75,608 square metres). It too 
straddles Berm No. 1 and it is longitudinally divided in two. There are clear indents in 
the outer rampart, along the south front of the fort, that represent fighting/observation 
positions. There are also smaller enclosures, mainly along the inside of the southern 
perimeter with hints of structures, one of which might be a mortar pit. Evidence for 
the bulldozing of the embankments, mainly from north to south, is clearly visible. 
Being along Berm No. 1, the fort is now redundant. 
 
A polygonal fort (around 250 metres long by 125 metres wide, with an area of around 
22,826 square metres) with rounded corners and sides is shown in Fig. 4.44. This is a 
fort (ft 685) on a portion of Berm No. 3 which faces the Polisario controlled liberated 
zone (located in rectangle 126 of Fig. 4.6). The berm is made up of multiple 
embankments visible at both ends of the fort. The perimeter of the fort is defined by 
two concentric embankments, with bunkers and fighting positions facing south and 
east. The north-northwest, outer trace of the fort is very well-defined. It is probably 
revetted with stones on the outside, and there are visible bulldozing tracks from the 
making of the ramparts. The entrance into the fort in its northwest flank is ambiguous. 
There is a motor track that runs parallel to the longitudinal alignment of the fort, but 
from it, from the northeast, an off-shoot track approaches the fort through what might 
be a fenced off, rectangular enclosure. The offshoot track appears to head to the fort’s 
perimeter at a point where there is a small group of structures in the outer trace – the 
apparent entry into the installation – but the entrance cannot be clearly seen. It is 
probable, therefore, that the entrance is very narrow indeed, perhaps only capable of 
allowing one motor vehicle to pass through at a time, if at all. The fort is divided 
internally by earthen embankments, and there are many semi-subterranean structures 
 150
which are all roofed. It is also possible that there is at least one mortar pit visible in 
the south-southeast part of the fort. There are clear areas in the central part of the 
installation. 
 
Fig. 4.45 shows a redundant fort (ft 1335) along Berm No. 5 (located in rectangle 583 
of Fig. 4.6). Drifting sand has accumulated around it therefore some of its details are 
obscured, in particular, the location of its entrance which might be on either the east or 
west ends of the installation, adjacent to the territorial berm. This fort is a long, 
rounded polygon with two concentric perimeter banks (around 545 metres long by 175 
metres wide, with an area of about 69,109 square metres). It has been subdivided into 
around 34 small compounds by internal earthen blast barriers, within which are the 
remains of a small number of buildings. The southern trace of the fort has 
fighting/observation positions, and bunkers that are just visible. A trough caused by 
the bulldozing of the northern outline of the fort, and the territorial berm, is just 
visible. It is partially filled with wind blown sand. There are also two short lengths of 
earthen banks just outside the northern perimeter of the fort. 
 
Circular:   
There are no truly circular forts or fortlets, but sub-circular outlines are not 
uncommon, as are semi-circular traces. This grouping includes oval to kidney shaped 
fortifications and sub-circular delineations that are similar to fans (or tear drops). 
There are also shapes that hint at being diamond like, in that they are sub-circular, but 
with opposing apexes.  
 
The first of four examples of circular forts is a semi circular fortlet (flt 1252) on Berm 
No. 4, shown in Fig. 4.46 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). This installation 
(about 125 metres long by 70 metres wide, with an area of around 7,250 square 
metres) is concentric with two embankments making up its east facing front, but with 
up to four embankments making up its semi-circular rear. The rear defences appear to 
be integrated extensions of the secondary, rear ramparts of Berm No. 4. There are 
some earthen blast barriers compartmentalising the fortlet, and there is an entrance on 
its western side, accessed via two dog-legs, through the outermost defensive rampart. 
There are some buildings inside the fort, along with similar structures – bunkers – 
along the east facing front, where there are also some fighting/observation positions. 
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There is an apparent cordon of barbed wire in front of the installation, along its east 
facing flank. This fortlet is on that part of Berm No. 4 which is in Moroccan sovereign 
territory, north of Western Sahara. It is active and faces Algeria to the east. 
 
Also on Berm No. 4, and actively facing Algeria from sovereign Moroccan territory, 
(located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6), is the half egg shaped fort (ft 1250) shown in 
Fig. 4.47 (about 345 metres long by 170 metres wide, with an area of around 45,964 
square metres). This installation’s northeast facing front is crowded with bunkers and 
fighting/observation positions. There are some further structures closer to the centre of 
the installation and some mortar pits. The interior of the fort is subdivided by earthen 
blast barriers, which clearly show the bulldozer tracks from their creation, or upkeep. 
There are avenue like routeways within the compound and there is a clear entrance in 
the western perimeter, which also has an earthen barrier in front of it. The southern 
and western trace of the fort is concentric with multiple embankments. It is possible 
that there is also an earth embanked ‘U’ shaped position for a large vehicle, possibly a 
tank or a self-propelled artillery piece. There is barbed wire in front of the fort, 
roughly parallel with its eastern side, which is barely visible in the figure as a pale 
line.  
 
Fig. 4.48 is a very clear image of a sub-circular fort (ft 1597), still in active use on 
Berm No. 5 (located in rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6). This fort (about 245 metres long by 
180 metres wide, with an area of around 35,184 square metres) has a perimeter of two 
concentric ramparts that are very well-defined. They appear, in the main, to be 
revetted (presumably with stones). There are also clearly defined fighting/observation 
positions along the east facing front of the fort, along with bunkers just behind. The 
fort is subdivided by earthen blast barriers, and there are some revetted, trench like 
passageways, one of which links an area with two obvious mortar pits with the eastern 
front of the fort, and one other type of gun pit. The entrance to the installation is 
clearly open, and nearby is a helicopter landing zone, immediately to the northwest. 
Some tracks from bulldozing, presumably to maintain the outer defences, are visible 
along the west and northern exterior of the fort, with a hint of clearance activity along 
part of the eastern front. 
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The last example of a fort in the circular category is an installation that is kidney 
shaped and located along the redundant, southern portion of Berm No. 5 (ft 1387). It is 
shown in Fig. 4.49 (and located in rectangle 553 of Fig. 4.6). The fort (about 330 
metres long by 185 metres wide, with an area of around 45,646 square metres) has a 
perimeter of two concentric banks, and it is subdivided into multiple compartments by 
earthen blast barriers. Many of the embankments, including those portions of the outer 
trace behind Berm No. 5, show signs of the bulldozing which created them. There are 
three entry points into the fort with one including a spur embankment extending out of 
a rectangular outwork. The figure shows that windblown sand has accumulated within 
and around the fort and it obscures details. Nevertheless, there are 
fighting/observation positions, and some bunkers, along the southern, outward facing 
trace of the fort. 
 
Irregular:   
These include forts and fortlets with sinuous outlines, or outlines that follow natural 
contours. The latter are more commonly found in the hillier parts of Western Sahara. 
Surprisingly, though, irregular traces of fortifications can also be found in relatively 
flat desert areas.  
 
An irregular fort (ft 1391) along Berm No. 5, and situated in an area of desert with 
low relief is shown in Fig. 4.50 (located in rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6). It is a double 
embanked, concentric installation with a single embanked extension along its south 
front and with multiple compartments divided by earthen blast barriers. The fort 
(about 580 metres long by 320 metres wide, with an area of around 122,201 square 
metres) is situated along a now redundant part of Berm No. 5, and wind blown sand 
has accumulated in places. There are roofless buildings and bunkers, many of which 
are along the fort’s southern trace where there are also fighting/observation positions. 
Traces of bulldozing from the construction (and upkeep) of the fort, and the territorial 
berm, are visible. There are also indicators of a single gun pit for a piece of artillery. 
The entrance into the fort is on its northern side, and there is an earth embankment 
protecting it. There is also a break in the western perimeter of the fort that might 
represent another entry point. 
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Fig. 4.51 shows a still occupied fort (ft 681) along Berm No. 3 (located in rectangle 
126 of Fig. 4.6). It follows the contours of a serpentine escarpment looking over 
Polisario controlled territory to the south. The fort (about 520 metres long by 270 
metres wide, with an area of around 62,564 square metres) has a concentric perimeter, 
consisting of two earthen banks, and the interior has been sub-divided by numerous 
earthen blast barriers. There are also well-defined routeways within the installation. 
Fig. 4.52 is a lower level aerial view of the same fort, and it shows that most of the 
embankments are revetted with stones. It also shows that most of the buildings, or 
bunkers, are partly subterranean. Additionally, Fig. 4.52 shows that the frontal 
embankment of the fort is at a lower level than the second rampart, therefore, as 
indicated in Fig. 4.51, there are fewer bunkers and fighting/observation positions 
along the very front of the installation, with a greater number of bunkers positioned on 
the slightly higher, second earthen bank. There are four probable mortar pits in the 
fort, while Fig. 4.52 clearly shows an additional gun pit close to the west most 
extremity of the fort (where an apparently blocked entry into the installation is 
visible). A turning circle for vehicles, visible in Fig. 4.51, indicates the main entrance 
into the fort as being at its northern extremity. However, the figure does not show the 
entrance clearly, so perhaps it is either obscured or very narrow indeed. To the north 
of the entrance, within 200 to 600 metres from the fort, there are three helicopter 
landing zones. These are not shown in Fig. 4.51. 
 
The junction of Berms Nos. 3 and 4 is shown in Fig. 4.53 where there is another 
indicative example of a still active, irregularly shaped, concentric mural fort (ft 687), 
located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6. Like ft 681, this installation (about 450 metres long 
by 305 metres wide, with an area of around 60,089 square metres) follows the natural 
contours of the escarpment upon which it is positioned. There are fighting/observation 
positions, and some bunkers along the southern perimeter of the fort, and there are 
numerous bunkers and other buildings inside the installation. There are multiple 
compartments outlined by earthen blast barriers, with well-defined routeways 
extending across the installation. As with forts ft 681 and ft 685, the main entrance 
appears to be obscured, or perhaps even blocked with a building, though just to its 
west there is a break in the rampart that is clearly another entry point into the fort. 
There are two helicopter landing zones to the immediate north, where also, the portion 
of Berm No. 3 which previously extended from the fort northwards (to the west of the 
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more square-like landing zone at the far left of the image) has since been bulldozed 
away (bulldozer tracks and the faint shadow of an alignment indicate the former 
position of the berm). There is also an installation identifier inscribed on the ground 
just outside the entrance to the fort. Two small oblong earthworks are also visible just 
outside the northern limit of the installation. 
 
An irregular mural fort (ft 1269) that started life as a half circular installation, situated 
on Berm No. 4, is shown in Fig. 4.54 (about 350 metres long by 70 metres wide, with 
an area of around 24,365 square metres). It is located in sovereign Moroccan territory 
close to, and facing east towards the border with Algeria (within rectangle 952 of Fig. 
4.6). It is still active. The earlier frontal barriers of the installation, along with a 
sizable portion of its internal earthen blast barriers, have been bulldozed away, leaving 
a fort that arcs from south to north and opening to the east. Its perimeter is concentric 
with multiple earthen embankments. There are clear fighting/observation positions in 
the outer rampart facing Algeria with, apparently, very few bunkers. Instead, the bulk 
of the fort’s buildings and bunkers are situated within and behind the second frontal 
rampart. The fort is compartmentalised with earthen blast barriers and there is a clear 
entrance on the northwest side. It includes a protective, and partly masking, earthen 
bank in front of it. There is a very clear cordon of barbed wire in front of the fort, and 
additionally, some small circular earthworks to the southwest that might represent 
temporary gun emplacements. 
 
 
Complex:   
This term does not apply to the shape of a fort per se. Instead, it denotes a layout that 
is literally more complex (to lesser or greater degrees) than the delineations noted 
above, and usually made more ‘complex’ by being made up of different types of 
sections or compounds of varying shapes (multi-part). Four indicative examples are 
described below.  
 
A straightforward, complex mural fort (ft 1648) situated on a knoll along the southern 
limit of Berm No. 6 (active and facing Mauritania) is shown in Fig. 4.55. Located in 
rectangle 850 of Fig. 4.6, it is about 130 metres long by 85 metres wide, with an area 
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of around 7,554 square metres438. Its shape follows the contours of the knoll on which 
it is situated and its trace is made up of a single defensive embankment, which is 
revetted on the inside. In all probability, the perimeter rampart was constructed by 
clearing away loose earth from the top of the knoll and banking it up along the 
perimeter, then facing it with stones along its inner face. This has resulted in a very 
well-defined outline in which there are numerous niches representing fighting and 
observation positions. There are bunkers and buildings inside the fort and two clear 
gun pits. The fort is accessed by a ramp and there is a bulldozed embankment around 
the base of the knoll, behind the territorial berm. The berm itself has an accumulation 
of drifted sand along its southern face, but its northern side has been maintained by 
bulldozing. Outside the fort, to its southeast, is a further embanked enclosure taking in 
a smaller knoll, which also has some dugout fighting and observation positions on its 
top. There is also a helicopter landing zone to the immediate northwest of the 
installation. 
 
Another complex, mural fort (ft 145) is shown in Fig. 4.56 (about 330 metres long by 
185 metres wide, with an area of around 34,001 square metres). It is situated along 
Berm No. 1 and it lies in an area of desert with very low relief (located close to, but 
outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). Although it has been out of 
use for some time, with all of its buildings and bunkers roofless, the scouring in the 
sand caused by the bulldozing in its construction and upkeep is still quite evident. The 
fort seems to have been initially conceived as a simple double embanked, partly 
concentric installation, subdivided by earthen blast barriers. The eastward facing outer 
embankment appears to incorporate a trench-like passageway, within and along its 
length, along with niches representing fighting/observation positions. Behind these are 
bunkers, incorporated into the second perimeter rampart. The fort has been expanded 
with an additional rampart added to the west, which includes a right-angled entry into 
the installation. A further enclosure was added to the north, with an observation 
passage (or trench) looking eastwards. Bunkers and buildings were constructed in the 
extensions to the fort, along with two gun (probably mortar) pits. Additional 
                                                 
438 In the far southwest of Berm No. 6, the overwhelming majority of forts are under 10,000 square 
meters in area, therefore, and on the face of it, it is hard to differentiate between forts and fortlets. 
Nevertheless, fortlets have still been marked out by their smaller size, designated in the southernmost 
part of Western Sahara by being under 5000 square metres in area. 
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embankments with some buildings were also constructed outside the fort to the west, 
where an identifier for the installation was also inscribed on the ground. 
 
A third example of a complex fort (ft 1274) is visible in Fig. 4.57 (about 470 metres 
long by 140 metres wide, with an area of around 50,789 square metres). It is on Berm 
No. 4, in sovereign Moroccan territory, and near the border with Algeria. This still 
active fort was originally a sub-circular double embanked fortification (around 160 
metres in diameter), which was subsequently extended to the north. The initial, near 
circular trace includes fighting/observation positions in the outer embankment facing 
east, with bunkers and other buildings within the second rampart. There is a clear 
entrance on the western side of the fort. Subsequently, the fort had a rectangular 
extension added to the north. This too is concentric with multiple embankments, and 
with fighting and observation positions in the outer rampart (formerly part of the 
frontal bank of Berm No. 4) facing Algeria to the east. There are bunkers and other 
buildings within the second frontal embankment, and there is a rectilinear area within 
the extension that is possibly a helicopter landing zone. The entry to the fort was made 
quite elaborate when the installation was enlarged, with protective earthen banks 
being added. There are circular embanked artillery gun emplacements, just outside the 
fort to the west, where there is also an installation identifier inscribed on the ground. 
 
Fig. 4.58 shows a distinctive complex fort (ft 290) situated along the Smara salient on 
Berm No. 1. This is a large group of enclosures utilising high ground and a spur, and 
at least four knolls overlooking a wadi to the east (covering a large area of around 
205,581 square kilometres).  The core enclosure (around 520 metres long by 360 
metres wide) at the lower left centre of the figure has concentric, double embanked 
defences with observation and fighting positions facing the east. Behind these are 
subterranean bunkers that appear to be roofless, indicating that the fort is redundant. 
Similar structures are visible within sub-circular enclosures within the fort, and there 
are additional earthen banks. The serpentine, contoured extension to the east also has 
fighting and observation posts facing the east, in salient positions and on a knoll, 
linked by a communication trench. The single embanked outer perimeter (probably the 
latest phase of the defensive ensemble) links a number of knolls which are all fortified 
with fighting positions and bunkers, and two of these have communication trenches 
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heading back to the core fortifications. This installation is indeed, a good example of a 
multi-part, complex fort. 
  
In summary, from the examples cited here, all mural forts and fortlets have at least 
one earthen (sand and stone) rampart or embankment (a berm) surrounding them, 
though most have multiple embankments that follow the whole or at least part of the 
trace of any given fortification. These encircling banks are not very different from the 
linear embankments of the territorial berms, and judging from Google Earth imagery 
and terrestrial photography, their profiles and methods of construction (through 
bulldozing) are exactly the same. Google Earth imagery shows that in almost all 
instances, there are observation and fighting positions along the fronts of the forts and 
fortlets. Some of these are open while others are, or were, covered. The latter would 
include semi-subterranean bunkers. There are also bunkers within the compounds, 
which are undoubtedly for accommodation, command, communication, stores and 
munitions (see fig. 4.52). The examples illustrated show that it is not unusual for forts 
and fortlets to be internally compartmentalised by earthen blast barriers (see fig. 4.59). 
These would protect personnel and facilities if the position was shelled while under 
attack, and they could be used to secure internal portions of a fort if an enemy actually 
occupied any part of it.  
 
The fighting and observation positions along the perimeter of a fort or fortlet can be 
covered or uncovered. Where they are uncovered, they can often appear to be simple 
niches within the internal face of a bank or rampart, presumably revetted with stones 
or sandbags. Such niches can be seen in Fig. 4.60, where along the trace of the fort, 
there is a raised walkway with obvious fighting/observation positions constructed in 
the perimeter bank. A comparative example from Israel’s bar Lev line is shown in Fig. 
4.61. In this instance, small revetted fighting positions are clearly discernable along 
the perimeter of an Israeli Moazim. Such open positions, as would also be the case 
with covered positions (bunkers), could undoubtedly accommodate small arms and 
machine guns, and as in fig. 4.62, even recoilless guns. Mortar positions could also be 
included, but these might be placed deeper within a fort along with limited artillery, 
presumably howitzers. It is more usual for ‘big’ guns to be placed in fire support bases 
in the rear. Though in contrast to this usual practice, Berm No.1 (and in some 
occasional instances Berms No. 3 and 4) has fire support batteries attached, and in 
 158
some cases constructed as integral to some of its mural forts. But before continuing 
with a description of fire support bases (firebases), an overview of other, smaller 
mural installations is in order.  
 
Small Mural Installations and Mural Compounds 
 
There are numerous installations attached to the berms that are compounds and/or 
fighting positions. Mural compounds (‘mcomp’ in Fig. 4.5) can be of almost any 
shape and almost always without internal features. They are apparently cleared areas 
enclosed by a single bank. Examples (see Fig. 4.63) are mcomp 251 (about 195 metres 
long by 55 metres wide) and mcomp 252 (about 120 metres long by 65 metres wide) 
along Berm No. 1, and located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6. There are also, long and 
thin rectilinear compounds that can be found attached to, and running longitudinally 
along some of the berms. Fig. 4.64 illustrates one such ‘parallel’ compound (‘pcomp’ 
in Fig. 4.5). Here, the compound (pcomp 132 on Berm No. 1, and located in rectangle 
187 of Fig. 4.6) is long and thin (about 370 metres long by 40 metres wide), with a 
clear entrance, and an additional longitudinal bank close behind the frontal trace, 
facing east. There are no obvious internal buildings, but fighting and/or observation 
positions can be made out in the front. It is possible that mural compounds are some 
kind of ad hoc troop and material marshalling areas, while parallel compounds are 
occupiable fighting and observation positions. Both could have been used on a 
contingency basis by Moroccan reaction forces, to counter Polisario attacks or 
incursions. 
 
In numerous instances, and along many lengths of the berms, there are small (under 50 
metres along their longest side) bastion like features that may very well be smaller 
versions of the larger compounds evident along the berms. They may have served as 
small mustering positions, or observation and/or ad hoc fighting positions, perhaps 
designed to accommodate small detachments of quick reaction forces. They have not 
been individually plotted on the project GIS, but elaborate versions of these have been 
plotted within sampling rectangle 952 (see Fig. 4.6) at the eastern most extent of Berm 
No. 4. Recorded as ‘small occupation positions’ (‘sop’ in Fig. 4.5), they are in effect, 
small fortlets, (usually up to 50 to 60 metres along their greatest length) with bunkers 
and other structures, and observation and fighting positions. They are very densely 
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distributed along Berm No. 4, facing Algeria (Fig. 4.21), and examples of them are 
shown in Fig. 4.65 (sop 2097 and sop 2098).  
 
Many portions of the berms also include individual artillery gun pits just behind them, 
and earth embanked vehicular slots – or tank slots – similarly emplaced. There are 
also many instances where vehicular slots, for self propelled artillery or tanks, were 
constructed up against the berms themselves, presumably to accommodate mobile 
firepower that could move along any given length of barrier in a reactive capacity to 
any form of attack.439 Examples of vehicular slots and gun pits outside of fortifications 
and behind the berms can be seen in Figs. 4.36, 4.37, 4.53, 4.54, 4.57, 4.63 and 4.65.    
 
Fire Support Bases 
 
The fire support base (or firebase) as a distinct entity came into being during the 
Vietnam War,440 in an environment where artillery firepower had to be delivered over 
all points of the compass. In Vietnam, there was no ‘front line’ as would be commonly 
understood, instead, the American military and its allies had to contend with enemy 
operations that could ‘erupt’ from almost any location. Because of this, fire support 
bases were mainly disposed in a network with the ability to give interlocking and 
supportive artillery fire.441  
 
Kelley depicts fire support bases in Vietnam as 
 
ground installations designed to house artillery and/or mortar units firing in support of 
maneuvering infantry elements and of other bases within the range of their weapons. 
Firebases typically housed infantry security forces and communication elements, units 
that varied in size according to the dictates of the terrain, the number of artillery 
pieces in place, the estimated size of nearby enemy forces and degree of threat. 
 
Most were generally circular in design (or built in any shape necessary to conform to 
the terrain) and contained any number of artillery pieces and/or mortars defended by 
various combinations of exterior concertina wire, trenches, sandbagged 
                                                 
439 Similar positions, constructed for reactive tanks and self propelled artillery were incorporated into 
Israel’s Bar Lev Line defences along the Suez Canal (Dunstan 2008: 28). 
440 Hay [1974] 1989: 97. 
441 Foster 2007: 14. 
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bunkers/foxholes and dirt berms. …landing pads for helicopters were normally built 
within or adjacent to most firebases…  442 
 
While Picken, recounting the Australian experience in Vietnam, succinctly describes a 
fire support base (FSB) as: 
 
In its simplest sense, the FSB was a rapidly constructed fortified artillery base 
position (gun area), usually sited near the centre of the area of operations (AO) and 
used as a support base for task force, battalion or company operations. The role of the 
FSB was to bring artillery and mortar fire within range of friendly forces operating in 
depth.443 
 
Fire Support Bases on the Berms  
Although the Moroccan defensive barriers against Polisario are linear, the concept of 
the fire support base has obviously been applied to them. Along all of the berms, 
firebases are to be found well behind the frontal barriers. However, along segments of 
Berm No.1, there are thirteen instances of firebases being part of, or attached to mural 
forts (with forty-two further firebases in the rear). This is counter to all of the other 
berms, except for Berm No. 3, which has one such installation, and Berm No. 4, 
which has four. Two indicative examples of mural forts with integrated firebases, 
from Berm No.1, are shown in Figs. 4.66 and 4.67 (mural firebases are abbreviated in 
the table in Fig. 4.5 as either ‘ftfb’ – a fort with a firebase as an integral part, or ‘ftfba’ 
– a fort with a firebase apparently added at a later date). 
 
The first of these, Fig. 4.66, shows a mural fort with an integrated firebase within its 
enceinte. This is ftfb 133, on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). It 
measures about 660 metres by 440 metres, with an area of around 208,701 square 
metres. This installation is very much a complex fortification. There appears to be an 
initial phase that consisted of an irregular mural fort in an area of low desert relief. 
The front of the fort, with its narrow double embankment, and multiple fighting 
positions and bunkers, follows natural contours and faces southeast. Its interior is 
subdivided with a single embanked enclosure, or compound, that includes four 
                                                 
442 Kelley 2002: xix. 
443 Picken 2012. 
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artillery gun pits (measuring between 20 and 26 metres in diameter, and possibly for 
self propelled artillery). There are further subdivisions within this compound, and 
further buildings or bunkers. Subsequently, the irregular fort, with its internal fire 
support capabilities, had added to it, another compound around its northwest side. 
This is a single embanked enclosure that is subdivided, including rectilinear 
enclosures and one large circular enclosure. There are also, open, ‘U’ shaped 
vehicular slots. Traces of the bulldozing to construct the installation are faintly visible 
in places, though wind blown sand has masked these. The buildings and bunkers that 
are visible are all roofless since this fortification is on a redundant berm. 
 
The second figure, Fig. 4.67, shows a rectilinear mural fort (around 120 metres by 300 
metres in area), also on Berm No.1, but with a firebase added onto its northwest flank 
(ftfba 16). Located in rectangle 215 of Fig, 4.6, the original mural fort is very clear 
and its compartmentalisation with earthen blast barriers, and with routeways, is 
sharply delineated. The fort is now redundant, so its internal bunkers and buildings, 
which are all roofless, can be easily made out. The rampart surrounding the fort is 
single banked, and along its southeast, frontal trace, there is a string of bunkers, and 
buildings that presumably represent accommodation as well as observation and 
fighting positions. In fact there are probably up to six fighting positions (though faint) 
that extend out slightly from the frontal trace like small stubby bastions. The fort has 
two right-angled entrances on its northwest flank, and further gaps or entry points 
adjacent to where it joins with Berm No. 1. The added firebase compound is 
rectilinear in shape (around 80 metres by 230 metres in area) with a very sharply 
defined perimeter. It has an entry at its southwest corner, which is shared with the 
mural fort. The firebase has few structures in it save for four gun pits, around five 
metres in diameter. There is an entry into the fort where there is a concentration of 
buildings, which might, by virtue of their closeness to the firebase, represent a fire 
command centre. The overall area of the installation is 60,339 square metres. 
 
Fire Support Bases Behind the Berms  
As already pointed out, the overwhelming majority of fire support bases are located 
behind the territorial berms. The distances vary from anywhere between, less than 200 
metres to more than 14 kilometres. Because the berms are usually sited on relatively 
high ground so as to get a good view of the terrain in front of them, firebases are 
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commonly found on slightly lower ground behind them. There are even instances 
where a firebase is deliberately positioned behind a hill or hillock. Firebases are 
usually surrounded by an earth embankment, and within them, there can be from two 
to 13 artillery gun emplacements (usually gun pits). Single gun installations are very 
uncommon, but there are also firebases built to accommodate self-propelled artillery, 
and in these instances the guns can be sited in large vehicular slots. Seven indicative 
examples of firebases are described below, mainly to illustrate apparent trends in the 
construction of the installations and the disposition of their guns. As in the foregoing 
descriptions of other installations along the berms, the following ‘snapshots’ have 
been taken from, or close to, the sampled rectangles selected from Google Earth. 
 
Fig. 4.68 illustrates a polygonal shaped firebase (fsb 1470), positioned more than four 
kilometres behind, and to the northwest of Berm No. 5 (and located to the west of 
rectangle 491 in Fig. 4.6). The firebase was originally sub-square in plan, but its 
northeast corner had been cut back, perhaps to allow the stagnant water that 
apparently accumulated in the wadi, against the base’s northern perimeter, to drain 
away (though perhaps, unsuccessfully). The firebase is surrounded by a single 
embankment, which has been constructed and maintained by bulldozing. It has an area 
of around 103,436 square metres with sides measuring approximately 390 metres by 
340 metres. The firebase is on an active length of Berm No. 5, facing Polisario 
controlled territory. There are numerous buildings and bunkers clearly visible within 
the compound, along with marked out routeways and some less clear vehicular slots. 
The entrance to the firebase is from the north and a helicopter landing zone (partly 
surrounded by stagnant water) is nearby. There are three gun pits in a line from west-
northwest to east-southeast and they have an average internal diameter of 23 metres. 
They all have structures on both sides of their open ends, which are probably crew 
shelters, and/or ammunition stores. The Google Earth image actually shows self-
propelled artillery within each gun pit, and their large diameters would be necessary 
for such mobile guns to manoeuvre.  
 
An example of a more rectilinear firebase (fsb 1255), located just over five kilometres 
behind Berm No. 4, is clearly shown in Fig. 4.69 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). 
It has an area of around 70,000 square metres with sides measuring approximately 335 
metres by 265 metres. This installation is within sovereign Moroccan territory facing 
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the border with Algeria to the east, and it is clearly occupied with artillery in its gun 
pits and with its bunkers and buildings roofed. This base could also be considered a 
‘complex’ installation since it has a compartmentalised extension to the north. The 
firebase has a double embanked perimeter along three of its sides, along which are 
observation positions and bunkers. There are also other bunkers and buildings 
distributed throughout the installation. There are right-angled entries into the base, at 
the north and southwest corners, and there are four gun pits with well-defined circular 
embankments. Their internal diameters average out at under 17 metres. Three of them, 
which are linked by earthen banks, have external, oblong earthworks attached to them. 
These are possibly for ammunition storage or other vehicles, while within the parapets 
outlining the gun pits, there are small square structures or bunkers – possibly crew 
shelters. The Google Earth image clearly shows that there are self-propelled artillery 
pieces in each gun pit. There is at least one clearly defined, possible gun pit outside 
the firebase, and being at around 10 metres in diameter, it could accommodate a 
howitzer, or just serve as an observation post. There is a cleared square area just 
outside the base’s southern perimeter, which is barely visible, and this might be a 
helicopter landing zone. 
 
An example of a sub-circular fire support base (fsb 1327), positioned around 4.25 
kilometres behind Berm No. 5 is shown in Fig. 4.70 (located in rectangle 583 of Fig. 
4.6). The firebase is positioned behind the redundant portion of Berm No. 5 to the 
west of Berm No. 6, and it is obviously out of use since all of its bunkers and 
buildings are roofless. Nevertheless, (with an area of around 26,876 square metres, 
and with a diameter of nearly 200 metres) this is a good example of a well-defined 
firebase with a total of five gun pits, all with internal diameters of around 18 metres. 
Four of the gun positions are along the southern perimeter of the base with the fifth 
gun pit just north of centre. The firebase has a single perimeter embankment, and 
observation positions are distributed along it. There are bunkers associated with the 
gun pits and there are a variety of buildings within the northern trace of the base. 
There is also a half circular enclosure within the northern side of the installation. The 
entrance to the base is from the northeast, and it is protected by an external blast 
barrier. There are depressions from bulldozing around the installation, presumably 
from its maintenance as well as construction. 
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The redundant fire support base (fsb 1257) shown in Fig. 4.71 is situated two 
kilometres east-southeast of fsb 1255 (described above) and west-northwest of Berm 
No. 4.  This part of Berm No. 4 is still actively occupied, but fsb 1257 obviously went 
out of use at some time, presumably to be replaced by fsb 1255 (both firebases are in 
rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). The firebase can be considered as being irregular in shape, 
though it is essentially a bent oblong with its convex side facing the Algerian frontier 
to the east. Its length is around 455 metres with a width of roughly 270 metres, and 
with an area of 67,737 square metres. The installation is surrounded by a single 
earthen bank, and there are additional enclosures along its western side. There are two 
entrances into the base. One is at the northwest end, protected by a blast barrier, while 
the second is at the southwest end, passing through an outer enclosure. There are the 
remains of roofless bunkers along the base’s eastern trace along with depressions and 
mounds at the very south of the installation. There are four obvious gun pits, more or 
less in a line arcing to the east. Their internal diameters average out at around 19 
metres and most have small rectangular earthworks at their openings, which are 
probably the remains of crew shelters. There is a further arced parapet, immediately 
north of the gun pits, and this has an internal earthwork. Superficially, this looks like a 
gun pit, but it might be the remains of some kind of command position. The size of the 
gun pits suggests that they were designed for self-propelled artillery. 
 
A complex fire support base (fsb 237) is illustrated in Fig. 4.72 (located in rectangle 
157 of Fig. 4.6). This redundant installation is just over one kilometre north of Berm 
No. 1. Its overall dimensions are around 230 metres by 223 metres with an area of 
about 32,305 square metres. The main part of the firebase is a sub-circular, earthen 
enclosure with four gun pits integrated into its perimeter. There is also a central gun 
pit and just to the north, a sub-rectangular embanked enclosure, capable of housing 
another gun. Two further compounds are up against the immediate perimeter to the 
north. The main sub-circular enclosure has an additional, mantle like, compound 
around its northern end wherein there are two further gun pits, unroofed bunkers, and 
vehicular slots. The entrance into the firebase is from the north. The five gun pits in 
the southern half of the main part of the installation have internal diameters averaging 
eight metres. This indicates that they were probably designed for towed artillery. The 
two perimeter compounds north of these average, internally, at just over 12 metres in 
diameter, while the rectilinear enclosure (north of centre) is eight by 14 metres in area. 
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These last three positions might have been designed for self-propelled artillery 
(perhaps turreted howitzers). The two gun pits in the northern, outer part of the 
installation, have internal diameters of around 10 metres. These could house either 
towed artillery or self-propelled howitzers. 
 
Fig. 4.73 shows a firebase (fsb 703, located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6) designed to 
accommodate self-propelled artillery. The installation is located about one kilometre 
northwest of Berm No. 3, and it measures around 225 metres by 250 metres, with an 
approximate area of 47,596 square metres. It is partly surrounded by a sub-circular 
embankment that is incomplete, incorporating a plateau like rise in the ground to the 
east-southeast. This would also mask the firebase from the territorial berm. This 
firebase is redundant, as is the section of Berm No. 3 that it is associated with, being 
situated behind Berm No. 4. Tracks from the bulldozing to construct this base are 
clearly visible in the Google Earth image. The main features in the installation are the 
four, open vehicular slots that face east-southeast towards Berm No. 3. They are 
between nine and 10 metres long by around six metres wide, internally, and at least 
three of them have the remains of bunker-like structures (now roofless) associated 
with them. These would have served as shelters for the gun crews. Because these 
vehicular slots are mono-directional, it is probable that they were intended for self-
propelled howitzers with rotating turrets. There is a round dugout behind the slots, and 
to the west, there are the remains of a couple of features that might be roofless 
bunkers. 
 
The last illustrative example of a fire support base (fsb 682) is shown in Fig. 4.74 
(located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). It too is situated behind Berm No. 3, and it 
appears to have been abandoned, even though the barrier to its south is still active. In 
fact, it is only around 1.5 kilometres north-northeast of fort ft 681 (described above). 
This firebase is an example of an unenclosed artillery position, covering an area of 
around 190 metres by 180 metres, at approximately 36,693 square metres in area. It is 
hidden behind a knoll to the south, and a second to the northwest. The southern knoll 
has been fortified with earth embankments and dugouts, and at least two vehicular 
slots for tanks or self-propelled guns. There are also dugout positions on the eastern 
slope of the northwesterly knoll. There are three artillery gun pits laid out in a 
triangular fashion. They have dugouts and earthworks that probably represent bunkers 
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associated with them. The average internal diameter of the gun pits is 17 metres (and 
they are around 60 to 80 metres apart), so it is likely that they housed self-propelled 
artillery. But one of the gun pits appears to have the roofless remains of a bunker 
within it, and this might very well represent a later phase when the function of the 
position might have changed, perhaps from a firebase to a field encampment.  
 
The examples of fire support bases depicted here (including the mural forts with 
firebases) indicate the generalised range of morphology, and fixtures, of firebases 
behind the Moroccan berms. All have a single earth embankment surrounding them, 
except for one, and the majority of gun pits are large enough for self-propelled 
artillery. Of the examples cited, the numbers of gun pits range from three to five (with 
the potential, elsewhere along the berms, of up to 10 in one installation). Additional 
structures include bunkers for shelter and accommodation, with the largest associated 
building or bunker probably representing a command and communications post.444  
For comparative purposes, see Fig. 4.75, which is a contemporary sketch of firebase 
Kramer in Vietnam. There are real schematic similarities in this drawing with the 
firebases along the Moroccan berms, especially if the tents are replaced with mud 
brick or stone structures, and bunkers. See also Fig. 4.76, which clearly shows the 
layout of firebase Roy in Vietnam. This base accommodated self-propelled artillery, 
and the photograph shows the immediate buildings and structures associated with the 
gun pits, with further ancillary structures and tents. However, unlike in Vietnam, 
where American firebase gun pits were laid out in a circular or star like formation,445 
in Western Sahara, many of the bases have their guns laid out in arcs, convexly 
directed toward the nearby territorial berm. Nevertheless, the artillery employed 
would still be able to give all round fire support if required. A low level aerial view of 
such a Moroccan firebase, unfortunately at an unknown location, is shown in Fig. 
4.77, and this clearly shows an arc of self-propelled guns with associated parapets and 
buildings, some of which are semi-subterranean.  
 
 
                                                 
444 For descriptions of fire support bases see Arnold 1987, Foster 2007, and Ott 1995  
445 Arnold 1987, Foster 2007, and Ott 1995. 
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Other Installations: installations in the rear 
 
There are support installations and facilities behind all of the territorial berms. These 
can be simple compounds (‘comp’ in Fig. 4.5) with no, or very minimal internal 
features, but similar to the mural compounds visible along the territorial berms. 
Examples of such compounds from Berm No. 1 (comps 256 and 257) are shown in 
Fig. 4.78 (they are both around 60 metres by 40 metres in area). Here, the compounds 
are situated in a broad wadi beneath higher ground to the west, with the territorial 
berm around 1.25 kilometres to the south. The southern compound (comp 257) is in 
two parts (a dividing embankment is faintly visible), while comp 256, to the north, 
includes a faint circular feature that could have housed a gun. As with mural 
compounds, it is possible that these installations were constructed to serve as 
mustering positions and temporary storage compounds. Both compounds are located 
in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6.  
 
There are also forts positioned in the rear (‘raft’ in Fig. 4.5), and these can include 
enclosures with single embankments surrounding a military camp, or garrison, as in 
the example shown in Fig. 4.79. In this view from Berm No. 6 (located to the north of 
rectangle 853 in Fig. 4.6), the fort (rft 1674) is subdivided into three large 
compartments by slight embankments, and there are various buildings spread 
throughout the installation. The boundary rampart is irregularly delineated, and the 
main entrance is along the south side. This installation is just under 10 kilometres 
north of Berm No. 6, and it measures around 415 metres by 380 meters, with an area 
of approximately 119,763 square metres. The facility is very much a camp as opposed 
to a fort, strong point, or fighting base. Another example, this time of a very 
developed camp just east of Smara and immediately behind Berm No. 1 is rft 282, 
shown in Fig. 4.80 (located in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). The irregular outline of this 
facility follows the contours of the higher ground that it is situated on, and its 
perimeter rampart includes observation and fighting positions. There are many 
buildings and vehicle parks, plus a sports field. There are clearly marked out 
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routeways, helicopter pads and a communications pylon. This installation is around 
550 metres by 385 metres in plan, with an area of around 115,184 square metres. 
 
However, some forts in the rear are constructed just like mural forts, and in these 
instances they are usually positioned very close to the berm. One such example is rft 
236 (see Fig. 4.81), a now redundant fort only around half a kilometre north of Berm 
No. 1 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). It conforms to the expected layouts of 
polygonal mural forts: it is concentric with two ramparts, and it measures around 235 
metres by 150 metres, with an area of about 27,465 square metres. The outer bank has 
fighting positions and observation posts (presumably including bunkers – now 
unroofed), while the inner compound has been subdivided by earthen blast barriers. 
The entrance is protected by a blast barrier, and traces of bulldozing, presumably from 
upkeep as well as construction, are clearly visible. For all intents and purposes, this is 
a mural fort, which for reasons of military contingency has been positioned behind 
Berm No. 1, as opposed to being positioned on it. Another example of a fort in the 
rear is rft 706 (see Fig. 4.82), less than four kilometres northwest of the redundant part 
of Berm No. 3. This fort has an irregular single rampart around it, and there are 
extensions to the north and west. The installation is compartmentalised, and possible 
earthen bunkers or partly subterranean structures, though now roofless, are just 
visible. There are also three bulldozed vehicular slots that could have accommodated 
self-propelled artillery. What looks like the main entrance into the fort is from the 
south, and it has a blast barrier in front of it. Also, it is interesting to note that this 
redundant installation is in relatively low-lying ground, which has caused water from 
seasonal rains, to accumulate within its southern compound. The fort covers an area of 
around 97,070 square metres, measuring overall, about 425 metres by 370 metres. It is 
located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6. 
 
In the Guelta Zemmour region, it is not unusual to find forts in the rear that are 
situated on top of rocky hills, or along ridges. One such fort (rft 1588), at around one 
kilometre northwest of Berm No. 5, is shown in Fig. 4.83 (located in rectangle 359 of 
Fig. 4.6). Here, a narrow ridge top enclosure (around 35 metres wide by 205 metres 
long, with an area of just under 4,500 square metres) is clearly shown with buildings, 
undoubtedly including bunkers, hugging the frontal trace of an installation that 
obviously follows natural contours. There is a clear entry via a track that passes a 
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probable, helicopter landing zone to the immediate northwest. There is also a ridge top 
rampart that extends northwards, following the lie of the land. A low level aerial 
photograph of a similar ridge type installation (though more densely packed with 
buildings) is shown in Fig. 4.84. In this image (though its precise position is 
unknown), buildings and bunkers cling to the ridge of a hill much like a closely 
packed hill top village from, for instance, the Mediterranean or the Levant. It is also 
fortified, in that a trench or parapet can be made out along the farther edge of the 
buildings. 
 
There are also enclosed and unenclosed military camps or garrisons (‘gar’ in Fig. 4.5) 
behind the berms. They consist of numerous buildings similar to those in Fig. 4.84 but 
more spread out, especially if situated on flatter ground. A Google Earth image of part 
of an unenclosed camp (gar 1112) around 8.5 kilometres north of Berm No. 4 
(measuring around 775 metres by 575 metres in area) is shown in Fig. 4.85 (located in 
rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6), while Fig. 4.86 illustrates the nature of such a camp from a 
low level aerial view. In fact, this unattributed aerial photograph is an image of gar 
1112 taken from the north, and it shows the buildings along the wadi that runs 
diagonally in the lower left corner of Fig. 4.85 (and marked out with a rectangle). 
These images clearly illustrate the nature of a Moroccan military camp in the desert. It 
shows the irregularity of the camp’s layout with a variety of relatively small buildings, 
some of which are above ground while others are partially subterranean, and it shows 
lines of armoured personnel carriers indicating that this is a base for a rapid reaction 
force. The Google Earth satellite image (Fig. 4.85) of gar 1112 also shows lines of 
vehicles, and these are probably armoured personnel carriers just like the ones in Fig. 
4.86. 
 
Summary  
 
This chapter has had the sole aim of trying to present, in a comprehensive manner, the 
monumental materiality of the Moroccan berms. This has been in stark contrast to the 
limited descriptions and anecdotes about the barriers usually put forward by analysts, 
commentators, and journalists. The methodology has been traditionally 
archaeological, relying on description and a form of sampling, though dependant on 
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remotely collected imagery, mainly from Google Earth. Such an approach is within 
the forensic range of archaeological methodologies.  
 
Other great military barriers can be directly engaged with, such as the Great Wall of 
China and Hadrian’s Wall. To anyone on the ground, they are constituted and 
apprehendable. Even the Palestinian barrier built by Israel can be encountered 
materially, and therefore directly. As pedestrians, these barriers can be walked along, 
and upon, though of course, the Palestinian barrier can only be observed from ground 
level. With the Moroccan barrier dividing Western Sahara still manned and mined, it 
is unapproachable. Its scale is immense. By covering a national territory, and by 
varying in its makeup across that territory, the barriers are hard to conceive of 
holistically. The tables and plots presented here, along with satellite and other 
imagery, therefore, have had the main aim of trying to mitigate this. Counts of forts, 
lengths and types of earthen banks, along with maps and photo images, do not have to 
be used for statistical presentation and analysis only; they can be used by our 
imaginations and our critical faculties, to gain an understanding and appreciation of 
the monumental character of the barriers dividing and partitioning Western Sahara.  
 
Although we can only look at, and chart, the Moroccan berms from afar, there are 
those who have faced the barriers directly, either as combatants, as journalists, or as 
refugees trying to cross the barriers from the Moroccan side to the Polisario controlled 
Free Zone. Such people have had direct experiences of the berms, and concomitant to 
this chapter, it is their confrontations with Morocco’s ‘Great Wall’ that are dealt with 
next, in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONFRONTING THE BERMS 
 
This chapter continues on from Chapter 4, with an aim of giving greater presence to 
the materiality of the Moroccan berms: but not through the panoptic gaze of Google 
Earth. Instead, it will give the distanced view of the berms, and the desert in which 
they are disposed, a greater depth by bringing the Moroccan barriers down to a human 
scale. The emphasis is on how desert regions have been fought over in asymmetrical 
war, and by extension, how the barriers have been perceived, confronted and 
negotiated on the ground, by either attacking fighters, occupiers, observers, or 
civilians desperately trying to cross from Moroccan occupied Western Sahara to the 
Polisario controlled Free Zone. 
 
Mobile Guerrilla Tactics 
 
Before the berms were completed – enclosing most of Western Sahara – 
Polisario/SPLA held sway over the territory’s open desert. Their long-range raids, 
even into Morocco and Mauritania, were audacious. But since in the end they could 
never match the manpower and material of the Moroccan armed forces, their fighting 
strength could only lay in their revival of the traditional Arab raid, or ghazi.  
 
Chapter 3 has already described the revival of the ghazi in the context of the anti-
colonial hostilities that took place in the western Sahara, from the late 19th century up 
to the Ifni-Sahara War of the late 1950s, and further still up into the last quarter of the 
20th century. Outside of the context of inter-tribal conflict, the employment of the 
surprise, lightening raid has been an important tactic for any weaker hostile in an 
asymmetric war. Hugh Kennedy noted a 7th century occurrence where ‘a wily old 
Bedouin leader’ gave advice to a force of inexperienced Iraqis invading Syria. He 
encouraged them to reconnoitre the position of the nearest water source and to use 
their mounted mobility to position themselves between the water source and the 
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enemy. They were urged not to fight on open ground so that the larger Syrian force 
could not surround them. 
 
They should not stand still or form a traditional line of battle because their opponents 
had both horsemen and foot soldiers and each group would support the other in close-
quarter combat. If the[ir] line was broken, it would be disastrous. Instead, they should 
keep the advantages offered by their mobility and divide the[ir] army into small 
squadrons (katā’ib), each of which could support the others.446 
 
This is clearly a description, from a Bedouin perspective, of a fast moving, mounted 
engagement, where knowledge of terrain, unconventional fighting, and fighting in 
small groups, with a flexibility of manoeuvre and mutual support is described in an 
asymmetric situation. This too was the essence of partisan warfare, for instance, in 
Spain during the Peninsular War of 1808-1814. With a superior knowledge of the 
countryside, insurgents harassed the occupying French army in small groups. They 
would quickly attack and then withdraw, and attack again, incessantly harassing the 
enemy,447 giving us the term guerrilla, from the Spanish for ‘little war’ or petit 
guerre.  
 
Guerrilla tactics stem from the basic tenet of their forces seeking only to give battle 
on their terms, which entails knowing their opponent’s position and strength, knowing 
when it is possible to isolate him from help or escape before help arrives, having the 
element of surprise on their side and fighting at a time of their choosing… The 
ambush and raid are their favoured tactical methods.448 
 
This method of warfare was honed by T.E. Lawrence in the Hejaz, during the Arab 
Revolt of 1916-1918, during the First World War. Lawrence could not reconcile 
warfare as practiced by the established armies of the time, with the tactics of the 
irregular tribesman that were the bulwark of the Arab revolt against Turkey, especially 
within the geographic expanse of Arabia. So Lawrence went back to first principles, 
as he wrote, he realigned his thinking by re-contextualising it, and as he said, taking 
                                                 
446 Kennedy 2007: 60. 
447 Chartrand 1999: 165-166.  
448 Smith 2006: 157.  
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‘refuge in Arabia’, and thereby, looking at the very land area the Arabs ‘wished to 
deliver’. 
 
I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps 
one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all 
that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with 
banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing 
intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were 
like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We 
might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s head; 
and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to 
the killing.449  
 
This echoes a view expressed by Clauswitz more than 80 years earlier, who when 
writing about a ‘people in arms’, described a guerrilla war as one which by its nature, 
would not consist of concentrated actions and troops movements. Instead, such an 
insurgency would be spread out spatially and temporally, and be more like a ‘process 
of evaporation’, depending ‘on how much surface is exposed’. 
 
The greater the surface and the area of contact between it [the insurgents] and the 
enemy forces, the thinner the latter have to be spread, the greater the effect of a 
general uprising. Like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the 
enemy forces.450  
 
And presaging Lawrence, Clauswitz went on to describe a popular uprising as one that 
‘should be nebulous and elusive’ and never materializing ‘as a concrete body’, so that 
the enemy could not strike at it decisively. Nevertheless, guerrillas should still be able 
to hit their enemy in a concentrated way. Though described like a ‘fog’, they ‘must 
thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of lightning may 
strike at any time’.451 Lawrence recognised that the Arabs of the Hejaz, as with 
Polisario combatants, had ‘range over force’. They had strategic, not tactical strength. 
‘Their cards were speed and time, not hitting power’,452 and this was only possible 
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because of the camel and the Bedouin’s knowledge of the desert. Though added to this 
was the employment of armoured cars, which became integral to the campaigns in the 
Middle East, including the Hejaz. With Europeans becoming comfortable with the use 
of armed motor vehicles in rough, desert terrains, they eventually developed ‘a style 
and art of sand-driving’,453 which would evolve into a truly 20th century approach to 
desert warfare, of which the Polisario/SPLA would become beneficiaries.  
 
The Italians first used armoured cars in Libya in 1912.454 But the British, besides 
employing heavy and light armoured cars in the Middle East in World War One, also 
organised Light Car Patrols in Egypt’s Western Desert, from 1916 to 1919.455 These 
were cut down Model T Fords, with some armed with machine guns, which proved 
highly effective for reconnaissance patrols and raiding against Sanusi insurgents from 
Italian occupied Libya during 1915-1917. Rolls Royce armoured cars had proved their 
worth as attack vehicles, but in facing the Sanusi, the lighter Ford’s, with their ease of 
maintenance and high wheel bases became vehicles of choice.456 Theses cars proved 
that the deeper desert could be accessed by appropriately fitted out motor vehicles, 
and could be used in desert warfare. They became the inspiration for R.A. Bagnold’s 
use of motorcars in his explorations of the Libyan Desert from 1929 to 1938,457 and 
equally, the inspiration for the Long Range Desert Group of the Second World War.458 
Closer to Western Sahara, however, the French employed motorised Foreign Legion 
units, which took part in their occupation of the western reaches of the Sahara. These 
were mainly armoured cars patrolling throughout the Algerian Sahara, southern 
Morocco, and Mauritania, and supporting French actions in ensuring the pacification 
of the tribes based in Western Sahara and northern Mauritania.459 The Italians also 
developed their offensive desert motorized capabilities between the two World Wars. 
In 1938, their Libyan Saharan Companies were reorganised and motorised and they 
developed the Sahariana desert patrol car – designed specifically for long distance 
desert travel and fighting.460   
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With the onset of World War Two, and with the threat of an Italian invasion of British 
held Egypt, Ralph Bagnold proposed an approach to desert fighting that would not 
have been out of place to Lawrence some 25 years earlier, and the Polisario in the last 
quarter of the 20th century. In 1940, Bagnold approached Sir Archibald Wavell, 
Britain’s Commander in Chief in the Middle East, with the idea of self contained, 
motorised units being employed to enter Libya through the deeper desert – where he 
explored between the wars – to reconnoitre and harass Italian forces. In short, in 
Bagnold’s own words, to carry out ‘piracy on the high desert’.461 This comparison 
with piracy, with war on the high seas, was an analogue used by Lawrence in 
describing the Hejaz campaign against the Turks. 
 
In character these operations were like naval warfare, in their mobility, their ubiquity, 
their independence of bases and communications, in their ignoring of ground features, 
of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. ‘He who commands the sea is at 
great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will’: he who 
commands the desert is equally fortunate. Camel raiding parties, self-contained like 
ships, could cruise securely along the enemy’s land-frontier, just out of sight of his 
posts along the edge of cultivation, and tap or raid into his lines where it seemed 
fittest or easiest or most profitable, with a sure retreat always behind them into an 
element which the Turks could not enter.462 
 
This description by Lawrence can equally apply to the tactics of the Polisario/SPLA in 
their war with Morocco and Mauritania. While Lawrence’s fighters were camel 
mounted, the raiders of the LRDG and Polisario were vehicle mounted. As such, their 
ranges were greater, and they could carry adequate fuel and supplies and be self-
sufficient. While Polisario undertook long-range raids into sovereign Mauritanian and 
Moroccan territory, just as the LRDG did in their raids into Italian Libya, their 
embracing of motorized guerrilla tactics affected how they confronted the Moroccan 
berms, and their raids affected the reactions of the Moroccan military. 
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Polisario Confronting the Berms 
 
In 1986, the journalist Jeremy Harding visited Western Sahara and saw a portion of 
the berms at close quarters. His Polisario guide, Nuruddin, though able to speak a 
number of European languages often condemned the wall with the French term ‘la 
pourriture’, referring to the barrier as something rotting, something in decay. His view 
was simple and contemptuous. If the wall were left alone, it would just crumble away, 
it would return to the desert from which it was made.463 But the archaeology of the 
berms tells a different story, and in time, traces of the walls will be indelibly inscribed 
onto the desert’s surface, save perhaps, in those extremely sandy regions where the 
desert winds are their strongest. 
 
Polisario insurgents undoubtedly had the upper hand in their fight against Mauritania 
and Morocco, and then Morocco on its own, in the vast desert spaces of Western 
Sahara. Like Lawrence’s camel mounted raiders, and Bagnold’s LRDG, they would 
exploit their intimate knowledge of the desert, and they would harass and attack 
Moroccan positions. Their guerrilla tactics were finely honed, and with small groups 
of armed Land Rovers they would always attack Moroccan positions, on the move, 
and then quickly withdraw. Additionally, when Polisario forces occupied a Moroccan 
position they would not stay long, but again withdraw, and rapidly attack another 
Moroccan strong point. Such continued harrying of the Moroccans improved the 
SPLA’s fighting abilities, and the Moroccans were even more vulnerable when the 
attacks occurred in the hotter times of the year, with the Saharawis being much more 
comfortable in the Summer heat than the majority of Moroccan soldiers.464 
 
Although Saharawi tactics could include large columns of tens of vehicles, even up to 
a hundred or more at a time (also including armoured vehicles), in the end, their 
strength lay with their own modern and mechanized form of the smaller scale ghazi. 
As Chapter 6 will show, as at Tifariti, these tactics were highly successful in taking 
Moroccan occupied positions in the badiya. But when the berms were constructed, for 
all of Nuruddin’s contempt, the Moroccan barriers did put a substantial break on 
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Polisario’s offensive effectiveness.465 This being the case, Jon Anderson sardonically 
described the war with Morocco as turning into a ‘kind of military pantomime’, where 
appearing to be at war took the place of real hostilities. To Anderson, who visited 
Western Sahara between 1988 and 1991, Polisario’s offensiveness merely became 
orchestrated ‘displays of their military prowess’. The berms made a ‘mockery’ of the 
war, forcing the Saharawis to symbolically continue to assault the barriers, to breath 
life into the conflict as a sort of ‘bellicose ritual or blood sport. Like a family seeking 
to retain the semblance of a nobler lineage than present appearances suggest’. 
Anderson additionally observed that Saharawi participants in these actions talked 
about them for months after the fact. He went on to say: 
 
Indeed, these battles amount to precious heirlooms, material for the carefully tended 
oral history of a war that now exists mostly in name. Guerilla veterans like Moulay 
[Anderson’s guide] are discernibly wistful, speaking as if their best times were behind 
them, back in the days before the wall.466 
 
Contrary to this, Polisario combatants were still able to occasionally attack the berms 
in a relatively conventional way and bloody the Moroccan defenders. One very bad 
year for Morocco was 1987 when substantial Polisario forces attacked the Moroccan 
military in 16 locations.467 A common Polisario attack on the barrier, according to 
Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez, could target two mutually supporting mural posts 
at the same time, approached at night to avoid detection. The first phase would be a 
mechanised incursion across the barrier followed by a second phase of further 
vehicular and tank attacks on the two posts. While holding the forts, the force that 
crossed the berm would wait and engage the Moroccan rapid reaction force that would 
be called into the battle (in a third phase), and deal them as fatal a blow as possible. 
Another Polisario motorised unit would give back up to the attackers and take 
captured material and prisoners to the rear.468 Such a surprise attack could only shock 
the Moroccans, cause them to deploy forces away from other positions, destroy 
material and give the Moroccans a ‘bloody nose’. But a territorial inroad would not be 
made. These were essentially harrying attacks, and that was all the SPLA was able to 
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do to a lesser or greater degree. But Polisario and the SPLA could be mischievous in 
their relationship with the berms. It was not unusual for them to approach the berms at 
night, and as already pointed out, remove mines from in front of the barriers and 
rebury them behind the Moroccan positions.469 Such a simple attritional tactic could 
only add to the spectre like quality of the Saharawi insurgents.  
 
Moroccan Soldiers and the Berms 
  
The Moroccan forces manning the berms (and numbering up to 120,000470) have 
mainly been conscripts, save for the officer class, and many came from the more 
temperate parts of Morocco north of the Wadis Draa and Sus, and including the very 
clement Rif and Atlas mountain regions.471  Because of this, they were not used to the 
extreme heat of Western Saharan summers, when Polisario would increase their 
operations, and this definitely took its toll on them.472 Although, as already pointed 
out, this research mainly looks at the Western Sahara conflict from the Saharawi 
perspective, there is at least one Moroccan soldier whose experiences of manning the 
berms can inform this dissertation.  
 
In 2010 the Algerian journalist and writer on Arab affairs, Anouar (Anwar) Malek 
interviewed a Moroccan army deserter for the Algerian newspaper Echourak, and it 
was published online. The soldier was an infantry officer named Abdelilahou Issou 
who was commissioned in 1988 and rose to become the head of an infantry company. 
Stationed along one of the berms facing Polisario held territory, he explained that an 
infantry company could be split up and stationed at different posts along the barrier, 
between which were unmonitored lengths of berm fronted by land mines and barbed 
wire. The minefields and barbed wire failed to prevent the SPLA from infiltrating the 
barrier, and, according to Issou, the Moroccan units facing a mechanised Polisario 
attack would often flee ‘in disarray’.473 This might be an exaggeration, but it tallies 
with some of the comments made by Polisario interviewees, Mohammed Deya and 
Habua Breica – that Moroccan soldiers would easily give up after a fight and that 
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Polisario tactics were a psychological strain on them.474 Issou claims to have thwarted 
a number of Polisario incursions between 1988 and 1990 but he became bitter when 
his resources were reduced (for instance, he described himself as being ‘downsized’ – 
presumably he meant that the number of men under his command was reduced).  
 
In his interview, Abdelilahou Issou never mentioned where he was stationed along the 
berms, but he talked about continual attacks by the SPLA. Saying that ‘Polisario 
fighters pounded daily our positions with heavy machine-guns causing many 
casualties among the Moroccan troops’. He added that the soldiers’ lives became a 
‘nightmare’ from Polisario’s ‘relentless and ill-fated attacks’. Though he also claimed 
that Saharawi ‘commandos’ would sneak into Moroccan army barracks and slit the 
throats of sleeping soldiers, which made him very fearful and kept him up at night.475 
This last point is out of keeping with the way in which Polisario have presented 
themselves as behaving throughout the sixteen years of war. As Anderson noted: 
 
Polisario has refrained from using terrorism to strike at Morocco beyond the wall. 
Because it pretends to nationhood, the Polisario affects the sober demeanor seemingly 
appropriate for a sovereign state: Its fighters aren’t called guerrillas, but soldiers – and 
soldiers, of course, don’t commit acts of terrorism. This is war with a sense of honour, 
fought on the battlefield.476 
 
But a sense of honour was not apparent on the battlefield, according to one Moroccan 
army doctor who was captured by Polisario during the fighting at Lebouirate in 1979, 
and recounted that he saw Polisario fighters kill wounded Moroccan soldiers in their 
hospital beds.477 Honest accounts of all wars will show that extreme brutality can 
occur on all sides. Even one of my informants, Malainin Larkhal, who has maintained 
that Polisario fought honourably since it was against their ‘Saharawi culture’ to do 
otherwise, has commented that if hostilities were to resume between Morocco and the 
SADR, the younger fighters of today, out of frustration with the political impasse that 
exists over Western Sahara and the maltreatment of Saharawis in the occupied 
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territories, would fight with a greater brutality than any of that which might have 
occurred in the war before the 1991 ceasefire.478 
 
Crossing the Berms 
 
There are those who have taken the extreme step of leaving the Moroccan occupied 
zone for the Polisario liberated one, and have done so by walking hundreds of 
kilometres across open desert, crossing over the berms, and traversing the minefields. 
Many have been activists who would have faced imprisonment for their political 
activities, such as Malainin Larkhal and Hamdi Touballi, or they have been idealistic 
teenagers like Salek Labaidi Bachir. These individuals have had a very direct 
experience of the Moroccan barriers, and not as military personnel cosseted within 
defended camps and positions, but as vulnerable civilians, pedestrians, facing first the 
open desert, and then the complete panoply of the fortified berms.  
 
Salek Labaidi’s ‘story’ began in 2004, when as a teenager of seventeen, he and some 
friends were appalled by the treatment of corralled camels by the Moroccan army in 
the city of Smara, in the occupied zone. As Salek recounted in an interview:  
 
[The] Moroccan soldiers had caught the camels close to the Moroccan wall, and they 
were taken to Smara where I lived. The soldiers didn’t feed or water them, but the 
camel means our [Saharawi way of] life, our culture. We, and the people of Smara, 
felt strongly that the soldiers did something bad.479  
 
So Salek, with four friends broke into the camel compound and freed the camels, and 
as a result, the friends found themselves crossing the desert, and escaping into the 
liberated Polisario held territory southeast of Smara. What is striking, is that this was 
not an obviously political act, instead, the teenagers were moved by a perceived 
societal imperative to liberate an animal which represented the essence of  Saharawi 
culture. The camel is the animal upon which their traditional, nomadic, pastoral 
society depended, and since there are no oases as such in Western Sahara (save for the 
valley of the Saguia al-Hamra), the following of the rains by camel, across vast ranges 
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to seek out pasture and temporary water sources, was integral to the centuries old 
lifeways of the Saharawi tribes. As already noted, this was why the largest of the 
Saharawi tribes, the Reguibat, used to be known as ‘the people of the clouds’,480 
meaning that they would follow the clouds that bring the rains, and this could only be 
done by camel.  
 
This act of ‘animal liberation’ caused Salek and his companions to walk seventy 
kilometres, towards and across the berms that surround Smara, and into the liberated 
zone. They passed a rear support base, and then ten kilometres further, to the south-
southeast, they stood on a hill which overlooked the barrier. ‘After a short walk, we 
saw the berm, it was very big, like a snake’.481 It was one o’clock in the morning and 
the moon was out. Salek described the land around the berm as barren, and there were 
lights from the small bases along the barrier. Upon encountering the barrier, Salek was 
initially confronted by a dry-stone wall around one and a half metres high by three 
quarters of a metre thick (see Fig. 4.41). Then at about three metres distant, a two 
metre high earthen bank, followed again by a second similar bank with a single fence 
of barbed wire in the front. There was a military base nearby, encircled with barbed 
wire, and Salek remarked that there was something which he interpreted as a radar 
installation. The teenagers had stopped to rest between the second and third barriers, 
but when they thought that they were seen by a Moroccan soldier, only a few metres 
away, they ran over the third barrier and through the barbed wire. Surprisingly, Salek 
could not remember how he got through the wire, but he obviously did, and he and his 
companions made it safely through the minefield. The five youths eventually made 
their way to Bedouin grazing their camels in the liberated zone. Their journey took 
four days, and they eventually moved on to the Saharawi refugee camps near Tindouf, 
Algeria, where Salek is now a journalist.482  
 
Malainin Larkhal’s case was different. He was a high profile activist in the Moroccan 
occupied capital of Western Sahara, El-Ayoun (he is now Secretary General of the 
Saharawi Journalists and Writers Union). Speaking in an interview, he recounted how 
he had been arrested a number of times and even tortured, so for his own safety, and 
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for that of his fellow activists, he left the occupied territory in the Summer of 2000 
when he was threatened with a further arrest.  
 
He travelled southwards, towards Mauritania, with his brother and a friend. First by 
car to Bojdour, and then by another car driven by a smuggler who agreed to take them 
close to the berm by the border with Mauritania. They were then to travel southwards 
by foot, but their trek to the wall was much longer than expected. Malainin knew that 
he and his friends were at a disadvantage being, as he said, ‘city boys’. They didn’t 
know the ‘ways of the desert’, and they were travelling in the southwest of the country 
where there are many sand dunes which made walking very difficult, but luckily, they 
had the ‘strength of youth’ on their side. When they made it to the berm, they first 
came upon a Moroccan base where they saw Moroccan soldiers milling about, and 
Malainin even took the time to note the base’s mud brick buildings. The smuggler had 
told the three that when approaching the berm, they would first come across a track 
that the Moroccans maintained and swept clear, so as to detect the foot prints of 
people approaching and trying to cross the barrier. They located the path, and 
afterward came upon a sand embankment. After this, they found the larger frontal 
embankment of the barrier, but between the two the ground was strewn with flat 
stones and this created a distinctive tactile experience for the refugees. In Malainin’s 
words: 
 
I remember that they were also using rocks between the small embankment and the 
first big wall [embankment]. They were putting some kinds of rocks, like flat rocks, 
and the problem was that when you’re walking, you make noise, because they start 
hitting each other… it was unnatural, their presence was unnatural, and I remember 
that. Walking on these walls, when you’re walking under these conditions, you think 
that everyone is looking at you, and that any sound you make will bring soldiers.483 
 
Malainin encountered no barbed wire in front of the barrier and made it safely through 
the land mines in front of it. After crossing the border into Mauritania, the three 
refugees eventually made their way northwards to the Saharawi camps, near Tindouf. 
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Seven years after Malainin Larkhal crossed the berms, the young Saharawi activist 
Hamdi Touballi was compelled to leave his home in El-Ayoun for the Polisario 
controlled free zone. Hamdi had become very involved in protests in the capital and 
was arrested on the first day of the Saharawi civilian uprising (or intifada) that started 
in the occupied territories in May 2005. He was subsequently arrested a number of 
times and kept under surveillance, so in January 2007 he decided to leave his home 
and cross the berms. A friend of his first drove him into the desert southeast of Dakhla 
and then walked with him part of the way toward the berm. They got within 30 
kilometres or so of the barrier, and Hamdi then walked on by himself. Hamdi 
recounted to me his crossing of the barrier: 
 
I remember, it was maybe half past two or three in the morning [when] I found myself 
at the wall. When I was close to the wall I could hear Moroccan soldiers talking near 
to me, but I was lucky because I was alone. I was very, very scared, not from the 
soldiers, but from the mines. I thought, that if I exploded a mine the problem was that 
no one was with me, no one could help me. And of course, the Moroccan soldiers 
would not help me. 
 
Hamdi described the barrier he crossed as consisting of two earthen banks, with the 
frontal barrier higher than the rear embankment, around eight metres behind it. There 
was barbed wire in front of the berm, but Hamdi could not recall how he got through 
it.484   
 
Malainin, Hamdi and Salek all made it successfully across the berms. In the locations 
in which they crossed, they all describe a line of parallel barriers, though the first of 
these was made of stone in the north of the country. The barriers could be climbed and 
walked over easily, but they were obviously designed (essentially as steep sided sand 
banks) to stop vehicles – the motorised raiding parties of the Polisario/SPLA. It is 
striking that the barbed wire, noted in all published descriptions of the berms, was 
meagre in the sections crossed by Salek and Hamdi, and non-existent in the south, 
near the Mauritanian frontier. It is also noteworthy that the minefields were easily, and 
safely crossed by foot. Malainin Larkhal is of the opinion that the mine fields and 
barbed wire fences have not been maintained by the Moroccans, because over the 
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years, as already noted, SPLA soldiers have removed the mines and barbed wire in 
many places.485 
 
Importantly, these three accounts give us something of an experiential view of the 
Moroccan barriers, and for the durations of their journeys, Malainin, Hamdi and Salek 
became immersed in their undertakings, and ‘dwelled’486 in the hostile environment of 
the desert and the berms. They had to confront the barriers they crossed in an 
undeniably direct, bodily way. They had to carefully navigate across an unknown 
space, as Ingold would say as ‘wayfarers’,487 using all of their senses to make their 
way, in a ‘kinesthetic interplay’ of the tactile, sonic and visual,488 while filled with 
fear and other strong emotions. Tilley would describe their visceral experiences as 
‘holistic’ and even ‘carnal’,489 though in the real life context of individuals facing the 
possibility of death in a hostile environment (from armed soldiers and land mines) 
these terms might appear inadequate, perhaps even trite. Trying to understand a 
landscape, especially a contested one through the experiences of intimately involved 
individuals, ‘is much more than an academic exercise – it is about the complexity of 
people’s lives, historical contingency, contestation, motion and change’.490 
 
Salek’s distinctive description of the barrier as a large ‘snake’ is reminiscent of the 
sinuousness of the trenches and wire entanglements of the First World War. In fact, 
when viewed from above, in Google Earth for instance, the berms can appear graceful. 
They can appear serpentine or angular, to sweep or glide, and the forts can appear 
organic in form. But when viewed from the ground, Malainin had this to say about 
Morocco’s ‘great’ wall: 
 
It is very ugly. When I’ve seen, for example, the Berlin wall, you can draw graffiti on 
it, you can express yourself, it is something physical.., I mean, when you see the 
                                                 
485 Fadel and Larkhal, Interviews. 
486 Ingold 1995. 
487 Ingold 2007. 
488 Feld 2005: 181.  
489 Tilley 2004. 
490 Bender 2001: 2. 
 185
Israeli wall, it’s similar, it’s very imposing and big, this one is just a berm, it’s just 
dirt, some embankment. Even if you take it in photos it isn’t interesting…491 
 
This brings us back to the contemptuous view of the berms expressed by Jeremy 
Harding’s guide, Nuruddin. Although the barriers definitely limited Polisario’s 
offensive operations they are still viewed as impotent. So impotent, that Saharawi 
youths periodically march up to the wall in the north of the country, in protest, and 
even try to dismantle it.492 Of course, this impotency has not been tested in battle, and 
it will take a resumption of hostilities to see if the Saharawi contempt for the barrier is 
truly well founded. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter, along with its predecessor, has aimed to give presence to the materiality 
of the Moroccan berms that partition Western Sahara. Chapter 4 has shown, through 
description and characterisation of the barriers, the extreme lengths that a nation can 
take to appropriate another, while this chapter has more than indicated, the nature of 
direct human interactions with the physical result of those lengths – Morocco’s ‘Great 
Wall’. As an archaeological feature (complex and multi-phased), it is one of the 
largest of its kind, though the Great Wall of China exceeds it by at least 2700 
kilometres.493 As an archaeological phenomenon that literally traverses great swathes 
of an entire country, it is archaeology at a truly macro scale.  
 
When the berms are viewed through Google Earth, they are a visual expression of 
Harrison’s view that an archaeology of the present should be perceived as a single 
stratum upon which the past and present is manifest. When looking at the geography 
across which the berms traverse, then the very places where soldiers have undoubtedly 
fought, and where civilians have found themselves forced to ‘dwell’ (and some still 
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do) in an unfamiliar environment  – in their bid to cross the barriers – indicate that this 
multi-faceted study of the berms is undoubtedly an archaeology in and of the present. 
The immensity of the berms, and perhaps more importantly, the will to build them 
across a national territory, indicates, as Gonzáles-Ruibal might put it, ‘reason’ that has 
gone ‘berserk’. The berms are exaggerated and baroque. In a theatre of war that has 
been asymmetrical, they are excessive – they are super modern. And when the 
archaeology of the berms is augmented by the experiences of those who have 
confronted them directly, now and in the recent past, then the traumatic materiality of 
the Western Sahara conflict can be disclosed and made bare. 
 
But the berms are also, quite fundamentally, a material expression of the three issues 
or themes that infuse this research: colonialism, conflict and exclusion. They manifest 
the colonial will of Morocco to keep hold of Western Sahara, they were born out of 
conflict – warfare in the open desert – and their aim has been to mitigate Polisario’s 
advantages as desert, guerilla fighters. In the end, they have partitioned the country 
and excluded those Saharawis in exile, in Tindouf in Algeria, from around 80 percent 
of their country. It has also turned the 20 percent of the country under SADR control 
into a liminal zone, a threshold outside the Moroccan edifice of the berms, and with 
one location specific to, and within it – the settlement of Tifariti – being of special 
importance to the Saharawi people. 
 
The materiality of Tifariti, and how its archaeology indicates the part the settlement 
has played in the story of Western Sahara is dealt with next, in Chapter 6. In the 
relative terms of this research, it is landscape archaeology at the meso scale. It 
examines the palimpsest of the immediate Tifariti region from the Middle Holocene 
up to the present day. It too is an archaeology, in and of the present. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE LANDSCAPES OF TIFARITI 
 
Pre-Islamic Archaeology in the Tifariti Area 
 
Western Sahara is rich in prehistoric remains. A very small number of archaeological 
teams, mainly from Spain, work in the country, but a relatively substantial number of 
sites and features have been recorded and published. Nevertheless, what has been 
published is only the tip of the iceberg, since so much of the fieldwork carried out to 
date has been mainly exploratory, and there have been very few systematic 
excavations of stratified sites.494  
 
The University of East Anglia has been involved in fieldwork in the territory since 
2002, and since 2007, its Western Sahara Project (WSP) started to intensively survey 
an area 14 kilometres north of Tifariti, referred to as the TF1 Study Area (see Fig. 
6.1). The study area covers approximately 9.5 square kilometres, and includes 411 
prehistoric monuments, which it is presumed range in date anywhere from around 
3000 B.C. to A.D. 1000. Virtually all of the monuments are funerary or ideational (or 
ritual) and relate to a period (recognised in many other parts of the Sahara as well) 
when a cultural shift into pastoralism occurred, spurred on by the aridification of the 
Sahara around 5200 years ago. There is also evidence for occupation sites dating to 
the Early and early Middle Holocene, representing the seventh to ninth millennia 
B.P.495  
 
This prehistoric/pre-Islamic archaeology with its rich funerary remains is viewed, in 
the context of this research, as the base stratum upon which the archaeology of later 
periods lie. It is a rich layer, which, based on fieldwork carried out by the WSP, is 
visible in most areas, especially where the ground is particularly hilly and rocky. From 
the results of the WSP’s fieldwork carried out in 2005, 2007, 2008 and in 2009 (and 
incorporating plots of monuments identified on Google Earth imagery by Yves 
                                                 
494 Clarke and Brooks, in press. 
495 Brooks et al 2009, and Clarke and Brooks, in press. 
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Gauthier for the 2009 field season), and taking into account fieldwork for this 
dissertation carried in 2011, at Tifariti, it is obvious that funerary monuments extend 
from Tifariti, where the topography changes from flat hamada desert in the south, to 
the rocky and undulating terrain of the Zemmour region to the immediate north (see 
Fig. 6.2). The desert in the south is open with virtually no landmarks, while in the 
north the landscape is enfolding with a complex network of connected wadis. Tifariti 
is at the junction of these two lands and, presumably, people at all times would 
perceive and interact with these distinct regions differently. It has been proposed that 
the Zemmour region, including the Tifariti area, was one of many refuges (or refugia) 
for Saharan peoples in the Middle Holocene.496 Such areas remained relatively 
verdant, while other regions of the Sahara were becoming arid and approaching the 
aridity of today. Even now, the Tifariti area is seen by Saharawis as a good place to 
live, where there is good pasture, and the climate is clement. For example, Fig. 6.3 
shows the amount of vegetation present in the Wadi Tifariti today. 
 
Fig. 6.4, as well as Fig. 6.2, clearly illustrate the generalised distribution of recorded 
funerary remains around Tifariti, and within the Tifariti Study Area (which measures 
14.5 kilometres, east to west, by 16.6 kilometres, north to south, with the settlement of 
Tifariti just north of centre). They show that by being located amidst hilly and 
dissected terrain, funerary remains are situated where there are the raw materials – that 
is to say stones – to build them. There may also be areas of dense concentrations of 
monuments, suggesting recognised ‘lands’ or ‘zones’ of the dead (or ‘the spirits’)497 as 
distinct from habitation areas. However, if talking about pastoralists, is it correct to 
apply such a dichotomy at all? Surely, and in an arid environment with scant pasture, 
grazing animals would follow fertile wadis irregardless of any areas of intense 
funerary remains, especially since the steeper sided wadis in the rockier parts of the 
desert will collect more water during the occasional rains that occur, resulting in more 
succulent herbage. Such a situation might encourage a certain amount of opportunism 
in the placing of funerary constructions close to wadi routeways; and as with those 
                                                 
496 Brooks and Clarke 2010, and Clarke and Brooks, in press. 
497 For instance, the location of these types of monuments on higher rocky ground resonates with some 
aspects of traditional African religions. Amongst the Hausa for instance, hills and inselbergs were 
traditionally the dwelling places of the spirits, in particular, the ‘Iskoki’, who were the arbiters of 
human affairs (Insoll 2003: 27, 293 & 295). 
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ancient societies where the dead might be buried within domestic spaces,498 here too 
can be the sepulchres of the dead in what is in effect a lived in, pastoral landscape of 
wadis and pasture. The dead and the living can share the same space. The living can 
continue to utilise the routes that meander through this so called ‘land of dead’ for 
centuries afterwards, all because of the imperative to find pasture for grazing animals 
and beasts of burden, and for the need of pasturalists to get from one location to 
another. 
 
Two burial cairns in the TF1 Study Area were excavated by the WSP in 2005, and the 
skeletons found were carbon dated. The dates were (when calibrated) A.D. 420-770 
and A.D. 430-595499 indicating that stone burial mounds, and the customs associated 
with them were still in use within a couple of centuries before the coming of Islam 
into the region. The Berber, Sanhaja tribes of the western Sahara converted gradually, 
though superficially to Islam by the mid 8th century, but their attachment ‘to Islam 
prior to the Almoravid period was superficial, and animist notions retained much of 
their hold’.500 As with other parts of the Sahara, Sahel and Sudan,501 their conversion 
was partial and their practices were obviously mixed with earlier, traditional African 
religious practices. With this in mind, it is conceivable that some funerary 
monuments, for example burial cairns, could have been constructed after the 8th 
century, and if not, they could have still been a focus for early Islamic burials since a 
considerable number of Islamic graves (‘kerb burials’)502 have been found amidst, and 
close to tumuli in the TF1 study area (often disposed as ‘satellite’ burials). This could 
indicate that such an area of pre-Islamic burials may have continued as an area of 
ideational significance, perhaps until the reinvigorated evangelisation of the far west 
of the Sahara during the early rise of the Almoravids in the 11th century.  
 
Archaeology From the Arrival of Islam to the Spanish Colonial Era 
 
Except for occasional Islamic burials recorded throughout the areas surveyed by the 
WSP, and those kerb burials found specifically amidst earlier funerary remains, as in 
                                                 
498 The prehistoric village of Catalhöyük, in Turkey, is well known for its numerous interments in 
houses. For an overview, see Hodder 2007.  
499 Clarke and Brooks in press. 
500 Pazzanita and Hodges 1994: 39 & 400 
501 Insoll 2003. 
502 ‘Kerb burials’ is the descriptive term used by the WSP for these, apparently Islamic burials. See 
Brooks et al 2009, and Clarke and Brooks in press. 
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the TF1 area (see Fig. 6.5), very little else has come to light archaeologically that can 
indicate human activity around Tifariti from the earlier centuries of Islam to the 
modern era. Meagre stone outlines, perhaps indicating the footings of simple shelters 
have occasionally come to light, as have hearths. But without excavating these 
features their dates will never be known, and where the WSP has investigated what 
appear to be open air camp sites, they have been dated to the Early and early Middle 
Holocene. It is highly likely that there are identifiable remains of early habitation 
sites, both pre-Islamic and later, throughout the areas explored by the WSP (and other 
archaeological missions), but they have not unequivocally come to light as yet. They 
are either hard to recognise or the survey methods employed have been inadequate. 
Since there are no oases in Western Sahara (save for the lower Saguia al-Hamra) and 
Saharawi pastoralists have traditionally had to rely on, and follow the rains for their 
sustenance – and as Hart has pointed out, ‘every schoolboy… knows, Bedouin life is 
built around camels, grass and water’503 – it is probable that the one artefact reflecting 
the human occupation of the Tifariti area, and probably much of Western Sahara from 
the arrival of Islam to the modern era, is the landscape itself. This is a landscape not 
so much moulded by people, but one utilised by people in the most basic, experiential 
and embedded ways. 
 
Tilley has pointed out that a landscape is ‘a series of named locales, a set of relational 
places, linked by paths, movements and narratives’.504 Richard Bradley has written of 
an ‘archaeology of natural places’, observing that ‘natural places have an archaeology 
because they acquired a significance in the minds of people in the past’.505 While in 
the context of the Sahara (and drawing upon the example of a locale known as 
Taouardi, near Gao in Mali), Calegari has defined what he calls a ‘symbolic-
functional place’ which is ‘a meeting point, full of history and archaeological 
evidences that, when seasonally attended by the Tuareg people… reveals itself as a 
sort of “invisible” village’,506 where there are locations for specific practices, 
mundane and otherwise, including places with historical, mythical and symbolic 
importance. The TF1 study area might be an example of such a place, such an 
‘invisible’ locus. There is the routeway of the Wadi Tifariti that links the open desert, 
                                                 
503 Hart 1998: 31. 
504 Tilley 1994: 34.  
505 Bradley 2000: 35. 
506 Calegari 2005. 
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just south of Tifariti, with the long distance wadi system (itself, a system of paths and 
grazing areas) that eventually drains into the Saguia al-Hamra to the north. The 
prehistoric burials in the area had an importance that transcended the coming of Islam 
testified by the presence of Islamic graves in their midsts. In fact, eight Islamic burials 
were incorporated into an impressive prehistoric standing stones site (see Fig. 6.6). 
 
The greater wadi system itself, as a series of linked natural routeways with areas for 
grazing, camp sites, and burial of the dead, can be viewed as a single archaeological 
site: a place of pastoral habitation with a myriad of meanings, symbolism and 
histories. The Wadi Tifariti could also have been a part of one of the many north to 
south corridors that were used by the long distance caravans that traversed the western 
fringe of the Sahara from the Moroccan Wadi Nun, including the towns of Goulmim 
and Aqqa (or Tamdult Aqa), to the Senegal.507 A map indicating caravan routes 
through the western Sahara in the 18th and 19th centuries, possibly reflecting more 
ancient routes, is shown in Fig. 6.7. 
 
Archaeology of the Spanish Colonial Period at Tifariti  
 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, it took the Spanish 50 years before they occupied 
any parts of the interior of Western (Spanish) Sahara. However, it is conceivable that 
the Wadi Tifariti saw martial activity associated with the anti-colonial struggle of 
Sheikh Ma el-Ainin and his sons, after he founded the town and religious centre of 
Smara, just south of the Saguia el-Hamra in 1898, from whence he lead those regional 
tribes that allied themselves with him in opposition to French expansion in the west of 
the Sahara. The immediate Tifariti area at this time was probably a locus for seasonal 
Bedouin pastoralists since, according to local knowledge, spring water was accessible 
at Tifariti by at least 1912.508 This was two years after Ma el-Ainin died (though anti-
colonial hostilities continued under his son Ahmed el-Hiba509), and one year before a 
French expeditionary column under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mouret 
occupied Smara, and destroyed part of it on March 1st, 1913. On the column’s return 
                                                 
507 For discussions on these routes across the west of the Sahara see: Norris 1986, Blanchard 2005, and 
Lydon 2009. 
508 See the Appendix 1, though Fadel (Interview), claims that the very first ‘well’ at Tifariti was dug in 
1912. 
509 Hodges 1983: 60. 
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to Attar, it travelled southeasterly from Smara in the direction of the Wadi Tagliat 
(Tagliatt or Tachleieft), a place name in the vicinity of Akchach, around 30 kilometres 
northeast of Tifariti. While in the Wadi Tagliat, it was attacked by a force of 
tribesmen under the leadership of Mohammed Laghdaf (another of Ma el-Ainin’s 
sons),510 and after the column extricated itself it headed back to the Adrar, arriving in 
Attar on March 28th. Nevertheless, Berthome recounts that while in the area of the 
Wadi Tagliat, the French troops found an abundance of good pasture and water in 
shallow wells.511 This points to the Tifariti region as being conducive to pastoral 
occupation, then as now, and it is even imaginable that Tifariti could have been visited 
for water by the French column on its southwesterly route towards Bir Moghrein (Fig. 
6.8, shows the route of Mouret’s column). 
 
 
Western Sahara was deemed pacified by 1934 and in that year the Spanish camel 
corps, the Tropas Nomadas, entered Smara, though it would take another two years 
for a permanent Spanish presence and garrison to be set up in the town. The Spanish 
had yet to occupy Tifariti (around 130 kilometres southeast of Smara), but a Spanish 
military survey team must have visited the place in 1944 or 1945 since an 
astronomical survey point was set up at Tifariti and recorded on the 1949, 1/500,000 
scale map of the territory. This map also shows two permanent wells with the 
descriptor hasi512 (or hassi), being wells of only 6 metres or so in depth.513 A further 
well was dug in 1951-1952 and also described as a hassi.514 It is probable that these 
wells were dug by the local Bedouin seasonally occupying Tifariti, since it was only 
in the decade of the 1960s, that the Spanish authorities started to increase the 
territory’s water supply in earnest by the digging of new wells.515  
 
                                                 
510 The location of this engagement is noted on the U.S. Army Map Service map: Mauritanie, North 
Africa  (1:2,000,000 scale) 1958, as Gleib el Fertouna. Gebel El Fertuna (another transliteration of the 
place-name) is also indicated on the 1949 (1:500,000 scale) Spanish military map of Western Sahara 
(Rodriguez Esteban 2011). For an account of the 1913 Mouret expedition which covered 1,700 kms in a 
return journey – departing from Attar on February 9th and returning on March 28th – see Trout 1969: 
211, Mercer 1976: 114-115, Hodges 1983: 60-61 and Berthome 1996. 
511 Berthome 1996. 
512 Rodriguez Esteban 2011. 
513 Mercer 1976: 194. Though Pazzanita 2006: 200, puts a hassi (hasi) at a maximum depth of 12 
metres. 
514 Although wells were recorded at Tifariti by 1949 on the Spanish 1/500,000 map of the territory 
(Rodriguez Esteban 2011), this later hasi is described on the Tifariti History Plaque (see Appendix 1) as 
‘the first’ well of Tifariti, superseding the spring which the plaque notes as existing in 1912.  
515 Mercer 1976: 194. 
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A Spanish colonial presence was eventually realised at Tifariti in 1964516 when the 
place became an outpost for the Spanish Foreign Legion who built one of the new, 
small forts that were being established in the further reaches of the territory, after the 
insurgency of the Ifni-Sahara War of 1957-1958. Tifariti received its first community, 
and colonial government facilities in 1968.517 But this might have been preparatory to 
the decision to build a tourism complex that year, with the intention of turning Tifariti 
into ‘the Costa Brava of the desert’.518 Needless to say, the scheme was never carried 
out, but some developments did take place and the remains of these make up a 
substantial part of late 20th century archaeology at Tifariti. 
 
A suggested, though undoubtedly partial, plan of Tifariti during the Spanish 
occupation (1964 to 1975) is shown Fig. 6.9. It is based on Google Earth imagery and 
historical photographs available on the Internet,519 also my visits to Tifariti in 2007 
and 2008 as part of the WSP, and the further survey season I undertook at Tifariti in 
2011. The figure shows the heart of the settlement. The scrub vegetation in the 
western half of the Google Earth image clearly indicates the Wadi Tifariti with a 
tributary. The ground is relatively flat, and the wadis drain to the north at the top of 
the image. Nonetheless, the ground in the upper centre and upper right (northeast) of 
the image is very rocky, and it rises above the wadis. It actually creates a shallow 
basin in which Tifariti sits. 
 
Fig. 6.9 also shows 11 features (including one group of features) from the Spanish 
colonial occupation, which it has been possible to easily plot. They are (the numbers 
match the numbers in Figs. 6.9 and 6.10): 
1. Fort built by the Spanish Foreign Legion, reputedly in 1964. 
2. Infirmary associated with the Spanish fort. 
3. Three external buildings near and/or associated with the fort. 
4. The post commander’s accommodation and/or office. 
5. Bake house. 
6. Main water cistern (linked by a pipe on stanchions to the fort). 
                                                 
516 Bachir Achmed, Saharawi facilitator to the WSP, per. comm. 
517 See Appendix 1. 
518 Mercer 1976: 217. 
519 Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara (2011) and La Mili en el Sáhara (2001-
2013). 
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7. Subsidiary water cistern (linked by pipes on stanchions to the main water 
cistern and the commander’s accommodation). 
8. Rubbish dump. 
9. Well site. 
10. The ‘Colonia’: prefabricated, low cost accommodation built by the Spanish for 
the local Bedouin. 
11. Islamic Cemetery 
 
These 11 features are discussed below, though there is an additional feature from the 
Spanish occupation not listed or shown in the figure, and that is the airstrip that is 
located 700 metres to the southwest. Instead, its disposition is shown in Fig. 6.59.  
 
1. The Spanish Fort 
If the fort was the earliest manifestation of a Spanish presence at Tifariti, then it must 
have been a very lonely outpost indeed for the first four years of its existence, very 
much like the fort at Tichla in the 1940s (see Chapter 3). There are two photographs 
of the fort available on the Internet that show what it looked like by 1975-76. The first 
is Fig. 6.10, which shows the fort amidst a number of the buildings plotted in Fig. 6.9. 
The second, Fig. 3.11, in Chapter 3, clearly shows the fort garrisoned and in defensive 
readiness since sandbags line the corner blockhouse parapets. Even though the fort is 
now in poor condition due to a Moroccan air attack in 1991 (see Fig. 6.11), the record 
I made of it in 2011 (along with the earlier photographs I took of it in 2007) coupled 
with photographs of the identical and contemporary posts constructed at Hausa, Bir 
Enzaren, Mahbes and Echdeiria (see below) can give us a very good view of what the 
Tifariti fort and outpost was like between 1964 and 1976.  
 
An outline plan of the fort is shown in Fig. 6.12. It is a partial reconstruction, and 
photographs of some of the post’s external elevations, as they appear today and as 
they would have looked before 1975-76 are shown in Figs. 6.13 to 6.18. The 
maximum, overall dimensions of the outpost are 37 metres east to west by 37 metres 
north to south.520 The fort was constructed around a central rectangular courtyard 
aligned east to west, measuring 24 metres by 15.5 metres (see Figs. 6.19 to 6.22). 
                                                 
520 The curtain walls are battered and these dimensions were recorded at around 1.4 metres above the 
ground. 
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There was a blockhouse type structure at every corner and these were approximately 
4.4 metres high, while the curtain walls connecting them were approximately 3.5m 
high. The blockhouses were rectangular in plan with the largest at the northeast corner 
of the fort measuring six metres by 13.5 metres, and the smallest at 6.5 metres by 8.5 
metres at the northwest corner of the fort.  There was a dog-leg shaped blockhouse at 
the southeast corner extending over an overall area of 11.5 metres square. This was 
linked to a right-angled entrance into the fort from the west. This only had a bar across 
it where there was also a door, presumably into a guardroom (these are only just 
visible in Fig. 3.11, while an entry bar is also visible in the entrance to the fort at 
Echdeiria in Fig. 6.16).  
   
The central courtyard was surrounded by rooms, averaging 5.5 metres in depth. 
Externally they, and the corner blockhouses, had narrow, vertical slits (loopholes) for 
windows, testifying to the defensive nature of the building, while internally, there 
were more standard sized windows with shutters facing into the courtyard. Access to 
the roofs was by external, vertical ladders of steel rungs built into the walls of the 
courtyard. The roofs all had very low parapets, though the parapets of the corner 
blockhouses were 1.22 metres high. They were not crenellated but they were 
decorated with repeating geometric motifs in rectilinear panels. The external walls of 
the fort (averaging 0.45 metres thick) were made of cast concrete and apparently 
raised in horizontal stages; first to window sill level, then to window head, and finally 
up to roof level. The interior walls were made of cement blocks, as were all the 
parapets (0.3 metres thick), while the concrete roofs had metal rod reinforcements. All 
the walls were painted white (though now discoloured). This was unlike the earlier 
fort at Tichla, for instance, which was constructed of stone rubble with a rough render 
(see Fig. 6.23). There is now rubble in the central courtyard of the fort at Tifariti, but a 
photograph exists showing a small walled off area, surrounded by a low decorative 
parapet, with low pillars and trailing plants in which there was, what could best be 
described as a menagerie (see Fig. 6.22). There are wired enclosures and kennels for 
goats, or perhaps a gazelle, and a possible aviary, perhaps for a bird of prey. There is 
also a dovecote on the roof of the fort. The low parapet of the enclosure would not 
have been out of keeping on a Mediterranean patio, and the animals may have been 
tended as pets, as well as sources of additional food to presumably improve a 
monotonous military diet.   
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The domestication of space within the forts was apparently common. Although these 
were military establishments, the officers and soldiers obviously wanted their living 
and working space to provide them with comfort within the harsh desert environment 
in which they found themselves. A photograph (Fig. 6.24) of the interior of the fort at 
Hausa (a fort identical to Tifariti) shows the courtyard consisting of ‘crazy paving’, 
and with a solid awning under which there was a seating area for the soldiers to relax. 
Another photograph (Fig. 6.25), this time of the similar fort at Bir Enzaren, obviously 
shows that the courtyard was filled with trees, making the white walled central space a 
cool, and presumably welcoming place. 
 
At Tifariti (and this presumably applies to the other similar forts), the northeast corner 
of the courtyard gave access to a shower block, while there were laundry facilities in 
the east range near by, along with a canteen which had a built in bench with sink, and 
a decorated bar. Alterations were made to the fort over time, presumably from the 
initial Spanish occupation up to 1975-76, to the Moroccan occupation of Tifariti 
(1977-1979), and to the occupation of the post by the Polisario/SADR forces up to 
1991. Fig. 6.12 shows the salient constructional phases in plan, and they can be 
tentatively described as:  
 
Phase 1: This represents the initial construction of the fort.  
Phase 2: Alterations were carried out on the fort, mainly in the eastern range. These 
apparently consisted of alterations, and/or blockages to doorways. These were 
probably carried out during the Spanish occupation since they were finished 
(rendered) to match the initial construction of the fort. 
Phase 3: This phase consists of further alterations – blockages of doors and infill, but 
in course un-rendered stonework, laid in a cement mortar and painted to match the 
existing paintwork. It is possible that this phase is Spanish too, primarily based on the 
painting of the alterations. 
Phase 4: It cannot be certain whether or not this phase is separate from Phase 5, but it 
is structurally different. It is mainly represented by two large stone rubble walls (in a 
mud plaster) added to the outside of the north wall of the fort. The purpose of these 
walls is not known, nor if they had a cross wall connecting them (their northern ends 
are denuded and the ground is covered in rubble and sand). There is also a stone and 
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mud mortar infill in one of the doors in the east range of the fort, and this too might 
belong to this phase. 
Phase 5: As noted above, this phase of alterations might be the same as Phase 4. 
However, it is characterised by mud brick infill, for instance, in the southeast corner 
of the southeastern corner blockhouse (where a door has also been inserted), and there 
are a couple of replacement partition walls, plus external walling outside the north 
wall of the fort. What can separate this phase from Phase 4, though, is the fact that the 
mud mortar used in this phase is lighter than that used in the previous phase. Perhaps 
Phase 4 represents some alterations made during the Moroccan occupation of Tifariti, 
while this latter phase was carried out solely during the Polisario reoccupation of the 
fort from 1979 onwards. 
 
2. The Spanish Infirmary  
When interviewed in October 2011, Bahia Awah (formerly a soldier in the 
Poliosario/SPLA and stationed in Tifariti during the latter 1980s)521 made the point 
that there was an infirmary in Tifariti during the Spanish occupation. He was 
ambiguous about its location, and when interviewed, I was uncertain as to whether he 
was talking about an infirmary built by Polisario after the Moroccans left the 
settlement in 1979, or he was actually talking about a Spanish built building. 
Nevertheless, photographs of three Spanish posts in Western Sahara from the 1970s, 
available on the internet, appear to have cleared the matter up.  
 
First, Fig. 6.26 shows the fort at Bir Enzaren with a smaller building away from it and 
to the right. It is constructed in a similar way to the fort in that it has low parapets on 
its roof and an apparently matching render. From what can be seen, the building 
consists of two parts. The larger part has a long horizontal window, with a doorway 
just beyond it, and there is a nib of an extension towards the fort at the far end of the 
structure. The second part of the building (closer to the viewer) is smaller, and slightly 
lower and it has two small windows that are visible. Matching this, and in a 
photograph of the Spanish post at Hausa, is another similar building (see Fig. 6.27). 
The windows and door are the same, as is the roofline, though in this instance the roof 
has eaves and no parapet. The angle of the photograph makes it hard to discern 
                                                 
521 Awah, Interview. 
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whether or not there is a small extension at its furthest corner, nevertheless, the two 
buildings are apparently identical in form. But what makes this image most important 
is that it has a caption stating that it is a ‘view of the school’ (presumably the treble 
domed structure on the left), the ‘medical clinic’ (presumably the central building) and 
the ‘Territorial Police Headquarters’ (the fort in the distance). An identical building at 
Mahbes is visible at the far right of Fig. 6.40. It too has a flat roof with eaves, and its 
close juxtaposition to the fort is very similar to that at Tifariti, Bir Enzaren and Hausa.  
 
These three photographs have helped to identify the Spanish period infirmary, or 
clinic, at Tifariti, as marked out in Fig. 6.8, and which is visible to the right of the fort 
in Fig. 6.9 (and distant by around 25 metres). The elevation that can be made out is 
virtually the same as the building elevations seen in Figs. 6.26, 6.27 and 6.40, except 
that there is a further extension to the right (though this part of the building at Tifariti 
would have been out of site in the photos of Hausa, Bir Enzaren and Mahbes). The 
infirmary was hit during the Moroccan air attack of August 1991 and the elevation 
visible in Fig. 6.9 has been destroyed (see Fig. 6.28). A view of the building from its 
south side is shown in Fig. 6.29. It is now the office of the Mayor of Tifariti. 
 
3. External Buildings near the Fort (including 3a and 3b) 
An external single storey building associated with the fort at Tifariti is visible to its 
left, and just beyond it in Fig. 6.9. It was long and thin, rendered, and painted just like 
the fort. Its estimated footprint (up to 45 metres long by six metres wide) is outlined in 
Fig. 6.8. With the building no longer present, there are newer buildings standing in its 
place. The building was under 20 metres south of the fort, and similar buildings can be 
found in photographs of other Spanish bases in Western Sahara. For instance, such a 
building (though associated with other structures and with a courtyard) is shown in 
Fig. 6.16, just in front of the fort at Echdeiria. 
 
Two further buildings, external to the fort and no longer standing are clearly shown in 
Fig. 6.9 (and indicated in Fig. 6.8). Just north of the infirmary was a building (3a) 
made up of two parallel ranges on a north to south axis with a narrow courtyard 
between them. The building seems to have not been rendered in the same manner as 
the fort, so it is possible that it was not associated with the military. Perhaps it was the 
settlement’s school during the Spanish occupation of Tifariti. Additionally, offset to 
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the west, and further north of the infirmary was another courtyard structure (3b). What 
this building was can only be guessed at, but as with the possible school, its imprint 
was slightly visible on the ground in 2011.  
 
4. The Commander’s Accommodation/Office 
The Spanish Commandant’s accommodation was identified as such by Bahia 
Awah.522 It was built in its own trapezium shaped compound (around 35 metres by 35 
metres in area) and it can just be seen at the right hand edge of Fig. 6.9. It is also 
vaguely visible in Fig. 6.22, beyond the fort and just below the hills in the upper right 
of the photograph. Its present condition in 2011 is shown in Fig. 6.30. The 
Commander’s quarters measure around 10 metres by 10 metres in area. It was 
rendered and painted in the same manner as the fort and infirmary, and the present 
enclosure wall of rubble masonry (with some parts in mud brick) has been raised on 
top of earlier, much more neatly built masonry – probably the remains of the original 
compound wall. 
  
5. The Bake House 
Behind and to the immediate north of the fort (by around 30 metres) are the ruins of 
the post’s bake house, as identified by Bahia Awah.523 It can be seen just below the 
fort in Fig. 6.9, and like the fort and the other buildings already described, it was 
rendered and painted in white, though the building was of mud brick construction. It 
had multiple rooms and a beehive type oven, and there are the impressions of wall 
tiles on one of the interior walls. It is now in a very ruinous state with building rubble 
spread around it (see Fig. 6.31). Some alterations occurred to it in its lifetime since its 
doorways had been blocked with stones set in a mud mortar. Its size was 
approximately nine metres by eight metres in area with a narrow, channelled, 
extension out to the northwest for around 15 metres. This extension is still surrounded 
by dark earth – probably made dark by ash and soot. The precise purpose of this 
feature is not known, but it might have been some kind of flue (see Fig. 6.32). 
 
 
 
                                                 
522 Awah, Interview.  
523 Awah, Interview. 
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6. Main Water Cistern, and 7. The Subsidiary Water Cistern 
There used to be a water cistern (see Fig. 6.9) situated on the higher, rocky ground 
north of the fort by about 130 metres. According to Bahia Awah,524 it was similar to 
the cistern presently behind the modern infirmary in Tifariti, and roughly at the same 
elevation – at just a few metres higher than the fort (producing a gravity feed). Its 
precise size is not known since the place where it was situated is now totally devoid of 
any remains. Nevertheless, its position is indicated by the series of white washed 
concrete posts that carried the water pipe that fed the fort (see Fig. 6.32). Also, there is 
a second line of similar posts (see Fig. 6.33) that link the position of the cistern with a 
subsidiary, rectangular cistern (No. 7 in Fig. 6.9, and almost 180 metres to the 
southwest), which provided the Commander’s quarters with water.  
 
8. Spanish Army Rubbish Dump 
Amidst boulder outcrops around 100 metres north-northwest of the fort is a sheet 
midden, primarily made up of broken glass from wine, beer and other bottles. This 
was, as Bahia Awah525 described it, the rubbish dump for the soldiers of the Spanish 
garrison at Tifariti. It covers an area of approximately 100 by 60 metres and it is 
shown in Figs. 6.33 and 6.34. 
 
9. The Well Site 
Bahia Awah526 informed me that the well which provided water for Tifariti and the 
Spanish garrison (and is probably the location of the well, or hassi dug in 1951-52) 
was situated around 250 metres west of the Spanish fort (see Fig. 6.9). Its remains are 
very obvious, and it is within a low earth embanked area at the southern end of the 
compound of a recent experimental/model farm. There are at least four visible shafts 
(lined with stones and in variable states of disrepair), amidst weathered spoil tips, 
from the digging and re-digging of the wells, which seems to have continued until 
quite recently (see Fig. 6.35). There are pipes in and on the ground, including one 
associated with a small concrete lined water cistern. There are further, substantial 
diggings for water around 140 metres to the south-southeast and it is probable that 
these have superseded this earlier well site.  
                                                 
524 Awah, Interview. 
525 Awah, Interview. 
526 Awah, Interview. 
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10. The Spanish Colonia 
As part of the Spanish occupation of Tifariti, a colonia, that is a planned arrangement 
of housing for the local Bedouin, was constructed around 200 metres southeast of the 
fort. It was destroyed as a result of the war, but its remains cover an area of 
approximately 130 metres by 150 metres. It mainly consisted of 10 gridded blocks of 
pre-fabricated houses with other, mud brick buildings and amenities. Fig. 6.36 shows 
its layout. The present track into Tifariti, from the east, bisects the colonia remains, 
utilising an earlier avenue between the housing blocks. There are six low-lying 
concrete platforms on the north side of the track, equidistantly spaced in a grid pattern. 
Each measures about 13 by 38 metres. At the eastern end of these, and to the south of 
the track, there are four more identical platforms. These all represent the foundations 
for housing, perhaps similar to the houses shown in Fig. 6.37. To the west of these 
latter foundations are the remains of mud brick buildings. They too are laid out in a 
grid, but one that is slightly askew to that of the concrete house platforms.  
 
Both Bahia Awah527 and Muhammed Deya,528 the Mayor of Tifariti, agreed that there 
were around 300 ‘houses’ in Tifariti during the Spanish occupation. This is probably 
an exaggeration since in the years 1968 to 1972 a total of 1319 houses were built in 
Western Sahara.529 If 300 of these were in Tifariti, then these would have accounted 
for almost one quarter of all the accommodation built in the territory, and this was 
probably unlikely. Tifariti was only a small settlement, situated far out in the badiya. 
Nevertheless, Muhammed Deya530 did say that there were about 600 families living in 
the Tifariti area at the start of the war and that many of these were still living in 
Bedouin encampments since there was not enough permanent housing. Also, and 
perhaps most importantly, virtually all of the families were still pastoral, and they, or 
at least some family members, seasonally travelled with their herds in and around the 
Tifariti region. In fact, Kalthoum Salma,531 a Bedouin woman from the Tifariti area, 
recounted in an interview that in the past many nomads, from Mauritania as well as 
Western Sahara, would encamp together in the Tifariti area and graze their herds. 
                                                 
527 Awah, Interview. 
528 Deya, Interview. 
529 Mercer 1976: 209, Table 9. 
530 Deya, Interview.    
531 Salma, Interview. 
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They would also range from Tifariti to Mahbes and Echdeiria in the north of the 
territory. However, this diminished after a severe drought in 1961,532 with families 
settling in the towns, and with many men joining the Spanish colonial military.  
 
11. Islamic Cemetery 
There is a walled off Islamic cemetery roughly 275 metres southwest of the fort at 
Tifariti. It covers an area of around 80 by 45 metres, and is surrounded by a stone 
rubble wall. The bulk of the graves are aligned, more or less, north to south, so that 
the interred can lie on their right sides and have their heads turned towards Mecca. 
However, within the northern third of the cemetery, the graves are aligned northeast to 
southwest and these are the graves of Moroccan soldiers who died at Tifariti during 
the Moroccan occupation. The graves, according to Bahia Awah,533 include multiple 
burials and they are much plainer than the nearby Saharawi graves. The Moroccan 
graves are, on the whole, simple earthen mounds with a head and footstone (see Fig. 
6.38). In contrast, the Saharawi graves (see Fig. 6.39) have kerbs around them with 
very sizable head and footstones, and in some instances, decorative arrangements of 
quartz stones, usually in a longitudinal line along the length of the grave mound. 
Although considerably more elaborate, these graves are similar to the ‘kerb burials’ 
recorded in the field surveys of the WSP, and the use of quartz to decorate them harks 
back to prehistoric times, since the WSP has recorded scatters of quartz on top of, and 
around, a number of pre-Islamic tumuli.534 They are visible on the ground in Fig. 6.5, 
spread out within the standing stones site in the TF1 study area. 
 
In summary, it has already been noted that the military outposts established by Spain 
throughout the territory were more than isolated Beau Geste type forts. They were 
central to the control, if not at least the surveillance, of the colonized by the colonizer. 
These posts were foci providing services (including basic shops), medical facilities, 
housing, basic education, and security. They attracted many Bedouin, and as 
Muhammed Deya535 pointed out in an interview, in the case of Tifariti, the Bedouin 
stayed relatively close, taking their herds out along the wadis nearby when there was 
                                                 
532 Kalthoum Salma’s testimony is reflected in the drop of camel numbers throughout Western Sahara 
from 50,000 in 1960 to 24,000 in 1961. Mercer, 1976: 165, Table 4. 
533 Awah, Interview. 
534 Clarke and Brooks in press. 
535 Deya, Interview. 
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rain, and in the dry season returning to the settlement, or to a camp close by. At these 
times the settlement might have looked like the scene in Fig. 6.40, which is a 
photograph of the Spanish post at Mahbes taken in 1974, with its fort (just like the one 
at Tifariti), ancillary buildings, an infirmary, and a large Bedouin encampment close 
by.  
 
The Archaeology of War at Tifariti 
 
The pastoral way of life of those Saharawis who lived in the badiya around Tifariti, 
and of those who were semi-sedentary in the settlement, was to change in an 
unimaginable way by the end of 1975. On October 31st of that year, the northeast 
corner of Western Sahara was invaded by elements of the Moroccan military and this 
was the start of a war that would last until 1991.536 The Moroccans attacked Echdeiria, 
Hausa and Farsia, outposts that had been abandoned by the Spanish the day before. 
Polisario forces put up stiff resistance but were unsuccessful, while remaining Spanish 
forces made no attempt to stop the clashes.537 Mauritanian troops also started to 
invade the southern part of Western Sahara in the third week of December. 
 
In accordance with the Madrid Agreement of November 14th 1975, and after ironing 
out the practicalities of withdrawal on the ground, the last Spanish garrison in the 
territory left Villa Cisneros on January 12th 1976. In response to the Moroccan 
occupation of the country, Polisario, with its very limited resources, tried to occupy 
and defend those towns and settlements where the Spanish left a vacuum. However, 
with Morocco’s advantage in manpower and material, and with Polisario’s need to 
look after the exodus of refugees heading eastwards out of Western Sahara, this could 
not be sustained.538 Small settlements throughout the Territory, including Oum 
Dreiga, Tifariti, and Guelta Zemmour, which had become important sanctuaries for 
Saharawi refugees, were being attacked if not taken one by one in the first few months 
of 1976,539 and after an air bombardment of Tifariti, in January 1976,540 it was 
                                                 
536 Zunes and Mundy 2010: 6. 
537 This invasion of Western Sahara was also aimed at diverting Polisario’s attention from King 
Hassan’s ‘Green March’, which did not commence until November 6th 1975. Hodges 1983: 219-220. 
538 Hodges 1983: 230. 
539 Damis 1983: 71.  
540 See Appendix 1. As a boy of 14, Bahia Awah experienced bombardment and the dropping of napalm 
when he was a refugee travelling from his home in Ausserd, in Tiris, to Tifariti. He arrived in Tifariti 
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claimed by Morocco that their troops occupied the settlement on the 5th of 
February.541 But according to the New York Times in March 1977, Tifariti was a 
‘ghost town’, abandoned by Polisario as a result of the 1976 bombing, and the 
Moroccans had ‘not moved in’. Instead, the ‘Saharan Guerillas’ were described as 
having complete freedom of movement throughout the Tifariti region.542  
 
It has been estimated that approximately one third to one half of the Saharawi 
population left the towns and badiya as a result of the Moroccan and Mauritanian 
invasions of 1975 into 1976.543 Temporary centres for the refugees moving out of the 
country were systematically bombarded by air, and livestock as well as people were 
attacked. It has also been claimed that water sources were poisoned.544 These attacks 
are recalled ‘with horror’ by older Saharawis.545 Morocco’s intention was to 
concentrate the population in the larger towns, in effect, in a concentration of 
population that has been a hallmark of many counterinsurgency operations, from the 
Spanish in Cuba in the latter 19th century546 to the Americans in Vietnam.547 A 
population in towns can be watched and controlled, and they can be isolated from the 
insurgents in the countryside who they might want to support. In response, Polisario 
set up refugee camps near Tindouf, in Algeria, and during the years of hostilities, 
these had a very high proportion of women, children and the elderly, since many men 
of fighting age were in the Polisario/SADR army – the SPLA.548 
 
Since the aim of the Moroccans at the beginning of the war was to clear the regions, 
they only moved into the ‘ghost town’ of Tifariti in August 1977 – they eventually 
withdrew on March 12th 1979.549 According to Muhammed Deya, the Moroccan 
occupation of the settlement was part of a large offensive made up of four Moroccan 
                                                                                                                                            
about one week after the January 1976 bombardment. He had set out from Tiris on the 25th of 
December 1975 (Awah, Interview). 
541 Hodges 1983: 230-232. 
542 Howe 1977: 2.  
543 Damis 1983, p. 41. 
544 Salma, Interview. 
545 Shelley 2004: 190. 
546 Hyslop 2011. 
547 Karnow 1983: 253-258.  
548 Damis 1983: 41. 
549 See Appendix 1, and Fadel, Interview. The precise date of 12 March is from Knight 1979. 
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battalions.550 Although Tifariti had been bombarded at the beginning of the previous 
year, many of the buildings were still intact, so the troops occupied the houses of the 
colonia along with the Spanish fort and associated buildings.551 From this period too, 
the Moroccans started to fortify Tifariti with ‘embankments and trenches around four 
kilometres [to] five kilometres’ around the settlement.552 They ‘dug in’, as they had 
done so, and would continue to do at other locations throughout Western Sahara, with 
the overall extent of their fortifications highlighting that the invaders were definitely 
occupying an alien, contested landscape; one which Polisario fighters knew 
intimately, and wherein they knew how to survive and to fight.  
 
‘It isn’t enough to hold the posts – the land in between has to be occupied, and if it 
isn’t, it will be hell for them,’ said a [Polisario] military leader, referring to the 
Moroccan and Mauritanian ‘occupiers’. 
‘But in between, there is nothing…’ 
‘That is where we are at home,’ he replied imperturbably.553 
 
The Moroccan ‘post’ at Tifariti was reminiscent of the defensive ‘boxes’ used by the 
British in World War Two in the Libyan Desert. These could hold three battalions 
with support and artillery. ‘The perimeter would consist of slit trenches to hold the 
infantry with some more elaborately constructed gun pits for the artillery’.554 The 
whole would have frontages of one to two miles (up to more than three kilometres) 
surrounded by barbed wire and minefields.555 There is no evidence of there ever being 
a cordon of barbed wire around Tifariti, and AOAV/LMA has only found limited 
minefields. Also, the extent of the Moroccan ‘box’ was more than double that of the 
boxes laid out in Libya. Nevertheless, the analogy is a useful one, hence the term 
‘box’ is a convenient descriptor of the Moroccan defences at Tifariti. 
                                                 
550 Deya, Interview. Muhammed Deya estimated there were 4000 to 5000 troops in the four battalions. 
This is probably correct since a modern army battalion can consist of approximately 1000 men. He also 
said that there were earlier attempts by the Moroccans to occupy the Tifariti region, but these were 
successfully prevented by the battle tactics of Polisario. 
551 Fadel, Interview. 
552 Deya, Interview. 
553 Weexsteen 1976: 3. 
554 Gilbert 1992: 116. 
555 Moorhead 1943: 50-51. Moorhead describes the ‘boxes’ as square, but this was not so. They were 
boxes in that they were enclosed and self contained, and supposedly, able to resist attack from all sides, 
much like an infantry box formation in the Napoleonic Wars. One just has to look at the remains of the 
World War Two box at Bir Hacheim on Google Earth, for example, to see that the layout of such dug in 
defences where far from rectangular.  
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The Defensive ‘Box’ at Tifariti 
 
When talking about the Moroccan army in the field, Muhammed Deya disparagingly 
said that whenever they would stop, no matter what they were doing, they would 
always dig and fortify their positions. Then, after a few attacks by Polisario, they 
would be forced to abandon the positions that they laboured so hard to make. On the 
other hand, Polisario never created defended outposts, they never ‘dug in’, they were 
always on the move in light vehicles.556 However, the remains of the labours of the 
Moroccan army at Tifariti are impressive. The various feature types had specific 
purposes and the materiality of their presence, cut into the ground, has a story to tell. 
 
Muhammed Fadel,557 Chief of Reconnaissance of the SPLA in the Tifariti Region, has 
provided a very generalised overview of the disposition of Moroccan forces in and 
around Tifariti. With their command post east of the Wadi Tifariti, at the Spanish fort 
and colonia, he maintained that they positioned their artillery and tanks within the 
higher ground west of the wadi. A ring of dug out defences surrounded this core area, 
but their west flank did not extend as far as the Wadi Legtaf, the next large wadi to the 
west. In turn, this defensive trace was encircled by a further ring which extended, as 
has already been noted, around four to five kilometres out from the centre of Tifariti, 
and this, according to Fadel, was encircled by land mines.558 
 
The Archaeology of the Tifariti Box: the salient features 
 
Tifariti is set within a terrain that generally slopes downward to the north. The 
tributaries to the Wadi Tifariti, and the Wadi Legtaf (both draining to the north – see 
Figs. 6.4 and 6.60) have their watersheds around five to nine kilometres south of 
                                                 
556 Deya, Interview. This has also been reiterated by Bachir Ahmed (facilitator to the WSP) to Nick 
Brooks (co-director of the WSP) per. comm. However, ‘digging in’, even for a single night’s stay, 
especially in a hostile environment, is common practice for any conventional army. 
557 Besides the archaeology on the ground (which is mainly examined through satellite imagery), the 
oral account and descriptions of Muhammed Fadel (who took part in the Polisario operations in and 
around Tifariti, and in the greater Zemmour region during the war) and Habua Breica (who only joined 
the SPLA in the 1980s) are my major sources for describing the ‘siege of Tifariti’. These are 
undoubtedly limited and one sided, but they present two unique accounts of an arena of conflict that is 
not described anywhere else. Their inclusion is in keeping with the hybrid approach of modern conflict 
archaeology where all types of knowledge are examined, with an ‘aim… to foster an intellectually 
coherent interdisciplinary approach to the study of… twentieth-century conflict’ (Saunders 2004, p. 3). 
558 Fadel, Interview.  
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Tifariti. This is more or less in an arc outlining the south most limit of the basin in 
which Tifariti is situated (and from which open hamada desert extends southwards 
into nearby Mauritania). Just north of the colonial settlement the ground rises 
abruptly, though slightly, with roughly southwest to northeast trending folds of very 
rocky ground (including hard linear, igneous intrusions) dissected by the Wadi Tifariti 
and its tributaries. This higher ground is a watershed for minor tributaries into the 
Wadi from the east, and it outlines the Wadi Legtaf on the west. On the north side of 
the Wadi Legtaf the ground rises in folds again (with numerous linear, igneous 
intrusions). It also extends to the northeast, creating another watershed (also cut by the 
Wadi Tifariti) from which further tributaries flow northwards to the Wadi Tifariti.  
 
Descriptions of Defensive Features at Tifariti 
 
I visited Tifariti in October and November of 2011, when one of my survey goals was 
to familiarise myself with the Moroccan positions on the ground so that I could 
identify and plot them more effectively on Google Earth. To this end, I photographed 
and made notes on numerous defensive features in an area of more than 6.5 square 
kilometres. Upon returning to the U.K, I mapped most, if not all, of the defensive 
features easily identifiable on Google Earth in the rectangular Tifariti Study Area 
(14.5 kilometres east to west by 16.6 kilometres north to south) shown in Fig. 6.2. 
This figure also shows that the Moroccans had to lay out their defensive box within a 
landscape of prehistoric remains that extends southwards from the TF1 study area of 
the WSP, into the rocky ground surrounding the settlement of Tifariti. 
 
As already pointed out in Chapter 4, the modern military concept of defence, 
especially the defence of a fighting force, hinges on the notion of ‘survivability’. The 
following, therefore, is an outline description of the salient types of defensive feature 
constructed by the Moroccan army so that it could ‘survive’ while occupying Tifariti 
from 1977 to 1979 (these were additional to those Spanish colonial structures 
occupied by the Moroccan army). They are described within six overarching 
categories, or groups of features, and although there are variations and sub-types 
within each group, it is the larger group designation that has been applied to each 
plotted feature in the accompanying mapping. This is because the details that 
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differentiate the specific sub-types cannot be easily made out in the satellite imagery 
of Google Earth. Also, I was only able to investigate a small part of the Tifariti 
defensive box while in the field (the box covers a total area of more than 90 square 
kilometres) so the cartographic representation of it, like that of the berms in Chapter 4, 
has been solely dependent on Google Earth imagery, and must be viewed as a remote 
sensing exercise with all of its inherent limitations. Nevertheless, the descriptive 
groups are:  
 
Dug Out Positions  
The Moroccans did not build earthen barriers (berms) around Tifariti, nor did they dig 
trench systems. Instead, their defences relied on strings, or concentrations, of dug out 
fighting positions for one or two soldiers – perhaps more in some instances. Such 
features are ubiquitous when an army ‘digs in’ in virtually any terrain. Individual 
fighting positions can vary from single soldier, scraped out positions,559 also known as 
‘skirmisher trenches’ (or ‘skirmisher pits’)560 – shallow diggings with the spoil heaped 
in front, in which a soldier can lie to reduce his frontal profile while defending himself 
(see Fig. 6.41) – to ‘foxholes’,561 also referred to as ‘slit trenches’,562 which can be up 
to a metre or more deep (depending on the subsoil) with their excavated spoil spread 
around them as a parapet, and excavated to accommodate one or two soldiers (see 
Figs. 6.42 and 6.43). Besides serving as fighting positions, foxhole type diggings can 
be found away from forward areas as shelters for soldiers,563 and they can serve as 
observation posts appropriately positioned.564 Where the ground is rocky and the 
bedrock is close to the surface, as at Tifariti, dug out defensive features will not be 
deep and they will often have low stone parapets around them. Other dug out positions 
include machine gun and mortar pits (see Figs. 6.44 to 6.47). These are usually larger 
than two man foxholes (mortar pits can be up to four metres in diameter), and since 
most dug out positions at Tifariti are partially filled in with side wall collapse and 
wind blown sand, it is hard to be precise about the original size and depth of many of 
them, on the ground, let alone through the processes of mapping with a facility like 
Google Earth. Nevertheless, spot recordings at Tifariti in 2011 indicate that single 
                                                 
559 Rottman 2007: 7. 
560 Rottman 2005b: 31, and 2007: 31. 
561 U.S. War Department 1944: 47-51. 
562 Holmes 2003: 298. 
563 U.S. War Department 1944: 52. 
564 U.S. War Department 1944: 54. 
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man foxholes can be 1.3 to 1.6 metres wide by 1.9 to 2.3 metres long, while presumed 
double man foxholes, which could also be machine gun positions, mortar positions or 
even positions for hand held rockets, could range from 3.0 by 2.0 metres to 3.0 by 4.0 
metres in area. Though small features have been pointed out to me as small mortar 
pits, at only 1.4 to 1.9 metres in diameter.565 With dug out fighting (and other) 
positions being the mainstay of the Moroccan defences at Tifariti, the overall 
distribution of all defensive positions can be seen in Fig. 6.60. 
 
Entrenchments 
Single and small groups of dug out fighting positions occasionally have approach 
trenches associated with them. These are usually short linear features that originate 
behind the fighting positions, and they presumably gave protection to soldiers 
accessing them – perhaps in situations where certain fighting and observation 
positions were more liable to attack than others (see Fig. 6.48). There are also distinct 
groups of fighting positions linked along trenches, and it is possible that these 
represent mini strong points. By being linked, soldiers could move between the 
different fighting pits (foxholes or slit trenches), responding to any specific threat and 
giving each other support (see Figs. 6.49 and 6.50). The distribution of entrenched 
positions is usually along the outermost defences of the Tifariti box and they are 
discussed further below. 
 
Built-up Positions 
At Tifariti, these are often stone built, enclosed structures that are usually above 
ground, though in most cases, they are partly dug into the earth. Where it has been 
possible to examine them in the field, they are made up of stone rubble (on mud bricks 
in some cases) with a mud mortar, and they would have been roofed when they were 
occupied. Many of these were probably shelters, or accommodation huts for soldiers, 
and there are instances of windows in their side walls, made from wooden crates and 
large tin cans with their bases removed (see Figs. 6.51 to 6.53). Their plans can be 
rectilinear, or ovoid, and the individual structures can measure around 1.25 to 4.0 
metres by 1.75 to 4.0 metres in area. They can be single and/or on their own, close 
together or in contiguous groups. The bulk of these shelters are in an area I have 
                                                 
565 Fadel, Interview. 
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called the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ (discussed below). There are similar structures in the TF1 
study area of the WSP, but these are mainly made of mud bricks (see Fig. 6.54). Also, 
similar accommodation features occur along the berms, and they have been noted in 
Chapter 4, and in particular, see Figs. 4.30, 4.32, 4.52, 4.69, 4.76, and 4.78.  
 
When structures similar in construction to these are on defensive front lines, then they 
are probably not structures built solely for accommodation, but either sangars or 
bunkers. However, when viewing these two specific types of features on Google 
Earth, it is hard to differentiate between them. This is especially the case since all 
built-up structures are now roofless, and there are instances where these types of 
features are obviously embanked with earth. This can blur the definition of their 
outlines, making it nearly impossible to distinguish sangars from roofless bunkers, and 
both of these from large, revetted dugouts.  
 
Vehicular Slots 
As already noted in Chapter 4, vehicular slots are also known as ‘tank slots’,566 though 
this does not mean that they can only accommodate tanks. They are also known as 
‘hull-down scrapes’ or ‘AFV revetments’,567 and as ‘hull defilade pits’.568 They are 
created by excavating a rectangular pit into which a vehicle can be easily driven in 
and out of. They are surrounded on three sides by earthen parapets. These ‘U’ shaped 
features are protective, from which tanks or self-propelled howitzers can safely 
discharge fire. They can also accommodate trucks or jeeps with recoilless guns, and 
they can be made to simply protect vehicles behind forward areas. Examples are 
shown in Figs. 6.55 and 6.56. Small ‘U’ shaped vehicular slots are apparently 2.3 to 
3.0 metres wide, but from the spot records made in the field in 2011, their lengths 
appear to be no longer than 5.75 metres. Larger vehicular slots, for tanks or artillery, 
are definitely no smaller than 3.5 metres wide, and from Google Earth, their lengths 
can be observed up to, and at more than 10 metres. There are few, small vehicular 
slots along the southern limits of the Tifariti box, but they are very evident north of 
the Wadi Legtaf. On the whole, they can be found between the limits of the inner and 
                                                 
566 Rottman 2005b: 22.  
567 Dunstan 2008: 29. AFV is an acronym for an armoured fighting vehicle. 
568 Rottman 2007: 51. 
 211
outer Tifariti boxes, and there is a great concentration in the Tifariti redoubt (see 
below).  
 
Gun Pits 
Artillery gun pits are circular or sub-circular in shape. They can vary in size 
depending on the type of gun they have been designed for. They can be as small as 
four metres in diameter, and even smaller, mainly as mortar pits, or they can be more 
than 10 metres in diameter to accommodate towed artillery or self-propelled guns. 
They are created by excavating a shallow hollow in the ground and using the spoil to 
create a circular parapet around them. This can be simply embanked, or revetted 
internally with stones and/or sandbags. Access is by a ramp through which artillery 
can be emplaced in the pit, though in Vietnam for instance, the pits were nearly closed 
with the artillery pieces dropped into them by helicopter.569 Very often, these pits have 
small bunkers or shelters associated with them, and storage areas for gun shells (see 
Figs. 6.57 and 6.58). The distribution of gun pits at Tifariti is discussed below. 
 
It seems that circular gun pits really came into being during World War Two. The 
mono-directional linearity of defence and offence that was a hallmark of World War 
One was replaced by an all round approach to tactics, since armed forces became 
highly mobile with multi-directional troop movements. Occupied positions could be 
outflanked and attacked from unforeseen directions, therefore support artillery had to 
be able to pivot around to cover a number of different angles. This really became 
obvious during the Vietnam War with the creation of fire support bases, which has 
already been discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Other Features  
Besides occupying the buildings at the very centre of Tifariti, the Moroccans also 
utilised the old Spanish airstrip (see Fig. 6.59) located around 700 metres south of the 
Spanish fort. They, or the Spanish, might have been responsible for the three conical 
cairns on high ground, around 480 metres to the north of the airstrip (and almost in 
line with it) which might have served as some kind of landing markers. Also, along 
the lower slopes near the markers, there are large inscriptions on the ground laid out in 
                                                 
569 Foster 2007: 22-23. 
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stones. One is in Arabic and it is visible on Google Earth – it reads ‘God, The Nation, 
The King’, and it includes a crown laid out in stones.570 The other is in capital Latin 
letters inscribing ‘ALTEA’, but the meaning of this is not known. LMA/AOAV has 
mapped the locations of four contained minefields and other areas of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) in and around Tifariti (see Fig. 6.66). The minefields are a part of the 
Moroccan defences around the northern half of Tifariti, while many of the UXOs are 
probably related to air attacks by Morocco. Fortunately, LMA/AOAV has removed 
most, if not all UXOs from Tifariti, making it a much safer place today.571  
 
The Archaeology of the Tifariti box: a landscape of defence 
 
From August 1977 until March 1979 the Moroccan army ‘dug in’ at Tifariti, more or 
less in a continual state of siege.572 Throughout this period, Polisario/SPLA forces 
carried out a war of attrition against the Moroccan forces occupying key positions 
throughout the badiya. Their tactics mainly consisted of repeated harassment strikes 
by small motorised units, unpredictably executed in time and space. Their aims were 
to isolate the Moroccans in their strongholds by cutting communications and supplies, 
and to demoralise them, thereby forcing them to withdraw from their positions.573 At 
Tifariti, as Muhammed Fadel described, the Moroccan defences consisted of an inner 
line and an outer line. This is illustrated in Figs. 6.60 and 6.62, and the disposition of 
these defences can be best described using the KOCOA scheme of battlescape 
analysis.  
 
KOCOA574 is a methodology for understanding the landscape character of a 
battlespace. It was originally devised in its present form by the United States military, 
though in general, some type of systematised battlescape analysis has been a hallmark 
of all tactical planning in war. It is now increasingly used by conflict archaeologists as 
a tool for analysing battlescapes.575 It is undeniably similar to general landscape 
characterisation which is a methodology used by landscape archaeologists and the 
                                                 
570 Translated by A. Wasse. Email message, 7 November 2013. 
571 AOAV 2008 & 2011. 
572 Fadel, Interview and Breica, Interview 2 November. 
573 Fadel, Interview. 
574 A thorough description of KOCOA (also known as OAKOC) can be found in U.S. Department of 
the Army 2009.  
575 Bleed and Scott 2011. 
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heritage management sector, to understand and appreciate historical landscape 
evolution. KOCOA stands for: 
 
Key terrain: This is any locality whose occupation affords a ‘marked advantage’ to 
whichever combatant group controls it. High ground is an obvious example of key 
terrain since it can dominate an area and thereby afford good observational views and 
fields of fire. Another example might be a valley or wadi, since its occupation could 
facilitate the control of movement. 
 
Observation: Essentially viewshed – what can be seen from any given position. This 
also highlights intervisibility and those spaces that cannot be viewed, referred to as 
dead space. Observation also relates to fields of fire. 
 
Cover and concealment: These relate to protection from enemy fire and observation. 
They can be natural and/or man-made – therefore, they include defensive features. 
 
Obstacles: Any obstruction that is designed or employed to impede, or stop, a 
combatant force is an obstacle. These can be natural or man made. 
 
Avenues of approach: These are natural or man made features that facilitate the 
movement of combatants towards their objectives. They can be summed up as 
corridors of mobility. 
 
Applying KOCOA to the Tifariti Box 
 
Fig. 6.60 shows the overall distribution of defensive features in the Tifariti box as 
more or less concentrically placed, but on closer examination this is not so 
straightforward. There are multiple inner and outer lines of dug out fighting positions. 
Some are lengthy and well-defined while others are not. There are blocks and lines of 
features, all related to terrain in and outside of the box. A KOCOA characterisation 
can help explain them. 
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Key Terrain and Observation 
Although the terrain in and around Tifariti is low lying, it does have topographic 
variance. Tifariti lies in a slight basin or depression, with natural drainage flowing 
northwards from the watershed delineating the southern edge of the depression. The 
northern side of the basin is demarcated by a zone of folding rock formations with 
dense concentrations of linear igneous intrusions that are ridge-like since they are 
harder than the rock through which they intrude. There is also slightly higher ground 
within and outside of the basin, and this lies at an elevation of 480 metres or more. 
This ground, within and around the Tifariti box, constitutes a zone of key terrain on 
which the bulk of the Moroccan defensive positions are located (see Fig. 6.61). In the 
center of the box, and south of the Wadi Legtaf, though also extending east of the 
Wadi Tifariti, are the inner lines of defensive positions – an ‘inner’ box. This utilises 
all of the higher ground around the earlier Spanish settlement, including a salient, 
though low lying east to west ridge of intrusive igneous rock south of the settlement – 
just south of the Spanish airstrip (see Fig. 6.62). 
 
What can be observed from the inner defensive box, its viewshed, is quite striking. As 
Fig. 6.63 shows, by selecting six viewpoint positions along the inner box and using a 
GIS tool576 to highlight the ground visible from those viewpoints, a generalised 
viewshed around the Tifariti inner box can be created. Surprisingly, the viewshed 
extends southwards only as far as the arcing southern limit of the basin in which 
Tifariti lies. Here there is an arcing ridge of higher ground at around 480 metres 
(highlighted by a ring of outer defensive positions), and beyond this arc, the ground 
apparently rises slightly (as a watershed) before dipping again to the south, thereby 
producing dead ground. On the western side of this arc there is a tributary to the Wadi 
Legtaf, and this too is in dead ground. Visibility only increases on the western upward 
slopes of the tributary, where further, outer defensive positions lie on the 480 metre 
contour. This higher ground extends to the north side of the Wadi Legtaf, and arcs to 
the northeast as a further ridge of high ground (also, intermittently at 480 metres 
elevation) extending east-northeast beyond the Wadi Tifariti. This high ground, this 
key terrain, is also the location of further outer defensive positions.  
 
                                                 
576 This is the internet application, Hey What’s That, available at http://www.heywhatsthat.com/. 
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The 480 metre high ground that marks the east side of the inner box, extends 
eastwards, but visibility along it is intermittent, with areas of dead ground. Further 
dead ground is to the east, and there is dead ground to the northeast of the inner box 
too. Here, the viewshed from the inner box only follows a well delineated north-
nortwesterly line of extended defences with more dead ground to the east. This 
indicates that the ground to the east slopes downwards, out of sight from the inner 
box, and then rises again further to the east, as is shown in the northeast (upper right) 
corner of Fig. 6.63. 
 
It is conspicuous how, in the main, the viewshed from the inner defensive box extends 
out only as far as the 480 metre high ground upon which Tifariti’s outer defences – the 
outline of its outer box – lie. Presumably, it was the limit of this viewshed that 
contributed to the placing of Tifariti’s outer defences where they are. From these 
slight rises in the ground surrounding the inner box, the outer box could extend the 
defensive gaze over greater ground, but not everywhere. The viewshed from this outer 
key terrain is shown in Fig. 6.64 – it is based on 17 viewpoints. When comparing this 
to the viewshed shown in Fig. 6.63, it is obvious that there are fewer white areas 
representing dead ground. It also shows how the defences of the outer box had a good 
reverse view over the inner box. When the two viewsheds are combined, however (see 
Fig. 6.65), they show that the dead ground within and close to the outer box is 
diminished greatly, but unexpectedly, the ground to the southeast (and the very 
southwest) of the outer most defences is still dead. Also there is still some dead 
ground to the east, and to the northwest. On the face of it, this might appear as a 
handicap for the Moroccans, but what follows, on issues of ‘cover and concealment’ 
might clarify things.  
 
Cover and Concealment   
Dug out fighting positions are by their very nature designed to facilitate their own 
concealment. By being earth embanked and low lying, especially in open country, as 
in a desert, they also give cover from attack. As already noted, the Tifariti box covers 
an area of more than 90 square kilometres, and within this the Moroccans dug and 
constructed at least 7170 defensive positions,577 with the overwhelming majority 
                                                 
577 This is the count of defensive positions plotted using Google Earth. 
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being concealed (and thereby covered). The nature of the dugouts, in relation to the 
firepower and tactics of Polisario/SPLA attackers, probably enhanced the survivability 
of the Moroccan troops. Also, and perhaps most crucially for much of the southern 
limit of the Moroccan defences, their outer positions were placed just a few hundred 
metres behind and down hill of slightly higher ground (where the open hamada desert 
opens up to the south) increasing their concealment from SPLA attackers approaching 
from the south and southeast. These reverse slope, defensive positions could also 
surprise attackers, especially in their first encounter with them, since they would 
become visible to the attackers only when they would be in range of the smaller arms 
(assault rifles, sub machine guns, and machine guns) deployed by the troops 
occupying the defences.578 Similarly, the majority of artillery gun pits were placed 
within, and south of, the inner defensive box (see Fig. 6.68), and these too would not 
have been immediately visible to Polisario’s motorised attackers. 
 
Obstacles 
Tifariti has no natural obstacles to the south, and the openness of the terrain would 
make attackers relatively visible from a considerable distance. Even if an enemy 
cannot be seen directly, if they approach by motor vehicle, as the Polisario/SPLA 
would have done, their dust streams would be visible for many kilometres. 
Nevertheless, if they did break through the outermost defences of the box, they would 
have had to negotiate at least two lateral ridges of intrusive igneous rock, which would 
have slowed down their movement, and in some instances, even dictate their route of 
attack through limited gaps in the ridges. Similarly, the undulating hills that are 
present in the northern half, or so, of the Tifariti box, and which extend northwards for 
a good many kilometres, do present real obstacles to motorised attack. As Figs. 6.4 
and 6.61 indicate, these are numerous, lateral intrusions of hard igneous rock that 
break up the terrain into ridges and troughs. With the troughs running roughly parallel 
with the Tifariti defences, the terrain suggests that it would have been difficult, or at 
least slow going, for the Polisario/SPLA to make direct, head on, hit and run attacks 
that were their hallmark. Their movements would have undoubtedly been hampered 
causing them to relinquish, to some degree, the element of total surprise. Also, even if 
a motorised attack was successful, the raiding party would possibly be forced to 
                                                 
578 The types of small arms used by Morocco, as noted in Denis 1976: 653, had a range of around 300 
to 800 metres.  
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withdraw through a route not of their choosing, but one dictated by the configurations 
of the ridges and troughs. This would have been an operational handicap, making 
them vulnerable to potential counter attacks and maybe even driving them into a 
minefield.  
 
The minefields (shown in Fig. 6.66) were distinctly placed only around the northern 
half of the Tifariti box on, or adjacent to, wadis in three out of four instances. This is 
in stark contrast to the claim made by Muhammed Fadel, that the settlement was 
surrounded by mines. Also, no mines were located by LMA/AOAV and MINURSO 
around the southern half of the Moroccan defences. Perhaps this was a matter of 
economy since the open desert to the south would have required too many mines, 
while in the north, the obstacles posed by the ridge and trough character of the terrain 
might have forced SPLA attackers into the wadis where their movement could be 
swift (if staying out of the sandy centre of the wadis), but predictable and limited, and 
unfortunately for them, channelled into the minefields. 
 
The defences themselves must not be ignored as an obstacle, or better, as a series of 
obstacles to SPLA attackers. That is what they were constructed for, and the 
distribution of their different types is shown in Figs. 6.66 to 6.69. The greater 
concentration of defences is disposed in the northern half of the Tifariti box, and this 
is supported by the density plot shown in Fig. 6.70. Such a distribution would 
additionally suggest that the north of Tifariti was more liable to being attacked, but as 
already pointed out, the very terrain could hamper attacks by fast motor vehicles, and 
this would have been exacerbated by the mine fields associated with the natural 
routeways – the wadis. With this being the case, and as a result, with the SPLA being 
deterred from attacking from the north, the density of defences there might not 
accurately reflect the SPLA threat. On the other hand, the defences in the south appear 
to have been laid out with the concept of defence in depth in mind, and with a 
considerable variation of different types of positions. If SPLA attackers made it past 
the outer ring of defences, the system, theoretically, could have bogged them down 
within a matrix of obstacles made up of defensive lines of dugouts (many enhanced as 
entrenchments) and gun positions, prior to their reaching the inner defensive box. Be 
that as it may, in the last two months of the Moroccan occupation of Tifariti, it was 
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from the south, southwest and southeast that the SPLA/Polisario attacked, compelling 
the Moroccan army to withdraw from Tifariti.579 More of this is discussed below. 
 
Avenues of Approach 
The corridors of mobility for the SPLA into and around Tifariti were the wadis to the 
north, and what could be called a ‘plain of mobility’ to the south – the open hamada 
desert (see Fig. 6.71). The northern wadi routes were limited in number, and the 
folding igneous landscape in between them did not make travel across country easy. 
The wadis could also be mined, as already noted, and most could be observed from 
many positions along Tifariti’s outer defences. In contrast, the desert to the south gave 
easy movement to motorised SPLA units (much of it was dead ground), and when far 
enough away from Tifariti, they could circle back into the rockier terrain on either 
side of the settlement, and beyond, to seek cover after a sortie. Also, attacks from the 
south had the added advantage of being driven into the prevailing northerly winds. For 
instance, SPLA units could drive up close to Moroccan forward positions at night 
when the dust streams from their vehicles could not be seen, and the sound of their 
motors could drift away to the south on the prevailing winds, furthering their ability to 
surprise the Moroccan garrison. But the open desert may not have always been to their 
advantage. While moving throughout the flat hamada, Polisario raiders were always 
vulnerable to potential air surveillance and attack. Be that as it may, and for all of their 
superiority in material, the Moroccans may have held crucial outposts dotted around 
the badiya, but in the empty areas in between, the Saharawi fighters – the ‘sons of the 
clouds’ – really did predominate, and were always ‘at home’. 
 
The Archaeology of the Tifariti box: Tifariti besieged 
 
It has not been possible to find published descriptive references to the fighting that 
took place in and around Tifariti between 1977 and 1979. This was a period when the 
Polisario/SPLA held sway throughout the badiya, and what could be called ‘the siege’ 
of Tifariti was part of a continual war of attrition, in which most if not all Moroccan 
positions away from the main urbanised centres of the territory, were being 
continually harassed by Polisario. In a place like Tifariti, the aim was to remove the 
                                                 
579 Breica, Interview 2 November.  
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Moroccan occupiers, and not to destroy them in battle.580 This is contrary to the view 
that when a force is encircled, as the Moroccans were at Tifariti, it would usually be 
‘followed by a battle of annihilation, the classic goal of all types of ground combat’.581 
Saharawi forces were more inclined to rout their enemy in battle, more in keeping 
with the longer term, historical approach to warfare as described by John Keegan.582 
And as T.E. Lawrence explained in his Science of Guerilla Warfare (though with 
reference to Turkey and Arabia):  
 
Now the Arab aim was unmistakably geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking 
lands in Asia. In the doing of it Turks might be killed, yet ‘killing Turks’ would never 
be an excuse or aim. If they would go quietly, the war would end. If not, they must be 
driven out: but at the cheapest possible price, since the Arabs were fighting for 
freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive.583 
 
In fact, Malainin Larkhal has even pointed out that in the fighting prior to the 1991 
ceasefire, Polisario fought with a chivalric ‘spirit’.584 In describing the tactics 
employed by Polsario/SPLA in 1976, John Damis has written: 
 
Polisario military tactics stressed mobility and the element of surprise. …the front 
operated in groups of five to eight Land Rovers, units small enough to conceal 
themselves in the hills during the day. At night, moving under the cover of darkness, 
Polisario guerrillas were able to employ a variety of light weapons – rifles, machine 
guns, land mines, mortars, antitank launchers, SA-7 shoulder-mounted missiles – and 
engage in hit-and-run operations to harass Moroccan forces and interdict supply 
columns.585 
 
Damis went on to say that in the hillier areas of Western Sahara, the guerrillas had an 
‘abundance of caves and hideouts’ in which to conceal themselves (see Fig. 6.72). 
Also, that in 1977 and 1978 their raiding parties became more ambitious, consisting of 
up to 150 vehicles that could, apparently, move freely across the badiya with little 
                                                 
580 Breica, Interview 2 November.  
581 U.S. Department of the Army 1952: 1. 
582 Keegan 1978. 
583 Lawrence [1929] 2005: 277.  
584 Larkhal, Interview. 
585 Damis 1983: 83. 
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interference. ‘The guerrillas began to employ heavier, Soviet-made weapons, 
including 122-millimeter rockets, cannons, and Kalashnikov assault rifles’.586  
 
Muhammed Fadel emphasised that while the Moroccans occupied Tifariti, the 
Polisario/SPLA aim was to continuously attack them ‘in guerrilla style, so as never to 
give… the enemy a chance to rest’ and to cut off their supply lines, and by doing so, 
‘to attack their morale’.587 By making it hard for the garrison to receive supplies 
overland, the Moroccans were forced to supply and stay linked with Tifariti solely by 
air. However, the airstrip was obviously vulnerable, because the SPLA invested 
Tifariti from the south.588 
 
Habua Breica – though not a contemporary of Muhammed Fadel – has additionally 
described the SPLA investment of Tifariti. He summarised the Polisario tactics as 
those of a war of attrition. SPLA units would frequently select different parts of the 
Moroccan defensive perimeter and attack them using two to four land rovers. These 
would be rapid attacks with all guns continually firing. Shock and awe tactics, but on 
a relatively small scale, aiming at weak points in the Moroccan defences, and 
repeatedly attacking from different directions. The Saharawis would aim to over run 
selected locations, and to take prisoners for intelligence. These attacks also drew 
Moroccan mortar and artillery fire, and by so doing, the Saharawis would learn where 
the Moroccan guns were. Such tactics were de-moralising for the Moroccans, 589 and 
as Che Guevara has written, after a furious surprise attack, the battlefield 
 
suddenly converts itself into total passivity. The surviving enemy, resting, believes 
that the attacker has departed; he begins to relax, to return to the routine life of the 
camp or fortress, when suddenly a new attack bursts forth in another place, with the 
same characteristics… The fundamental thing is surprise and rapidity of attack.590  
 
Habua Breica is of the opinion that during the war many Moroccan soldiers had 
nervous breakdowns from these types of assaults. This was made worse at Tifariti 
                                                 
586 Damis 1983: 83. 
587 Fadel, Interview. 
588 Fadel, Interview. 
589 Breica, Interview 2 November. 
590 Che Guevara 2007: 17. 
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when the Moroccans were cut off and could only receive air dropped supplies. This 
was in 1978, and presumably at the end of the year, since this supposedly went on for 
at least two months culminating in a Moroccan withdrawal in March 1979, after a 
substantial SPLA attack. In the assault, Tifariti was attacked from three sides – the 
east, south and west – and the Morrocans had an avenue of escape to the north.591  
 
When investing Tifariti, Muhammed Fadel emphasised that the SPLA first attacked 
the outlying Moroccan defences – the outer limits of the Tifariti box (the ‘wings’ as he 
described them to me).592 The need for the Moroccans to bolster the outer perimeter, 
or ‘wings’, in response to the threat of SPLA attacks, is perhaps illustrated by the fact 
that many of the outer dugout fighting positions, especially in the south, were grouped 
in clusters linked by trenches. This made each group of around five to more than 10 
dugouts a mini-strongpoint (see Figs. 6.49 and 6.50). Also, some of these southern 
positions included protective approach trenches, as did many of the fighting positions 
on the outer perimeter on the high ground north of the Wadi Legtaf (see Fig. 6.66). 
Here too, there were many built up positions (sangar-like features), perhaps testifying 
to the need for more solidly constructed fighting positions, or illustrating that the 
ground was simply too rocky for digging into easily (see Fig. 6.67). The southern 
perimeter of the Tifariti box was also supported by artillery, since there were many 
gun positions dispersed within the flatter ground behind the outermost perimeter. 
These included small gun pits, presumably for mortars, and larger pits (more than four 
metres wide) which could also include associated dugouts and/or built up features, 
plus vehicular slots large enough to accommodate tanks and/or self propelled artillery 
(see Figs. 6.68 and 6.69). It is interesting to note that there is no clear preference to the 
siting of artillery positions west of the Wadi Tifariti, as maintained by Muhammed 
Fadel. The archaeology, as mapped, obviously shows otherwise.  
 
Polisario tactics proved successful, especially once the guerrillas were able to prevent 
airplanes from landing and bringing in supplies. Without air support, the Moroccans 
eventually withdrew into the centre of Tifariti, and also, according to Muhammed 
Fadel, the protective wadis and high ground west to west-northwest (from 400m to 1.7 
                                                 
591 Breica, Interview 2 November. 
592 Fadel, Interview. 
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kilometres) of the old Spanish fort (all well within the inner Tifariti box).593 The 
approximate extent of this ‘redoubt’, so to speak, is shown in Fig. 6.73 (and a Google 
Earth close-up of its central part is shown in Fig. 6.74). It was obviously chosen for its 
survivability (its ‘cover and concealment’) value, and from its higher elevations (its 
‘key terrain’) a very good view (or ‘observation’ through viewshed) could be had over 
much of the ground as far out as the original, outer Tifariti box. The hilly nature of the 
terrain in which this redoubt was situated was obstructive to access (with ‘obstacles’ 
to movement caused by constrictive ‘avenues of approach’), so the Moroccans must 
have thought that this was a reasonably occupiable pocket of defence.594 It is also 
possible, that the gun pits and large vehicular slots in and around the centre of Tifariti 
date to the contraction of the defences, when artillery would have been pulled in from 
the outer defensive box. Nevertheless, from these positions, they could still rain 
accurate fire on SPLA attackers. 
 
Habua Breica maintained that the Moroccan infantry stationed at Tifariti were a 
mobile force, mainly employing armed Jeeps and Land Rovers to counter the mobility 
of the small motorised Polisario units. The troops, he additionally maintained, were 
around 1200 in number,595 though in 1979, Polisario claimed that there were 6000 
Moroccan troops in Tifariti.596 Nevertheless, those soldiers occupying the redoubt, 
built rubble and mud shelters (bivouacs), and numerous vehicular slots that could only 
have been constructed for jeeps or trucks since their remains indicate that they were 
too small for tanks or self propelled guns (on average they are 2.5m wide by well 
under six metres long). Fig. 6.75 shows a captured Moroccan jeep with a 105mm 
direct fire recoilless gun mounted on it. According to Habua Breica, these were the 
mainstay of Morocco’s mobile infantry.597 Some of the vehicular slots at Tifariti are 
positioned such that they could have a view over the surrounding terrain, thereby 
facilitating the use of direct fire guns that could have been mounted on the jeeps 
positioned in them (see Fig. 6.76). Other slots are situated in lower lying areas 
suggesting that these were simply protective parking places (see Figs. 6.56 and 6.77). 
                                                 
593 Fadel, Interview. 
594 In this instance, ‘pockets are formed as the result of operations in which the attacker entirely 
surrounds a large number of the opposing forces’ (U.S. Department of the Army 1952: 1). 
595 Breica, Interview 2 November. 
596 Knight 1979.  
597 Breica, Interview 2 November. 
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All of the vehicular slots were also situated in such a way as to make driving in and 
out of them easy. 
 
As already described, the shelters, or bivouacs, could be multi-celled or single room 
huts, constructed of random rubble in mud mortar, and partly dug into the ground. 
They could be single, free-standing cells or a complex of rooms. Some had windows, 
really lights, framed by large re-used tin cans with their bases cut out, or wooden 
crates, also without bottoms. Their roofs, now missing and with no evident remnants 
nearby, were probably flat, as in Figs. 4.38, 4.52, 4.60, 4.77, 4.79, 4.84 and 4.86. One 
three celled structure was pointed out by Muhammed Fadel as being a mortar position 
in the Tifariti redoubt.598 If this was a mortar post then it was the only one of its kind 
since fortified mortar positions were usually dug-in with a circular parapet of earth, 
and there are apt examples of these along the northern edge of the redoubt. Instead, 
the structure was probably a makeshift mortar position, taking advantage of the 
relatively high sheltering walls of a previously built up stone shelter, and maybe even 
occupied only in the lattermost stages of the fighting at Tifariti as part of ‘last ditch’ 
efforts by the garrison to defend itself. Examples of some of the shelters are shown in 
Figs. 6.51 to 6.53 and 6.78. The Moroccans also built some structures into the odd 
ancient stone tumulus. One in particular, with adjacent areas of cleared of stones as a 
kind of assembly area, is shown in Fig. 6.79. Nearby was also the laid out stone 
inscription (already referred to) proclaiming ‘God, The Nation, The King’, along with 
the stones spelling out ‘ALTEA’. Both would have been visible from the air, with the 
former still visible on Google Earth (see Fig. 6.80). 
 
After repeated harassment attacks, and by becoming more and more isolated, the 
Moroccan garrison at Tifariti was in an untenable position by the end of 1978. With at 
least two months of concentrated assaults by Polisario/SPLA forces, culminating in 
one big Polisario push from the southern quarters of the compass, the Moroccans have 
been described as leaving Tifariti in disarray.599 However, the precipitousness of the 
Moroccan departure can be looked at in a different light. When Richard Knight, then 
working for the American Committee on Africa, visited Western Sahara in 1979, he 
had this to say: 
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I actually saw part of a battle near Tifariti.  It was getting dark, but we could 
see the mortar explosions.  In fact our guides pulled us back when a mortar 
exploded about 90 feet away.  I later learned from POLISARIO that by March 
12 the 6,000 Moroccans who had occupied Tifariti had retreated and been sent 
to reinforce Semara [Smara], a town closer to the coast which is also under 
attack by POLISARIO.600  
 
It is interesting that Polisario did not tell Knight that they had routed the Moroccans. 
Here was an ample opportunity for letting the word out (to a sympathetic American 
activist) that the SPLA was able to siege an occupied town and re-take it by force of 
arms. Instead, from whatever Knight was told, he got the impression that yes, the 
Moroccans retreated from Tifariti, but also, they were sent to reinforce Smara. It is 
undoubtedly the case that Moroccan troops could no longer hold positions in the 
badiya, and that Morocco was changing its strategy to one of defending Smara, Bou 
Craa and El-Ayoun – the so called ‘useful triangle’. It is possible, therefore, that the 
Moroccans did not leave Tifariti because they were pushed out in a decisive assault, 
but instead, were ordered to withdraw to defend Smara, when the Moroccans realised 
that all of their positions in the badiya were unsustainable. In support of the notion 
that the Moroccans did not leave Tifariti too precipitously, Muhammed Fadel made it 
clear to me that when the Moroccans withdrew from the settlement they destroyed the 
colonia which they had occupied, and they laid mines all around the town.601 Bahia 
Awah saw the colonia in a ruinous, destroyed condition, when he arrived in Tifariti in 
1986,602 but LMA/AOAV, and Minurso, have found no evidence for extensive 
minefields around the settlement.  
 
With the Moroccans leaving Tifariti on 12 March 1979, the Polisario/SPLA was free 
to re-occupy the settlement. This heralded a new phase in the archaeology of Tifariti – 
one of re-appropriation. Still, constructive attempts at re-settling only started after 
1991 when the United Nations brokered the present ceasefire between the SADR and 
Morocco. 
                                                 
600 Knight 1979.  
601 Fadel, Interview. 
602 Awah, Interview. 
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The Archaeology of Post War Tifariti 
 
With the construction of the Moroccan berms completed in 1988, Tifariti was securely 
located within a defacto, Polisario controlled liberated zone. From camps within the 
zone, as well as from the Tindouf region, SPLA units were still conducting 
harassment attacks on the Moroccan berms. For all intents and purposes, Tifariti was 
still in a war zone and this was made very clear when Moroccan planes attacked the 
settlement in August 1991, just before the United Nations ceasefire came into effect 
on the 6th of September. It has been recorded in Tifariti that the remnants of the 
community facilities were destroyed at that time,603 including parts of the old Spanish 
fort, part of the adjacent infirmary, and according to Bahia Awah, the school.604 
 
The exodus of refugees at the start of the conflict, and the continuance of hostilities 
throughout the badiya really did depopulate the territory. The open desert became a 
dedicated arena for battle, and in the Western Sahara panhandle, that was solely 
between Polisario and Morocco. According to Kalthoum Salma – a Bedouin woman 
who lived in the Tifariti area before the war and has since returned – after the defacto 
partition of the country, and even after the mid 1980s, there was a trickle of some 
Saharawis returning to the liberated territories under the protection of the SPLA. At 
this time, Polisario was trying to increase livestock in the region,605 but this really only 
developed after the ceasefire with the development of a new cash economy in the 
refugee camps. This was, and still is, contributed to by Spanish pensions to Saharawi 
veterans of the colonial military, the development of internal and regional trade, 
donations from Spanish families supporting the families of children they have 
fostered, solidarity tourism (and NGO workers and the like) and remittances from 
Saharawis working abroad. The increase in such available money has resulted in the 
revival of mobile pastoralism, with many families grazing herds of camels and goats 
in, for example, the greener pastures of the Zemmour region in the free zone. Some 
families do this seasonally, others send out only some members of their family to tend 
                                                 
603 See Appendix 1: the Tifariti History Plaque records that during the attacks on Tifariti two Moroccan 
planes were shot down – on the 4th and 26th of August 1991. The first plane was a French Mirage while 
the second was an American F5E. Both pilots were captured. 
604 Awah, Interview. 
605 Salma, Interview. 
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the animals, while others have de-camped totally to the liberated badiya. Also, since 
the ceasefire, and since the resettlement of Bedouin families with their herds, many 
Saharawis enjoy visiting their relations in the badiya – in their homeland – and in an 
environment that is very different from the stark hamada of the camps.606 As a 
Saharawi guide told the researcher Pablo San Martin:  
 
Some of these Saharawis whom we’re seeing going to Bir Lehlu, Tiris… don’t go 
because they have animals there; they go to visit relatives and friends. Well, in fact, 
they go on holidays! We like the desert… and we also like to go on holidays…607 
 
The Tifariti area is seen as being very inviting, and it has a special resonance for the 
Saharawi people. To use Hirsch’s words, it is a place that ‘is a source of restorative 
power’.608 In fact, it is restorative on a variety of levels – from the practical and 
concrete to the ideational. Since the ceasefire, the SADR government has inaugurated 
infrastructural developments with the aim of repopulating the Tifariti area. For 
instance, (and with the assistance of NGOs and some Spanish municipalities) a new 
well was dug in 1991, and a new water pump was fitted in 1998. A school and 
hospital were constructed in 1999, while a regional museum was also established. A 
small experimental/model farm was created and provided with farm equipment. In 
2005 a new housing development was started, called the ‘Solidarity District’, and in 
the same year, the first telephone and Internet link was made with the settlement. 
Tifariti is seen as a future Saharawi capital within the liberated territories, and the 
foundation stone for a Saharawi National Council headquarters building was laid in 
2005. Also, assemblies of the Polisario ‘Congress of the Popular Front’ have been 
held in the settlement every four years since October 2003.609 United Nations’ 
ceasefire observers (MINURSO) have a base and airfield in Tifariti,610 while 
LMA/AOAV land mine clearance operations are based in the settlement.611 In 2009 it 
was even proposed that a ‘University of the Desert’ be based in Tifariti, but that 
                                                 
606 San Martin 2010: 157-164. 
607 San Martin 2010: 164, citing a conversation with a Saharawi guide in the Free Zone, November 
2005. 
608 Hirsch 1995: 5. 
609 See Appendix 1. 
610 See the MINURSO website at http://minurso.unmissions.org/ and 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/index.shtml. 
611 AOAV 2008. 
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initiative has evolved, in the first instance, into an art school based in the refugee 
camps in Tindouf, Algeria.612 For a plan of contemporary Tifariti, see Fig. 6.81.  
 
The weather of the Tifariti region is considered very clement indeed.613 It is cooler 
than the hamada at Tindouf, and the air is considered very fresh, much fresher and 
clearer than in the camps. Because of this, people have re-settled in the Tifariti area 
for their health, encouraged by Polisario programmes for the sick and the elderly. This 
was the reason why one Saharawi woman I spoke to, Lamat Brahim, came to Tifariti – 
her mother was suffering from asthma.614 Kalthoum Salma also has asthma, and her 
renewed semi-pastoral life in the open spaces of Tifariti suits her.615 Rains 
occasionally fall in the Zemmour region, and as Fig. 6.3 shows, the Wadi Tifariti is 
relatively verdant. Westerners from temperate climes might view the Tifariti area as 
dry and harsh, with just a little bit of scrub vegetation, but Saharawis like Lamat 
Brahim, think that the region is ‘beautiful’. In the mornings she would go out for 
pleasurable walks if she has little to do, and in all, she feels very attached to the 
place.616 The Saharawi poet. Sidi Brahim Salama J’Dud summed up such sentiments 
in a few lines from a very impromptu composition he recited for me in 2011:  
 
You are very dear my country,  
And you know it is true, 
You are beautiful with your verdancy 
And with your good weather… 617 
 
At present, Lamat Brahim only has goats, but she would like to increase their number, 
and acquire camels.618 Kalthoum Salma’s family grazes both goats and camels. She 
commented on how families used to have hundreds of camels before the war, while 
now they may only have as many as ten.619 This small number of animals might be 
true for some families, but I and other members of the WSP, when travelling between 
                                                 
612 Rigg 2009. The Saharawi School of Art was inaugurated in the Bojdour refugee camp in Tindouf, 
Algeria, in November 2013. See http://artifariti.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/inaugurada-la-primera-escuela-
de-arte-y.html accessed 28 March 2014. 
613 Deya, Interview. 
614 Brahim, Interview. 
615 Salma, Interview. 
616 Brahim, Interview. 
617 Salama J’Dud, Interview. 
618 Brahim, Interview. 
619 Salma, Interview. 
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Tindouf and Tifariti, have seen camel herds probably numbering more than a hundred. 
Also such a high number of animals in any given herd makes it worthwhile, and 
necessary, to follow the rains across a broad range, as Kalthoum has additionally 
maintained. In the past, such ranges from Tifariti extended in a northerly direction to 
Mahbes and Echdeiria, but because of the berm, they now extend to the south (see Fig. 
6.82). Much of the livestock in the badiya was supposedly killed off by the Moroccan 
military in their invasion of the country, in an attempt to drive the Bedouin into the 
towns. As a consequence, the animals seen today around Tifariti have been brought 
out by trucks from the Tindouf area and Mauritania.620  In all, Polisario has been 
relatively successful in getting Saharawis to start resettling the Tifariti area. 
Undoubtedly, the development of facilities such as the regional infirmary and the 
digging of new wells in the wadis,621 and the presence of a school, 622 along with land 
mine clearance by LMA/AOAV, have had a positive effect on increased pastoralism 
in and around the clement, naturally inviting Wadi Tifariti. 
 
Recent Pastoral Settlement at Tifariti 
 
The evidence of post 1991 pastoral settlement at Tifariti constitutes some of the latest 
strata of contemporary archaeology that has impressed itself onto the Tifariti 
palimpsest. It shares space with the remains of war, the colonial past and the 
prehistoric past. Although pastoralism has been on the increase since 1991, its present 
spread in and around Tifariti (in the Tifariti Study Area) can be observed and mapped 
for the years 2006 to 2008 using Google Earth.623 The dated satellite imagery 
available on Google Earth makes it possible to map the sites of Bedouin tents that 
were occupied, theoretically at least, from 1991 up to 14 May 2008. These are: 
 
                                                 
620 Salma, Interview. 
621 In 2011, I saw small sheds in open locations in the Wadi Tifariti and its tributaries. According to 
Malainin Larkhal, who was with me at the time, these were shelters for new well diggings. I can also 
affirm that there were very few of these in 2007 when I first worked in the Tifariti area, so their 
numbers have obviously increased. 
622 Brahim, Interview. She told me in 2011 that she was very happy with the school and its teachers. For 
her, it was a contributing reason for living close to Tifariti. 
623 During the later phases of writing this dissertation, in early 2014, Google Earth released new 
satellite imagery dated to 2013. However, because this imagery was released at such a late date, it has 
not been included in this research. 
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 The imprints of tent encampments that existed prior to 21 February 2006 (see 
Fig. 6.83). 
 Tent sites, occupied and visible on 21 February 2006 (see Fig. 6.84). 
 The imprints of tent sites that were set up after 21 February 2006 but were 
deserted by 14 May 2008 (see Fig. 6.85), and finally, 
 Tent sites, occupied and visible on 14 May 2008 (see Fig. 6.86). 
 
Modern Saharawi tents are very different from the traditional tents of the Maghreb 
and the western Sahara. The traditional tent was usually made of goat and camel hair, 
and it had a low wind resistant profile with a central peak.624 On the other hand, the 
modern tent is square or rectangular, made of canvas, and tall enough for an adult to 
stand up in. In plan, modern tents can measure anywhere from five to seven metres 
along a side, while the traditional tent would have measured, on average, seven metres 
in width by five metres in depth.625 The two types of tents are shown in Fig. 6.87, and 
the relatively square and uniform footprint of a modern canvas tent can be easily seen 
on Google Earth (see Fig. 6.88). Contemporary tented sites in the Tifariti area can 
consist of one or more tents, while some campsites might include domestic mud brick 
structures.626 
 
The distribution of tent sites that were occupied, presumably since 1991 and up to 21 
February 2006 is shown in Fig. 6.83. There were 305 individual tent ‘footprints’ 
(impressions) including three sites that were probably the remains of built structures. 
Unfortunately, since these cannot be broken down into individual years, then the 
growth in numbers and the movement of tents within the study area, over time, cannot 
be enumerated. Nevertheless, the figure shows that tent sites stayed relatively clear of 
those areas in which there are many intrusive igneous ridges. Tents were positioned 
close to wadis and wadi tributaries, on lower ground where there is good pasture, with 
an increasing density towards the Wadi Legtaf, westwards from the Wadi Tifariti. 
                                                 
624 Andrews 1971. 
625 Modern tent dimensions have come from measurements I took in the field while dimensions for the 
traditional Maghrebi tent are from Andrews 1971: 141.  
626 When I interviewed Kalthoum Salma, for instance, I was taken into a mud brick building which was 
white washed and well maintained. It served as a majlis – a room (or space) for meeting visitors. 
However, when I visited the semi permanent camp of Muhammed Deya, the Mayor of Tifariti, the tent 
served as a majlis, in which I and other guests had a meal. This latter use of the tent is also more in 
keeping with the domestic arrangements of Saharawi households in the refugee camps. 
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Unsurprisingly there were few tent sites in the open hamada desert to the south, 
though apparently, the wadis cutting through the hamada obviously gave shelter to 
some tent sites. 
 
Google Earth imagery, dated 21 February 2006, provides a snapshot view of the 
disposition and spread of occupied Bedouin tent sites in and around Tifariti on that 
specific day. The plotted tents are shown in Fig. 6.84. Here, there are 130 sites of 
individual, newly set up and occupied tents, which include three possible built 
structures and four associated enclosures or zaribas. The majority of the tent sites are 
within the shallow basin in which Tifariti is situated, and they are in sheltered 
locations either on, or next to, wadis or wadi tributaries. Only one group of tents is 
north of the Wadi Legtaf, while seven groups of tents are located amidst the wadis and 
tributaries southeast of the Tifariti basin, in the more open hamada desert. 
 
According to Google Earth imagery, in the two years between 21 February 2006 and 
up to 14 May 2008, 139 newly sited tents were set up in and around Tifariti, including 
one built structure. As Fig. 6.85 shows, the preference was to site tents and tent groups 
within the shallow Tifariti basin, south and southeast of the Wadi Legtaf and east of 
the Wadi Tifariti. The tent sites in the hamada to the southeast diminished, while tent 
sites increased northeast of Tifariti along the tributaries draining from the east. The 
area of intrusive igneous ridges north of the Wadi Legtaf and west of the Wadi Tifariti 
was still a deterrent to tent site placement, but beyond this area, tent sites were 
established in the far northwest of the study area. Again, the preference for tent sites 
was still on the lower ground, usually close to or on wadis and their tributaries. This 
distribution changes in the Google Earth image of the settlement taken on 14 May 
2008. The distribution of occupied tent sites on that day is shown in Fig. 6.86. The 
number of newly set up and occupied tents has risen from 139 for the previous two 
years to 169 (including two compounds and two possible built structures). Their 
distribution has altered distinctly in that there are now very few along the Wadi Legtaf 
and there has been a concentration of tent sites closer in to the centre of Tifariti. There 
has also been an increase of sites amidst the tributaries to the Wadi Tifariti in the 
northeast of the study area. Overall, if looking only at the Google Earth snapshots of 
21 February 2006 and 14 may 2008, since they represent single moments in the 
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occupation of the settlement, there has been a marked movement of tent sites towards 
the northeast. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.89.  
 
Movement of tent sites and camps should be expected of people who rely on having 
good grazing for their animals. The movement of tents and camps around Tifariti, and 
the overall increase in numbers, can only reinforce the notion that people have a 
positive attitude to Tifariti, be it the good weather, the pasture along the wadis, or the 
provision of facilities such as a school and infirmary. The increase of tent sites as 
illustrated on 14 May 2008, can also reflect that the potential hazards of UXOs has 
been extensively diminished – through the efforts of LMA/AOAV – and as a 
consequence, Saharawis are increasingly more willing to occupy the badiya in and 
around the settlement. 
 
Sites of Political Re-Appropriation 
 
There are other ‘footprints’ of tents around Tifariti, which are visible in the satellite 
imagery from Google Earth (see Fig. 6.90). These are modern, square Saharawi tents 
that have been set up in neat rows as accommodation for the delegates and visitors 
(and additional SPLA soldiers) who come to Tifariti for the Polisario National 
Congresses that have been held every four years at the settlement. These are very 
much acts of re-appropriation by the SADR government, aiming to show that there is 
a tangible link between the government of the refugees and their territory – their 
country. That is why, as already mentioned, there is a SADR government building 
under construction in the centre of Tifariti, with the aim being to develop Tifariti into 
a Saharawi capital in the Liberated Territory.  
 
Polisario National Congresses have been held at Tifariti since 2003, when previously, 
they were held in the Tindouf refugee camps. The 11th Congress was held on 12-19 
October 2003, the 12th Congress was held on 15-21 December 2007 while the 13th 
Congress was held on 15-21 December 2011. When these occur, Tifariti has a great 
influx of people, more than a thousand in number (almost 2000), and made up of 
Saharawis from the camps and the Saharawi Diaspora, foreign visitors and dignitaries, 
Polisario/SADR workers and officials, and members of the SPLA. Tents are set up to 
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accommodate the influx, all aligned in neat rows. There is a ‘festival’ feel to the 
gatherings, with the flying of flags and bunting. A view of Tifariti during one of the 
congresses is shown in Fig. 6.91. Google Earth imagery can actually indicate the 
change in size of the congresses based on the spread of tent footprints. The imagery 
dated to 21 February 2006 shows that the area occupied by orderly rows of tents, 
presumably for the 2003 congress, were only set up close to the eastern entrance to the 
settlement and the old colonia, and the building complex which houses the school and 
museum – where large meetings could be accommodated. Fig. 6.92 shows the 
disposition of the tents from the 2003 and 2007 congresses. During the latter congress, 
many additional tents were set up to the west of the Spanish airstrip, and this 
undoubtedly reflected an increase in attendance at the congress.  
 
The old Spanish airstrip is a large, compacted area at a uniform level. It measures 
approximately 1.25 kilometres long by 42 metres wide, and is aligned 17 degrees west 
of due north. It is used for the assembling of SPLA troops in parades, which are an 
integral part of the National Congresses. There is a spectator stand positioned along 
the eastern edge of the airstrip, with two flanking platforms for viewing parades and 
displays, and in 2011, there were the visible remains of associated ancillary structures 
behind the stand and platforms. Opposite is a flagpole, and decorative walls (see Fig. 
6.93). There are concrete podiums north and south of the stands, and one concrete disc 
with a map of Western Sahara rendered on it (see Fig. 6.94). This space is unique to 
Tifariti. Along with the SADR building under construction, the infirmary and school, 
and the new housing under construction, the people of Western Sahara are asserting 
their rights to ownership to, and their right of self-determination within, the territory 
of Western Sahara. These acts are deliberately political, and because of this, the 
archaeology of contemporary Tifariti is not just a social archaeology, but a political 
one as well.  
 
There is one other feature, inscribed on the ground that is visible to all who visit 
Tifariti, and it is clearly visible on Google Earth. It too has a political presence. It is a 
large pavement of stones, rectangular in shape (measuring around 30 metres uphill by 
12 metres or so in width) and painted as a representation of the Saharawi flag (see Fig. 
6.95). Beneath it, also laid out in painted stones at 12 metres high, and also visible on 
Google Earth, are the letters RASD (for the SADR), and Libertad, ‘Liberty’ in 
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Spanish. It is situated on a northeast facing slope, around 670 metres west-northwest 
of the old Spanish fort. It is at the approximate southeast limit of the Tifariti redoubt, 
but also, only 300 metres east of the Moroccan inscribed hillside slogan, ‘God, The 
Nation, The King’, already noted.  
 
A Multiplicity of Layers – a Multiplicity of Meanings 
 
There is a diversity and continuity of archaeological strata in the Tifariti area. This is 
undoubtedly true for all places on the globe, but Tifariti and Western Sahara are the 
focus of study here. These strata, from the prehistoric to the contemporary, have each 
had different meanings for the social groupings that inhabited the space making up the 
area of study, and there have been ideational and sensorial phenomena unique, and not 
so unique, to the inhabitants of each archaeological ‘period’. These periods, these 
strata, as I prefer to describe them, are all juxtaposed one with each other, on top of, 
alongside and interdigitated. Because of the nature of my fieldwork, and the nature of 
field survey as something akin to wandering,627 they are surficial. The materiality 
present on the ground is an assemblage628 and a collage of the things visible, as only 
seen by an observer on the ground, and additionally for me, in my own face-to-face 
interaction with Saharawis telling me their ‘stories’ – both official and unofficial.629 
There is a distinct horizontality to this archaeology since things from the past are only 
percolations up to the surface,630 and these include the thoughts and memories (and 
imaginings) of my informants as well as the evidence of material remains on the 
ground – which can also include the imaginings of ‘the archaeologist’ when 
contemplating what those, and any, remains are. 
 
The contemporary archaeology of Tifariti does not end here, however, and an 
additional stratum of materiality and meaning has been added to the Tifariti 
palimpsest. This is the ARTifariti art festival, and this addition to the collage is the 
subject of the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
627 Graves-Brown 2012.  
628 Harrison 2011 and 2013.  
629 Yaron 2006: 10.  
630 Witmore 2006.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
 
ARTifariti 
 
 
Soon after it went online, the panopticon view provided by Google Earth had a 
singular, reverse panopticon effect on an artist from Seville in Spain. Fernando Peraita 
had been a conscript in the Spanish Army in Western (Spanish) Sahara during 1975-
76, and as a result of the events of that winter he, as with many other Spaniards, has 
had a continuing, positive predisposition towards the Saharawi people and their cause. 
In 2005 he found himself looking at Google Earth imagery over Western Sahara and 
was astounded at the land art quality of the Moroccan berms. To borrow from Roland 
Barthes, he experienced a punctum, it could be said that he felt ‘pierced’ by the image, 
‘bruised’ even.631 Here was a design etched upon the surface of the earth, extensive 
and bold, and as Peraita expressed it: ‘the berm is a piece of [land] art tied to death, to 
suffering, and to separate the people, terrible, no? Culture [art] is usually used for 
peace, for good things’.632 With this in mind, he set upon gathering together a group of 
Spanish artists who could create a piece of land art in the Saharawi liberated zone, 
situated opposite the berm. But this was impractical, so Peraita and his colleagues 
changed tack: 
 
Instead of making one [work of] land art we (were) going to create a centre of 
contemporary art (dedicated) to peace and human rights that can be a weapon (against 
the wall), in the middle of the desert, in a no-man’s land. We can create a centre of art 
in a city that has been bombed by Moroccan planes, and where a lot of fighting has 
taken place, but nobody in the world knows about it, and, near the archaeological rock 
art sites of Rekeiz.633 
 
The ‘city’ that had been bombed was Tifariti, and so ARTifariti was inaugurated in 
2007. For two weeks every October to November, up to 2010, groups of artists 
                                                 
631 Barthes 2000. 
632 Peraita, Interview. 
633 Peraita, Interview. 
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(mainly from the Spanish speaking world, plus Saharawi artists and a mix of other 
foreign artists) would descend on the town of Tifariti adding an expanding stratum of 
contemporary archaeology in the form of art interventions on top of the strata of 
earlier occupations and archaeological periods. On the ARTifariti blog, the festival 
describes itself as 
 
a Festival of Art and Human Rights which aims to give visibility and voice to the 
Saharawi people, a community that survives between occupation and exile claiming 
through artistic practices the right of individuals and peoples to their land, their 
culture, their roots and their freedom.634 
 
This message is at the core of ARTifariti’s ethos, believing that Art can be a tool in 
developing a people’s international presence and domestic well being just as much as 
those NGOs that provide material and infrastructural aid.635 As the 2012 open call for 
participants to the 6th ARTifariti festival presented it:  
 
ARTifariti is a working context in which artistic practices play a provocative, 
reflective and transformative role. The focus is the Sahara conflict, but from here 
expands into other territories, questioning any situation where individual and 
collective human rights are violated. 
 
…ARTifariti is an appointment with artistic practices as a tool to vindicate Human 
Rights; the right of the people to their land, their culture, their roots and their freedom. 
It is an annual encounter of public art to reflect on creation, politics and society, and a 
point of contact for artists interested in the capacity of art to question and transform 
reality. ARTifariti also aims to promote intercultural relations, fomenting the 
interchange of experiences and skills between local artists and artists from other parts 
of the world in order to contribute to the international widespread coverage of the 
Sahrawi reality. It provides a reflection point from the world of Art and Culture 
through direct knowledge and promotes the development of the Saharawi people 
through their Cultural Heritage.636 
 
                                                 
634 ARTifariti n.d. 
635 GraDCAM 2012.  
636 ARTifariti 2012 
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The festival is also seen by Saharawis as an assertion of their sovereignty over their 
country: it is a means of re-appropriation, even if it is undertaken mainly by foreign 
artists, as a kind or re-appropriation by proxy. ARTifariti is also seen as reinforcing a 
Hispanic-Arab culture that undoubtedly makes Saharawis unique, and feel unique, 
within the Arab world. As the Commander of the SPLA in the Tifariti region put it:  
 
ARTifariti is a means of exercising sovereignty over our territory [and] the liberated 
territory, besides contributing to the preservation of our national identity and our 
Spanish-Arabic culture. It is the foundation stone of a road that can only lead to 
freedom.637 
 
ARTifariti is more than just a collection of artists creating works of art in Western 
Sahara. Fernando Peraita has described it as a tree with many branches.638 The 
branches are projects that have extended the original purpose of the festival and some 
have developed lives of their own. It is the purpose in this chapter to deal only with art 
within the context of the landscape of Tifariti; but briefly, examples of some of the 
extended projects of ARTifariti include:  
 
 Exhibitions in numerous locations throughout Europe and the Americas.  
 ‘Disappeared Saharawis’ – this is a project whereby artists working with 
Saharawi families produce ‘psychological portraits’ of family members who 
have ‘disappeared’ in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and whose families 
never had photographs of them. 
 ARTifariti artists have spent time with Saharawi families in the occupied zone, 
recording evidence of physical maltreatment in conjunction with medical 
examinations of torture victims. It is planned that this work will be compiled 
into a book for presentation to the United Nations. 
 The production of audio and video records of the experiences of Saharawi 
people. 
 ARTifariti has already worked with the school in Tifariti, but they have set up 
a school of art in the refugee camps as part of the ‘University of Tifariti’. 
                                                 
637 Brahim Ahmed Mahmud, Head of the 2nd SADR Military Region, quoted in ARTifariti 2007: 5. 
638 GraDCAM 2012. 
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ARTifariti artists will give master classes at this new ‘University of the 
Desert’.639 
 ARTifariti runs a parallel programme to its main festival aimed at international 
art students, giving them the opportunity to live and work with Saharawis in 
the refugee camps, learning from the experience and producing original art. 
 Sahara Libre Wear – this is a fashion project producing hand printed and 
manufactured clothing in the Refugee camps for sale abroad. Every year, 
ARTifariti, includes a Sahara Libre fashion show. 
 
These examples give only an indication of the range of projects undertaken by 
ARTifariti, while the annual catalogues produced by the festival describe even more 
undertakings.640 Nevertheless, the festival started out as a meeting of artists and 
Saharawis in the desert landscape of Tifariti – an encounter between peoples, and also 
an encounter between the visiting artists and the Western Sahara badiya. That context 
had a bearing on the artists and the art they produced. 
 
Art on the Land 
 
In all, the range of art produced at Tifariti between 2007 and 2010 consisted of indoor 
and outdoor works – three dimensional works and constructions (installations and 
sculptures), and more traditional flat surface – painted – artworks, and photography 
(besides other types of art activities and interventions, such as the work of Francis 
Gomila and Bettina Semmer in 2009, described below). The bulk of the art created by 
Saharawi artists (making up, for instance, around a third of the artists in 2010) has 
been in flat painted works, or small scale three dimensional pieces, and much of it is 
on show in the Tifariti Museum. In fact, there are only a handful of pieces created by 
Saharawi artists that have been painted out-of-doors. These have not been sizable, 
though exceptionally, there is one large painting that has been executed on a 
substantial rock outcrop, which will be described and discussed below. With almost 
                                                 
639 The Saharawi School of Art, founded through the initiatives of ARTifariti, was opened in November 
2013 in the Bojdour Camp, one of the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. This was the result 
of the efforts to create a ‘University of the Desert’, started in 2009. See Rigg 2009 and ARTifariti n.d.: 
http://artifariti.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/inaugurada-la-primera-escuela-de-arte-y.html accessed 28 
March 2014. 
640 Electronic versions of the catalogues can be viewed and downloaded from ARTifariti n.d. 
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no Saharawi artists producing art on the land, and because this research is essentially a 
landscape study, it is the outdoor installations in open spaces which will be explored 
here, and as a result, this account will be biased in favour of the foreign artists who 
have attended the ARTifariti festivals. In the four years in which the festival was held 
at Tifariti, the numbers of artists per year ranged from 25 to almost 50 and they hailed 
from at least 16 countries.641 Out of these, the work of only 18 artists will be discussed 
in detail here, and it is the emplacement of their work in the landscape (though two of 
the works were carried out virtually, employing Google Earth), and their recorded 
experiences at Tifariti, which is just as important as the content of their creations. But 
first, the setting of Tifariti as a place for out-of-doors art will be addressed.   
 
The basic topography of the Tifariti basin has been described in Chapter 6. When I 
undertook fieldwork in Tifariti in the Autumn of 2011, besides exploring the conflict 
landscape around the settlement, I also recorded as many of the remaining art 
installations as could be easily located out of doors. In all, I noted up to 24 locations 
of individual, or groups of, artworks (all given alphanumeric descriptors of AR1 to 
AR24), but this number should not be viewed as exhaustive. For instance, some 
outdoor installations have undoubtedly been removed (judging from the ARTifariti 
catalogues, they were portable), while there are others that quite simply could not be 
located.  Since there is no obvious curation of the art produced at Tifariti, many of the 
installations are in poor condition and they have not fared well in the harsh desert 
climate. And since no map of any kind exists, indicating the location of the artworks, I 
had to depend solely on finding them by simply looking over the landscape, and 
walking over it as in any standard archaeological landscape survey. A gazetteer of the 
artworks recorded in the field is in Appendix 3. 
 
A plot of the locations of the artworks recorded in 2011 is shown in Fig. 7.1. The 
location of the south-most intervention, however, has been taken from satellite 
imagery dated to 2013, available on Google Earth. I was not able to find the artwork 
in 2011 because of the very shallow profile of its remains, but it is a notable piece so it 
has been included in the work of the 18 artists discussed here (and it has been given 
                                                 
641 The countries are (in alphabetical order): Algeria, Argentina, Columbia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Mexico, Portugal, Senegal, South, Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United States, Uraguay, and Western 
Sahara. 
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the alphanumeric descriptor of AR25). With the artists resident and based in the 
Tifariti school and museum complex during their stays in the settlement, it appears 
that no individual pieces were created more than around 1.1 kilometres from their 
base. In all, the artist’s works have been created over an area extending about 1.4 
kilometres (northwest to southeast) by one kilometre (northeast to southwest), with the 
outermost northern installations positioned on the threshold of the rockier, and 
enfolding landscape that extends from Tifariti northwards. Also, there was a marked 
shift in the disposition of the recorded out-of-doors artworks, or installations, moving 
from west to east across the landscape. 
 
ARTifariti 2007 
In 2007,642 most of the festival’s artists (Saharawi, Spanish and Portuguese at that 
time) were working in and around the compound of the Tifariti School, where the 
festival was always based. However, the expansiveness of the desert and the open 
spaces around Tifariti, apparently led to the creation of three pieces of art, of which 
two could be described as ‘land art’ while one could be termed ‘trench art’643 (and 
their distribution is shown in Fig. 7.2). It is possible that at this stage, the artists were 
trying to fulfil the original idea of Fernando Peraita by creating land art that could be 
seen, like the Moroccan berms, from space, and they succeeded in doing so with at 
least one piece. This was the large inscription: Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22), laid out in 
stones painted pink, and extending over an area of around 37 metres by 15 metres. 
 
It is an undeniably whimsical artwork (see Fig. 7.3), quite out of keeping with the 
profound sense of purpose as originally espoused by Peraita, but its irony is 
purposeful. By being positioned close to the Moroccan military dugouts nearby, it was 
intended as an ‘absurd invitation’ to be visible on Google Earth (see Fig. 7.4). 
According to its creator, the artist Fernando Pinteño, its purpose was to compare the 
plight of the Saharawi people – who feel forgotten by the international community and 
lead a subsistence existence – with the ‘effeminacy’ and ‘luxury’ of the well known 
film Breakfast at Tiffany’s.644 This is clearly a socio-political play on words, literally 
pasted (like a protest poster) on the surface of the earth to be visible on Google Earth, 
                                                 
642 ARTifariti 2007 was held on the 10th to 17th of  October 2007. 
643 Saunders 2003. 
644 ARTifariti 2007: 50-51. 
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close to the SADR flag which is similarly delineated by painted stones and equally 
visible on Google Earth, and only some 90 odd metres to the northwest. 
 
The other piece of land art is the Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return (AR21) 
shown in Fig. 7.5. This was seen as a work in progress, and indeed, it was extended in 
2008 and re-titled Camino del Aaiún or The Way to El-Ayoun. Its form as of 2008 (and 
recorded by me in 2011) essentially consisted of a linear routeway of stones laid out 
as two kerbs meandering from the southeast (where a stela was raised as a starting 
point) to the northwest (see Fig. 7.6). This was a cooperative work by all of the 
ARTifariti participants, and they each laid stones and other objects within the kerbs, 
including messages in many instances. The objects included the detritus of war 
including, for example, metal fragments and shrapnel, pieces of tank treads, a child’s 
shoe and animal bones. The work was conceived as something hopeful, with the 
SADR Premier commenting about the work, as ‘… the first step of a thousand steps 
we take to Aiun’.645 
 
A third piece of art was created only 100 metres north of The Way to El-Ayoun. This 
was Proyecto de Eliminación – 2, or Removal Project – 2, by Carlos de Gredos 
(AR24).646 This artwork, like two others, which will be discussed below, is a piece 
that has its roots outside of Western Sahara. Carlos de Gredos, like the other foreign 
participating artists is a link between Western Sahara, its people, and the outside 
world. His artwork too, is a similar link. It is trans-national in nature since a sister 
artwork, Removal Project – 1, was created in Spain on the Cerro Gallinaro headland 
near Hoyocasero, Avila, Spain, in March 2007.647  
 
Removal Project – 1 was not a piece of land art per se, instead it was conceived as an 
‘ephemeral’ artwork, disposed on the land, and based on the burnt out and rusted 
wreck of a car that the artist found in the countryside on the Cerro Gallinaro. Here, 
the artist painted in red, the word FUEGO on the side of the car, but the ‘FU’, though 
in capitals, was painted at a smaller scale. Fuego means ‘fire’, and the artist has 
                                                 
645 ARTifariti 2007: 58-59 and ARTifariti 2008: 102-103. 
646 ARTifariti 2007: 28-29. 
647 This became part of a larger land art project, started and coordinated by Carlos de Gredo in 2008, 
creating a centre for art and nature on the Cerro Gallinero headland in Spain. See 
http://cerrogallinero.com/ accessed 1 May 2013. 
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written that he deliberately wanted to create ‘a pun’ on the word, emphasising that our 
egos – painted in larger letters as ‘EGO’ – can have as great, if not a greater 
destructive capability than fire. This wreck, which was to be left in the countryside as 
a piece of outdoor art, eventually went through its own destructive transformation 
which the artist could not foresee. Between March 2007 and May 2011 Carlos de 
Gredos photographed the car and during that time, its position changed – it was even 
set upright (see Fig. 7.7), and eventually it was robbed of body and chassis parts until 
it was left as an unrecognisable fraction of itself. Indeed, the destructiveness of its 
original fire, making it a wreck, made it vulnerable to near obliteration. The work of 
vandals made the destruction of the ‘EGO’ complete.648  
 
Seven months later, in October 2007, Carlos de Gredos was in Tifariti, and there he 
found the wrecked hulk of a Moroccan army tank, and he decided to paint it exactly as 
he had painted the burnt out car in Spain, with the word FUEGO (‘fire’) on its side. 
This piece of military hardware is situated on rising ground, amidst the Tifariti 
redoubt, less than a kilometre northwest of the old Spanish fort. It has presumably 
been in its present location since the Moroccans left the settlement in 1979, and it has 
been robbed of all of its removable parts. It is a medium sized Russian T54 tank, 
produced by the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1963.649 According to the SPLA the tank 
was originally in Egyptian service, but given, presumably with other material, to 
Morocco after the October War of 1973 between Egypt and Syria, and Israel.650 This 
gives the tank, as an artefact, a very distinctive biography. In short, it was produced 
some time before 1963 in a Russian factory; it saw service with the Egyptian army; it 
was acquired by Morocco some time after 1973, eventually ending up in the war zone 
of Western Sahara; and it was obviously disabled at Tifariti where the Moroccans left 
it in 1979. It was subsequently cannibalised by the SPLA with its impotent, 
unmovable hulk left in the desert amidst the abandoned dugouts of the Moroccan 
occupiers of Tifariti.  
  
Just as with Removal Project – 1, Carlos de Gredos obviously played with the concept 
of ‘fire’. He painted FUEGO on the turret of the tank, with the ‘EGO’ larger than the 
                                                 
648 De Gredos 2007-2011.  
649 Milsom 1970: 112-115. 
650 Breica, additional conversation, when interviewed 2 November 2011. 
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‘FU’, in red, and in the same manner in which he painted the car in Spain. The tank is 
a destructive machine, just as destructive as fire, and the tank ‘fires’ its weapon. 
Above all, a human decision is involved – a decision of the ego – to be violent, to fire 
an armament, to unleash fire and death. But the bringer of such destruction – the tank 
– is now a dead carcass, and only saved from rusting away by the dry climate of the 
desert. Nevertheless, the tank had already been diminished by being robbed for parts, 
and perhaps it would be diminished more so. So in keeping with his earlier work, 
Carlos de Gredos called his painted tank, Removal Project – 2 (see Fig. 7.8), and by 
appropriating an object of war material and transforming it, especially with a new 
meaning that goes beyond the Western Sahara conflict, and as a reflection on the 
human condition, it can be considered a rather large piece of ‘trench art’.  
 
ARTifariti 2008 
In 2008,651 the number of ARTifariti participating artists increased to 47. In this year 
they did not stray very far from their base in the Tifariti school complex, and the 
furthest they went away was only around half a kilometre. I recorded artworks created 
in 2008 at six locations, shown on Fig. 7.9, though the selected works discussed below 
include one piece which I could not locate (though as already noted, its location was 
made evident on 2013 Google Earth satellite imagery). Also, as already noted, the The 
Way to El-Ayoun was extended in this year too.  
                                        
Of the outdoor artworks created during the 2008 festival, there were two large and 
distinctive works that were also good examples of trench art. One is the Caballo de 
Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13),652 by the Mexican sculptor 
Rolando De la Rosa (with the Mexican journalist Susana Cato).653 Shown in Fig. 7.10, 
this was a five metre long by 7.5m high, three metre wide sculpture of a horse mainly 
made from oil drums and fragments of exploded ordnance, metal rods, steel girders, 
and empty cartridge cases. Upon arriving in Tifariti, De la Rosa was told about a 
goatherd who lost his right arm from a bomb during a Moroccan air strike in the 
Tifariti area. Upon finding the herder, the artist was taken to the site of the bomb 
                                                 
651 ARTifariti 2008, was held on the 22nd of November to the 6th of  December 2008. 
652 ARTifariti n.d.: http://artifariti.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/el-caballo-de-troya.html accessed 1 May 
2013.  
653 De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Escultor_Mexicano.html 
accessed 3 April 2014. 
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strike, and there he retrieved shrapnel from the explosion to use in his sculpture, and 
specifically, in the Trojan Horse’s skull (see Fig. 7.11). The distorted shrapnel gave 
the skull a deformed appearance, as if exploded. Fragmentation grenades were used 
for the eyes, and spent cartridges for the teeth. An improvised spear was put in the 
mouth of the skull, emulating the sharp tongue of the agonised horse in Picasso’s 
Guernica, and the artwork was made eerie by the whistling sound of wind through the 
spent cartridges used to make up the horse’s mane. The body of the horse was made 
up of oil drums painted red, with black, white and grey abstract designs, representing 
the wounding of the goatherd and the death of a child, and with skulls, according to 
the artist, denouncing the indiscriminate bombing of civilians that took place during 
the sixteen year war.  
 
The piece was constructed facing eastwards, on a platform of large stone slabs set 
within a ring of black and red stones. On the 11th of December, just five days after the 
official end of ARTifariti 2008, this ‘Trojan Horse’ was transported by truck, in what 
De la Rosa called a ‘White March of Peace’ (in opposition to King Hassan’s Green 
March of 1975), to the Moroccan berm closest to Tifariti to stand sentinel over it. 
There, a placard was placed in front of it with a picture of the 19th century President of 
Mexico, Benito Juárez,654 with a quote of his in Arabic, Spanish, English and French 
declaring: ‘Among individuals as well as among nations, to respect other people’s 
rights is Peace’. The artist also placed inside the sculpture, United Nations resolutions 
issued in favour of the Saharawi people.655 
 
As with Removal Project – 2, this sculpture is a trans-national piece of art. In fact, in a 
recorded interview in 2008 De la Rosa said that this was his seventh ‘Trojan 
Horse’.656 His first horse was constructed in 2005657 and his ninth ‘Trojan Horse’ was 
                                                 
654 Benito Juárez was President of Mexico in 1862 when France invaded the country and installed the 
Hapsburg, Maximillian, as France’s Emperor of Mexico. Juárez led the revolt against the French who 
were expelled by 1867. 
655 ARTifariti 2008: 24-25 & 117.  
656 Puerco Radio 2008.  
657 De la Rosa n.d.: 
http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/El_caballo_de_Troya_Mexicano.html accessed 3 
April 2014. 
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made in 2010-2011.658 All, except the Saharawi horse, were made in Mexico, though 
the ninth was destined to take part in a march in Buenos Aires on the 35th anniversary 
of the 1976 military coup in Argentina. It, like the Saharawi horse, carried content, but 
in this instance it was books, papers, videos and testimonies of Argentinian exiles who 
lived and died in Mexico – their adopted country – during the period of the 
Argentinian dictatorship. So, around the globe, De la Rosa has installed ‘Trojan 
Horses’ in Mexico, Western Sahara and Argentina, and all as public art with a sense 
of social advocacy, resistance to injustice, and people’s struggles for freedom.659 To 
De la Rosa, his ‘Trojan Horses’ are ‘a symbol of victory over Walled power’,660 and 
in Western Sahara it is the Moroccan Wall that is the symbol of a foreign and illegal 
occupation of one country by another. 
 
The Mexican made horses were constructed from wooden crates, the common types 
that can be found in market places throughout the world. They have all been painted 
with patterns and images, and slogans, as in the case of the Saharawi horse. In fact, in 
2010 De la Rosa commemorated Aminatou Haidar, the most high profile woman 
activist in the Saharawi cause, and Lubna Masarwa, a leading feminist Palestinian 
activist, with such a ‘Trojan Horse of Crates’. It was painted with motifs reminiscent 
of pre-Columbian Mexican art, and with a portrait of Emiliano Zapata (an important 
Mexican revolutionary leader in the early 20th century), and most importantly in this 
instance, images of armed, revolutionary women fighters.661 Symbolism in art is very 
important to De la Rosa, and to quote the artist from the ARTifariti 2008 catalogue:  
 
For me, in times of uncertainty, redefinition and [new] paradigms, there is something 
that endures from remote times: the strength of symbols. The use of symbols in art is 
able [sic] to penetrate people’s deepest heartstrings.662 
 
                                                 
658 De la Rosa collaborated with another artist, Real Yamina, on this work: see De la Rosa n.d.: 
http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Caballo_de_Troya_en_Argentina.html accessed 3 
April 2014. 
659 De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Caballo_de_Troya_Argen-
Mex.html accessed 3 April 2014. 
660 De la Rosa n.d.:  http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/RolandodelaRosa.html 
accessed 3 April 2014. 
661 De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Photos.html#grid accessed 3 
April 2014. 
662 ARTifariti 2008: 24-25 & p. 117.  
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The second piece of trench art in 2008 was an outdoor installation created by the 
Spanish artist Federico Guzman, called El Muro de la Vergüenza, or the Wall of 
Shame (AR10), a common epithet for the Moroccan berms. As already noted, the 
charity Action on Armed Violence, formerly Land Mine Action (LMA/AOAV), has 
its Western Sahara headquarters in Tifariti, and in their offices they have a small 
museum displaying the range of lethal ordnance that can be found across the 
landscape of Western Sahara as a result of the war. They use these to educate local 
people to the dangers of unexploded ordnance (UXOs) – though now the Tifariti area 
is free of UXOs. But when Guzman saw the display of armaments and became aware 
of the accounts of accidents and fatalities caused by the then uncleared ordnance he 
gladly agreed, when asked by LMA/AOAV, to create a sculpture outside their offices 
in Tifariti.663 
 
His first idea was ‘to make a tree with all the mines, bombs and grenades hanging 
from it, as if to transform death into life’.664  But he had little time, so he chose to 
create a short wall out of sheet metal, shaped like a simple explosion. On it he welded 
a grid of rods, and onto these he welded many decommissioned examples of the types 
of ordnance that can be found in the open desert, from gun shells, to mortar rounds, 
bombs, bomblets and grenades. All to hammer home the reality of UXOs and their 
dangers, or as Guzman has noted, to create a catalogue of ‘objects that… only belong 
in a museum as the vestiges of history’s senseless violence’. The sculpture stands 
outside the LMA/AOAV offices in Tifariti (see Fig. 7.12), and the blatant display of 
ordnance serves as a stark reminder of the conflict. And as Guzman thought at the 
time, ‘it really looks like a “wall of shame”’.665 
 
                                                 
663 ARTifariti 2008: 86-87 & 123, and Guzmán n.d.   
664 Guzmán n.d. Both De La Rosa’s and Guzman’s artworks resonate with the sculptures made out of 
decommissioned weapons and ordnance by Mozambiquen artists through the ‘Transforming Arms into 
Tools’ project, established by the Christian Council of Mozambique and Christian Aid in the 1990s. In 
the U.K., this resulted in an exhibition at the OXO Gallery in London, and with the British Museum 
acquiring (in 2002) an iconic sculpture: the ‘Throne of Weapons’ (British Museum 2006), and 
commissioning a new sculpture in 2005, called the ‘Tree of Life’. Like Guznam’s original idea, ths 
latter work is a tree, representing life and its longevity, yet it has been constructed out of the residue of 
weapons of war, materials that exist to end life. See the British Museum website at 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight_objects/aoa/t/throne_of_weapons.aspx and 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=157
9948&partId=1&searchText=tree+of+life&page=1  
665 Guzmán n.d.  
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Both Guzman’s and de la Rosa’s installations, and Carlos de Gredos’ appropriated and 
painted tank (from 2007), are undoubtedly works of trench art reusing ‘industrial 
scrap’ and war material, and as Saunders has succinctly put it: 
 
Whether recycled from the metals of war, scraps of wood, bone or textile, the 
majority of trench art is a reworking of both matter and material worlds to make 
something new… It is bricolage – the making of something new and single from a 
plethora of old things, something of peace from war, something harmless from objects 
designed to kill, something from the battlefield brought into the home and the 
museum, and therefore both dramatically ‘out of context’ and recontextalized at the 
same time.666   
 
This clearly presented appraisal of trench art can extend to some outdoor, painted 
artworks at Tifariti too. The ruined Spanish fort and the old infirmary nearby have 
been appropriated as canvases for new painted pieces. Here, martial buildings have 
been ruined through the violent actions of war – by bombing – and have been left in a 
ruinous state, but it has still been possible through artistic intervention for them to be 
redefined as ‘something of peace from war’.  
 
A delegation of nine Algerian artists took part in ARTifariti in 2008. Most of them set 
themselves the task of painting and working on the ruins of the Spanish Foreign 
Legion fort and the post’s old infirmary, now the Tifariti mayor’s office just to the 
west. In effect, the result has been the transmutation of ruined and jaggedly broken 
buildings into colourful derelicts that would not be out of place on an urban 
demolition site where graffiti artists have had access. Their work, in places, is 
mischievous and child like, while in other instances they have transformed the ruined 
parts of the fort and infirmary with weighty imagery. Unfortunately, their paintings 
were all quite faded by 2011 when I recorded them, and they no longer possessed the 
vibrancy reproduced in the 2008 ARTifariti Catalogue. Nevertheless, these 
interventions are the latest phase in the archaeological biography of these Spanish 
period buildings. 
 
                                                 
666  Saunders 2003: 184. 
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The north and east sides of the old Spanish infirmary were hit during the Moroccan air 
strikes of 1991, and a part of its roof collapsed. The collapse on the eastern end of the 
building was consolidated, and the resultant sloping roof with its black bitumen 
surface became a surface for the Algerian artist, Karim Sergoua, to paint a mural 
(around 6.5 metres wide) simply entitled Víctimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims 
(AR8). Fig. 7.13 shows the finished work as it looked in 2011. It is primarily black 
and white with additional motifs sprayed on in purple. The artist painted in white, as if 
in negative, on the black bitumen base, and this created a series of black and white, 
shadowy silhouettes: standing human figures and portraits, and abstract designs. A 
number of the portraits are also presented like ‘mug shots’, or the portrait photographs 
or drawings, of missing Saharawis.667 Though painted onto a solid background, these 
anonymous vignettes appear like posters or ‘paste-ups’, and this is a real link with 
graffiti, or street art as manifest today.  
 
Poster or paste-ups are amongst the more recent instances of graffiti/art production. 
They are predominantly black ink on white paper with a contrasting graphic 
appearance… They fade and easily tear or peel away. The weathered affect may well 
be a sought after aesthetic or it may be a direct reposte to the much-maligned 
advertising posters… The paste-up’s fragility reiterates the ephemerality of graffiti/art 
or the specific content of the graffiti artist’s message…668 
 
In fact, the artist’s message is that the ‘innocent victims’ of the Western Sahara war 
are fragile. In effect, they are ephemeral – ‘traces, torn bodies of children, women 
[and] combatants’ who were ‘rained’ upon by bombs from the sky.669 Additional 
motifs were added in purple to the work, sprayed over and around the black outlines, 
and many of these were applied with stencils – another link between this artwork and 
graffiti.670  
 
                                                 
667 These are like the photographs of missing persons that are often presented by the relations of people 
who have ‘disappeared’ in authoritarian regimes throughout the world. In 2010, a number of ARTifariti 
artists applied themselves to the issue of missing, or ‘disappeared’ Saharawis in the Moroccan occupied 
zone. See ARTifariti 2010: 109-133. 
668 Frederick 2009: 217. 
669 ARTifariti 2008: 45 & 118.  
670 Frederick 2009: 217. 
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Further pieces of graffiti type art, executed on the ruins of the Foreign Legion fort 
include a piece entitled Gritos bajo los escombros de Tifariti or Cries under the ruins 
of Tifariti (AR23), by the Algerian Abd el Kader Belhorissat (see Fig. 7.14). This is 
similar to Innocent Victims, since it too has been painted onto a collapsed roof – the 
remains of the roof of the fort’s blockhouse at its southwest corner – but it is visually 
more complex. It is polychromatic as compared to the near monochrome of Innocent 
Victims. It is also three dimensional, since the roof has fallen and broken unevenly, 
and fragments of broken parapets lay on the roof’s surface. As many surfaces as 
possible have been painted, and there is a mix of abstract designs and stylised human 
figures culminating in a work that is very cluttered and chaotic. It is perhaps this 
apparent chaos that reflects the artist’s intention to ‘describe the continuous cry… of 
being [in] a place of crime’.671 
 
Just around the corner from Cries under the ruins of Tifariti, along the western range 
of the Spanish fort, is a further graffiti-like intervention. Here the Algerian artist 
Djeffal Adlane has painted a piece, entitled El renacimiento de un pueblo or The 
rebirth of a nation (AR23a). The piece (see Fig. 7.15) has sculptural elements added 
to it in the guise of a figure outlined by wire and freestanding in front of the painted 
wall, with spent gun cartridges and a projectile container set into concrete at its base. 
The piece incorporates into its design, the metal ladder grips that are built into the wall 
and gave access to the roof of the fort. The artist also painted the window shutters 
with the silhouettes of people, and added his own mock window. The colours were 
bright and brash but they were extremely faded in 2011. There are plant-like motifs 
and a schematic human figure holding a gun. Slogans in French, English and Arabic 
were also painted onto the wall espousing peace and liberty, and stating that the real 
beast which a man has to fear is himself.672 In summary, the artist has written this 
about the piece: 
 
                                                 
671 ARTifariti 2008: 46 & 119. 
672 ‘Homme sait tu il n'ya pas pire bete a craindre a l'homme que l'homme lui meme.’ Translated as: 
‘Man[kind], you know there is no worse beast for a man to fear than Man himself.’ This can be made 
out from photographs taken by myself in 2011, and from a photo of the artwork in ARTifariti 2008: 47. 
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In the ruins of a house, the colours that symbolize… life, …writing that marks [out]   
peace and a metal silhouette that straightens up towards the sky that testifies [to] the 
strength of [the] survival of a whole nation.673  
 
Another graffiti-like artwork that shares the western range of the Spanish fort with 
The rebirth of a nation is Un orden estblecido or An established order (AR23b) by 
Barris Syphax, another Algerian artist.674 This is an apparently unfinished, black and 
white intervention on fragments of collapsed roof (see Fig. 7.16). It includes three 
‘paste-up’ like portraits which, according to the artist, represent a Saharawi family 
from when ‘Tifariti was free’, and a three point proclamation stating: ‘An established 
order: …of a power that claims others’ land. An escape: …of a nation that was 
expelled from his land. A search: …of a cry that rises against injustice [sic]’.675 
 
Another Algerian artist worked on the remains of the south facing wall of the 
southeast corner of the Spanish fort, creating further graffiti-like artwork. This was 
Azzouz Seïf El Islem who painted a piece he entitled S/T (AR23c).676 Here, shown in 
Fig. 7.17, he painted the partial silhouette of a person above the door in the later mud 
brick corner infill, and he painted a shadowy person, upside down on the door itself. 
To the immediate left, he painted false loopholes and extended two of the real ones. 
Beneath these, a cluster of people was painted in red, yellow and black, with 
additional abstract patterns and text, which in effect, proclaims that through the 
intervention of ordinary people, the ‘murderers’, presumably Morocco, can no longer 
occupy Western Sahara.677 
 
The most striking artwork applied to the crumbling walls of the old fort, however, has 
been carried out by the Algerian artist, Bessaï Zineddine (though he signed the work: 
T-Kharbishíne). This is a salient piece of anti-war graffiti art painted in a right angle 
of walls (the original southern wall of the Spanish fort, and a later wall abutting it) 
entitled, No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards (AR3).678 The intent of 
                                                 
673 ARTifariti 2008: 47 & p. 119. 
674 ARTifariti 2008: 49 & p. 119. 
675 ARTifariti 2008: 119. The three point proclamation can also be made out from a photograph taken 
by myself in 2011. 
676 ARTifariti 2008: 51 & p. 119. 
677 The text (in French) can be made out in a photograph in ARTifariti 2008: 51.  
678 ARTifariti 2008: 50 & 119.  
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the piece has been encapsulated by the artist as: ‘they came, they saw, we expelled 
them and we defeated them’.679 
 
It was originally a very colourful piece (see Fig. 7.18), though now it is very faded. 
The central feature of the painting is a stylised human figure with elongated arms 
stretching horizontally to either side. The figure is black, with colourful faces and 
circular patterns painted within it. The arms have dots extending within, and along 
them, and they end bulbously as opposed to having hands. The entire figure is outlined 
with protruding red nibs, which are reminiscent of tank treads. In fact, the heads and 
other circular motifs painted within the figure brings to mind gears, or the wheels of a 
tank. There is the hint of a bluish sky with black rectilinear outlines delineating the 
possible outlines of yellow to buff buildings. However, the possible building outlines 
have numerous short cross-bars, that suggest that they might be machine-cranks, or 
cam-shafts. The arms of the figure have long drips of black paint extending from them 
reinforcing the idea that this is a human machine, perhaps bleeding. Though it cannot 
be discerned whether or not the figure (or ‘machine man’) is Moroccan or Saharawi. 
Slogans have been painted on the piece in Spanish and French: ‘not me’, ‘walking’, 
and ‘move back’.680  
 
There are fragments of collapsed walling from the fort lying in front of the piece, and 
on these, abstract outlines have been drawn (AR5). They appear to have been done by 
different hands, presumably all from the Algerian delegation, and the patterns include 
green and blue sprayed circles with dots, a face, and other linear patterns. Also, an 
arrangement of painted stones was laid on the foundation of the turret that existed at 
the western end of the collapsed southern wall of the fort (AR6). On the north side of 
that part of the southern wall still standing, Lalidji Walid painted a group portrait of 
all of the Algerian artists who took part in ARTifariti 2008. Called El Grupo or The 
Group (AR3a), this was not a conventional group portrait, instead, all of the artists 
stood up against the wall and had their outlines marked out and infilled with black 
spray paint (see Fig. 7.19). All of their names where spray-painted above their painted 
silhouettes, and the piece had an element of jolliness about it. This was made 
                                                 
679 ARTifariti 2008: 119. The quote is an obvious play on ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’. 
680 NO ME (Spanish): NOT ME; MUEVO  PARA ATRÁS  (Spanish): MOVE BACK, or MOVE TO 
THE BACK;  MAKENCHE (unknown), and MARCHE (French): WALKING. 
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especially obvious in a photograph of the artists standing in front of the piece in the 
2008 ARTifariti catalogue.681 Further graffiti-like painting (AR23d) was applied to the 
north and east walls of the fort’s courtyard (see Fig. 7.20). These mainly consisted of 
sprayed on geometric motifs and the painting of some stone infill along with the 
painting of a wooden door. Unfortunately, half of the painting on the door was 
missing when I recorded it in 2011. 
 
The Algerian artists expressed a sincere desire to create a statement that would 
illustrate their sympathy for the Saharawi people and their cause. They believed that 
their 
 
works tell a story from the past. It is the history of a nation that has not decided his 
fate. They reflect, in a virtual way, the traces of the past, a fresco, a portrait or a 
collective signature to immortalize the moment of a whole group that sympathize and 
feel [a] friend of the Saharan people [sic].682 
 
Approximately 225 metres to the east-southeast of the old fort is a building that has 
been constructed on top of the foundation platform of a former Spanish colonia 
building. On the easterly facing wall of the building, a mural was painted in 2008 by 
the Spanish artist María Ortega Estepa,683 and it was called Viajando al Paraíso or 
Travelling Paradise684 (AR11).  This painting, like the interventions of Carlos de 
Gredos, and Rolando de la Rosa, already described, is a trans-national artwork. Estepa 
is obviously intrigued by woodland trees and flora, and she has painted companion 
murals in Barcelona, Madrid and Córdoba, and according to the Arte Sostenible 
website she had plans, as of 2010, to undertake similar paintings in Alicante, Huelva, 
and in other cities in Spain, and in Zacatecas, Mexico.685 Estepa is not a protest artist 
and she combines her creative work with art education and therapy. In an art 
workshop presented on YouTube she said ‘… there is no big theoretical foundation 
behind my work, nothing like that, only my relationships and connections and my way 
of looking at the world; how I see the world, how I see other people and how I see life 
                                                 
681 ARTifariti 2008: 44  & 118. 
682 ARTifariti 2008: 118. 
683 Ortega Estepa n.d.: http://www.mariaortegaestepa.com/obramenu.html accessed 14 May 2013. 
684 ARTifariti 2008: 64-65 & 120 and Ortega Estepa n.d.: 
http://www.mariaortegaestepa.com/obra_viajandoelparaiso.html accessed 14 May 2013. 
685 Asociación Arte Sostenible 2008-2013. 
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in general’.686 In Travelling Paradise she explores our close and intimate relationship 
with nature and landscapes, and in particular, as at Tifariti, in an environment far 
removed from that which she has painted. She sees this as a kind of dialogue with the 
environment that is renewed in every place that she has created a companion piece of 
art.687 
 
Travelling Paradise is 7.6 metres wide by 3.2 metres high (see Fig. 7.21). It is a 
painted forest scene out of place in the arid desert of Western Sahara. Only the trunks 
of trees are visible with a horizon line high up near the top of the painting. The trees, 
apparently, have no canopy so the only shadows evident are those of the trunks. The 
colours move from pale yellows to greens and blues, and in all, they are very soothing 
– cooling even. They suggest grass in a wooded glade. There are flowers and prickly 
pears. The artist even created free-standing flowers placed in front of the mural as 
well as a tree trunk, leaning up against the artwork, extending above it, and painted in 
an identical way to the trees painted onto the wall. Trees, other types of plants and 
flowers are an inspiration to Estepa, they are her starting point,688 and apparently, they 
are a part of what she thinks of as paradise. In Estepa’s words:  
 
I wanted to bring what I consider to be my own kind of paradise; therefore I’ve 
worked with colour to paint a forest, so that a person here, can dream and forget a 
little about the reality in which they are living in. Well, I believe that paradise can be 
anything that you want it to be, a moment that you lived with someone, and I leave 
with that sensation, with the conclusion that this country – the people who inhabit the 
whole Sahrawi Nation – is, for me, a paradise.689 
 
The last piece of art from 2008, which will be discussed here, is one which was not 
found in 2011, and its position on Fig. 7.9 has been derived from Google Earth 
imagery dated to 2013. It is an interesting intervention since it harks back to the 
prehistoric remains that abound in the Tifariti region, but the artist, judging from the 
2008 ARTifariti catalogue and his own web site,690 has not consciously made the link. 
                                                 
686 Olivares 2010.  
687 Ortega Estepa n.d.: http://www.mariaortegaestepa.com/bio.html accessed 14 May 2013. 
688 Olivares 2010.  
689 ARTifariti 2009b.  
690 Roiz de la Parra 2008. 
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The artwork is a political piece of land art entitled La sombra del gnomon or The 
shadow of the gnomon (AR25) by Guillermo Roiz. It is spread out over an area of at 
least 35 metres, and it consists of a gnomon in the shape of a hand, painted red and 
representing Morocco, with two eight metre wide rings of stone on either side (see 
Fig. 7.22). One ring was made of quartz, representing salt, which was traded along the 
caravan routes that went through Western Sahara, and also by extension, representing 
a traditional, nomadic way of life. The other ring was made of red stones symbolizing 
the Saharawi people’s land. At dawn, the shadow of the gnomon – the shadow of the 
occupying Moroccans – would be cast over the white circle: cast over traditional 
Saharawi lifeways. At sunset it would be cast over the red circle: cast over the land of 
Western Sahara itself.691 
 
It is probable that the hand-shaped gnomen has fallen down or been removed, leaving 
only the stone rings, which, with their lack of height could not be easily located three 
years after the piece was created. Nevertheless, and unbeknown to the artist, he has 
created stone rings that would not be out of place amidst the ancient monuments in the 
vicinity, and would only stand out as anomalies because of his selective use of 
coloured stones. This anomalousness, however, might very well lessen when the 
stones undoubtedly sustain future erosion by motor and foot traffic, and even acquire a 
venerable patina of age. Guillermo Roiz, through this modern intervention, has 
unwittingly created a physical link between Tifariti’s pre-Islamic past and the present. 
He has imbued his rings with meaning, just as the stone monuments of prehistory 
would similarly have been meaningful to those who created them millennia ago. 
 
ARTifariti 2009 
ARTifariti 2009 was held in the settlement from the 17th to the 31st of October of that 
year. There were 45 contributing artists from ten countries (eight of which were 
Saharawi), and as in 2008, and judging from the artworks that I could record in 2011, 
out-of-doors interventions were created at a maximum of around 600 metres from the 
artist’s base in the Tifariti school. Fig. 7.23 shows the location of ARTifariti 2009 
artworks recorded in 2011. However, during the 2009 festival some artists undertook 
landscape works based on the digital globe of Google Earth, and since Google Earth 
                                                 
691 ARTifariti 2008: 62-63 & 120. 
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has been an important tool in this research, it is appropriate to briefly describe them 
here. These were ‘virtual’ inscriptions on the land, in effect, taking Fernando Peraita’s 
original intention and attempting to realise it in digital space. One work in particular 
was Francis Gomila’s video,692 posted on the internet (see Fig. 7.24) entitled Muro de 
la Vergüenza ‘F Word’ Tour 2010 or Wall of Shame ‘F Word’ Tour. In it,  
 
Gomila travels close to the northern end of the… wall erected by Morocco to keep the 
Saharawi people from returning to their homeland. As Saharawi activists protest, 
under the surveillance of the Moroccan army guarding the wall, Gomila traces a GPS 
track forming the words ‘FUCK OFF’. The GPS data drawing was uploaded to 
Google Earth as a protest to the continuing occupation of the Western Sahara. 693 
 
Gomila and another artist, Bettina Semmer from Germany, undertook another similar 
piece entitled Fósforo: Piss for peace or PHOSPHOR: Piss for peace. This 
intervention was created as a protest against phosphate extraction by Morocco, in the 
occupied territories. It was carried out in two parts. First, Gomila and Semmer 
collected urine from people in Tifariti and they proposed to do some kind of 
phosphate test on it – unfortunately, the description of their ‘experiment’ is unclear in 
the 2009 ARTifariti catalogue. From the point of view of digital landscapes, however, 
they did ‘etch’ onto the digital globe of Google Earth the ancient alchemist’s symbol 
for phosphorus by creating a 130 metre long ‘in-situ GPS earth drawing’ at Tifariti. A 
photo record of the intervention was uploaded onto the Internet, along with a Google 
Maps plot of the ‘virtual’ piece of landscape art (see Fig. 7.25).694 This kind of work 
explores our relationship with digital globes, topography and geography. It adds a 
‘virtual’ layer of landscape features onto the stratum of contemporary archaeology as 
it has been defined so far. It has very great potential, especially since it can actually 
facilitate the kind of aspiration that was the very impetus for ARTifariti.  
 
At a more terrestrial level, an Algerian artist, Kenza Mebarak added the words ‘THE 
END’, painted white on black onto the south wall of the old Spanish infirmary, now 
the office of the Mayor of Tifariti. The piece is called Ficción o realidad or Fiction or 
reality (AR8a) and the style of the painting clearly mimics a film frame with white 
                                                 
692 Francis Gomila is an artist based in Gibraltar and Germany. 
693 ARTifariti 2009: 76 & 94, and Gomila and Semmer 2009.  
694 ARTifariti 2009: 77 & 94, and Gomila and Semmer 2010.  
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sprocket holes painted vertically along both side edges. At the time, the artist also 
created a temporary installation in front of the wall painting (see Fig. 7.26), using the 
fence already there and covering it with fragments of cloth and clothing, and by 
adding animal bones picked up from the desert and blanched by the sun. Some of the 
fence posts had tins, and even an apparent helmet placed on top of them, and tins or 
canisters with their tops painted white were lined up in front of the fence. The artist 
wanted to point out that although a film might include horrible things, it will always 
end, punctuated with the words, ‘The End’. But the horrors of a real war are different, 
they can linger on, and by juxtaposing this filmic trope with the reality of contestation 
in Western Sahara, the artist hoped that his work would remind people ‘never [to] get 
used to violence and injustice’.695  
 
ARTifariti 2010 
The year 2010 was the last in which the ARTifariti festival was held at Tifariti. There 
were 41 participating artists from ten countries, of which 13 were Saharawi, and the 
festival took place from the 16th to the 30th of October 2010. In that year, judging from 
the artworks that could be located in 2011, there was a shift of outdoor interventions 
to the north and east of the Tifariti school (see Fig. 7.27), even going into an area 
which was previously deemed unsafe by LMA/AOAV but was by then cleared of 
UXOs. The old Spanish fort had one new intervention painted onto it. This was a 
portrait of the 14 year old, Nayem El Garhi who was shot dead by Moroccan security 
forces at the Saharawi Gdeim Izik protest camp outside El-Ayoun in the occupied 
territories on October 24th 2010. The camp was set up on October 9th and it was 
violently dismantled by Moroccan police on November 8th. When the death of the 
teenager was made known, it had an immediate effect on the ARTifariti participants. 
They prepared a letter of protest for Ban Ki-Moon, the U.N. General Secretary, and 
presented it to the Commander of the United Nations’ MINURSO base at Tifariti, and 
on their last full day in Tifariti, Federico Guzman painted the portrait on the remnant 
of the old Spanish fort’s south facing wall.696 The work (AR4) is monochrome and 
                                                 
695 ARTifariti 2009: 71 & 93. 
696 ARTifariti 2010: 148 & 152. 
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apparently based on a photograph of the teenager released at the time (see Fig. 
7.28).697 
 
The last art intervention that will be singled out in this chapter is U’m Dreiga or Oum 
Dreiga (AR18), by the Saharawi artist Mohamed Moulud Yeslam. This is a very 
distinctive artwork, painted on the south facing side of a sizable outcrop of boulders 
almost half a kilometre east-northeast of the old Spanish fort (see Fig. 7.29). It is bold 
in colour, composition and size, measuring at least 10 metres long by 4.25 metres 
high. The artist has described it as a ‘Guernica of the desert’,698 ‘dedicated to the 
memory of the civilians killed in the bombings of Tifariti and Um Draiga where, 
during the Moroccan invasion… the Saharawi people who fled from the cities… were 
bombed in the desert with napalm and white phosphorous’.699 
 
The rock outcrop that the piece was painted on was naturally fractured into at least 
five pinnacles, presenting an irregular front with some of the rock faces set back from 
their neighbours. This gave depth to the piece with alternating backgrounds and 
foregrounds. In the foreground, there are crouching figures painted with traditional 
black tents behind them. In places they are presented as if they are just squatting on 
the ground carrying out daily activities (see Fig. 7.30), but in other parts of the piece 
they have agitated faces and at least one figure has arms in a distorted pose. A camel 
looms, and beneath it a mother holds a baby while a man stands alongside with his 
head downcast. All of the figures have streaks of red paint running down them, like 
blood (see Fig. 7.31). There are two large faces on either side of the outcrop (a detail 
of one is shown in Fig. 7.32), while in the left third of the work, there is a large raven, 
or crow, holding a baby in its claws (see Fig. 7.33). The baby is kicking and 
screaming, and judging by a painting that the artist made later, entitled The Massacre 
of Gdaeim Izik, the crow or raven represents Morocco. In the latter painting Yeslam 
shows the birds eating Saharawi children (see Fig. 7.34).700 
 
                                                 
697 The painting was based on a photo of the teenager, available from the Spanish El Mundo newspaper 
at the time, and released on their website: 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/10/24/internacional/1287956073.html accessed 17 May 2013. 
698 ARTifariti 2010: 69. 
699 ARTifariti 2010: 147. 
700 Yeslem 2012. 
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When I recorded the piece in 2011, the colours were faded a good deal, and the colour 
pink, which the artist says he used to represent exploding phosphorus (shown in the 
artwork as raining from the sky and clearly visible in Fig. 7.29) was barely visible. He 
also employed fluorescent paint so that it would glow at night, but that effect was lost 
after the passing of a year. At the base of the work, Yeslem also placed items he 
collected locally, such as old shoe fragments, bleached bones, pieces of shrapnel and a 
part of a tank tread, all the detritus of war and the leftovers of people who passed 
through Tifariti.701 In all, the work has a narrative; there are refugees, at Oum Dreiga 
and Tifariti, and they have set up tents and are carrying on with their lives; they are 
attacked from the air with phosphorous and napalm and they suffer and agonise; 
innocents die at the hands of the Moroccan invaders. To Yeslem, the aerial bombing 
of Saharawi refugees in 1976, in their makeshift transit camps, was a ‘forgotten 
Guernica’, and these rocks were a silent witness to those attacks. They could now 
‘speak’ through his art.702  
 
A Landscape of Solidarity, Commemoration and Protest 
 
It is not necessarily the artworks produced at Tifariti that are important in this study; 
instead, it is the sentiments of the artists and what they feel about Western Sahara and 
its people, and about their realising their art in the territory. For the artists, it is an act 
of solidarity with the Saharawi cause, engendered through the personal production of 
art, and in the belief that art can further that cause. Their work is not high art, and by 
the very nature of the interventions described herein it is highly ephemeral. In 
particular, the out-of-doors works do not fare well, exposed to the extreme weather 
conditions of the Sahara. Nevertheless, the art produced during the ARTifariti 
festivals can, undoubtedly, be viewed as war art (including war specific protest art), 
trench art, and solidarity art. 
 
Laura Brandon summed up the meaning of ‘war art’ as ‘art shaped by war. …war 
inspires permanent and impermanent art that may be propaganda, memorial, protest, 
and/or record’.703 Saunders is of the opinion that traditional war art and memorials are 
                                                 
701 Yeslem 2012. 
702 Yeslem 2012.  
703 Brandon 2009: 3. 
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impressionistic, representing war from a distance in time and place. In contrast, trench 
art has a sensuousness and ‘tactile immediacy… particularly [those] items made from 
the metal waste of war’, incorporating the very ‘agents of death and mutilation 
directly’.704 Solidarity art has been defined by Jacqueline Adams as ‘a little-studied 
subset of resistance art’,705 which in particular ‘is art that individuals buy or help sell 
or export in large part so as to help a group of people’.706 Notwithstanding this, 
solidarity art, like the art of social and political movements is employed symbolically, 
‘to frame the message, to attract resources, to communicate information, and foster 
emotions’.707 And it is in this broader, symbolic sense – especially from the position 
of the foreign artists who have taken part in ARTifariti – that the term ‘solidarity art’ 
is applicable here. 
 
It is the sense of solidarity with the Saharawi people, as expressed by the foreign 
artists in their art and sentiments that is so striking. They have invested emotion and 
physical work into creating a landscape of solidarity. As already noted, the bulk of art 
produced by Saharawi artists have been traditional paintings, produced indoors. But 
since many of the foreign artists work in three dimensions in the first place, their work 
lends itself to being created out-of-doors. These artistic interventions are ‘one small 
but significant dimension to an ever-expanding archaeological record’.708 They have 
created an archaeological stratum with their personal handiwork as features, as 
markers. This marking the land in the support of a cause, as a protest and an 
affirmation, and as a re-appropriation of a locale by, or for, its former inhabitants who 
were driven away by conflict, can also be seen at District Six in Cape Town, South 
Africa.  
 
District Six, South Africa 
 
District Six was a distinctively mixed race, working class area that prospered in Cape 
Town until the South African, apartheid regime declared it a ‘whites only’ area under 
the Group Areas Act of 1966. As a result, the entire community was removed by 
                                                 
704 Saunders 2003: 14.  
705 Adams 2009: 1. 
706 Adams 2009: 3-4. 
707 Ferrer 2009: 41. 
708 Schofield 2011: 187. 
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1984, and the townscape that existed was razed to the ground, leaving only the 
outlines of streets and churches standing.709  The rich mix of peoples living in District 
Six from the colonial period to its erasure inevitably resulted in contestation, 
‘struggles’ and at times, ‘fierce battles’. However, these have been seen as  
 
generative ones which have ploughed deep furrows into the South African landscape, 
and from which have grown authentic cultural and social practices and formations. A 
surprising diversity of South African experiences take their roots or have been 
fertilized by these struggles. In looking at the emergence of a new single South 
African identity an awareness of this aspect of District Six history is not an 
insignificant fact. The mission… is, therefore, to emphasise the symbolic importance 
of this small patch of ground in that much grander [South African] endeavour.710 
 
This sense of national and cultural resonance ascribed to a specific location, and born 
out of adversity is something that District Six shares with Tifariti. They are both 
places where the narratives of people have been ‘arrested’ and have therefore become 
laden with emotion, and in the case of District Six, even seen as an area of ‘salted 
earth’.711 With such a strength of feeling, the District Six Sculpture Festival opened on 
September 24th 1997 for six weeks. As at Tifariti, though running as a single event, 
outdoor art interventions were created by 62 artists ranging from sculptures to 
paintings and with performances and interactions. This outdoor sculpture garden was 
meant to be short lived. The artworks, as at Tifariti, were mainly made of cheap or 
locally found materials, and many works were made on the day.712 
 
The notion of permanent fixtures gave way to the idea of monuments which can be 
anti-monumental, existing as transient markers and triggers of recognition, association 
and memory, and the physically vulnerable structures are indicative of the fragilities 
that they infer/recall. They do not have to exist as towering statuesque monoliths, 
resisting questions regarding their suitability. Many are offerings rather than 
dogmas.713 
 
                                                 
709 Schofield 2011: 35.  
710 Layne n.d.: 5.  
711 Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 13. Additionally, for a discussion of District Six, as embodying an 
‘archaeology of memory’ see Coombes 2003. 
712 Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 22.  
713 Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 13.  
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Both the ARTifariti festivals and the District Six Public Sculpture Project have 
brought in artists with a strong sense of solidarity and empathy to ‘declare worth’ to 
lands and people who were victims of governments that wanted them to ‘vanish’ and 
to pay homage to their sufferings ‘during... [their] forced removals’.714 With reference 
to District Six, but also applicable to Tifariti and Western Sahara: 
 
Through their various works, artists drew our attention not only to District Six as a 
place, a physical landscape once densely populated and now scarred and barren, but 
as a metaphor for a range of displacements. The wholeness of the place and the 
totality of its meanings were vividly contrasted with the lost and broken: fragments 
indicating the break-up and fracturing of society and the loss of things precious to the 
soul. The project should be approached in a similar way; understanding it as an 
attempt by a group of artists to gather the many fragments, both physical and 
narrative, that commemorate both an era and its people… Many sought to re-invest 
spaces, revaluing not only the physical land and its social and cultural traditions, but 
also the place it holds in the psyche of South Africans.715 
 
In fact, the above quote also holds true for archaeology – it illustrates how art can 
explore the past, and the contemporary past, and present new and parallel insights for 
archaeologists and the formation of archaeological knowledge.716 
 
Being seen as an ephemeral project from the start, the sculpture park at District Six 
has been deteriorating since its inception, and the sense of it being an archaeological 
site of the contemporary past was remarked upon by John Schofield when he matter-
of-factly stated: ‘the archaeology of some of these interventions remained when I 
visited [District Six] in 2001’.717 ‘Some’ of the interventions ‘remained’ and they 
remained as ‘archaeology’ – this is undeniably the same at Tifariti. This is also the 
same across the Atlantic, in the Nevada desert, where there are the remains of a Cold 
War era protest camp outside the United States government’s nuclear arms, Nevada 
Test Site.  
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Peace Camp, Nevada 
 
As at Tifariti and District Six, similar land art, though not necessarily created by 
artists, has also been created within a landscape of protest adjacent to the United 
States’ nuclear weapons Nevada Test Site, around 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. 
Starting in the 1950s and continuing into the present day, a series of three protest 
camps now referred to as the Peace Camp, were set up outside the entrance to the 
Nuclear Test Site, and served as a locus for thousands of anti-nuclear activists and 
demonstrators. Here, a distinctive ‘archaeology of opposition’718 has materialised in a 
desert area not that different from Tifariti – rocky and with scrub vegetation. A camp 
and place of congregation has come into being for individuals, and  
 
over 200 groups with different and coeval environmental and social interests, 
including pacifists, anti-war groups, anti-nuclear coalitions, environmentalists, and the 
Western Shoshone tribe – the traditional [land] owners in the area.719  
 
The protesters have come from different backgrounds, and at the camp they would 
coalesce into short-lived, loosely organised social groups expressing their opposition 
to nuclear arms testing and proliferation around the world. ‘The nature of the camp 
reflects their short-term social activities, and to some extent, their marginalized 
relationship to society as a whole’.720 
 
Beck, Drollinger and Schofield carried out two archaeological field seasons at the 
Peace Camp in 2002. The Camp covered an area of 240 hectares, and 771 cultural 
features were recorded. Most of these were built with local stones, though some were 
brought in for specific pieces of art. The stone features included cairns, rock caches, 
stone circles (rings), foundations for sculptures and the like, geoglyphs, path outlines, 
‘gardens’ with stone outlines, hearths and low stacks of stones. Areas cleared of 
stones were occasionally found close to stone features, probably for a tent or open-air 
sleeping place. Wood and metal artefacts were rare, and logs were imported for fires 
and for building, along with wooden crates. Other features ranged from concrete 
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statuary foundations to fencing materials, paths and tracks, statues and sculptures, 
willow branch structures, laid out symbols, prayer poles, masks, graffiti (in drainage 
tunnels), and a porta-loo.721  
 
The Camp has a great deal of ‘symbolic art’. Such artworks were usually laid out on 
flat ground and were made from locally collected rocks. The works consisted of peace 
symbols, stone spirals and stone platforms. Large stone circles were created with 
objects (for instance, ceramic and metal masks) placed at the cardinal points. There 
was even a relatively large abstract flower design and a group of sculptures of 
children, called ‘the shadow children’. The word ‘peace’ was laid out in stone on one 
low ridge and written in English, French, Russian and Japanese, representing the 
countries with nuclear capabilities in the 1980s.722 
 
Summary 
 
As with the artists of ARTifariti and those that took part in the District Six Sculpture 
Projects, the protestors at the Peace Camp put a good deal of energy into expressing 
their aspirations through art. At Tifariti the goal has been to forward the cause of self-
determination and human rights for the Saharawi people. At District Six it was to 
commemorate, and to seek justice for the displacement and ruin of a thriving 
community, which once again, could be representative of a way forward for post-
apartheid South Africa. At the Nevada Peace Camp, the goal has been to rid the earth 
of nuclear weapons, and to aim for a just world – a world at peace and in harmony 
with ‘Mother Earth’. 
 
The Peace Camp was and continues to be active concurrently with the government 
power structure that is the focus of the dissent. Instead of engaging in acts of 
destruction to express their desires, the people at the Peace Camp have put their 
efforts into creating symbols in the desert as testimony to their intent and hopes, 
establishing their own, separate permanent cultural legacy.723 
 
                                                 
721 Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 77 -78. 
722 Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 82-83. 
723 Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 86.  
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However, the sculptures and artworks created in Nevada are, just like those at Tifariti 
and District Six, anti-monuments. There is no ostentation and they speak in a language 
which their creators (and hopefully other people) understand. The fact that they are 
created on the land and heavily laden with meaning (and in the case of the Peace 
Camp) by non-artists, makes them analogous in the broadest of terms, with the 
prehistoric petroforms and other stone monument types that populate, for instance, the 
Tifariti region. The archaeology of recent conflict has been described as being similar 
to prehistoric archaeology, since documentation for such very recent contestations is 
often deemed ‘classified’ by the countries or parties involved, and their own accounts 
of their actions can be unreliable, since often they would wish to keep unclear their 
aims and goals.724 The enquiring archaeologist, therefore, has to rely on traditional 
fieldwork and the inherently forensic qualities of archaeological interpretation. This 
specifically methodological, and evidential affinity with prehistoric archaeology, 
conceptually links the strata of archaeology at Tifariti, from 1975-76 up to the very 
present, with the archaeology of those pre-Islamic peoples who populated the Tifariti 
region some 5000 years ago.  
 
                                                 
724 Schofield 2005: 39-40. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 
Introduction  
 
As the preceding chapters illustrate, this dissertation has tried to tell what could best 
be described as a ‘big story’. The much-used analogies of weaving a rich tapestry, or 
painting a large canvas, are not inappropriate in describing it. The core of the project 
has been the materiality of the Western Sahara conflict from late 1975 to 1991, and its 
aftermath. However, to successfully describe, characterise, and contextualise that 
materiality, forays have been taken into Saharan prehistory and pastoralism, Saharan 
trade, European colonialism, modern era warfare (for both conventional and 
unconventional wars, and ranging from Asia to Africa and the Americas), the geo-
politics of the Maghreb, land art, protest and war art  – including trench art – 
contemporary interactions on the internet (including websites, blogs, videos and 
online archives), oral testimony/history, neo-geography, and even satellite imagery 
activism. As a whole, these all accentuate the breadth of the story to tell. Open source 
and/or free GISs have been employed, and Google Earth has been utilized as a 
primary visual and topographic source for archaeological survey (both virtual and on 
the ground).  
 
This research has been multidisciplinary, multi-vocal and multidimensional, and its 
aim has been to explore and give presence to the overwhelming reality of an entire 
territory (Western Sahara) transformed by the ‘works’ of modern war in the last 
quarter of the 20th century and well into the 21st. The way in which this has been done 
has of necessity been selective, and the resources drawn upon have been incomplete. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to say that the results are collage-like – and as an 
archaeological study of the materiality of a contemporary conflict, this project has 
undoubtedly been singular.  
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Recapitulation of Content 
 
As an archaeological landscape study, this dissertation is grounded in the idea that 
landscapes are a palimpsest, and that within any place or landscape the materiality of 
the past and present can exist and be visible side by side. My view, as expressed in 
Chapter 1, is that the best way of studying a landscape, especially one of modern 
conflict – with all of its complexities – is not to give preference to any specific type of 
knowledge or data, but to include a variety of relevant sources and avenues of 
approach. Essentially, this has been accomplished through combining the practical and 
forensic skills of traditional landscape archaeology with oral testimony and historical 
accounts (in all the various forms noted in Chapter 2). This connects the past and the 
present, and brings into being, as Rodney Harrison would put it, an archaeology ‘of 
and in the present’. This is poignant in the context of Western Sahara since the 
conflict is still unresolved, and the country is partitioned by Morocco’s monumental 
and fortified berms. As a result, the conflict and its materiality persists into the present 
day, becoming something new for every generation of Saharawis. This conceptual 
approach has given presence and voice to the materiality of the Western Sahara 
conflict in a public – or forensic – way (as would be expressed by Eyal Weizman), 
through the very medium of this dissertation: and this is very much in keeping with 
the idea of forensics within archaeology as being something much more than 
meticulous note taking.  
 
The issue of colonialism, with its concomitance of conflict, has been fundamental to 
this research. The power imbalance between the coloniser and the colonised has been 
expressed at a macro (national) scale, through the carving out of the desert sands 
(through mechanical earth-moving) of the territory-wide matrix of earthen barriers – 
the berms. These are a physical embodiment of exclusion, dividing the territory and 
separating the majority of the indigenous Saharawi population (mainly in Algerian 
refugee camps) from around four fifths of their national territory, as appropriated by 
Morocco. Such a barrier system, made up of almost 4000 kilometres of earth and 
stone banks, and fully fortified (with nearly 2000 military installations, landmines, and 
barbed wire), can only be appreciated and studied through satellite imagery, and in 
this dissertation, that has been successfully done through the employment of Google 
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Earth. The centrality of this online tool to this research cannot be overstated, and it is 
probable that this has been the first time that a war-work as monumental as the berms, 
has been studied through the application. But Google Earth has also been instrumental 
in studying Western Sahara’s conflict landscape at a regional (meso) scale, where, in 
and around the settlement of Tifariti, it has successfully made visible a palimpsest of 
archaeology that ranges from the prehistoric to the contemporary.  
 
This unique use of Google Earth has not only been instrumental in undertaking this 
study – recording and analysing a range of archaeological phenomena – but by being 
used in conjunction with the other resources employed in this research, it has created 
an archaeology, or better still, it has brought into being an archaeology of the conflict 
in Western Sahara. As with all archaeological endeavours, what is examined is partial 
– fragments of a past reality – and by being mediated through satellite imagery, a 
concrete reality on the ground has been transformed into pixellated re-presentations on 
a computer screen. Conjoined with this are the actions of the archaeologist who, with 
human senses and fore-knowledge, also mediates and translates the material under 
investigation into new data and interpretations, reconstituting it through a creative act, 
yet never being certain of the authenticity of the final confection. To mitigate this, this 
research has taken a very catholic approach.  It has situated the interdisciplinary and 
multidimensional nature of the archaeology of modern conflict within the overall 
‘craft’ of archaeology – with its naturally heuristic approaches – and through utilising 
the resources and ‘tool kit’ elaborated upon in Chapter 2, it has foregrounded, and 
given presence to, the materiality of conflict and contestation in Western Sahara. 
 
That materiality, however, has not appeared in a vacuum. The Western Sahara conflict 
is but one episode (though one that started forty years ago and is still unresolved) in 
the history of the region. The narrative presented in Chapter 3 contextualises this. It 
gives a relatively compact overview of the land and people, and the history of Western 
Sahara. It has shown that the materiality of the territory as a place on the globe is a 
recent invention, jointly marked out by Spain and France after a series of negotiations, 
and only settled in 1912. The inhabitants of the region had no say in the matter. They 
were embedded in the land – they were a part of it – so they too were partitioned along 
with the landscape itself. This started a chain of events that, with the hostile invasions 
carried out by Morocco and Mauritania in the winter of 1975-76 (though the latter 
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relinquished its territorial claims in 1979), would turn the territory into a unique 
landscape of colonialism and imperialism, late 20th century conflict, and partition and 
exclusion, forging what the country of Western Sahara has become today. 
Additionally, Chapter 3 situates the Moroccan means of partition and exclusion – the 
berms – amidst some of the salient barrier systems of the 20th century. From European 
inter-world war defensive barriers, to barriers in Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa, it illustrates how countries can be delimited, carved up, and shaped by the will 
of nations, armies and individuals. 
  
The Moroccan berms are probably the largest appropriation of land by bulldozer that 
has ever occurred on the planet, and the mapping and collated data presented in 
Chapter 4 clearly illustrates the excessive, indeed, super modern extent that a modern 
nation will go to, to appropriate another, and confine it. These earthen, and mined, 
defences have been described by numerous commentators, but they have all been 
sketchy with conflicting details and statistics, and as a result, the material presence of 
the berms has never been appropriately explained to any audience. The berms have 
been a ‘taken for granted’, and as such, they have not received detailed attention since 
there have been other humanitarian and geo-political factors in the Western Sahara 
conflict that have understandably required greater attention. However, this ‘taken for 
granted-ness’ is exactly why the materiality of the berms has been elaborated on, and 
archaeologically characterised here for the first time. Without this, and through the 
employment of Google Earth (and other freely accessible Internet resources), their 
composition and make-up, and disposition, would be little known. In short, by 
applying the acute sensitivity to material remains that is the hallmark of modern 
archaeology, even through remote observation, and (in Chapter 5) by incorporating 
interviews with individuals who have crossed the berms, along with the commentaries 
of journalists who have confronted the barriers, and accounts of Polisario fighters and 
Moroccan soldiers at war (adding a distinctly human and experiential element to the 
archaeological description of the barriers), the Moroccan berms have now been given 
a presence they would otherwise not have had. They would have remained un-
constituted in the vague descriptions composed by the majority of writers and analysts 
on the Western Sahara conflict. 
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This dissertation moves from the macro (national) scale to the meso, or regional scale, 
in Chapter 6. Here, there is a sequence of archaeological periods, or overarching 
strata, in and around the settlement of Tifariti that is clearly evident. This sequence 
includes the distribution of numerous funerary monuments that probably range in date 
from around 3000 B.C to A.D. 1000, followed by the remains of the Spanish colonial 
period, and the subsequent remains of the occupation of Tifariti by Moroccan forces 
and its investment by Polisario in 1977-1979. These are made up of a defensive ‘box’ 
with inner and outer defences, and with up to 7000 individual foxholes, sangars, gun 
pits, defensive bulwarks, and troop accommodations covering an area of roughly 90 
square kilometres. In turn, these are surmounted by the physical manifestations of the 
various ways in which the Saharawi people are presently re-appropriating their 
patrimony in the liberated zone, especially at Tifariti – through new building works, 
Bedouin resettlement, and through the holding of Polisario/SADR national events. 
Overall, this materiality makes up a vast single stratum of features inscribed on the 
land, juxtaposed with each other and interdigitated. They are essentially an 
assemblage, and when enhanced by oral testimony (both official and unofficial) and 
the results of archaeological fieldwork, they make up a narrative that is akin to a 
collage. 
 
In Chapter 7, the archaeology of the Tifariti region moves from the meso to the micro 
scale. The term ‘micro’ has been used to indicate that at this juncture, this dissertation 
has directed its gaze at specific artefacts on the land – artworks – limited in number 
and extent, and created episodically over four years, all as part of the ARTifariti art 
festivals that were held in Tifariti from 2007 until 2010. This chapter caps the 
archaeology of Tifariti as described in Chapter 6, and the artworks are viewed as a 
part of the continuum of the settlement’s archaeology, from prehistoric times to the 
present day. The artworks examined in this chapter are all out of doors, as mainly 
free-standing sculptures or installations, and as murals. They are an expression of 
sentiment on the part of their creators – almost all foreign artists – in solidarity with 
the Saharawi people in their struggle for self-determination and recognition as an 
independent nation. Much of the artwork created has been made with cast off 
materials and the remains of unexploded ordnance. Many fall within the category of 
trench art, and/or protest art, though none are portable. They have been created in a 
contested territory, and one that is technically still in a state of war, since only a 
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United Nations brokered cease-fire keeps the peace. These are war art, but also 
memorial art, and to the artists they are solidarity art. The founders of ARTifariti, and 
the participating artists, see their creations as agents that can mediate change, and as 
positive, contributing additions – weapons even – to the arsenal of the Saharawi 
people in their struggle over the fate of their nation. The artworks are manifestations 
of the collective sub-culture, or community, that the artists belong to (at least while 
they are in Western Sahara). They work together as an aggregate and their creations 
are a manifestation of their individual and group sentiments. To borrow from Alfred 
Gell, the ARTifariti artworks are ‘enculturated beings’ and examples of ‘distributed 
personhood’. And this enculturated entity, consisting of artefacts imbued with the 
sentiments of their creators, individually and as a group, make up the latest stratum of 
archaeology in and of the present – amidst the vestiges of Spanish colonialism, and of 
Moroccan occupation and late 20th century war – at the settlement of Tifariti. 
 
Archaeological Consequences 
 
There are two research questions around which this dissertation rotates. (1) How has 
the landscape of Western Sahara been transformed by the 1975-1991 war, as 
manifested by the material remains of conflict? And (2), how are the Saharawi people 
manifesting the re-appropriation of their land, in particular, at the settlement of 
Tifariti, which has a special resonance for them?  These questions have been situated 
throughout this dissertation within the themes of colonialism, conflict and exclusion – 
and they have been viewed through three scales of resolution: the national, or macro, 
the regional, or meso, and the micro, being locus and episode specific. These are not 
hierarchical but, essentially, different aspects from which to view the profound 
materiality of conflict on the landscape of Western Sahara. 
 
The Material Remains of Conflict  
By employing the strategic methodology and resources described in Chapter 2, this 
research has undoubtedly shown how 20th century conflict has literally transfigured 
the landscape of Western Sahara through the material manifestations of war and 
contestation. It has charted the initial enclosure of the territory through the 
establishment of Spanish colonial outposts along its Atlantic coast, and through the 
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creation of the French (Mauritanian) limes of the Piste Imperiale, with its six forts on 
a front facing westwards into Western Sahara. It has shown how a place – Tifariti – 
known only for having a well, was transformed in the 1960s into a Spanish military 
outpost, though one which also served as a locus for the Bedouin in the region. It has 
also presented, for the first time, an archaeological survey of a Spanish Foreign 
Legion fort situated in the deep desert.  
 
The crux of this research, however, are the works of war from the conflict of 1975-
1991, and in particular, the six territorial barriers – the Moroccan berms – constructed 
in waves across the territory between 1980 and 1987. The mappings, illustrations, 
statistics, and descriptions that make up Chapter 4 (based on a comprehensive use of 
Google Earth) show how the landscape of Western Sahara has been transformed by 
this modern conflict. Although an overwhelming majority of Saharawis evacuated the 
territory in the wake of the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasions of 1975-1976, those 
who stayed in the territory, and those who still clung to a traditional nomadic 
existence in the badiya, had their pastoral way of life irreparably disrupted. The 
berms, with their forts, barbed wire and minefields cut off traditional route-ways and 
pastures, and confined a sizable proportion of Saharawis behind the barriers (in what 
has been described as the largest prison on the planet), while excluding an even 
greater number without. Additionally, the land near the barriers is still unsafe due to 
minefields and unexploded ordnance, and this is also the case along stretches of 
redundant barriers within the Moroccan occupied zone. 
 
With the berms transfiguring Western Sahara at a national scale, the hostilities 
between Polisario and Morocco (and Mauritania) also caused the territory to be 
transformed at the regional level. The Tifariti region was one such locus, being 
occupied by Moroccan forces from 1977 to 1979. As a result, Polisario/SPLA invested 
the settlement through long-term attritional guerrilla tactics, and to defend themselves, 
the Moroccans turned the settlement into a fortress. Through the use of Google Earth, 
oral testimony, and traditional archaeological survey, this research has been able to 
present, for the first time, an archaeological analysis of this deep desert battlescape, 
and this is probably the first study of its kind of any such battlespace from the latter 
twentieth century.  
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As with the berms, the archaeological data, analyses, mappings and illustrations 
generated for Chapter 6 clearly show how the Tifariti landscape was transformed by 
war. When coupled with oral testimony on how the war was fought, this dissertation 
has been able to present a holistic view of modern asymmetrical war. By situating 
Polisario tactics within the overall history of guerrilla warfare (and the history of the 
traditional Arab raid – the ghazi) this dissertation has shown how the attritional, 
mainly small scale, raiding tactics of Polisario was a way in which the Saharawi 
fighters could draw upon their intimate knowledge of the Sahara, as the so called 
‘children of the clouds’, and be at home in the vast, ‘in between’ desert spaces – the 
voids – between the ‘dug in’ Moroccan garrisons and strong points, for which 
Polisario/SPLA still showed (in 2011) a marked degree of contempt. The multi-
faceted archaeology of the Tifariti warscape shows that the defended settlement, even 
with its modern armaments, was not immune to the multiple and unpredictable, small 
scale and lightning raids of Polisario/SPLA, and that defences without continuous 
barriers could be easily over run by committed, well trained and experienced guerrilla 
fighters (even drawing upon techniques of warfare that harked back to pre-modern 
times). However, as pointed out in Chapter 5, when formidable barriers, such as the 
berms are constructed, highly mobile raiders can undoubtedly attack and disrupt the 
garrisons manning them, but in real terms, the barriers will continue to check the 
insurgents unless the will of the defenders is totally broken, or the guerrilla fighters 
turn to conventional warfare. From interviews carried out for this research, 
Polisario/SPLA does not seem to cling to the ghazi-like raid as its only offensive 
strategy. They have at times deployed large columns with tanks and mobile artillery, 
and they believe that they can truly breach the berms in a future war. This might be 
wishful thinking, since the Saharawis have no air force (a crucial arm in modern 
warfare), but when I visited Polisario/SPLA garrisons northeast of Tifariti in 2007, 
there were vehicle parks with numerous tanks and self-propelled artillery, clearly 
indicating that Polisario does not shy away from the conventional weapons of war.  
 
Territorial Re-appropriation 
The berms have created two Western Saharas. One cleansed of Polisario fighters and 
occupied by Morocco, and another, the hostile desert populated by a small number of 
Bedouin and the SPLA under Polisario/SADR control. The second Western Sahara 
can be interpreted as a liminal zone. It is the threshold in front of a curtain – the berms 
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– that cannot be passed through, and additionally, it is confined by further borders 
with Mauritania and Algeria. It is a self-contained geographical unit, though its 
eastern frontier is permeable. This in-between-land, if Malainin Larkhal’s 
interpretation is correct, symbolizes potentialities.725 It represents the fact that it is 
possible for the Saharawis to confront the Moroccan military, and to liberate a part of 
their country – so why not the rest of it? The very existence of a liberated zone (even 
with a small population and little infrastructure) also impresses upon the Saharawi 
people the fact that their land is occupied, and that it still has to be wrested free from 
its unwelcome occupiers. This clearly reflects the persistence of the materiality of the 
Western Sahara conflict into the present day. 
 
The archaeology of Tifariti, as brought to light through the examination of Google 
Earth imagery, and through targeted fieldwork and interviews in 2011, has clearly 
illustrated some of the ways in which the Saharawi people are re-appropriating their 
country in and around the settlement. The place is seen as a potential capital for the 
Liberated Zone. It too is a liminal locus, floating, cut off by the berms from the routes 
that used to connect it to the settlements now in Moroccan territory, and only linked 
umbilically by desert tracks to the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. As such, it 
serves as a kind of vestibule into the Liberated Zone. It is also liminal in that it is at 
the juncture of an undulating and rocky terrain that extends northwards, and the flat 
hamada desert that extends to the south. And as its archaeology indicates, this distinct 
situation puts it at the southern limit of an area rich in prehistoric funerary remains.  
 
Tifariti is a quiet settlement and it is very underdeveloped, but its archaeology 
(elaborated on in Chapter 6) clearly shows how a new and growing population of 
Bedouin pastoralists, have been inhabiting the wadis in and around the settlement in 
numerous familial tent encampments since the ceasefire of 1991. These new settlers 
have a strong and positive feeling towards the place. Its weather is clement, and 
Tifariti serves as a service centre with a water supply, a school, infirmary, new 
housing, a municipality office, an office for the regional SPLA commander, and a 
SADR government building under construction. Tifariti is a place poised to become 
something else – it is in the process of becoming actualised – and importantly, it is a 
                                                 
725 Larkhal, Interview. 
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meeting place for National Polisario/SADR celebratory events like the Polisario 
National Congresses that have been held there since 2003. When these occur, Tifariti 
swells by the addition of tent encampments for the delegates and soldiers visiting, and 
taking part in the event. These usually occupy the eastern part of the settlement and 
the area close to the old Spanish airstrip, where martial parades and associated cultural 
gatherings occur. In fact, the airstrip has become a central ceremonial space for the 
SADR. Here, fixed viewing stands have been built, with podiums, decorative 
delimiting walls, and flagpoles. The re-appropriation of this barren patch of desert has 
a clear materiality visible on the ground, and its archaeology has been clearly charted 
in this research. 
 
As a settlement that experienced the violence of war, Tifariti has acquired a special 
resonance for the Saharawi people. Because of this – and its location not far from the 
Rekeiz prehistoric rock art sites – it became the focus of the ARTifariti art festivals 
dealt with in Chapter 7. As with the providing of services for local Bedouin, along 
with housing, and national SADR events at Tifariti, the ARTifariti festivals have been 
a definite form of re-appropriation of this liminal Saharawi locus. From the politically 
charged artworks that have been recorded in this research, and from the oral and 
published testimony of the artists involved, the festivals have been a statement of 
intent that Western Sahara will one day be undivided and governed by the Saharawi 
people, and that there would be no exclusion of the two thirds, or so, of the Saharawi 
population on the eastern side of the berms. Strikingly, however, since nearly all of 
the outdoor interventions have been carried out by foreign (mainly Hispanic) artists, in 
solidarity with the Saharawi people, their sincere efforts can only be described as an 
attempt at territorial re-appropriation by proxy.  
 
Applications  
Wars cover great expanses of ground. Studying them by commercially available 
satellite imagery can be financially prohibitive. In consequence, therefore, this 
dissertation and the archaeological examples cited in Chapter 2 illustrate how virtual 
globes (in particular, Google Earth) can be successfully employed in studying past and 
contemporary landscapes. This research also illustrates how blogs and personal 
websites can be used in studying the materiality of modern wars, along with user 
generated online videos. At this very moment, satellite imagery activists and 
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neogeographers are harnessing such readily available internet tools and resources, to 
record and make known a multiplicity of crises across the planet. By working in this 
vein conflict archaeology can become an applied archaeology, and as such, it would 
sit well with the humanitarian focused satellite research that is being undertaken on 
conflict zones by, for instance, the Satellite Sentinel Project726 and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science.727 
 
The use of publicly available internet resources, as in this research, tells us that 
conflicts, and the scarred landscapes of conflicts, do not have to be unknown to us. 
We can cast our gaze over them, and we can study, analyse and characterise them as 
and when we want. We can even chart the progress of present day wars if our 
resources (both graphic and otherwise) are up to date. This tells us that the nature of 
conflict can be understood in geographic space in an accessible way, and that wars can 
be undisclosed. Just as audio-visual news coverage can bring us face-to face with 
conflict – with a sense of immediacy unknown in the past – seeing a conflict from 
space, spread over 1000s of square kilometres in area, and understanding how it has 
literally moved across a country, a territory, can indicate hitherto unknown aspects of 
modern war. In particular, and as this dissertation shows, these can include, the nature 
of power imbalances, the nature and character of battlespaces, degrees of destruction, 
and the means by which an army can ‘dig in’ and be sieged. The partitioning of a 
nation can be readily visualised, and the relationship between people (as both 
combatants and non-combatants) with the terrain and built environments in which 
they act out their lives can be characterised. Such geographies of militarised 
landscapes and frontiers, and battlespaces, though specific to each and every conflict, 
can, to an extent, be made bare. Wars – armed conflicts – have ‘big’ stories to tell, and 
the insights acquired, and the methods employed in carrying out this research, are 
applicable to other modern conflict landscapes, especially those that are relatively 
recent, and in regions where there are dangers to life through unexploded ordnance 
and/or hostile parties, and with very limited access. 
 
The hostilities of the Western Sahara conflict ended almost a quarter of a century ago. 
Since then, many other wars have erupted across the globe, and the material remains 
                                                 
726 At http://www.satsentinel.org/ accessed on 28 November 2013. 
727 AAAS 2014.  
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of those conflicts, along with the remains of even earlier wars, are now visible on 
virtual globes. Of course, the type of terrain in which a given conflict took place 
dictates how well its various remains will have been preserved, and how easily they 
can be seen through publicly available satellite imagery. Nevertheless, the works of 
war, and the landscapes transfigured by war, can be readily studied in many instances, 
especially in the arid regions of the world where ground cover is very limited. Some 
examples of such conflict landscapes, from within the third quarter of the twentieth 
century until now, can be found in Southwest Africa (Angola and Namibia), Ethiopia 
and South Sudan, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan, and of course, in Palestine. Conflicts 
like these have been long term and devastating in their effects. They have histories of 
real and imagined pasts, and materialities that will linger for a very long time – some 
of which will never be erased. Their study deserves an archaeological sensitivity that 
is concerned with both the living and the dead, and an approach that is not piecemeal, 
but longitudinal in scope. By applying the conceptual and strategic tools elaborated 
upon, and fruitfully employed in this research, this dissertation can lead the way, 
indeed be a template, for further similar archaeological studies of conflicts, and 
contested territories, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
 
Future Directions 
 
This research has undoubtedly opened up a broad arena of research for the 
archaeological study of modern and contemporary conflict. As already made clear, the 
Moroccan territorial berms cannot be studied at close quarters, but their make-up and 
operational mechanisms, and the militarised geography of which they are a part can 
undoubtedly be explored in much greater detail by further survey through remote 
sensing. Such research, expanding upon what this dissertation has covered, can only 
add to the story of Western Sahara, and the issues of land contestation and partition 
that is occurring in the world today.  
 
At a more regional level, with the ancient archaeology within the Liberated Zone 
sitting in many places amidst a landscape of modern conflict, this latter period of 
momentous activity should to be included in any further landscape studies carried out 
in Western Sahara. This would be in keeping with the basic tenets of contemporary 
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landscape archaeology where a holistic approach is taken and no preference is given 
to any specific period. Besides contextualising the more ancient landscape within the 
present day geography of the country, it would contribute to the historical narrative of 
the Saharawi people.  
 
The colonial period should also be explored further, especially since the Saharawis 
view their relationship with the Hispanic world as part of their heritage. They see 
themselves as having a unique Arabic-Spanish culture, which sets them apart from the 
former colonies of the French imperial project in Western Africa. This heritage has 
come under attack in Dakhla (Villa Cisneros) where, for instance, the original Spanish 
fort dating back to 1884 has been demolished by the Moroccan authorities. Other 
Spanish period remains in the occupied zone are ruinous, and luckily, the Spanish 
archaeologist Luis Blanco is surveying and recording some of them.728 In the 
Liberated Zone, however, much further work can be carried out in Tifariti. This could 
include more detailed architectural surveys of the fort, infirmary, and bake house, with 
the latter including excavation. To get further information on the day-to-day lives of 
the Spanish garrison, the rubbish dump northwest of the fort could be excavated. 
There is also scope for colonial period archaeology in the south of the country, at Zug, 
where the probable French fort could be surveyed and excavated. This would provide 
valuable insights into early French military activity in the region, just as fieldwork at 
Tifariti would contribute to our knowledge of the later Spanish occupation of the 
badiya. It is also possible that surveys could be undertaken in the Wadi Tagliat, 
northeast of Tifariti, to see if it is possible to identify the site of the French-Saharawi 
battle that took place there in 1912, after the sacking of Smara. The materiality of the 
European colonial period is a lacuna in our knowledge of the history of this part of the 
Sahara. Little, if any, of such research is being undertaken in other parts of the Sahara, 
therefore, such fieldwork would be a real contribution to colonial period studies. 
 
The Moroccan defences around Tifariti should also be investigated in greater detail. 
Here, there is the opportunity to explore a garrison – a whole martial community – 
under siege. Detailed surveys of selected areas of defences could be carried out along 
with excavations of selected groups of built structures, dug outs, trenches and artillery 
                                                 
728 Blanco Vázquez 2012. 
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gun pits. The open desert around Tifariti would be a perfect, and accessible, 
environment to study late 20th century field fortifications (and soldier’s field 
accommodations) with implications for understanding the materiality of place of 
contemporary, and near contemporary war zones such as Vietnam, Southwest Africa, 
the Falklands, and the Middle East, not to mention Afghanistan. 
 
There is also a great deal of targeted oral history work on the conduct of the war that 
can be undertaken. Much of the literature on Western Sahara has much to say on the 
plight of the refugees fleeing the territory in 1975-1976, and there are oral history 
projects looking at the Saharawi experience in its broadest sense, as in the case of the 
work of the University of Roehampton’s Hispanic Research Centre.729 However, it is 
the story of those people affected by the face of battle, the soldiers and veterans of the 
SPLA who, as yet, still have a story to tell. 
 
Further, more detailed recording of the remaining ARTifariti interventions could be 
carried out, along with further interviews with the artists. If the festival were to return 
to Tifariti, then its new art interventions should be plotted and recorded as part of any 
future landscape archaeology project in the immediate region. These, like the remains 
of the war with Morocco and the colonial period, as well as the surrounding 
prehistoric landscape, are all part of the very ‘big story’ that is the archaeology of 
Western Sahara. 
                                                 
729 Hispanic Research Centre (n.d.).   
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GLOSSARY 
 
On transliteration 
Throughout this dissertation there are words, names and place-names transliterated 
from Arabic. For consistency, the spellings of these presented in Pazzanita 2006, 
Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara (3rd edition), have been used. For those 
words not found in the Historical Dictionary, then spellings (especially for place-
names) from Servicio Geográfico del Ejército de España 1960, Mapa de las 
Provincias de Ifni y Sahara y Archipielago de Canarias have been used. 
Transliterations not used from these sources include: the Spanish ‘h’ sound for the 
Arabic ‘kh’ sound, and the French ‘ch’ for the English ‘sh’ sound, for instance, in the 
word sheikh (the latter transcriptions for both of these is preferred throughout this 
dissertation). Also, the western Saharan word, ‘oued’, for a dry watercourse or valley, 
has not been used, but instead, it has been replaced by the more commonly known 
‘wadi’. 
 
Selected Glossary730  
 
AOAV  
  
Action on Armed Violence, formerly known as Lind Mine Action 
(LMA): often noted herein as LMA/AOAV 
Badiya (Arabic) The open desert, which can include pasture-grounds: those 
regions outside of permanent settlement 
Bedouin Or Badouin (From Arabic): inhabitants of the badiya. Desert 
nomads, or pastoralists 
Berm In modern military usage, this is generically an earthen bank, or 
dyke: an earthen rampart or parapet 
Bir (Arabic) A deep well 
Ghazi (Arabic) The traditional Arab raid 
Guelb (Arabic) Igneous, plug-like rock outcrops and ridges 
Guelta (Arabic) Depressions or hollows of various sizes which collect 
                                                 
730 Most unfamiliar words and acronyms are defined when they initially appear in the text, but those 
listed here are repeated often, well after their initial explanation. 
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rainwater 
Hamada  (Arabic) Flat, open and stony desert: steppe-like 
Hassi  Or Hasi (Arabic): a shallow well 
Inselberg Igneous outcrop of rocks: a ‘tor’, often ridge-like 
Intifada (Arabic) An uprising: a campaign of civil disobedience 
LMA Lind Mine Action, now known as Action on Armed Violence 
(AOAV): often noted herein as LMA/AOAV 
Mahdi (Arabic) A religious and temporal leader who will restore justice and 
religious observance 
Marabout (From Arabic) An Islamic hermit or monk-like holy man 
Mehariste (From Arabic) French term for camel mounted troops (Camel 
Corps): the Spanish term is Tropas Nómadas 
MINURSO Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un referendum au 
Sahara Occidental (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara) 
Polisario Polisario Front: Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-
Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia 
el-Hamra and the Rio de Oro) 
Reg (Arabic) Similar to hamada, but less steppe-like, being associated 
with land that has natural run-off: in Western Sahara, reg landscapes 
are closer to the coast 
Regulares Spanish colonial troops from Spanish Morocco 
Sabkha Or sebkha (Arabic): salt pans, though specific salt pan areas are 
referred to as sebkhat 
SADR Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic: also noted herein as 
SADR/Polisario 
Saguia (Arabic) In Western Sahara: a water course or river 
SPLA Saharawi People’s Liberation Army: also noted herein as 
SPLA/Polisario 
UXO Unexploded ordnance 
Wadi (Arabic) A dry water course or valley 
WSP Western Sahara Project of the University of East Anglia 
Zariba (Arabic) An enclosure made of scrub, or thorn bushes 
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Appendix 1: 
The Tifariti History Plaque 
 
The Tifariti History Plaque is located in Tifariti, in the dining room of the Polisario 
accommodation facility for visitors to the settlement. 
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This framed board (shown above), measuring around one metre high by three quarter 
metre wide, and made of plywood with a plastic laminate surface, lists a number of 
key events in the history of Tifariti. These range in date from 1912 to 2005.  
 
As can be seen in the photograph (taken in 2011), the inscription is hand written in 
Arabic, with dates in European Arabic numerals. There is more than one hand, and 
events have been added to it over time: presumably by people associated with the 
SADR or SPLA in Tifariti, and/or the Tifariti Mayor’s office. In this research, 
therefore, this board is treated as a document representing ‘local knowledge’. There is 
an outline of Western Sahara in the bottom two thirds of the plaque, and there are pale 
hand impressions that underlie the writing. Dr. Alexander Wasse has kindly translated 
the text, from the Arabic to English. It reads: 
 
Water has been important and valued in all parts of the world throughout history. 
Most civilisations were established and developed around water sources, especially in 
the desert where water is equivalent to oxygen. 
 
Before the well (BIR) was dug, there was water in a natural fissure [a spring] 1912. 
 
The first well (HAASI) of Tifariti was dug in 1951-1952. 
 
The initial construction of government and community facilities 17.5.1968. 
 
Following the Tripartite Agreement and start of the Moroccan invasion of the nation, 
the community was subjected to air bombardment by the Royal (Moroccan) Armed 
Forces, targeting defenceless civilians, including women, children and the elderly 
January 1976. 
 
The community was occupied by Moroccan forces 1977-8. 
 
It was liberated by fighters of the Saharawi People’s Liberation Army 3.79. 
 
During ceasefire negotiations and before the arrival of foreign peace-keeping forces, 
it was reoccupied [by Polisario/SADR] and what remained of the community facilities 
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were destroyed at the end of August 1991. During these hostilities, two aircraft of the 
Royal Moroccan Air Force were shot down. 
 
The first was a Mirage and its pilot, with the rank of Captain, was captured on 4.8.91 
The second was a F5E and its pilot, with the rank of Lieutenant, was captured on 
26.8.91. 
 
The eleventh conference of the Popular Front [Polisario] was held on 12 to 19 
October 2003. 
 
The first telephone and internet office was erected 18.5.05. 
 
The well (BIR) was dug deeper in 8.1991. 
 
A pump was fitted to the well (BIR) on 8.05.1998. 
 
Construction of the school 4.1999. 
 
Construction of the hospital 10.4.1999. 
 
The regional museum was established 06.1999. 
 
The farm was equipped with machinery. 
 
Commencement of the ‘Solidarity’ district [housing] development 21.05.2005. 
 
Placement of the foundation stone of the [Tifariti] Saharawi National Council 
headquarters 21.05.05. 
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Appendix 2:  
Summary gazetteer of berm installations located within (or near) the ‘snapshot’ 
sampling rectangles described in Chapter 4 
 
There is a single table for each of the Moroccan berms – from No. 1 to No. 6. The 
fields include the ‘Name’, being the number applied to each installation during the 
digitisation process; the ‘Type’ of installation, as described in Fig. 4.5; the ‘Shape’, or 
generalised, descriptive morphological category (see Chapter 4, Part 2); the ‘Terrain’, 
or lie of the land; ‘FB Guns’, indicating the presence and number of artillery in fire 
support bases (firebases), as either ‘pits’ (gun pits) or ‘slots’ (vehicular slots that could 
house self-propelled artillery and/or tanks); the ‘Area’ of each installation (in square 
metres); ‘Rect’, or the sampling rectangle in which each installation is located (when 
an installation is just outside a rectangle, then its position is additionally noted with 
the indication of a cardinal point). The last two fields are for decimal longitude 
(‘Lon’) and latitude (‘Lat’). When some data has not been noted during the 
digitisation process, this is indicated by ‘n/n’, for ‘not noted’. 
 
Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles  
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
14 comp Polygonal Low relief  45991 215 -14.29331 26.05893 
23 comp Polygonal Flat desert  41296 215 -14.20124 26.12223 
30 comp Polygonal Flat desert  5373 215 -14.11954 26.16177 
31 comp Polygonal Flat desert  2861 182 -14.11936 26.1636 
256 comp Polygonal Dissected   1858 157 -11.71488 26.54882 
257 comp Polygonal Dissected   2207 157 -11.71543 26.54791 
124 comp? Complex Flat desert  10861 221 -12.77264 26.13621 
377 comp? Polygonal Dissected   9677 157 -11.64347 26.58682 
8 flt Polygonal Flat desert  4968 215 -14.3331 26.01102 
10 flt Polygonal Flat desert  3993 215 -14.30327 26.04328 
15 flt Polygonal Flat desert  2904 215 -14.27232 26.06934 
17 flt Polygonal Flat desert  4934 215 -14.24099 26.08431 
21 flt Polygonal Flat desert  3731 215 -14.21316 26.1067 
25 flt Polygonal Flat desert  3017 215 -14.18465 26.13885 
28 flt Polygonal Flat desert  2455 215 -14.15216 26.15149 
128 flt Polygonal Flat desert  7978 221 -12.71291 26.16424 
130 flt Polygonal Flat desert  6842 187 -12.69757 26.1936 
131 flt Irregular Flat desert  1229 187 -12.70167 26.21793 
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Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles  
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
243 flt Polygonal Low relief  8369 157 -11.77374 26.56121 
248 flt Irregular Low relief  4901 157 -11.77403 26.53408 
291 flt Polygonal Low relief  3572 124 -11.5635 26.84264 
388 flt Polygonal Flat desert  5938 248 -14.481 25.88408 
389 flt Polygonal Flat desert  7401 248 -14.46393 25.88574 
393 flt Polygonal Flat desert  6026 248 -14.40706 25.9152 
19 fsb Polygonal Low relief 3 pits 38811 215 -14.22477 26.09598 
121 fsb Circular Flat desert 4 pits 137091 221 -12.83013 26.15034 
134 fsb Complex Low relief 5 pits 208701 187 -12.67399 26.27722 
237 fsb Complex Dissected  11 pits 32305 157 -11.84645 26.54688 
239 fsb Complex Dissected  6 pits; 3 slots 63275 157 -11.81566 26.55834 
241 fsb Polygonal Dissected  1 pit; 9 slots 90146 157 -11.72231 26.63239 
254 fsb No perimeter Dissected  5 pits; multiple slots 341137 157 -11.71962 26.57289 
266 fsb Irregular Dissected  13 slots 79485 157 -11.64012 26.57437 
270 fsb Circular Dissected  1 pit; 5 slots 95174 157 -11.61101 26.63872 
271 fsb Irregular Dissected  4 pits 1113383 124 -11.54899 26.7111 
375 fsb Polygonal Dissected  7 pits; multiple slots 220241 157 -11.65581 26.5989 
387 fsb Polygonal Flat desert 3 pits 30725 248 -14.50791 25.88343 
392 fsb Irregular Flat desert 5 pits 91701 248 -14.43629 25.88959 
24 fsb? Irregular Flat desert  59498 215 -14.20312 26.1236 
9 ft Irregular Flat desert  93355 215 -14.32178 26.02247 
18 ft Polygonal Flat desert  25496 215 -14.22364 26.09484 
22 ft Polygonal Flat desert  32170 215 -14.19977 26.12105 
29 ft Irregular Crest top  37992 215 -14.11765 26.1618 
122 ft Polygonal Flat desert  14659 221 -12.80712 26.14204 
123 ft Polygonal Flat desert  46912 221 -12.77288 26.13432 
129 ft Irregular Flat desert  93556 187 -12.69629 26.17937 
135 ft Circular Low relief  66114 187 -12.65624 26.25802 
136 ft Irregular Flat desert  111313 187 -12.62361 26.27139 
138 ft Complex Low relief  318871 187 -12.60957 26.29882 
145 ft Complex Low relief  34001 187; E -12.53162 26.38712 
163 ft Polygonal Flat desert  75608 187; E -12.55907 26.42548 
150 ft Polygonal Flat desert  14433 221 -12.8289 26.14659 
238 ft Irregular Dissected   39727 157 -11.83602 26.53806 
240 ft Irregular Dissected   322755 157 -11.8034 26.54625 
242 ft Irregular Dissected   146552 157 -11.7788 26.5531 
244 ft Polygonal Low relief  250316 157 -11.75599 26.58405 
245 ft Circular Low relief  16440 157 -11.73838 26.5979 
246 ft Polygonal Low relief  56171 157 -11.72447 26.60901 
247 ft Irregular Dissected   99368 157 -11.71475 26.61621 
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Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles  
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
249 ft Irregular Low relief  124658 157 -11.76774 26.53578 
250 ft Irregular Low relief  27193 157 -11.7339 26.54222 
253 ft Polygonal Low relief  66069 157 -11.72612 26.54078 
255 ft Circular Low relief  24581 157 -11.71528 26.53749 
260 ft Irregular Dissected   35572 157 -11.69124 26.53761 
262 ft Polygonal Dissected   10931 157 -11.6778 26.54517 
263 ft Polygonal Dissected   47502 157 -11.67228 26.54936 
265 ft Polygonal Dissected   19905 157 -11.65534 26.55325 
267 ft Irregular Dissected   152341 157 -11.6413 26.56025 
268 ft Irregular Dissected   103812 157 -11.61411 26.57199 
278 ft Irregular Dissected   156406 124 -11.54177 26.67401 
279 ft Irregular Dissected   50377 124 -11.53099 26.68495 
280 ft Irregular Dissected   98079 124 -11.51124 26.69484 
281 ft Irregular Dissected   79321 124 -11.5012 26.72746 
283 ft Polygonal Dissected   20010 124 -11.50114 26.73623 
284 ft Irregular Dissected   168727 124 -11.49836 26.74352 
285 ft Irregular Dissected   32939 124 -11.50669 26.75854 
286 ft Polygonal Dissected   59103 124 -11.51696 26.77134 
287 ft Irregular Dissected   304428 124 -11.52035 26.78652 
288 ft Polygonal Dissected   47101 124 -11.52537 26.80126 
289 ft Polygonal Dissected   41482 124 -11.54044 26.81347 
290 ft Irregular Dissected   205581 124 -11.55191 26.83417 
292 ft Circular Low relief  17361 124 -11.58367 26.85007 
293 ft Polygonal Low relief  271217 124 -11.59792 26.85381 
385 ft Polygonal Coastal  44158 248 -14.54294 25.87516 
386 ft Polygonal Flat desert  45921 248 -14.50905 25.88054 
391 ft Polygonal Flat desert  36361 248 -14.43706 25.8861 
133 ftfb Complex Low relief 4 pits; 5 slots 311703 187 -12.68915 26.23992 
16 ftfba Polygonal Flat desert 4 pits 60339 215 -14.25848 26.07632 
26 ftfba Polygonal Flat desert 5? pits 39749 215 -14.16697 26.14528 
120 ftfba Complex Flat desert 4 pits; 5 slots 132430 221 -12.85141 26.1494 
127 ftfba Complex Flat desert 3 pits 175840 221 -12.72212 26.14892 
13 ftfba? Complex Flat desert n/n 94816 215 -14.29301 26.0556 
125 lz Polygonal Flat desert  2082 221 -12.77376 26.14025 
126 lz Polygonal Flat desert  2131 221 -12.82634 26.15094 
258 lz Polygonal Dissected   3776 157 -11.69483 26.54395 
264 lz Polygonal Dissected   3645 157 -11.65754 26.55501 
376 lz Polygonal Dissected   4383 157 -11.66053 26.58289 
378 lz Polygonal Dissected   4867 124 -11.52781 26.71259 
27 lz? Polygonal Flat desert  10018 215 -14.16871 26.14768 
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Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles  
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
148 lz? Polygonal Flat desert  2436 215 -14.22601 26.09751 
251 mcomp Polygonal Low relief  9673 157 -11.73067 26.54163 
252 mcomp Polygonal Low relief  5795 157 -11.72881 26.54115 
390 mcomp? Polygonal Flat desert  5986 248 -14.45372 25.88626 
132 pcomp Irregular Flat desert  14176 187 -12.69856 26.22535 
137 pcomp Polygonal Flat desert  8047 187 -12.61589 26.28423 
151 pcomp Polygonal Flat desert  3595 187 -12.61924 26.27724 
20 rft Circular Low relief  13622 215 -14.22883 26.09562 
236 rft Polygonal Dissected   27465 157 -11.85088 26.53959 
259 rft Polygonal Dissected   3689 157 -11.69223 26.54813 
261 rft Polygonal Dissected   3547 157 -11.69231 26.5392 
282 rft Irregular Dissected   115184 124 -11.5053 26.7306 
 
 
Table: Berm No. 2 – Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
400 fsb Polygonal Low relief 4 pits 129172 LR; 221 -12.62743 26.10525 
610 fsb Irregular Dissected 4 pits        52441 LR; 124 -11.39751 26.87576 
397 ft Polygonal Flat desert  65140 LR; 221 -12.67239 26.11697 
398 ft Polygonal Flat desert  12777 LR; 221 -12.64552 26.11266 
399 ft Irregular Low relief  150479 LR; 221 -12.63256 26.10285 
401 ft Circular Low relief  55141 LR; 221 -12.6146 26.09155 
402 ft Polygonal Low relief  139327 LR; 221 -12.60319 26.07159 
608 ft Polygonal Dissected  45041 LR; 124 -11.35243 26.81285 
609 ft Irregular Dissected  119188 LR; 124 -11.35979 26.83995 
611 ft Irregular Dissected  29290 LR; 124 -11.36102 26.8615 
612 ft Irregular Dissected  189847 LR; 124 -11.36872 26.87943 
613 ft Irregular Dissected  197860 LR; 124 -11.3846 26.90089 
396 pcomp? Polygonal Flat desert  27311 HR; 221 -12.69326 26.13432 
606 rft Circular Dissected  18460 LR; 124 -11.36663 26.79427 
586 rft? Complex Low relief  150261 LR; 124 -11.38836 26.67545 
 
 
Table: Berm No. 3 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
679 flt Polygonal Escarpment  4,464 126 -10.98637 26.91582 
675 fsb Circular Dissected  3 pits; multiple slots 182,645 92 -11.02469 26.94995 
682 fsb No perimeter Dissected  3 pits 36,693 92 -10.96404 26.92815 
683 fsb Polygonal Dissected  multiple slots 154,926 92 -10.94358 26.96133 
684 fsb Circular Dissected  4 pits 46,253 92 -10.9385 26.92773 
697 fsb Circular Dissected  9 pits; multiple slots 250,782 92 -10.91797 26.97574 
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Table: Berm No. 3 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
703 fsb Circular Dissected  4 slots 47,596 92 -10.89334 27.04147 
704 fsb No perimeter Dissected  1 pit; 6 slots 35,627 92 -10.91361 26.99591 
711 fsb Polygonal Low relief 2 pits?; 4 slots? 12,802 92 -10.84423 27.08017 
712 fsb Irregular Dissected  5 pits?; multiple slots 278,298 92 -10.85368 27.09428 
778 fsb Complex Low relief 4 pits 44,476 62 -9.96653 27.41491 
674 ft Irregular Escarpment  98,645 126 -11.03178 26.90965 
677 ft Polygonal Escarpment  37,043 126 -10.99195 26.91134 
681 ft Irregular Escarpment  62,564 126 -10.9704 26.91615 
685 ft Polygonal Escarpment  22,826 126 -10.93892 26.91665 
687 ft Irregular Escarpment  60,089 92 -10.91892 26.92149 
689 ft Polygonal Dissected   28,744 92 -10.91445 26.93011 
695 ft Polygonal Dissected   22,974 92 -10.9071 26.96206 
698 ft Polygonal Dissected   47,273 92 -10.89788 26.98111 
700 ft Irregular Crest top  41,197 92 -10.89349 27.00669 
702 ft Irregular Dissected   51,242 92 -10.89277 27.02869 
705 ft Polygonal Dissected   86,417 92 -10.86639 27.05235 
710 ft Irregular Crest top  35,790 92 -10.83834 27.07012 
775 ft Polygonal Low relief  86,707 62 -10.01125 27.36055 
776 ft Polygonal Low relief  107,474 62 -9.99509 27.38041 
777 ft Circular Low relief  39,651 62 -9.97857 27.38894 
779 ft Polygonal Low relief  103,927 62 -9.95615 27.40503 
780 ft Polygonal Low relief  58,679 28 -9.93468 27.4274 
781 ft Polygonal Low relief  104,054 28 -9.9214 27.441 
784 ft Polygonal Low relief  13,110 28 -9.905 27.45694 
694 ftfb Complex Dissected  4 pits 54,137 92 -10.90931 26.94909 
676 gar No perimeter Dissected    92 -10.99215 26.94798 
692 gar No perimeter Dissected    92 -10.91516 26.95969 
699 gar No perimeter Dissected    92 -10.90445 26.99891 
678 lz Polygonal Escarpment  3,968 126 -10.99345 26.91275 
680 lz Polygonal Escarpment  4,686 92 -10.97192 26.92278 
686 lz Polygonal Dissected   3,327 92 -10.93726 26.91915 
688 lz Polygonal Escarpment  6,497 92 -10.91927 26.92343 
693 lz Polygonal Dissected   5,728 92 -10.91216 26.95443 
701 lz Polygonal Dissected   11,692 92 -10.8985 27.01956 
690 pcomp Polygonal Escarpment  7,182 92 -10.9123 26.93765 
691 pcomp Polygonal Escarpment  4,320 92 -10.91083 26.94354 
696 pcomp Circular Dissected   19,835 92 -10.90377 26.96903 
706 rft Complex Low relief  97,070 92 -10.88948 27.07991 
707 rft Circular Low relief  15,339 92 -10.89243 27.08337 
708 rft Irregular Low relief  9,260 92 -10.89609 27.08244 
709 rft Polygonal Low relief  15,440 92 -10.89337 27.07855 
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Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
855 comp Polygonal Escarpment  9,656 126 -10.8716 26.91672 
1093 flt Circular Escarpment  1,308 100 -9.04033 27.00996 
1252 flt Circular Flat desert  7,250 952 -8.84457 28.03263 
1262 flt Circular Flat desert  4,285 952 -8.83152 28.05885 
1264 flt Circular Flat desert  3,028 952 -8.82256 28.07612 
1268 flt Circular Flat desert  5,895 952 -8.80913 28.14449 
1270 flt Circular Low relief  2,812 952 -8.80335 28.16802 
1272 flt Circular Low relief  9,004 952 -8.78603 28.20481 
1273 flt Circular Low relief  4,354 952 -8.79176 28.21899 
1275 flt Circular Low relief  3,000 952 -8.79749 28.23616 
2078 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2094 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2099 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2101 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2122 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2123 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2124 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2125 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2128 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2129 flt n/n n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
1084 fsb Polygonal Low relief 5 pits; 4 slots 27,863 100 -9.0711 27.02284 
1091 fsb Polygonal Low relief 8 slots 11,440 100 -9.02585 27.02123 
1108 fsb Polygonal Low relief 3 pits 33,416 100 -8.87518 27.02659 
1249 fsb Circular Flat desert 3 pits; 5 slots 112,286 952 -8.86695 28.01647 
1255 fsb Complex Flat desert 4 pits 70,008 952 -8.86947 28.10058 
1257 fsb Irregular Flat desert 5 pits 67,737 952 -8.84991 28.09075 
1261 fsb Polygonal Flat desert 4 pits 81,118 952 -8.86044 28.06733 
1281 fsb Circular Low relief 5 pits 34,946 952 -8.82234 28.23105 
1282 fsb Polygonal Low relief 3 pits 77,288 952 -8.86085 28.21948 
847 ft Irregular Escarpment  69,831 92 -10.91036 26.92082 
851 ft Irregular Escarpment  18,840 92 -10.89128 26.91702 
853 ft Irregular Escarpment  43,046 126 -10.87061 26.91268 
1080 ft Irregular Dissected  14,110 100 -9.08115 26.99912 
1081 ft Irregular Dissected  23,007 100 -9.08039 27.00814 
1089 ft Polygonal Escarpment  20,315 100 -9.05137 27.01232 
1094 ft Irregular Escarpment  33,998 100 -9.02839 27.00702 
1095 ft Irregular Escarpment  12,976 100 -9.00241 27.00922 
1099 ft Polygonal Escarpment  41,332 100 -8.97863 27.00884 
1102 ft Irregular Dissected; wadi  16,351 100 -8.95085 27.00925 
1104 ft Irregular Escarpment  68,758 100 -8.92663 27.0063 
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Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
1106 ft Irregular Escarpment  17,097 100 -8.89713 26.99952 
1107 ft Irregular Escarpment  41,730 100 -8.86691 27.00065 
1250 ft Circular Flat desert  45,964 952 -8.83421 28.00052 
1251 ft Circular Flat desert  95,189 952 -8.84761 28.02158 
1253 ft Irregular Flat desert  351,653 952 -8.83848 28.04382 
1263 ft Irregular Flat desert  53,916 952 -8.82575 28.06828 
1265 ft Circular Flat desert  88,446 952 -8.81864 28.08587 
1266 ft Irregular Flat desert  97,995 952 -8.81051 28.11505 
1267 ft Circular Flat desert  102,844 952 -8.81402 28.13427 
1269 ft Irregular Low relief  24,365 952 -8.80161 28.159 
1274 ft Complex Low relief  50,789 952 -8.79559 28.22865 
1271 ftfba Complex Low relief Multiple slots 79,689 952 -8.80587 28.17908 
1105 gar No perimeter Low relief   100 -8.93226 27.02774 
1111 gar Circular Low relief  256,693 100 -8.88588 27.04073 
1112 gar No perimeter Low relief   100 -8.94308 27.08674 
1260 gar Polygonal Flat desert  74,621 952 -8.86925 28.07467 
1085 gar? No perimeter Low relief   100 -9.08123 27.02401 
1086 gar? No perimeter Low relief   100 -9.06983 27.02037 
1113 gar? Complex Low relief  36,675 100 -8.90467 27.07712 
1115 gar? No perimeter Low relief   100 -8.92198 27.07506 
848 lz Polygonal Escarpment  3,349 92 -10.91032 26.92212 
852 lz Polygonal Escarpment  3,328 92 -10.89149 26.91884 
854 lz Polygonal Escarpment  3,037 126 -10.87209 26.91488 
1083 lz Polygonal Dissected  5,922 100 -9.08191 27.01155 
1109 lz Polygonal Low relief  4,171 100 -8.87673 27.02623 
1114 lz Polygonal Low relief  8,734 100 -8.92685 27.07573 
849 rft Circular Dissected  306,675 92 -10.88655 26.93779 
850 rft Irregular Dissected  151,611 92 -10.87548 26.95075 
1110 rft Complex Low relief  71,998 100 -8.89053 27.02675 
1254 rft Circular Flat desert  141,926 952 -8.90596 28.10529 
1256 rft Circular Flat desert  248,604 952 -8.87155 28.09192 
1258 rft Circular Flat desert  4,942 952 -8.88548 28.08002 
1259 rft Complex Flat desert  77,577 952 -8.8759 28.07346 
1280 rft Polygonal Low relief  65,781 952 -8.8391 28.23359 
2068 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2069 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2070 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2071 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2072 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2073 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2074 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
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Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
2075 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2076 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2077 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2079 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2080 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2081 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2082 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2083 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2084 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2085 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2086 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2087 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2088 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2089 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2090 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2091 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2092 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2093 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2095 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2096 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2097 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2098 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2100 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2102 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2103 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2104 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2105 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2106 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2107 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2108 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2109 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2110 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2111 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2112 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2113 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2114 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2115 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2116 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2117 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2118 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2119 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
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Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
2120 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2121 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2126 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2127 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
2130 sop Circular n/n  n/n 952 n/n n/n 
 
Table: Berm No. 5 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
1414 flt Circular Flat desert  5,979  520 E -14.34552 23.84089 
1416 flt Circular Flat desert  9,300  520 E -14.30974 23.85328 
1471 flt Circular Low relief  3,191 491 -13.3372 23.94377 
1472 flt Circular Low relief  1,978 491 -13.3281 23.9437 
1473 flt Circular Low relief  2,555 491 -13.31355 23.95097 
1482 flt Irregular Hill top  3,622 491 -13.24629 23.96734 
1485 flt Polygonal Low relief  7,069 491 -13.1955 23.97604 
1486 flt Polygonal Low relief  7,187 491 -13.18334 23.9813 
1584 flt Irregular Hill slope  3,684 359 -12.32561 24.98408 
1586 flt Polygonal Pediment  9,678 359 -12.26882 24.98786 
1593 flt Polygonal Pediment  5,324 359 -12.24881 25.04387 
1596 flt Irregular Hill slope  2,197 359 -12.3272 24.98516 
1481 flt? Polygonal Dissected  2,413 491 -13.2562 24.02348 
1318 fsb Irregular Low relief 3 pits; 1 slot 30,050 583 -15.84045 23.27661 
1327 fsb Circular Low relief 4 pits 26,876 583 -15.65438 23.35037 
1385 fsb Circular Flat desert 4 pits 84,917 553 -14.71523 23.65004 
1386 fsb Circular Flat desert 4 pits? 62,891 553 -14.70314 23.63989 
1390 fsb Irregular Low relief 2 pits 11,776 553 -14.65554 23.65547 
1412 fsb Polygonal Low relief 5 pits 51,805  520 E -14.38263 23.85222 
1465 fsb Polygonal n/n 3 pits; 2? slots 129825  491 W -13.39568 23.94036 
1470 fsb Polygonal n/n 3 pits 103436  491 W -13.39156 23.96637 
1484 fsb Polygonal Low relief 5 pits? 54,765 491 -13.22533 24.00173 
1488 fsb Irregular Pediment 4 slots 34,611 491 -13.11467 24.02134 
1594 fsb Polygonal Pediment 3 pits 51,263 359 -12.2572 25.05312 
1595 fsb Circular Pediment 3 pits 85,254 359 -12.26527 25.07296 
1315 ft Irregular Escarpment  51,469 583 -15.83497 23.23885 
1316 ft Circular Low relief  15,296 583 -15.81671 23.21952 
1319 ft Irregular Escarpment  30,501 583 -15.79671 23.22439 
1320 ft Circular Low relief  14,732 583 -15.78337 23.24706 
1321 ft n/n Low relief  3,870 583 -15.7759 23.25159 
1322 ft Circular Flat desert  27,326 583 -15.75448 23.26506 
1329 ft Circular Flat desert  16,403 583 -15.73697 23.27708 
1330 ft Circular Flat desert  42,409 583 -15.71003 23.29157 
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Table: Berm No. 5 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
1332 ft Circular Low relief  13,811 583 -15.68265 23.29851 
1333 ft Circular Flat desert  49,056 583 -15.65257 23.31171 
1334 ft Circular Flat desert  19,622 583 -15.62731 23.31263 
1335 ft Polygonal Low relief  69,109 583 -15.60954 23.31854 
1381 ft Circular Flat desert  29,472 553 -14.76704 23.6326 
1382 ft Irregular Flat desert  16,188 553 -14.73831 23.63049 
1387 ft Circular Flat desert  45,646 553 -14.70854 23.63017 
1388 ft Circular Flat desert  13,657 553 -14.68011 23.63149 
1391 ft Irregular Low relief  122,201 553 -14.6626 23.63751 
1392 ft Irregular Low relief  12,985 553 -14.63756 23.63479 
1393 ft Irregular Hill top  45,570 553 -14.61798 23.61841 
1409 ft Irregular Low relief  25,204  520 E -14.42594 23.79216 
1410 ft Circular Low relief  32,907  520 E -14.41594 23.82331 
1411 ft Circular Low relief  11,696  520 E -14.39534 23.83296 
1413 ft Circular Flat desert  36,314  520 E -14.37348 23.83558 
1415 ft Irregular Low relief  22,288  520 E -14.33513 23.84714 
1417 ft Irregular Hill top  43,279  520 E -14.27746 23.86007 
1463 ft Irregular n/n  14955  491 W -13.44257 23.89267 
1464 ft Irregular n/n  21492  491 W -13.41367 23.89995 
1466 ft Complex n/n  17001  491 W -13.40283 23.90934 
1467 ft Irregular n/n  125498  491 W -13.3938 23.92746 
1468 ft Circular n/n  8018  491 W -13.37312 23.92855 
1469 ft Irregular n/n  41796  491 W -13.35616 23.94064 
1475 ft Irregular Low relief  40,536 491 -13.31986 23.94734 
1476 ft Circular Low relief  13,120 491 -13.30323 23.96099 
1477 ft Irregular Low relief  53,996 491 -13.276 23.96772 
1483 ft Irregular Low relief  106,670 491 -13.21835 23.96881 
1487 ft Irregular Pediment  99,980 491 -13.17111 23.99048 
1489 ft Circular Low relief  15,657 491 -13.13791 24.00298 
1490 ft Complex Low relief  217,235 491 -13.11162 24.00947 
1501 ft Polygonal Pediment  167,467 491 -13.11244 24.10976 
1585 ft Irregular Crest top  12,256 359 -12.31773 24.97733 
1590 ft Irregular Hill slope  34,451 359 -12.2592 25.0195 
1591 ft Complex Low relief  29,277 359 -12.25082 25.02617 
1597 ft Circular Low relief  35,184 359 -12.23349 25.0602 
1598 ft Polygonal Hill top  19,547 359 -12.19721 25.10328 
1389 gar n/n Low relief  n/n 553 -14.68144 23.66779 
1474 gar n/n n/n  n/n 491 -13.32594 23.9628 
1480 gar No perimeter Dissected  n/n 491 -13.27476 24.1046 
1592 gar No perimeter Low relief  n/n 359 -12.2591 25.04533 
1317 rft Polygonal Low relief  10,063 583 -15.81109 23.22926 
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Table: Berm No. 5 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
1323 rft Circular Flat desert  12,922 583 -15.71907 23.32963 
1324 rft Circular Flat desert  35,227 583 -15.70769 23.32821 
1325 rft Polygonal Low relief  25,161 583 -15.66734 23.35831 
1326 rft Polygonal Low relief  14,761 583 -15.66446 23.3573 
1328 rft Circular Flat desert  33,954 583 -15.64857 23.35843 
1331 rft Polygonal Flat desert  9,694 583 -15.71277 23.29602 
1383 rft Circular Flat desert  3,040 553 -14.73424 23.63412 
1384 rft Circular Flat desert  2,228 553 -14.72348 23.64237 
1478 rft Circular Low relief  167,287 491 -13.30018 24.04247 
1479 rft Polygonal Dissected  29,939 491 -13.32783 23.99091 
1588 rft Irregular Hill slope  4,494 359 -12.2752 25.00591 
1589 rft Irregular Hill slope  1,503 359 -12.26869 25.0136 
1587 sop Irregular Low relief  403 359 -12.26695 25.00357 
 
 
Table: Berm No. 6 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
1635 flt Irregular Low relief  4500 850 -17.02515 21.33831 
1640 flt Polygonal Low relief  2924 850 -16.9792 21.3622 
1641 flt Irregular Low relief  3182 850 -16.96496 21.36064 
1643 flt Circular Low relief  2309 850 -16.93116 21.36318 
1646 flt Circular Low relief  3064 850 -16.89326 21.36097 
1679 flt Circular Flat desert  3666 853 -16.34059 21.36466 
1680 flt Circular Flat desert  5308 853 -16.31973 21.35731 
1682 flt Circular Flat desert  5336 853 -16.27585 21.34694 
1683 flt Circular Flat desert  6603 853 -16.25038 21.34949 
1686 flt Circular Flat desert  8275 853 -16.1878 21.34464 
1904 flt Circular Low relief  4671 850 -16.94387 21.36295 
1634 ft Polygonal Coastal  9509 850 -17.02845 21.34159 
1636 ft Irregular Low relief  7939 850 -17.02207 21.33738 
1637 ft Polygonal Low relief  2845 850 -17.01204 21.34959 
1638 ft Polygonal Low relief  3458 850 -17.0024 21.35887 
1639 ft Circular Low relief  6542 850 -16.99186 21.36363 
1642 ft Irregular Low relief  5401 850 -16.9592 21.36227 
1644 ft Circular Low relief  9286 850 -16.91408 21.36162 
1647 ft Polygonal Low relief  3274 850 -16.88841 21.36247 
1648 ft Complex Low relief  7554 850 -16.87057 21.36327 
1681 ft Circular Flat desert  12489 853 -16.29495 21.3508 
1684 ft Circular Flat desert  13251 853 -16.23047 21.35053 
1685 ft Circular Flat desert  4152 853 -16.20346 21.34856 
1687 ft Circular Flat desert  15094 853 -16.16153 21.34973 
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Table: Berm No. 6 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles 
NAME TYPE SHAPE TERRAIN FB GUNS AREA RECT LON LAT 
1688 ft Circular Flat desert  8172 853 -16.13915 21.35125 
1689 ft Circular Flat desert  8356 853 -16.11997 21.34877 
1691 ft Circular Flat desert  16465 854 -16.1012 21.34638 
1693 ft Circular Flat desert  7673 854 -16.08363 21.34356 
1694 ft Circular Flat desert  7572 854 -16.06439 21.34358 
1695 ft Circular Flat desert  20676 854 -16.04465 21.34611 
1696 ft Circular Flat desert  9311 854 -16.02176 21.34378 
1697 ft Circular Flat desert  10773 854 -16.00362 21.34131 
1698 ft Circular Flat desert  22652 854 -15.97727 21.33891 
1699 ft n/n n/n  10159 854 -15.95333 21.34113 
1700 ft Circular Flat desert  8137 854 -15.93621 21.3424 
1701 ft Circular Flat desert  15745 854 -15.90493 21.33495 
1702 ft Circular Flat desert  11394 854 -15.87711 21.33216 
1692 gar No perimeter Flat desert  n/n  853; N -16.10452 21.43097 
1674 rft Polygonal Flat desert  119763  853; N -16.11091 21.43707 
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Appendix 3:  
Gazetteer of ARTifariti out-of-door artworks recorded in 2011 
 
The following are brief citations on the different ARTifariti artworks recorded in 
2011. They include an alphanumeric descriptor for each artwork, or group of 
artworks; the location of each piece, in decimal degrees (north and west); the title of 
each, or most, artworks, followed by their creator; The ARTifariti season in which 
each piece was created; brief, descriptive notes (though, where an artwork has been 
discussed fully in Chapter 7, a reference is made to that chapter instead of providing 
an abridged description); and finally, a referral to the appropriate ARTifariti catalogue 
with page references (except in those instances where reference is made to Chapter 7). 
 
AR1 
26.15960 N / 10.56304 W 
Flor en el Desierto or Flower in the Desert (Panémona) by Roberto Pajares (with 
Cruz Echagoyen) 
ARTifariti 2009 
Constructed in 2009, this installation is an all-metal sculpture made up of vertical rods 
supporting a ring of cut out, and open, metal oil drums suspended at the very top of 
the piece. The installation stands around 8.5 m high, and it is supported at its base by 
three arcing metal braces of differing heights. They cover a base area of around 5 m x 
5 m x 5 m. According to the artist, this ‘wind-mill’ sculpture was supposed to be a 
practical installation, able to rotate and extract water from a well for the garden 
nearby. Looking at it in 2011, however, it seemed to have never been put to practical 
use. 
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: 26-27 & 89.  
 
AR2     
26.15934 N / 10.56230 W  
Mujer Saharaui or Saharawi Woman by Rosamar Corcuera 
ARTifariti 2008 
This sculpture of a Saharawi woman, is apparently made of thick cloth, wound and 
draped over an armitage of wood and wires, and standing approximately 1.6 m high. 
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Unfortunately, it has lost its head and some of its sculpted mud (possibly mixed with 
cement) render. The piece includes inlaid, coloured, broken glass; and a base of the 
same, with quartz fragments and decorative roundels that look as if they are glazed. 
The piece stands on a circular, mud brick and cement plinth close to the model farm at 
Tifariti. On the wall of the garden, in Spanish, and on the rear of the sculpture, in 
Arabic, the artist has inscribed a fragment of a poem written by her father, Arturo: 
I write peace when the sun shows up, 
I travel around lands and sands of life 
Sowing a dove in each furrow. 
Ref: ARTifariti 2008: 66-67 & 120 
 
AR3 
26.15946 N / 10.55992 W 
No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards by Bessaï Zineddine 
ARTifariti 2008 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR3a 
26.15946 N / 10.55989 W 
El Grupo or The Group by Lalidji Walid 
ARTifariti 2008 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR4 
26.15946 N / 10.55989 W 
Portrait of Nayem El Garhi by Federico Guzman 
ARTifariti 2010 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR5 & AR6 
26.15946 N / 10.55992 W 
Untitled: fragmentary designs and stone alignments, by members of the 2008 Algerian 
delegation of artists. These appear to be ad hoc artworks. 
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ARTifariti 2008 
See Chapter 7.  
 
AR7 
26.16053 N / 10.56020 W 
Al Paso de la Puerta or At [the] Door Step by Nabila Kalache 
ARTifariti 2009 
This is a low level, rectilinear alignment of stones painted white, representing the 
outline (or foundations) of a house and its rooms. The outlines are a single stone 
thickness, and height, and they cover an area around 6.3 m x 7 m.  
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: 67 & 93. 
 
AR8 
26.15943 N / 10.56033 W 
Víctimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims by Karim Sergoua 
ARTifariti 2008     
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR8a 
26.15943 N / 10.56033 W 
Ficción o Realidad or Fiction or Reality by Kenza Mebarak 
ARTifariti 2009     
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR9 
26.16007 N / 10.55795 
Unattributed, spray can painted patterns in red and green, with some black and white, 
on a low level rocky outcrop behind the infirmary in Tifariti. They extend for 
approximately 5 metres. These appear to be ad hoc designs. The outcrop is probably 
no higher than 1.7 m.  
No ARTifariti  reference. 
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AR10 
26.15918 N / 10.55782 W 
El Muro de la Vergüenza or The Wall of Shame by Federico Guzman 
ARTifariti 2008     
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR11 
26.15872 N / 10.55766 W 
Viajando al Paraíso or Travelling Paradise by Maria Ortega Estepa 
ARTifariti 2008     
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR12 
26.15857 N / 10.55708 W 
El Tikit de la Baraka or The Tikit of Baraka by Federico Guzman 
ARTifariti 2009 
This artwork is essentially a circular hut-like installation made up of steel reinforcing 
rods arcing inwards, and joining up to create a dome. The rods are welded together 
and the top of the dome is covered with palm fronds. Helping to support the dome is a 
central upright metal rod set in mud bricks, and radiating rods at the base.  
The artist was inspired by the traditional Mauritanian hut, known as a tikit, 
representing a shelter that gives both light and shade. The artist placed within the 
structure, items which he made out of the waste of war. For instance, there is a teapot 
with a soldier’s helmet for a lid, and with a spout made from a motor vehicle exhaust. 
Accompanying tea cups are made from car/truck oil filters and placed within a panel 
(perhaps from a truck) representing a tray. The piece looked forlorn in 2011, and it 
was surrounded by wire fencing material, presumably to protect it. 
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: 22-23 & 89 
 
AR13 
26.15811 N / 10.55573 W 
Caballo de Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse by Rolando de la Rosa 
(with Susana Cato) 
 21
ARTifariti 2008 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.  
 
Additional: In 2011, however, with the sculpture (AR13) already moved to the berm 
north of Tifariti, all that could be recorded was its base. This consisted of an 
approximately 10 m wide circle of stones with a centrally placed plinth of large stone 
slabs and rubble, on which the ‘Trojan Horse’ was originally placed, facing east. The 
remains of the ring consisted, in places, of alternating cobble sized, red and black 
stones, interspersed with small boulders. There was also, for about two thirds of its 
inner circumference, a narrow spread of quartz fragments. The ring was no more than 
a single stone or small boulder in height and about 25 cm thick. Four small, free 
standing boulders were placed within the ring, while along its easternmost arc there 
were five short orthostats. On these were painted, either in red or blue the names of 
four of the refugee camps at Tindouf: Ausserd, Ayoun, Dakhla and 27th of February. 
The words, ‘faith’ and ‘resistance’ were also painted onto two of the stones. These 
were in Arabic, but translated for me by the Saharawi accompanying me at the time. 
 
AR14 
26.15747 N / 10.55524 W 
Tear Down the Wall by Alexis Amador. 
ARTifariti 2010 
This artwork fell down sometime within a year after its creation. It was a single 
thickness, breeze block wall, with a jagged opening in it. It was painted to look like 
the wall from the Pink Floyd animated film, ‘The Wall’. To the artist, this installation 
was an effigy of the Moroccan berm, which was, in his words, a ‘…wall that is not 
seen, that no one wants to see, which is not allowed to be seen, and that we must see.’ 
Ref: ARTifariti 2010: 100-101 & 155 
 
AR15 
26.16124 N / 10.55678 W 
Unattributed ‘daubings’ of white paint on a boulder outcrop, about 18 m long and with 
Moroccan army shelters built up against it. The paint was relatively bright in 2011, so 
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the boulders were probably painted in the 2010 ARTifariti festival. They have been 
recorded since they represent a kind of land art, as does AR9. 
ARTifariti ? 
 
AR16 
26.15765 N / 10.55562 W 
A Standing Stone re-erected on a concrete plinth at the eastern entrance to Tifariti. 
This has not been raised as an ARTifariti artwork, therefore, it has probably been put 
in place by the Tifariti Town Council. Nevertheless, it has been included here as a 
piece of ‘public art’. It is a tall, slender orthostat, approximately 3.5 m tall (not 
including the 0.8 m height of its plinth). It is broken nearly in half, and it has been 
repaired with metal plates held in place with bolts, and with reinforcing rods welded 
together. It is of apparent antiquity, but its provenance is not known. 
 
AR17 
26.15983 N / 10.55607 W 
Diario Enterrado: 27
th
 de Febrero or Buried Journal: February 27th by Miluca Sanz 
This installation is a placard, in essence, a sign. It is a montage of metal panels, and 
items, with February 27th cut out of it (and also written in Arabic). The piece is up to 4 
m high, but the panel, on supports, is up to 3 m high x 1.8 m wide. The artist wanted 
to celebrate the date of the founding of the SADR, on the 27th of February, by 
embedding it in the ground. By making a link between the very land of Western 
Sahara and the proclamation of the Saharawi Republic. 
Ref: ARTifariti 2010: 80-81 & 160. 
 
AR18 
26.15994 N / 10.55497 W 
U’m Dreiga or Oum Dreiga by Mohamed Moulud Yeslam 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR19 
26.15896 N / 10.55656 W 
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This is a generic designation for a number of freestanding, and mural artworks 
(including AR20) by a number of different artists, that are disposed out-of-doors 
within the building compound which was the base for ARTifariti in 2007-2010, and 
where the Tifariti Museum is located. Within the context of this research, they are not 
pieces of land art (nor have they been seen as art on the land), but they were briefly 
noted and photographed in 2011. Amongst them were, upright, single plane, 
geometric constructions of wood shaped as either rectangles or triangles. There was a 
mechanical man-like construction made out of war detritus, and very similar to the 
artworks created by Mozambique artists through the ‘Transforming Arms into Tools’ 
project. There was also a small tee-pee with an associated, well made, wire outline of 
a man and a camel.  
Ref: ARTifariti 2009 and ARTifariti 2010.  
 
AR20 
26.15905 N / 10.55715 W 
Egoismo or Selfisness by Djamel Agagnia 
This mural is part of AR19, but it was noted separately in 2011. It is located at the end 
of the south colonnade of the building complex in which ARTifariti was based. The 
piece fills an arched niche, around 2.5 m high x 1.5 m wide. This is a compelling 
painting in which it shows Saharawis, with blacked out eyes, situated behind a barbed 
wire fence, staring out. The fence extends outwards, along the walls on either side of 
the niche in which the piece has been painted, and along it there are splatters of red 
paint representing blood. There was also similar red paint on the floor surface in front 
of the piece. There is a townscape behind the figures looking through and over the 
fence, and the sky is painted black. Lines of verse, by the Tunisian Poet Abulkasim 
Ashafi, were inscribed across the black sky: 
If one day the people aspire to life 
the dark night will disappear 
and the chains will inevitably be broken  (as quoted by Bahia Awah in 
ARTifariti 2010: 157) 
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: pp. 62-63 & 93 
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AR21 
26.16136 N / 10.56543 W to 26.16261 N / 10.56731 W 
Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return by all of the ARTifariti participants in 2007 
and 2008. 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR22 
26.16038 N / 10.56583 W 
Breakfast at Tifariti by Fernando Pinteño 
ARTifariti 2007 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR23 
26.15950 N / 10.55998 W 
This is a group of artworks, all painted on the walls and collapsed sections of the old 
Spanish fort at Tifariti. Their individual descriptors are AR23, AR23a, AR23b, Ar23c 
and AR23d. 
ARTifariti 2008 
See Chapter 7 where all these artworks are fully discussed. 
 
AR24 
26.16355 N / 10.56732 W 
Proyecto de Eliminacón - 2 or Removal Project - 2, by Carlos de Gredos 
ARTifariti 2007 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
 
AR25 
26.15366 N / 10.56166 W 
La sombra del gnomon or The shadow of the gnomon by Guillermo Roiz 
ARTifariti 2008 
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed. 
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Figures: 
Accompanying text of Vol. 1 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: General map of Western Sahara.  
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Fig. 3.2: Extent of traditional tribal ranges in Western (Spanish) Sahara in the third 
quarter of the 20th century. Image source: map from Damis 1983, p. 7, with additions 
from Mercer 1976, p. 128. 
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Fig. 3.3: The position of Villa Cisneros on the Dakhla peninsular along the inlet 
(Bahia) of Rio de Oro. The line of defensive blockhouses north of Villa Cisneros is 
also shown, circled in red. Image source: portion of 1951 Spanish Military (SGE) 
Map, from Blanco Vázquez 2012.  
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Fig. 3.4: An early view of the fort at Villa Cisneros showing the northern 'defensive 
tower' and the low, un-rendered curtain wall. Image source: www.sahara-
mili.net/images/fuerte/bens20.jpg accessed 11 April 2011. 
 
 
Fig. 3.5: A post card dated 1910 illustrating the monumentalising of the fort at Villa 
Cisneros, with nomads' tents in the foreground. Image source: www.sahara-
mili.net/images/fuerte/bens25.jpg accessed 11 April 2011. 
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Fig. 3.6: Ruins of the probable French fort at Zug. Image source: Western Sahara 
Project. 
 
 
Fig. 3.7: 1926 aerial view of the expanded fort at Villa Cisneros, clearly surrounded 
by barbed wire. Image source: http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/images/aero1926.jpg 
accessed 11 April 2011. 
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Fig. 3.8: By 1934 Western Sahara was enclosed by French and Spanish forts. The 
Spanish forts or positions, along the coast, north to south are (red squares): Cape Juby 
(Tarfaya), Villa Cisneros, and La Guera. Occupied Smara is also shown in the 
northern panhandle. The French forts along the Piste Imperiale, from northeast to 
south, are (blue squares): Tindouf, Ain Ben Tilli, Agmar (not labelled), Bir Moghrein, 
Idjil (F’Derick) and Atar. The western, French coastal fort at Cape Blanc is Port 
Etienne (Nouadhibou). Image source: base map from Mercer 1976. 
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Fig. 3.9: Spanish expansion in the 1930s and 1940s. Key (in red): No. 1, Smara; No. 
2, El Ayoun; No. 3, Guelta Zemmour; No. 4, Bir Gandus; No. 5, Tichla, and No. 6, 
Zug. Image source: base map from Mercer 1976. 
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Fig. 3.10: A very early view of the fort at Tichla. The barbed wire entanglement 
around the fort can just be made out. Image source: http://www.sahara-
mili.net/images/anoni/antc001.jpg accessed 9 April 2011. 
 
 
Fig. 3.11: The fort at Tifariti garrisoned by the Spanish Foreign Legion. Image source: 
http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm and http://www.sahara-
mili.net/images/amigost/tf001.jpg accessed 9 April 2011. 
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Fig. 3.12: The green squares show the new desert forts built by the Spanish in the 
1960s. Key: No. 7, Mahbes; No. 8 Echdeiria; No. 9, Hausa; No. 10, Tifariti, No. 11, 
Guelta Zemmour; No. 12, Bir Enzaren, and No. 13, Aargub (the numbers do not 
reflect any sequence of construction). Image source: base map from Mercer 1976. 
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Fig. 3.13: Outline of ‘Greater Morocco’, taking in parts of Algeria and Mali, and the 
whole of Mauritania. Image source: map from Damis 1983, p. 16. 
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Fig. 3.14: The partition of Western Sahara. The Moroccan occupied zone is north of 
the partition line, while the Mauritanian zone is south of it. El-Ayoun, Bou-Craa and 
Smara are shown as being in the so-called ‘useful triangle’. Image source: base map 
from Damis 1983, p. 77. 
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Fig. 3.15: Map of the Moroccan ‘berms’ partitioning Western Sahara and built 
between 1980-1987. The territory north and west of berms 4, 2, 5 and 6 is presently 
occupied by Morocco, while the territory to the east, including Tifariti and Zug, is 
held by Polisario/SADR. 
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Fig. 4.1: This Google Earth image of Western Sahara shows the extent of Google 
Earth (Digital Globe and Geo-Eye) high-resolution imagery (outlined in white) dated 
to 20 August 2008. This was the range of imagery available for the studying of the 
Moroccan berms as of 9 November 2010.  
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Fig. 4.2: Google Earth imagery showing the digitised delineations, or traces, of the 
Moroccan berms across Western Sahara. They have been drawn in different colours to 
differentiate them, and for their sequence of building see Fig. 3.15. The scale bar in 
the lower left indicates 200 kilometres.  
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Fig. 4.3: Spanish military map (Servicio Geográfico del Ejército de España – ‘SGE’) 
dated to 1960, with the digitised traces of the Moroccan berms across Western Sahara.  
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Bank type Description 
Single Berm is mainly a single embankment along its trace. 
Double Berm is mainly a double embankment along its trace. 
Multiple Berm has more than two embankments along its trace. 
Multiple 
configurations 
This can be a qualifier to the above types of berms. It indicates that 
there are a variety of additional configurations of embankments 
associated with a given defensive trace. 
Fig. 4.4: Table of descriptive terminology applied to berm embankments during 
digitisation from Google Earth. 
 
Installation 
type (code) 
Description 
ft Mural fort; a fort along a berm. But this type of installation can be free 
standing in those few regions where there are no berms, and the ‘barrier’ is 
made up of natural features. 
rft A fort behind the berm; a fort in the rear. 
ftfb Fort with a firebase apparently built as an integral part; a composite fort. 
Almost always mural. 
ftfba Fort with a firebase added or attached. Almost always mural. 
fsb Fire support base; always in the rear behind a given berm. 
flt Fortlet; up to 100 metres along its longest length or under 10,000 sqr 
metres in area. Almost always mural. 
comp Non-mural compound with no, or very minimal, internal features, and with 
no signs of obvious fortifications. 
mcomp Mural compound with no, or very minimal, internal features. With no signs 
of obvious fortifications. 
pcomp Long & thin mural compound, laid out parallel to a given berm. 
sop Small occupation position; essentially a small fortlet (flt) and apparently 
specific to Berm No. 4. Up to ca. 50 metres along their greatest length. 
These are densely spaced and very numerous along the berm facing the 
Algerian border, and because of this, only a sample of these installations 
have been recorded - within square 952 (see Fig. 4.6 and the reference in 
Fig. 4.19). There are other small, similar sized features associated with the 
berms, but these have no internal features and they have not been 
included in the tabulations in this chapter. 
gar Garrison or camp, usually with no enclosure and behind the berms. 
Fig. 4.5: Table of the basic descriptive types of military installations recorded along 
the berms. 
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Fig. 4.6: Map of Western Sahara showing selected (sampled) rectangles for ‘snapshots’ of the berms. These are shown in red overlying 
areas covered by Google Earth high-resolution imagery – outlined in broken lines. 
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Fig. 4.7: Map of Berm No. 1. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double 
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; broken blue line = Saguia 
el Hamra; thin black line = earlier Bou-Craa and Smara defences; thicker black line (east of Bou-Craa and Smara) = later defensive 
berms/barriers. 
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Berm No. 1: (Part 1) Barrier lengths for berm from Jebel Zini to Bou Craa Count 
Total length (kms) of all barriers (there are no natural barriers) 299* 
Length (kms) of single banked barriers 235 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with additional 
multiple configurations of banks 
64 
Berm No. 1: All military installations from Jebel Zini to Bou Craa  
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm 182** 
Number of mural forts (ft) 100 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 18 
Number of mural forts with an integral firebase (ftfb) 1 
Number of mural forts with a firebase added (ftfba) 1 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 23 
Number of fortlets (flt) 8 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 11 
Number of mural compounds (mcomp) 6 
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp) 14 
NB: *299 kms/**182 = 1 type of installation for every 1.6 kms  
Fig. 4.8: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up Part 
1 of Berm No. 1. The different types of installations along the berm have also been 
tabulated. To compare Part 1 with Part 2 of Berm No. 1, see Fig. 4.10.  
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Berm No. 1: (Part 2) Barrier lengths for berm from Bou Craa to the Atlantic 
coast 
Count 
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers) 335* 
Total Length (kms) of all barriers (excluding 101 kms of natural barriers) 234 
Length (kms) of single banked barriers 234 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with additional 
multiple configurations of banks 
<1 
Berm No. 1: All military installations from Bou Craa to the Atlantic coast  
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm 143** 
Number of mural forts (ft) 63 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 2 
Number of mural forts with an integral firebase (ftfb) 3 
Number of mural forts with a firebase added (ftfba) 8 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 17 
Number of fortlets (flt) 36 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 9 
Number of mural compounds (mcomp) 2 
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp) 3 
NB: *335 kms/**143 = 1 type of installation for every 2.3 kms  
Fig. 4.9: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up Part 
2 of Berm No. 1. The different types of installations along the berm have also been 
tabulated. To compare Part 2 with Part 1 of Berm No. 1, see Fig. 4.10.
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Berm 1 (Part 1) (Part 2) All 
Total length (inc natural barriers) 299 47% 335 53% 634**  
Single banks 235 79% 234 70% 469 74% 
Double and multiple banks 64 21% 0.5 <1% 65 10% 
Natural barriers   101 30% 101 16% 
Associated installations Count  Count  Count  
ft 100 55% 63 44% 163 50% 
rft 18 10% 2 1% 20 6% 
ftfb 1 <1% 3 2% 4 1% 
ftfba 1 <1% 8 6% 9 3% 
fsb 23 13% 17 12% 40 14% 
flt 8 4% 36 25% 44 12% 
comp 11 6% 9 6% 20 6% 
mcomp 6 3% 2 1% 8 2% 
pcomp 14 8% 3 2% 17 5% 
Total 182  143  325  
Fig. 4.10: Comparative table showing the differences and similarities between parts 1 
and 2 of Berm No. 1. 
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Fig. 4.11: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 1 (Part 1) and Berm No. 2, at the Smara salient, within and 
adjacent to rectangles 124 and 157. Note: ‘High resolution Google Earth imagery’ denotes (on all GIS ‘snapshots’) those areas 
covered by the best quality imagery available on Google Earth in 2010. 
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Fig. 4.12: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 1 (Part 2) in Rectangle 
215.
 48
 
Fig. 4.13: Map of Berm No. 2. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double 
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple 
configurations of banks; broken blue line = Saguia el Hamra; Black line = earlier and later barrier/berm defences. 
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Berm No. 2: Barrier lengths  Count  
Total length (kms) of all barriers (there are no natural barriers) 357*  
Length (kms) of single banked barriers 234 66% 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with 
additional multiple configurations of banks 
123 34% 
Berm No. 2 All military installations   
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm 202** 100% 
Number of mural forts (ft) 130 64% 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 16 8% 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 24 12% 
Number of fortlets (flt) 2 1% 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 11 5% 
Number of mural compounds (mcomp) 2 1% 
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp) 6 3% 
Number of rear garrisons (gar) 11 5% 
NB: *357 kms/**202 = 1 type of installation for every 1.8 kms   
Fig. 4.14: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up 
Berm No. 2. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated.  
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Fig. 4.15: Map of Berm No. 3. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double 
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations 
of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; broken blue line = Saguia el Hamra; Black line = earlier and later barrier/berm 
defences. 
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Berm No. 3: Barrier lengths  Count  
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers) 338*  
Length (kms) of single banked barriers 145 43% 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with 
additional multiple configurations of banks 
141 42% 
Length (kms) of natural barriers 52 15% 
Berm No. 3 All military installations   
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm 181** 100% 
Number of mural forts (ft) 111 61% 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 11 6% 
Number of mural forts with an integral firebase (ftfb) 1 <1% 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 41 23% 
Number of fortlets (flt) 1 <1 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 5 3% 
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp) 5 3% 
Number of rear garrisons (gar) 6 3% 
NB: *338 kms/**181 = 1 type of installation for every 1.9 kms   
Fig. 4.16: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up 
Berm No. 3. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated. 
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Fig. 4.17: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 3, in rectangles 92 and 
126. This mapping sample shows the barrier running west to east, and then turning 
northwards. Berm No. 4 extends to the east, into rectangle 126 and beyond. 
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Fig. 4.18: Map of Berm No. 4. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double 
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations 
of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; broken blue line = Saguia el Hamra; Black line = earlier barrier/berm defences.
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Berm No. 4: Barrier lengths  Count  
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers and the rear, 
subsidiary berm) 
624*  
Length (kms) of single banked barriers (excluding the rear, subsidiary berm) 43 7% 
Length (kms) of single banked, rear, subsidiary berm 138 22% 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with 
additional multiple configurations of banks  
432 69% 
Length (kms) of natural barriers 11 2% 
Berm No. 4: All military installations   
Total of all recorded defensive installations on and behind the berm 427  
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm (excluding 53 
sops from sampling rectangle 952) 
374** 100% 
Number of mural forts (ft) 153 41% 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 45 12% 
Number of mural forts with a firebase added (ftfba) 2 <1% 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 53 14% 
Number of fortlets (flt) 31 8% 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 26 7% 
Number of mural compounds (mcomp) 1 <1% 
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp) 10 3% 
Number of rear garrisons (gar) 53 14% 
Number of small occupation positions (sop): only in sampling rectangle 952 53  
NB: *624 kms/**374 = 1 type of installation for every 1.7 kms   
Fig. 4.19: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up 
Berm No. 4. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated. 
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Fig. 4.20: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 4, in rectangle 100. 
The rear, subsidiary barrier behind the berm (to the north) is also shown.                                                                                         
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Fig. 4.21: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 4, in rectangle 952. 
This sampled mapping clearly illustrates the density of installations in this length of 
the barrier, which directly faces the frontier with Algeria to the east. 
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Fig. 4.22: Map of Berm No. 5. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double 
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations 
of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; black line = earlier and later barrier/berm defences.
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Berm No. 5: Barrier lengths  Count  
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers, and the matrix 
of rear, subsidiary berms at 354 kms) 
1002*  
Length (kms) of single banked barriers (excluding the matrix of rear, 
subsidiary berms) 
264 26% 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with 
additional multiple configurations of banks (excluding the matrix of rear, 
subsidiary berms) 
327 33% 
Length (kms) of the matrix of rear, subsidiary berms 354 35% 
Length (kms) of natural barriers 57 6% 
Berm No. 5: All military installations   
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm 321** 100% 
Number of mural forts (ft) 203 63% 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 33 10% 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 46 14% 
Number of fortlets (flt) 19 6% 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 5 2% 
Number of mural compounds (mcomp) 1 <1% 
Number of rear garrisons (gar) 14 4% 
NB: *1002 kms/**321 = 1 type of installation for every 3.1 kms   
Fig. 4.23: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up 
Berm No. 5. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated. 
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Fig. 4.24: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 5, in rectangle 359. 
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Fig. 4.25: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 5, in rectangle 583. 
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Fig. 4.26: Map of Berm No. 6. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double 
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations 
of banks; black line = earlier barrier/berm defences.
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Berm No. 6: Barrier lengths  Count  
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including the rear, subsidiary berms) 1168*  
Length (kms) of single banked barriers (excluding the rear, subsidiary 
berms) 
361 31% 
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with 
additional multiple configurations of banks (excluding the rear, subsidiary 
berms) 
196 17% 
Length (kms) of rear, subsidiary berms 611 52% 
Berm No. 6: All military installations   
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm 364** 100% 
Number of mural forts (ft) 207 57% 
Number of forts in the rear (rft) 11 3% 
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb) 25 7% 
Number of fortlets (flt) 99 27% 
Number of non-mural compounds (comp) 7 2% 
Number of mural compounds (mcomp) 3 1% 
Number of rear garrisons (gar) 12 3% 
NB: *1168 kms/**364 = 1 type of installation for every 3.2 kms   
Fig. 4.27: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up 
Berm No. 6. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated. 
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Fig. 4.28: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 6, in rectangle 853, 
along the border with Mauritania. 
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Fig. 4.29: Google Earth image along Berm No.1 (in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). The 
bulldozer tracks are clearly visible only on the west side of the barrier. The sharply 
defined shadow on the west of the barrier indicates that the embankment is triangular 
in section. Scale bar at lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 23/12/12, 
DigitalGlobe.
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Fig. 4.30: A Google Earth image showing a section of Berm No.1 (in rectangle 215 of 
Fig. 4.6). When looked at closely, the top of the embankment appears to be flat or 
slightly indented, perhaps with two ridges. North is to the left of the image. Scale bar 
at lower left indicates 40 metres. Image date 31/1/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.31: Part of Berm No.1 shown on Google Earth (in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). It 
is a single embankment with clear evidence of being created by bulldozing from both 
sides. The top, in places, appears slightly flat, or with a slight depression. Scale bar at 
lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 31/12/04, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.32: A Google Earth image showing part of Berm No.5 (in rectangle 583 of Fig. 
4.6).  A single embankment is clearly visible with short sections of secondary banks. 
North is to the upper left. Scale bar at lower left indicates 200 metres. Image date 
26/1/04, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.33: A Google Earth image showing part of Berm No.1 (between rectangles 124 
and 157 of Fig. 4.6). It shows the direction of bulldozing in the construction of the 
barriers (only from one side), and illustrates how the secondary, western barrier more 
or less follows natural contours, with the primary frontal barrier cutting across natural 
drainage. A mural track is visible to the west. Scale bar at lower left indicates 200 
metres. Image date 12/6/10, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.34: A low resolution Google Earth image showing parallel banks along Berm 
No.2 at the Smara salient (located around nine kilometres southeast of rectangle 157 
of Fig. 4.6). Multiple tracks behind the barrier are also visible. Scale bar at lower left 
indicates 200 metres. Image date 2004, CNES/Spot. 
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Fig. 4.35: At just to the west of rectangle 491 in Fig. 4.6, this Google Earth image of 
Berm No.5 clearly shows a frontal defensive bank with subsidiary, intermediate 
banks. The tracks of the bulldozers which created the embankments are also clearly 
visible. The second, rear bank is not parallel with the frontal bank, but it also has a 
ditch on its south side (north is to the top left of the image). A causeway through the 
second bank and ditch is clearly visible, and water has backed up behind the second 
barrier, illustrating how the construction of the berms can affect natural drainage. 
Scale bar at lower left indicates 80 metres. Image date 3/3/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.36: A Google Earth image from rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6. North is to the upper 
left. It shows a multiple embanked section of Berm No.5, with three banks, though 
with the north most, rear bank, having a ditch in front of it (as in Fig. 4.35). A mural 
bunker is incorporated in the frontal bank (near the bottom of the image) and there are 
at least two vehicular slots behind the barrier, near the top of the image. The scale bar 
at lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 25/10/04, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.37: A very good Google Earth image of a short section of Berm No. 4, located 
in rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6. It shows a triple embanked barrier, facing south (north is 
to the left), and positioned on a watershed. A light line in front of the barrier probably 
represents barbed wire. There are bunker type structures associated with the front 
embankment. The bank making up the rear of the barrier includes a ditch along its 
southern side. The earthworks to the north (the left) are probably gun emplacements. 
The scale bar at lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 23/11/07, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.38: A low level aerial photo of the location indicated in Fig. 4.39, showing a Paris-Dakar rally car passing through the Moroccan 
Berm. It clearly gives a sense of scale, and illustrates the components making up the barrier. North is to the right of the photo. Image 
source: http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20091109-nem-csak-a-berlini-fal-nepeket-elvalaszto-falak-es.html accessed 14 September 2012.
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Fig. 4.39: A low resolution image from Google Earth showing a stretch of Berm No. 2 
in Mauritania, and located due south of rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6. North is to the right. 
The black circle indicates the approximate location of the crossing point though the 
Berm shown in Fig. 4.38. The scale bar at lower left indicates 400 metres. Image date 
2006, CNES/Spot.
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Fig. 4.40: View of Berm No. 4 taken near the border with Algeria. It shows multiple 
embankments and even the rooflines of buildings or bunkers. Image source: © 
‘wixtroem’, from http://www.panoramio.com/photo/40069297 accessed 3 september 
2012.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Photograph taken and posted on Panoramio and Google Earth by ‘wixtroem’.  There is no guarantee 
that the ‘geotagged’ location of the photograph on Google Earth is correct.  
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Figure 4.41: A view of the Moroccan barrier at ground level, photographed near 
Tifariti. The barrier has three elements: the stone wall at the rear, an earthen bank in 
the centre, followed by a frontal embankment with two ridges,just visible at the left of 
the photograph. The Saharawi soldier on the barrier gives a sense of scale. Image 
source: © Bruno Zanzottera, from http://stock.parallelozero.com and  
http://www.parallelozero.com/images/stock/mid/c72e465d7af3494aa14600a8956d98b
b5fa097fc.jpg accessed 12 April 2014. 
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Fig. 4.42: One of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets clearly visible on 
Google Earth. This is a redundant fortlet (flt 10) on Berm No.1 (located in rectangle 
215 of Fig. 4.6). Its internal buildings and bunkers are visible (now roofless) and the 
routeways in and out of the installation can just be made out. The scale bar in the 
lower left indicates 30 metres. Image date 26/5/12, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.43: Second of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets, clearly visible on 
Google Earth. North is to the left of the image. This is a redundant fort (ft 163) on 
Berm No. 1. It is located just outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6. 
It is clearly concentric with two perimeter banks and it is subdivided longitudinally. 
There are clear fighting positions along its southern face (they look like nicks, or 
indents, in the embankment). The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres. 
Image date 4/8/05, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.44: Third of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets. A concentric, 
polygonal fort (ft 685) with rounded corners on Berm No.3 (located in rectangle 126 
of Fig. 4.6). This fort is not redundant since it faces the Poliosario held zone of 
Western Sahara. It has fighting/observation positions along its southern and eastern 
flanks - facing the upper right, and right of the image (north is to the upper left), and 
its internal buildings and bunkers are roofed and visible. Its northwest side is very 
slightly bent (concave) while its south and southeast trace follows the contours of the 
slight rise on which it is situated. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. 
Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.45: Fourth of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets. This mural fort (ft 
1335) is located on a redundant part of Berm No.5, located in rectangle 583 of Fig. 
4.6. North is to the left. Though partly obscured by drift sand, the fort’s internal 
buildings are clear (and now roofless), and its concentric trace and multiple 
subdivisions are also clearly visible. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 
metres. Image date 3/1/04, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.46: Google Earth image of a semi-circular fortlet (flt 1252) on Berm No.4 
(located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). There are obvious bunkers along the front of the 
installation facing east. It is also sub-divided with embanked partitions. There is a 
cordon of barbed wire just in front of the fortlet, which is just barely visible. The scale 
bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 3/3/08, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.47: Google Earth image (in monochrome to highlight features) of a semi-
circular fort (ft 1250) from Berm No.4 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). This fort 
has a concentric trace along its rear, with a frontage (facing the northeast) filled with 
bunkers and fighting positions. The installation is obviously compartmentalised and 
its entrance is clear This fort faces Algeria from Morocco, north of Western Sahara. 
The scale bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 16/3/08, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.48: Google Earth image showing a sub-circular fort (ft 1597) on Berm No. 5 
(located in rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6). This fort is still occupied and it clearly shows 
fighting positions along its east facing front. It is also sub-divided with blast 
partitions. The fort has a rectilinear landing zone to the immediate northwest, while 
internally, there are gun pits and obvious bunkers. The concentric earthen banks 
outlining the installation have sharp outlines suggesting that they are revetted with 
stones. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres. Image date 25/10/04, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.49: Google Earth image of a kidney shaped fort (ft 1387) along a redundant 
part of Berm No.5 (located in rectangle 553 of Fig. 4.6). The fort is 
compartmentalised with internal internal blast barriers and there are fighting positions, 
and some bunkers, along its frontage, facing south (north is to the left). The remains of 
bulldozing tracks indicate that the fort was constructed from the north. The scale bar 
in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 20/10/05, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.50: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 1391) on Berm No.5 
(located in rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6), in an area of desert with low relief. It is mainly 
surrounded by a double embankment, and it is compartmentalised by numerous blast 
barriers. There are bunkers and fighting positions along its southern, curvilinear 
frontage (north is to the left). There are other buildings or bunkers, and even some gun 
pits within the installation. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image 
date 20/10/05, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.51: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 681) on Berm No.3 
(located in rectangle 126 of Fig. 4.6). Its defensive banks are concentric and follow 
the natural contours of three spurs of high ground. There are multiple sub-divisions 
with blast barriers. Buildings and bunkers are spread through out the fort, and there 
are bunkers and fighting positions at the salients facing south (north is to the left). The 
scale bar in the lower left indicates 90 metres. Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.52: Low level aerial view of fort ft 681 in Fig. 4.51. The view is to the east, so north is to the left. This image clearly illustrates the 
disposition of this sizable fort on high ground, overlooking Polisario controlled territory to the right (the south). Image source: 
unattributed image from http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-163.htm  accessed 15 January 2014.
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Fig. 4.53: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 687) situated at the 
junction of Berms No. 3 and No. 4 (located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). It follows the 
contours of an escarpment over lower ground to the west and south (north is to the 
left). Its defences are more or less concentric and there is multiple 
compartmentalisation. There are numerous buildings and bunkers with fighting 
positions visible along the fort’s southern flanks. There are two rectangular landing 
zones to the immediate north. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres. 
Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe.  
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Fig. 4.54: Google Earth image (in monochrome to highlight features) of an irregular 
shaped fort (ft 1269) on Berm No. 4 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). It used to 
be a concentric semi-circle but its frontage has been removed and it is now an 
irregular arc shaped installation. It is sub-divided and there are bunkers. Fighting 
positions are visible along the east facing front. A cordon of barbed wire is also just 
visible, about 100 metres in front of the fort, to the east. The scale bar in the lower left 
indicates 80 metres. Image date 16/3/08, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.55: Google Earth image of a straightforward, though partly complex, fort (ft 
1648) on Berm No. 6 (located in rectangle 850 of Fig. 4.6). It is situated on a knoll. It 
has an external enclosure to the east, which also incorporates high ground with the 
remains of fighting or observation positions. The south and east facing ramparts of the 
fort, with observation and fighting positions, are sharply outlined, indicating retaining 
walls along the internal faces. There are bunkers and buildings, and two gun pits, also 
well defined. A ramp leads into the fort from the north. The scale bar in the lower left 
indicates 50 metres. Image date 21/2/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.56: Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft 145) on Berm No.1 (located close 
to, but outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). It has observation and 
fighting positions along its angled east side overlooking a wadi. It has secondary 
embankments that give the impression that it has concentric defences, but this is not 
the case. Instead, the fort simply consists of multiple enclosures. There are annexes to 
the north and south, and besides the buildings and bunkers internally, there are also 
two possible gun pits. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 
4/8/05, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.57: Monochrome (for better clarity) Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft 
1274) on Berm No.4 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). The installation consists of 
an initial concentric sub-circular fort, with a multiple embanked rectilinear addition to 
the north. Both parts of the fort are compartmentalised and there are bunkers and 
observation and fighting positions on their eastern flanks, facing Algeria. It is possible 
that there are two small gun or mortar pits in the southern, circular part of the 
installation. There are five gun pits to the west of the fort, and there is a cordon of 
barbed wire, just barely visible, in an arc in front of the initial, circular fortification. 
The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 16/3/08, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.58: A complex fort (ft 290) on Berm No.1, in the Smara salient (located in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). This is a very large group of 
enclosures utilising a spur and at least four knolls overlooking a wadi to the east. The core enclosure at the lower, left centre of the image, 
has concentric defences with observation and fighting positions facing east. The contoured extension to the east also has fighting and 
observation positions facing eastwards, and the knolls just behind the single embanked outer enceinte, are all individually fortified. This 
is indeed, a multi-part, complex fort. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 300 metres. Image date 23/12/12, DigitalGlobe. 
 94
 
 
 
Fig. 4.59: This is a very good example of a concentrically embanked fort on one of the Moroccan berms, illustrating the complexity of 
internal compartmentalization with sand embanked blast barriers. Image source: unattributed image from 
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-163.htm accessed 15 January 2014. 
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Fig. 4.60: View of a mural fort along one of the Moroccan berms. The image shows the construction of internal buildings quite well, and 
a parapet walkway with niches: fighting and observation positions. Image source: attributed to ‘MINURSO Database’ and available at 
http://www.tindoufexpress.org/tep/?page_id=183&lang=en and http://www.tindoufexpress.org/tep/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Muro_ONU_2007.06.07_-1_028.jpg accessed 17 January 2014.
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Fig. 4.61: This is an aerial photograph of an Israeli fort or strong point (Maozim) from 
the Bar Lev Line, reputedly taken by an Egyptian spy plane some time before the 
1973 Arab- Israeli War. It is included here to illustrate what small fighting positions, 
or niches, along a defensive line can look like. Here they are revetted with sand bags, 
but stones could just as easily be used. There are metal hoops over the trenches, and 
these were for canvas shades. Image source: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/41809355@N00/877414678/ accessed 4 October 2012.2 
 
                                                 
2 Aerial photograph uploaded on to Flickr on 23 July 2007 by ‘Amr Saleh’, with the caption: ‘Egyptian 
military intelligence photo of a Bar Lev Line strong point, taken from a spy plane. Typical Bar Lev 
Line fortification, surrounded with 5 lines of barbed wire with land mines and traps in between. Under 
ground bunker is 15m deep into the ground made of railway reinforced concrete. With exception of one 
post, all Bar Lev Line points were stormed by Egyptian infantry in 1973.’  
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Figure 4.62: This image, taken as a still from a YouTube video, shows Moroccan 
soldiers in a bunker on the berm manning a recoilless rifle. It clearly shows the 
aperture size, and type of view available, from what is possibly a relatively standard 
bunker along the perimeter of a fortified Moroccan position along the berms. Image 
source: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=5KxzZQGpIHc&NR=1 
accessed 1 October 2012.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This is a still image taken from a video entitled (in English) Hassan II inspects [the] army in the 
Algerian-Moroccan border Moroccan Sahara. The video is undated and unattributed, but it has been 
uploaded onto YouTube by ‘Lineamarocco’ on 7 January 2010.  
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Fig. 4.63: Berm No. 1. Google Earth image of two mural compounds (to the west, in the left portion of the image) and a mural fort (to the 
east of centre), with vehicular slots (‘tank’ slots) behind the berm at the eastern (right) edge of the image. The compounds, from the west 
(left to right) are mcomp 251 and mcomp 252, and the fort is ft 253 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). The scale bar in the lower left 
indicates 180 metres. Image date 12/6/10, DigitalGlobe.
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Fig. 4.64: Google image of pcomp 132 on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 187 of 
Fig. 4.6). It shows a parallel enclosure, longitudinally subdivided, with 
fighting/observation positions along its front, to the east. The entry to the compound is 
from the west, near the north end of the compound. The scale bar in the lower left 
indicates 80 metres. Image date 2/5/10, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.65: Examples of small occupation positions on Berm No. 4 (located in 
rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). At the top (to the north) is sop 2097, while to the south is 
sop 2098. Between them are vehicular slots, probably for tanks (or perhaps even 
smaller vehicles that can mount guns), with a slightly larger slot, on its own and to the 
west, that could probably accommodate a self-propelled piece of artillery. The scale 
bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 16/3/08 (in monochrome for 
clarity), DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.66: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of ftfb 133 on Berm No. 1 
(located in rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). This multipart installation has four gun pits 
located more-or-less in its centre. Probably for self propelled artillery. North is to the 
upper left. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 200 metres. Image date 2/5/10, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.67: Google Earth image of ftfba 16 on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 215 of 
Fig. 4.6). A large, redundant, mural fort with a firebase attached to its northwest side 
(north is to the upper left). The firebase includes four artillery gun pits very spread 
out. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres. Image date 2/4/04, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.68: Google Earth image of fsb 1470 on Berm No. 5 (located to the west of 
rectangle 491 of Fig. 4.6). A polygonal fire support base, though originally sub-
rectangular, with three large gun pits for self propelled artillery. The guns can be seen 
in the image. The base is behind Berm No. 5 by more than four kilometres. The scale 
bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 3/3/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.69: Google Earth image of fsb 1255 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). A 
rectilinear, though complex, fire support base with four gun positions situated behind 
Berm No. 4. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 3/3/08, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.70: Google Earth image of sub-circular fsb 1327 behind Berm No. 5 (located in 
rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6). Though redundant, this is a fine example of a fire support 
base with five gun pits, perimeter fighting or observation positions, and clearly visible 
internal buildings. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 
3/1/04, DigitalGlobe. 
 
 106
  
Fig. 4.71: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fire support base (fsb 1257) 
behind Berm No. 4 (located within rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). This firebase is 
redundant, probably replaced by fsb 1255 (see Fig. 4.69). The scale bar in the lower 
left indicates 100 metres. Image date 3/3/08, DigitalGlobe. 
 
 107
 
Fig. 4.72: Google Earth image of a redundant, complex firebase (fsb 237) behind 
Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). This installation has numerous gun 
pits and vehicular slots. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 
14/9/12, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.73: Google Earth image of a firebase (fsb 703) for self propelled artillery, 
behind a redundant part of Berm No. 3 (located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). This 
firebase has been built behind a knoll along its east side. North is to the upper right. 
The scale bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.74: Google Earth image of an unenclosed firebase (fsb 682) behind Berm No. 3 
(located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). It is situated between two knolls, one to the south 
and the other to the northwest. There are three clear gun pits, and additionally, 
fortifications on the southern knoll. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 
metres. Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.75: This is a sketch of United States Army Fire Support Base Kramer in 
Vietnam. It shows the base perimeter; five artillery pieces in gun pits left of centre; the 
command centre, in its own protective berm (and labelled ‘TOC’); tent positions; and 
howitzer positions. Image source: United States Army Heritage and Education Centre, 
from: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ahec/AHM/AHT/Vietnam/Firebase.cfm accessed 
19 February 2013. 
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Fig. 4.76: Low level aerial photo of Fire Support Base Roy in Vietnam (dated 
February 1969). Image source: http://www.alphaavengers.com/PICS/fb-roy2.jpg and 
http://www.alphaavengers.com/firebases.htm accessed 19 February 2013. 
 
 
Fig. 4.77: Unattributed and undated photograph of a Moroccan fire support base 
behind one of the berms. Image source: http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-165.htm 
accessed 19 February 2013. 
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Fig. 4.78: A Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of two compounds 
behind Berm No. 1. To the north is comp 256 with a possible gun) pit within it, while 
comp 257 is to the south, and made up of two parts (both are located in rectangle 157 
of Fig. 4.6). The scale bar in the lower left indicates 30 metres. Image date 12/6/10, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.79: A fort in the rear (rft 1674), behind Berm No. 6 (located to the north of 
rectangle 853 in Fig. 4.6). This is essentially a garrison position surrounded by a 
single earth embankment. There are no obvious defensive positions along the 
perimeter bank. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 
26/1/04, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.80: A highly developed rear support fort (rft 282) on Berm No. 1, east of Smara 
(located in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). This large base has a great variety of facilities 
including a sports field. It follows the contours of the high ground on which it is 
situated, with lower ground sloping downwards to the east. The scale bar in the lower 
left indicates 100 metres. Image date 14/8/09, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.81: This rear support fort (rft 236) is around half a kilometre behind Berm No. 
1 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). It is very similar to other polygonal forts 
situated on, and integral to the territorial berms. Although this installation is 
apparently redundant, it has still been maintained, as shown by the clear bulldozer 
tracks. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 14/9/12, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.82: Google Earth image of a fort in the rear behind Berm No. 3 (rft 706). It is 
irregular in shape, though also complex, and in its southern part there are three 
possible positions for self-propelled artillery. This installation is located in rectangle 
92 of Fig. 4.6. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 8/2/06, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.83: Rear support forts are commonly found on hill top ridges in the Guelta 
Zemmour region of Western Sahara. This Google Earth image shows rft 1588, strung 
out on a ridge at around one kilometre behind Berm No. 5 (located in rectangle 359 of 
Fig. 4.6). The scale bar in the lower left indicates 40 metres. Image date 25/10/04, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.84: Unattributed and undated photograph of a Moroccan installation, 
presumably located behind one of the berms and situated on a hill top ridge. A 
defensive trench or parapet is just visible along the far edge of the closely placed 
buildings and bunkers making up the post. Image source: 
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-164.htm accessed 19 February 2013. 
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Fig. 4.85: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of garrison gar 1112 
behind Berm No. 4 (located in rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6). North is to the bottom of the 
image, and the marked out rectangle represents the approximate coverage of view in 
Fig. 4.86. Image date 4/9/07, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 4.86: Unattributed photograph of an unfortified army camp (or garrison) behind 
the Moroccan berms. Upon examination, it turns out that this is part of gar 1112 
behind Berm No. 4. The coverage of this view (south is to the top of the photo) is 
outlined in the rectangle in the lower left of Fig. 4.85. Image source: 
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-165.htm, accessed 19 February 2013. 
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Fig. 6.1: This map shows the location of the TF1 study area of the Western Sahara 
Project (WSP), north of the larger Tifariti Study Area (2011), which is the subject of 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
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Fig. 6.2: Distribution map of funerary archaeology from the WSP TF1 Study Area 
(shown in the upper left) to Tifariti. The density of blue dots in the TF1 area indicates 
that it has been intensely surveyed on the ground. Further ground based survey has 
also taken place just south of the study area, while the blue dots to the south and east 
have mainly been plotted from Google Earth. The dots within the larger Tifariti Study 
Area have been plotted from limited ground survey (in 2011) and Google Earth. The 
dark grey line represents the approximate boundary between rocky, undulating ground 
to the north, and flat, hamada desert to the south. 
 
Tifariti 
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Fig. 6.3: Photograph showing the vegetation in the Wadi Tifariti. This image was 
taken in the TF1 Study Area of the WSP.  
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Fig. 6.4: Distribution of prehistoric remains in the Tifariti Study Area. Key: red 
triangles = burial monuments; blue = wadi drainage; grey-green = land at 480 metres 
and over; brown lines = igneous rock intrusions. The distribution of monuments has 
been based on fieldwork in 2011 and plottings from Google Earth. Background 
mapping is 1/200,000 Soviet era Russian mapping (available from 
http://mapstor.com/map-sets/country-maps/western-sahara.html ). 
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Fig. 6.5: The TF1 study area - showing the disposition of late, probably Islamic period 
burials, amidst earlier prehistoric funerary monuments. Key: red crosses = kerb 
(Islamic) burials; grey circles = prehistoric funerary remains; cross hatched areas = 
rocky outcrops.  
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Fig. 6.6: View of the impressive standing stones site, WS001 in the TF1 study area 
(looking north). The insert shows some of the eight Islamic period burials disposed 
along, and within, the western side of this prehistoric monument (looking northwest). 
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Fig. 6.7: Map of caravan routes from 1700 to 1900 in the western Sahara. Though 
highly schematic, this map shows a corridor of routes passing through the greater 
Tifariti region. It is also possible that these routes reflect trails that antedate the 18th 
century by many centuries. Image source: map from Lydon 2009, p. xxvii, and 
georeferenced over Google Earth. 
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Fig. 6.8: Map showing the route taken by Lt. Col. Mouret, from Atar in the Adrar, in 
his raid on Smara in 1913. The outward journey is shown in blue with the return 
journey (though progressing all the way to Atar) shown in red. Tagliat is shown, 
representing the approximate location of the battle with a tribal force under 
Mohammed Laghdaf (along the Wadi Tagliat). As the map shows, the French troops 
would have passed within the Tifariti area on their return journey to Idjil, and then 
Atar. Source: based on Berthomé 1996, map on p. 144, but revised, taking the place 
name Tagliat into consideration. 
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Fig. 6.9: Plan of Spanish colonial Tifariti, 1964 to 1975. Key: 1 = fort; 2 = infirmary; 3 = external buildings near the fort; 4 = 
commandant’s quarters; 5 = bake house; 6 = main water cistern; 7 = subsidiary cistern; 8 = rubbish dump; 9 = well site; 10 = ‘colonia’; 
11 = Islamic cemetery. Scale at lower left indicates 150 metres, image date 21/2/06, Digital Globe.
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Fig. 6.10: Low level aerial image of colonial Tifariti, looking south. The numbers 
refer to the key in Fig. 6.8. Image source: 
http://www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/displayimage.php?pos=-270 accessed 9 
March 2013. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.11: Photograph of the fort at Tifariti taken in 2007. The view is similar to that 
in Fig. 3.11, but it clearly shows the damage sustained from the 1991 Moroccan air 
attacks. 
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Fig. 6.12: Plan of the Spanish fort at Tifariti. Key: the black and white outline 
represents Phase 1 of the fort (dashed lines represent reconstructed wall outlines); 2 
(yellow) = Phase 2; 3 (grey) = Phase 3; 4 (green) = Phase 4; 5(brown) = Phase 5; A = 
SW corner blockhouse; B = NW corner blockhouse; C = NE corner blockhouse; D = 
SE corner blockhouse; E = right angled entranceway; F = courtyard; G = location of 
menagerie; and H = location of dovecote on roof.              
 132
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.13: Composite image of the east facing elevation of the fort at Tifariti (recorded in 2011). The southern dogleg in the fort’s plan 
(see Fig. 6.12) was destroyed in the 1991 air attack, nevertheless, compare this elevation with the view of the contemporary fort at Hausa 
in Fig. 6.14.
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Fig. 6.14: This photograph of the Spanish fort at Hausa was taken in January-February 1969. It shows what the east elevation of the fort 
at Tifariti (Fig. 6.13) would have looked like soon after its construction. Image source: http://www.sahara-
mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
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Fig. 6.15: Composite image of the west facing elevation of the fort at Tifariti (recorded in 2011), showing the damage sustained in the 
Moroccan air strikes of 1991. To see what this elevation must have looked like in an undamaged state, see Fig. 6.16, an image of the 
contemporary fort at Echdeiria.
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Fig. 6.16: The fort at Echdeiria. As at Hausa, this fort was identical to the one at Tifariti, and this view shows the matching elevation to 
that shown in Fig. 6.15, before it was substantially damaged in the air attacks of 1991. The blockhouses at either end are clearly shown, 
as is the entrance to the right, where there is also a bar across it, as is similarly visible in Fig. 6.10. Image source: photograph taken in 
July 1974 by Adolfo Peña Herrero, available at: http://www.sahara-mili.net/person/albumPersonalMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
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Fig. 6.17: View of the rear, north facing wall of the fort at Tifariti taken in 2007. For a view of what this side of the fort looked like in its 
original condition, compare it with Fig. 6.18.
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Fig. 6.18: November 1974 view of the rear wall of the fort at Echdeiria, showing what the rear, northern wall of the fort at Tifariti would 
have looked like before it was damaged in 1991. Image source: photograph taken by Adolfo Peńa Herrero, available at: 
http://www.sahara-mili.net/person/albumPersonalMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
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Fig. 6.19: South facing elevation along the north side of the central courtyard of the fort at Tifariti. Composite photograph taken in 2011.  
 
 
Fig. 6.20: West facing elevation along the east side of the central courtyard of the fort at Tifariti. Composite photograph taken in 2011. 
The graffiti-like painting on both elevations was applied during one of the ARTifariti festivals held in Tifariti (2007-2010). See Chapter 
7.
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Fig. 6.21: East facing elevation along the west side of the central courtyard of the fort 
at Tifariti, photographed in 2011. This view almost matches that in Fig. 6.22. The 
graffiti-like painting on the building remains was applied during one of the ARTifariti 
festivals held in Tifariti (2007-2010). See Chapter 7. 
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Fig. 6.22: This westward looking view is similar to that in Fig. 6.21. It shows the 
interior of the fort at Tifariti while it was garrisoned by Spanish troops. It also shows 
what can best be described as a ‘managerie’ in the courtyard of the fort. There is also a 
dovecote on the roof of the fort in the upper centre of the photograph. Image source: 
http://www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/fotos/displayimage.php?pid=280&fullsize
=1 accessed 9 April 2011. 
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Fig. 6.23: View of the gateway into the 1940s fort at Tichla. Its construction is 
apparently of stone with a rough render. This is in contrast to the smooth, cast                                                                                            
concrete construction of the fort at Tifariti. Image source: photograph taken in 1971 
by Juan Piqueras, available at: http://www.sahara-
mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013. 
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Fig. 6.24: A 1970 photograph showing the central courtyard of the Spanish fort at 
Hausa, which was identical to the fort at Tifariti. A permanent awning with seating is 
visible in the background, and the soldier is standing in a courtyard with irregular 
paving slabs (‘crazy paving’). Image source: photograph taken in 1970 by Manuel 
Cordero, available at http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm 
accessed 9 March 2013. 
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Fig. 6.25: This photograph shows how the interior courtyard of the fort at Bir Enzaren 
was filled with trees, undoubtedly giving the fort a cooler environment. Image source: 
photograph taken in 1975 by Luis Ángel Martinez Pérez, available at 
http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.  
 
 
Fig. 6.26: Low level aerial view of the Spanish post and fort at Bir Enzaren. The fort, 
which matches the fort at Tifariti is to the left, while to the right is the infirmary. 
Image source: http://www.amigosdeltercertercio.com/ifni/html/images/79.jpg 
accessed 11 March 2013. 
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Fig. 6.27: View of the Spanish post at Hausa, captioned ‘View of the school, medical 
clinic and Territorial Police Headquarters in the northern town of Hausa’.4 The 
medical clinic, or infirmary, is in the centre of the image. Image source: 
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-40.htm accessed 11 March 2013. 
 
 
Fig. 6.28: View of the remains of the Spanish period infirmary in Tifariti (2011), 
looking southwest.  
 
                                                 
4 The original Spanish is: ‘Vista de la escuela, el dispensario médico y la sede de la Policía Territorial 
de la localidad norteña de Hausa’. 
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Fig. 6.29: View of the Spanish period infirmary in Tifariti (2011), looking northwest. 
The graffiti-like painting on the building was applied during one of the ARTifariti 
festivals held in Tifariti (2007-2010). See Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.30: View (looking northeast) of Spanish post commander’s 
accommodation/office at Tifariti. There is the trailer from an articulated lorry to the 
left of the building. 
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Fig. 6.31: View (looking west) of the bake house behind the fort at Tifariti. The oven 
is to the left. A doorway has been blocked, and the impressions of wall tiles can be 
seen on the internal wall, visible to the right.
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Fig. 6.32: View, to the south, showing the concrete posts that supported the gravity fed pipe that provided water to the Tifariti Fort. The 
Bake House is also visible in front of the fort. Its northwest, channelled extension (possibly a flue) is visible with ashy ground adjacent.
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Fig. 6.33: View, looking south, of the posts that carried a water pipe to the subsidiary cistern that served the Commander’s quarters. The 
area of ground reflecting sun light in the right of the photograph is a part of the Spanish garrison rubbish dump. 
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Fig. 6.34: Looking west over a part of the Spanish garrison’s rubbish dump.
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Fig. 6.35: This might be the site of the earliest well in Tifariti. It is the site of the 
water source used during the Spanish occupation of the settlement, and it has 
obviously been dug and re-dug a number of times. It has probably been a main source 
of water until quite recently, but it appears to have been out of use by 2011. 
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Fig. 6.36: Google Earth view (in monochrome for clarity) of the remains of the 
colonia at Tifariti. There are six housing blocks north of the road, and four at the east 
end, south of the road. They are all neatly aligned. The remaining area to the west, and 
south of the track, consists mainly of the remains of mud brick buildings. The scale in 
the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date, 11/7/13, CNES/Astrium. 
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Fig. 6.37: View of low cost housing in El Ayoun in the 1960s. These are examples of 
what the pre-fabricated housing in the colonia at Tifariti might have looked like. 
Image source: Norris 1964. 
 
 
Fig. 6.38: View (looking to the south) of Moroccan soldier’s graves in the Tifariti 
cemetery. 
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Fig. 6.39: A view looking southwest of local Saharawi graves in the Tifariti cemetary. 
They are surrounded by stone kerbs. Their head and footstones are large, and 
decorative quartz stones can be seen on graves in the centre of the photograph. 
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Fig. 6.40: A panorama of Mahbes, showing a large Bedouin encampment in the left half of the photograph; an identical fort to the one at 
Tifariti off centre to the right; ancillary post buildings beyond the fort; and an infirmary type building at the right hand edge of the photo, 
similar to the infirmary at Hausa. This image clearly shows the relationship between the different elements, Saharawi and Spanish, 
making up a Spanish period desert settlement. Image source: photograph taken by José Rodrigues Sosa in 1974, available at 
http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/jrdgzs/jrs001.jpg accessed 17 March 2013.
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Fig. 6.41: View of a shallow ‘skirmisher trench’ or ‘scrape’. This is a posed Polisario 
photograph with supposed woman combatants, but it illustrates the nature of quickly 
excavated, or scraped, single soldier fighting positions. Image source: SADR Military 
Museum, Rabuni, Algeria. 
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Fig. 6.42: Moroccan defences at Tifariti.View of single man foxhole, or slit trench. 
 
 
Fig. 6.43: Moroccan defences at Tifariti.View of a large, or two-man foxhole, or slit 
trench. It has an additional, rubble stone divider between the two positions. 
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Fig. 6.44: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. Possible machine gun or heavy portable gun 
position fronted with boulder parapet. 
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Fig. 6.45: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A stone parapetted, presumed, special 
purpose dug out. Perhaps a command or observation position.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.46: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A probable mortar pit, with a smaller dugout 
fighting position to the left.  
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Fig. 6.47: A recent image of a mortar pit, freshly dug by U.S. soldiers. This was 
probably taken during a training exercise, nevertheless, this pit is not that different 
from the one shown in Fig. 6.46. Image source: 
http://www.ar15.com/forums/t_1_5/1545742__ARCHIVED_THREAD____Paratroop
ers.html&page=6 and http://imageshack.us/a/img401/334/l4d0.jpg accessed 4 
February 2014. 
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Fig. 6.48: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of Moroccan defensive 
positions along the western perimeter of the Tifariti box. Their aspect is to the 
northwest, and there are clear approach trenches, presumably to observation positions 
looking over the lower ground in the upper left of the image. Behind the trenches, 
there are further defensive dug out, and built up, positions. The scale in the lower left 
indicates 50 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.49: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of dug out Moroccan 
fighting positions linked by trenches, located along the southern perimeter of the 
Tifariti box. The scale in the lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, 
DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.50: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a group of dug out fighting 
positions linked by a trench. 
 163
 
 
Fig. 6.51: View of Moroccan field housing at Tifariti. To the left and right of the metre scale, there are even stone mastabas, or benches: 
places where soldiers could sit outside and congregate.
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Fig. 6.52: Moroccan Army field shelter at Tifariti. Just visible to the right of the metre scale is a window made out of a wooden box. 
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Fig. 6.53: Moroccan Army field shelter at Tifariti, with a tin can for a window just left of the metre scale.
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Fig. 6.54: Moroccan Army field structure in the Wadi Tifariti at the TF1 study area. It 
is built mainly of mud bricks with, in this example, an internal cement render. The 
structure is surrounded by embanked earth, with an entry passage revetted with stones. 
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Fig. 6.55: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a vehicular, or ‘tank’, slot in the Tifariti redoubt. Other similar slots are behind this one, 
and further behind are soldiers’ bunker-like shelters.
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Fig. 6.56: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a vehicular slot in the Tifariti redoubt. This excavated and embanked feature is clearly 
revetted internally with boulders. Beyond it, going up the slope, are other dug out defensive structures.
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Fig. 6.57: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A Google Earth view of gun pits in a wadi 
within the Tifariti box. The pit in the centre, and the two smaller ones in the lower left, 
have nib-like extensions that represent crew or ammunition bunkers, or protective 
embankments. There are other dug out features clearly visible as well. The scale in the 
lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
 
 170
 
Fig. 6.58: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. Another Google Earth view of gun pits in a 
wadi within the Tifariti box. In these examples, which might be large mortar pits, 
there are long approach trenches with protective dugouts linked to them. The scale in 
the lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.59: Google Earth image showing the Spanish airstrip south-southwest of the old 
Tifariti Fort and colonial period buildings. The scale in the lower left indicates 300 
metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.60: Distribution of defensive features (red dots) around Tifariti. Also showing 
natural drainage and ground at 480 metres and above. In total, 7170 Moroccan 
defensive features have been plotted from Google Earth. 
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Fig. 6.61: Distribution of defensive features located over key terrain (highlighted and 
cross-hatched) around Tifariti (shown by a black circle). The map also shows the 
spread of ridges formed by igneous intrusions (light brown lines, mainly in the upper 
part of the map). 
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Fig. 6.62: This map indicates the disposition of the inner defensive box (highlighted 
with criss-crosed hatching) around Tifariti (shown by a black circle), set within the 
outer defences - the ‘outer’ defensive box.  
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Fig. 6.63: This map shows the viewshed (in red) around the inner Tifariti defensive 
box. The cross hatched areas are areas of key terrain, while the criss-cross hatched 
area indicates the inner Tifariti defensive box. The yellow triangles are the locations 
from which the viewshed has been created. The white, background areas of the map 
are dead ground – areas that cannot be seen from the inner defensive box. The area of 
central Tifariti is shown by the black circle. 
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Fig. 6.64: This map shows the viewshed (in red) from the outer, Tifariti defensive 
box. The cross hatched areas are areas of key terrain, while the criss-cross hatched 
area indicates the inner Tifariti defensive box. The blue triangles are the locations 
from which the viewshed has been created. The white, background areas of the map 
are dead ground – areas that cannot be seen from the outer defensive box. The area of 
central Tifariti is shown by the black circle. 
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Fig. 6.65: This map shows the combined inner and outer viewsheds (in pink to red) in 
and around the entirety of the Tifariti box. The cross hatched areas are areas of key 
terrain, while the criss-cross hatched area indicates the inner Tifariti defensive box. 
The white, background areas of the map are dead ground – areas that cannot be seen 
from any of the defences. The area of central Tifariti is shown by the black circle. 
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Fig. 6.66: Distribution of entrenched defences within and around the Tifariti box. Key 
terrain is shown cross-hatched. All defensive positions are represented by red dots. 
Yellow triangles represent defensive positions with approach trenches, while those 
shown as light blue dots represent groups of fighting positions linked by trenches. The 
red criss-crossed areas are minefields (MF). 
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Fig. 6.67: Distribution of built up structures in and around the Tifariti box: shown by 
yellow diamonds. Built up structures include sangars and shelters, and/or soldiers’ 
accommodation. All other defensive positions are represented by red dots. Key terrain 
is shown cross-hatched. The red criss-crossed areas are minefields. 
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Fig. 6.68: Distribution of artillery gun pits in and around the Tifariti box. Blue dots 
represent gun pits up to 4 metres in diameter. Yellow squares are gun pits larger than 
4 metres in diameter. Criss-crossed yellow squares represent gun pits with associated 
dug outs.  All other defensive positions are represented by red dots. Key terrain is 
shown cross-hatched. The red criss-crossed areas are minefields. 
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Fig. 6.69: Distribution of vehicular slots in and around the Tifariti box. Blue triangles 
represent small defensive slots that could have accommodated jeeps and/or trucks. 
Yellow squares are larger slots that could have accommodated tanks and/or self-
propelled artillery. All other defensive positions are represented by red dots. Key 
terrain is shown cross-hatched. The red criss-crossed areas are minefields. 
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Fig. 6.70: An illustrative density plot of all the defensive features making up the 
Tifariti box. The darker the colour, from grey to black, represents a greater density of 
features: there is obviously a greater density in the northern half of the box compared 
to the southern half. 
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Fig. 6.71: This map indicates avenues of approach into Tifariti, shown by the grey 
arrows. A ‘plain of mobility’ existed in the open hamada desert to the immediate 
south and southeast of Tifariti. The area of central Tifariti is shown by the black 
circle. 
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Fig. 6.72: View of a disused Polisario/SPLA shelter in the Akhchach area northeast of 
Tifariti. Note how mud bricks and mortared rubble has been used to enhance the 
original, naturally hollowed out rock of the shelter, turning it into useable 
accommodation. 
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Fig. 6.73: The location of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ extends within the black rectangle. 
The red rectangle is the extent of the detailed Google Earth view in Fig. 6.74. 
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Fig. 6.74: The approximate centre of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ (for location, see Fig. 6.73), as seen in Google Earth (shown in monochrome 
for clarity). The scale in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
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Fig. 6.75: A captured, American made, Moroccan jeep with a 105mm recoilless rifle 
mounted on the rear. Photo taken at the SADR Military Museum, Rabuni. 
 
 
Fig. 6.76: A vehicular slot on high ground in the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ with a view over 
the surrounding terrain to the north. This is a well built feature, just large enough for a 
jeep type vehicle. To the right of the metre scale are the ruins of a stone shelter: 
presumably for accommodation or ammunition storage. A further built up structure is 
in the background. 
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Fig. 6.77: View of a vehicular slot situated in a low-lying position. This is in a solely 
protective position behind the crest of a ridge. This slot probably accommodated a 
jeep type vehicle. 
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Fig. 6.78: Composite panorama of buidings in the Tifariti ‘redoubt’. Just left of the metre scale is a vehicular slot; behind it, to the right 
and left, are the remains of shelters/accommodation for Moroccan soldiers. These features are protected behind the ridge (to the 
northwest) in the rear of the image.
 190
 
 
Fig. 6.79: A large prehistoric tumulus with the remains of Moroccan soldiers’ shelters built into its flank, just behind and to the right of 
the scale bar. There is an area cleared of stones to the right as well. The ridge in the background runs southwest to northeast.
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Fig. 6.80: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of a Moroccan 
proclamation laid out in stone, proclaiming: ‘God, The Nation, The King’. This 
feature is located about one kilometre east of the Spanish fort at Tifariti, near the 
southern limit of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’. North is in the upper right corner. The scale in 
the lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.81: Google Earth image of central Tifariti today. Key: 1 = site of early well; 2 = site of recent well diggings; 3 = school; 4 = school 
and museum; 5 = infirmary (with water cistern to the north); 6 = model farm; 7 = new housing (the ‘Solidarity District’); 8 = foundations 
for SADR  government building; 9 = LMA/AOAV offices (landmine clearance); 10 = cemetery; 11 = Mayor’s office (the old Spanish 
infirmary); 12 = Spanish fort; 13 = Spanish commandant’s quarters; and 14 = site of the Spanish colonia. The UN’s MINURSO base is 
located around 2.75 kilometres to the southeast. The scale in the lower left indicates 200 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.82: Comparison of Bedouin pastoral ranges before (in blue cross hatching) and 
after the war with Morocco (in red cross hatching). Based on the testimony of 
Kalthoum Salma at Tifariti, 2011. 
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Fig. 6.83: Distribution of the imprints of tent encampments in the Tifariti Study Area 
(shown as red dots) visible on Google Earth imagery dated 21 February 2006: 
presumably representing Bedouin encampments from 1991 to early 2006. Moroccan 
laid minefields are also shown in red criss-crossed hatching. 
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Fig. 6.84: Distribution of Bedouin tent sites in the Tifariti Study Area (shown by red 
diamonds) occupied and visible on Google Earth imagery dated 21 February 2006. 
Pre-February 2006 deserted tent sites (from Fig. 6.83) are shown as grey dots. 
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Fig. 6.85: The imprints of tent sites visible on Google Earth that were set up after 21 
February 2006 but were deserted by 14 May 2008. Tent sites that were visible on 21 
February 2006 (from Fig. 6.84) are shown as grey dots.  
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Fig. 6.86: Tent sites, occupied and visible on Google Earth as of 14 May 2008. 
Deserted tent sites that were set up after 21 February 2006 but were deserted by 14 
May 2008 (from Fig. 6.85) are shown as grey dots. 
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Fig. 6.87: Examples of the traditional (top) and modern (bottom) Saharawi tents. 
Source of upper image: http://www.aliceinwonderlands.com/Africa/sahara.htm and 
http://www.aliceinwonderlands.com/Africa/saharaimages/1nomad_family_s_tent-2-
300.jpg. Bottom image by Martin Dewhurst, available at 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/gsr/428297944/in/photostream/ both accessed 12 
February 2014. 
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Fig. 6.88: Google Earth view (in monochrome for clarity), in the Tifariti area, of the 
impressions (footprints) left from modern tents after a tent site has been abandoned. 
There is an unroofed building to the immediate left of the tent impressions. The scale 
in the lower left indicates 25 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.89: Distribution of tent sites as of 14 May 2008 overlying tent sites of 21 
February 2006 - showing overall shift towards the northeast. Yellow dots = 2008 tent 
sites. Red diamonds = 2006 tent sites. Grey dots = tent sites prior to 2006, and tent 
sites set up after 2006, but not occupied in May 2008. 
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Fig. 6.90: Google Earth image of impressions of tent emplacements set up for 
Polisario National Congresses held at Tifariti. The scale in the lower left indicates 30 
metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe. 
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Fig. 6.91: View of Tifariti with tents from one of the Polisario Congresses. Image 
source: http://blogdebanderas.com/2012/01/21/coleccion-de-banderas-del-sahara-
occidental/ accessed 13 February 2014. 
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Fig. 6.92: Plot of tent locations for Polisario/SADR National Congresses held at 
Tifariti in 2003 and 2007. Also showing the old Spanish airstrip that is used for SPLA 
displays and marches.  
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Fig. 6.93: View looking north along the old Spanish airstrip. Now the parade ground 
for the Polisario/SADR National Congresses held at Tifariti every four years. 
Spectator stands are to the right. 
 
 
Fig. 6.94: Map of Western Sahara in front of the stands at the Tifariti parade ground. 
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Fig. 6.95: Stone representation of the Saharawi flag on a northeast facing hillside just 
west of central Tifariti. Image source: http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-247.htm 
accessed 13 February 2014. 
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Fig. 7.1: Distribution of sites of all visible out-of-door ARTifariti artworks, recorded 
in 2011.  
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Fig. 7.2: Distribution of artworks from ARTifariti 2007 recorded in 2011: AR21, 
AR22, and AR24. (Note: AR21 is a linear artwork shown only by the positions of its 
NW and SE ends.) 
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Fig. 7.3: Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22) by Fernando Pinteño (ARTifariti 2007), looking 
southeast. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.4: Google Earth image of Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22). North is to the lower 
left. Some dug out positions from the Moroccan military occupation are visible, as is 
the SADR flag, laid out in painted stones on the northern flank of the high ground in 
the centre of the image. Scale bar at lower left indicates 80 metres. Date of image 
14/5/08, Digital Globe. 
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Fig. 7.5: Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return, also known as Camino del Aaiún 
or The Way to El-Ayoun (AR21) created by the contributors to ARTifariti 2007 and 
2008. This view is westerly, while the linear artwork extends to the northwest. 
Photographed in 2011. Photographed in 2011. 
 
 
Fig. 7.6: View to the northwest along The Way to El-Ayoun (AR21). Photographed in 
2011. 
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Fig. 7.7: Proyecto de Eliminacón 1 or Removal Project 1 by Carlos de Gredos (March 
2007) on the Cerro Gallinaro headland, Avila, Spain. Image source: photo by Carlos 
de Gredos, available at http://cerrogallinero.com/la-coleccion/obra-efimera/proyecto-
de-eliminacion-1/ accessed 1 May 2013. 
 
 
Fig. 7.8: Proyecto de Eliminacón 2 or Removal Project 2 (AR24) by Carlos de Gredos 
(ARTifariti 2007). This artwork is situated amidst Moroccan fortified positions at the 
eastern end of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.9: Distribution of ARTifariti 2008 artworks recorded in 2011: AR2, AR3-5-6,5 
AR8, AR10, AR11, AR13, AR21, AR23and AR25. (AR21, which was created in 
2007 is also shown since it was worked on in 2008 as well.) 
 
 
                                                 
5 AR3-5-6 is a single, location only, designation for some of the artwork carried out at the old Spanish 
fort. It includes AR3 and AR3a, AR5 and AR6. AR23 is also a single locational designation, including 
AR23, and AR23a to AR23d. 
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Fig. 7.10: Caballo de Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13) by 
Rolando de la Rosa (ARTifariti 2008). The sculpture is facing eastwards. Image 
sources; main photo: Nick Brooks; insert, detail of right front leg of the piece: 
ARTifariti.  
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Fig. 7.11: The head of the sculpture, the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13). The head 
has been made from shrapnel and its mane is made up of spent gun cartridges. Image 
source: photo by Nick Brooks. 
 
 
Fig. 7.12: El Muro de la Vergüenza, or The Wall of Shame (AR10) by Federico 
Guzman (ARTifariti 2008). This piece is situated outside the LMA/AOAV offices in 
Tifariti. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.13: Victimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims (AR8) by Karim Sergoua 
(ARTifariti 2008). An artwork painted onto the ruined, east facing, sloping roof of the 
colonial period Spanish Infirmary. Photographed in 2011. 
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Fig. 7.14: Gritos bajo los escombros de Tifariti or Cries under the ruins of Tifariti 
(AR23) by Abd el Kader Belhorissat (ARTifariti 2008), painted onto the ruined roof 
of the southwest corner of the old Spanish Fort at Tifariti. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.15: El renacimiento de un pueblo or The Rebirth of a Nation (AR23a) by 
Djeddal Adlane (ARTifariti 2008). This piece has been painted onto the east facing 
wall of the western range of the old Spanish fort at Tifariti, and facing into the central 
courtyard. Image source: ARTifariti. 
 
 218
 
Fig. 7.16: Un orden estblecido or An established order (AR23b) by Barris Syphax 
(ARTifariti 2008). This piece is located just to the north of The Rebirth of a Nation, in 
the northwest courtyard corner of the old Spanish fort. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.17: Wall painting simply entitled S/T (AR23c) by Azzouz Seïf El Islem 
(ARTifariti 2008), located on the south facing external wall of the southeast corner of 
the old Spanish fort at Tifariti. Image source: ARTifariti. 
 
 
Fig. 7.18: View, looking east, of a wall painting on the south facing side of the old 
Spanish fort, entitled, No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards (AR3) by 
Bessaï Zineddine (ARTifariti 2008). Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.19: Silhouette portraits of the Algerian delegation of artists at ARTifariti 2008. 
The piece is simply entitled, El Grupo or The Group (AR3a). Images source: 
ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.20: Graffiti like paintwork on the south facing wall of the north range of the 
Spanish fort (AR23d); carried out by members of the Algerian group of artists 
attending ARTifariti in 2008. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.21: Viajando al Paraíso or Travelling Paradise (AR11) by Maria Ortega 
Estepa (ARTifariti 2008). This mural was painted onto the façade of a building 
constructed on the foundation platform of a Spanish period colonia pre-fabricated 
house. It faces southeast. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.22: La sombra del gnomon or The shadow of the gnomon (AR25) by Guillermo 
Roiz (ARTifariti 2008). Upper image: the hand is ‘the gnomon’, able to cast a shadow 
over the two stone circles. The circle in the foreground was made from quartz while 
the other circle was made from red stones. The lower, Google Earth image shows the 
two circles of this artwork clearly. North, for both images, is in the lower left. The 
scale bar in the lower left of the Google Earth image indicates 30 metres. It is a 
DigitalGlobe image, dated 18/3/13. Source of upper image: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.23: Distribution of ARTifariti 2009 artworks recorded in 2011: AR1, AR7, 
AR8, AR12, AR19, and AR20. 
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Fig. 7.24: Muro de la Vergüenza ‘F Word’ Tour 2010 or Wall of Shame ‘F Word’ 
Tour (ARTifariti 2009) by Francis Gomila. Plotted on Google Earth and posted on 
vimeo. Image source: from http://vimeo.com/9645169, accessed 16 May 2003. 
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Fig. 7.25: Fósforo: Piss for peace or PHOSPHOR: Piss for peace (ARTifariti 2009) 
by Francis Gomila and Bettina Semmer. A GPS track plotted at Tifariti and uploaded 
onto Google Maps, showing the ancient alchemy symbol for phosphorous. Image 
source: from http://piss4peace.digitalshrines.com/#home, accessed 16 May 2013. 
 
 
 
 227
 
Fig. 7.26: Ficción o realidad or Fiction or Reality (AR8a) by Kenza Mebarak 
(ARTifariti 2009). Wall painting and accompanying installation applied to the old 
Spanish period infirmary, now the office of the mayor of Tifariti. Image source: 
ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.27: Distribution of ARTifariti 2010 artworks recorded in 2011: AR3-5-6, AR4, 
AR14, AR17, AR18, and AR19. 
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Fig. 7.28: Portrait of Nayem El Garhi (AR4) by Federico Guzman (ARTifariti 2010), 
killed by Moroccan security forces at the Saharawi Gdeim Izik protest camp in 
Moroccan occupied El-Ayoun in 2010. 
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Fig. 7.29: U’m Dreiga, or Oum Dreiga (AR18) by Mohamed Moulud Yeslam (ARTifariti 2010). Referred to as a Saharawi ‘Guernica’, 
dedicated to the Saharawi civilians killed at Oum Dreiga and Tifariti during the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara. Image source: 
ARTifariti.
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Fig. 7.30: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing figures squatting outside 
traditional Bedouin tents carrying out ‘daily chores’. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.31: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing figures in agony, with the purple 
colouring above them representing a Moroccan napalm attack. Image source: 
ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.32: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing the artist next to one of the two 
large faces that are on either side of the artwork. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.33: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing a crow or raven clasping a 
Saharawi baby. Image source: ARTifariti. 
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Fig. 7.34: ‘The Massacre of Gdaeim Izik’ - with crows or ravens eating Saharawi 
children. Image source: http://mouludyeslem.blogspot.co.uk/search?updated-
min=2012-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2013-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-
results=2 accessed 18 May 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
